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THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

A HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST AND FIRST YEARS OF OCCUPATION WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNT OF THE SPANISH RULE

BY

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Late American Consul at Durango, Mexico. For two years connected with the United States Philippine Commission during the establishment of civil government in the Philippines

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

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THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

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CHAPTER XII

THE FILIPINO APPEAL TO ARMS

At the beginning of February, 1899, the tension between the Americans and Filipinos was strained to its utmost, with no active influence at work to ease it at any point. In the United States, action in official circles was completely suspended, waiting for the vote of the Senate on the treaty. In the Philippines, the American authorities had just seen the January negotiations come to naught, had redoubled their energies in scrupulous preparation for emergencies, and had at the moment adopted a somewhat more stern attitude toward the Filipinos on their outer line. The Filipinos made preparations for the war, which practically all now felt to be inevitable, no less actively, though much less systematically. At this stage there occurred an incident which might have occurred at any time during January or earlier, but which would not then have been so certainly productive of warfare — a warfare that was to end only in the destruction of Filipino governmental pretensions.

The sort of friction which most threatened serious trouble had, since August, been that which arose over the question of what were the outer lines of the Americans in their occupancy of Manila. After those lines were defined by a survey and the disagreement over the blockhouses was apparently settled, in October, it might have been supposed that this friction would come to an end, and so it would had not the two forces been facing each other in mutual hostility and distrust. Quite deliberate encroachments upon the lines were made by

the Filipinos in December, in places where the Americans had not chosen to occupy all the ground up to the blockhouses. There were repeated instances, during that month and January, of attempts by subordinate Filipino officers to display their authority by invading territory their superiors had explicitly evacuated. Sometimes, too, they tried to gain a little notoriety at Malolos by wiring that they had pushed back the "cowardly Americans," when in fact they had done nothing. Instead of giving the explicit orders which would have prevented this sort of thing, the Malolos authorities condoned these incidents, or even approved the zeal of the officers, in a way which might easily give the latter to understand that they ought constantly to be on the lookout to gain a foothold in Manila, and which might also warrant them (at least late in January) in believing that, if they brought on a conflict, Malolos would not be displeased.[1]

The Filipinos could not complain of any such encroachments

[1] The document, *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, which contains by no means a complete record, furnishes evidence bearing out the above statements; also showing how the Filipinos had continued to prepare for trouble with the Americans. On December 6, Sandiko reported to Aguinaldo the adjustment of a difference between the pickets near San Juan del Monte (where the fighting finally began), and added: "Our preparations ought to continue." On December 9, Colonel Cailles, commanding south of Malate, declared that there were 3000 Americans in front of him, and, "if they enter Pineda, I open fire." Aguinaldo replied: "Three thousand American soldiers are few against my colonel and his three hundred soldiers." On December 21, the commander at San Pedro Macatí (on the south side of the Pasig) wired that the Americans kept encroaching, and that he awaited orders with regard to entering Manila and assisting the other troops when they opened fire. This had reference to a demonstration by the Americans in force in front of Santa Ana (probably a parade, for effect as well as for drill), which led all the insurgents on the south to draw their lines in closer, Cailles stating in his report that he occupied a blockhouse which was within the American lines. As soon as he heard shots at Santa Ana, he was going to order his men to "hurl themselves on the American line of trenches and follow the living to Manila. The dead can lie with the dead." The "Director of Diplomacy" (still Dr. Tavera) reported the next day the readjustment of these lines, and also indicated that the Filipinos were inside the lines agreed upon at La Loma, on the north of the city; but Aguinaldo said General García must not withdraw. On January 4, a commander along the river telegraphed that the Americans were sending ammunition to San Juan del Monte and were putting armor on two river launches. On January 8, Sandiko wired from Manila that, "as soon as the Filipino attack begins, the Americans

on their lines by the Americans, but they claimed that American engineers and other parties had attempted surveys or reconnoissances within their territory, and professed to be greatly disturbed by American correspondents who took photographs within their lines. On February 2, General Otis complained that the Filipinos had arrested several soldiers of his engineer corps within the American lines; Aguinaldo released them two days later, claiming they had encroached on Filipino territory.[1]

should be driven within the walls and the Intramuros district be set on fire." On the 10th, Cailles reported that the Americans had asked him to withdraw fifty paces (he was still inside the lines agreed upon), but said he was going to advance instead. The American commander wrote him a letter "as a friend," he said, but "I said from the day I knew that Maquinley opposed our independence I did not want to have dealings with any American. War, war is what we want. The Americans after this speech went off pale." Aguinaldo replied: "I approve and applaud what you have done with the Americans, and zeal and valor always, also my beloved officers and soldiers there. I believe that they are playing us until the arrival of their reinforcements, but I shall send an ultimatum and remain always on the alert." A few days later, Cailles wanted to know about the ultimatum, and also what rewards were to be given the forces first entering Manila. Aguinaldo replied that the ultimatum would be sent in a few days, and said: "Those who are the heroes will have as their reward a large quantity of money, extraordinary rewards, promotions, crosses of Biak-na-bató, Marquis of Malate, Ermita, Count of Manila, etc., besides the congratulations of our idolizing country on account of their being patriotic, and more, if they capture the regiments with their generals, and, if possible, the chief of them all [Otis], who represents our future enemies in Manila, which falls to you, or, better said, to General Noriel and Colonel Cailles." This is the answer as written out in handwriting identified by Captain J. R. M. Taylor as Aguinaldo's and initialed "E. A." It is not necessary to take it too seriously, as Aguinaldo found it easy to make all sorts of promises which he thought would help to keep his military commanders in line; it shows, however, how slightly he regarded the theoretical scheme of government which Mabini and the Assembly set up at Malolos, if, indeed, he was really familiar with the constitution, which forbade titles. At about this time, Aguinaldo wired his commanders of a dream he had had in which his troops entered Manila within four hours after the attack. His agents were buying stray rifles wherever they could be found in Manila, as well as endeavoring to get shipments of them past Dewey's ships. In the latter part of January, the telegrams from the commanders around Manila show how the military party chafed against the peace negotiations, and charged the Filipino commissioners with being hoodwinked by the Americans. On January 26, Aguinaldo decreed that, in view of the possibility of war, all fields must be planted, it being the duty of the chiefs of *barrios* to see to this. He had, on the 20th, given orders that all detachments of troops more than two kilometers from a telegraph station must establish a relay of orderlies. (For these two provisions, see *Taylor's Report*, p. 44.)

[1] See *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 91–92.

It was on February 2 also that a detachment of Colonel San Miguel's troops at San Juan del Monte deliberately came inside the American lines and took possession of a little *barrio* of houses in front of the American outposts, whom, according to the Americans, they began rallying, but who did not reply by fire, being under strict orders, as there had been more or less friction at this point. General MacArthur, commander of the division north of the Pasig, sent one of his officers with a personal note of protest to San Miguel, saying: "From this date, if the line is crossed by your men with arms in their hands, they must be regarded as subject to such action as I may deem necessary." San Miguel disowned the action and recalled the Filipino troops. But two nights later, when the American outpost had received authority to fire if there was any further invasion of their territory, four Filipinos refused to heed the cry of "Halt!" as they were advancing toward the little *barrio*, and a Nebraska private fired the shot which soon after brought on an engagement all along this line.[1]

[1] It would seem, from the official reports, that the matter of trouble at this outpost had been carried up to the American headquarters, and that full authority was given to occupy and hold this position, within the acknowledged American lines, but more advanced than had hitherto been held (the higher ground beyond the Santa Mesa racetrack not having at first been occupied by the American forces, the Nebraskan troops moving out there about January 20, for sanitary reasons), challenging the Filipinos if they again crossed the line, arresting them if possible, firing on them if necessary to keep them back, and holding the little *barrio* thus taken, whether or no it involved the necessity of using force to do so. The Filipino subordinates in immediate command seem to have had warning that another defiance on their part would cause trouble. (See Otis's own statements, *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 92, 93–94; MacArthur's account, including his correspondence with San Miguel, *ibid.*, pp. 423–24; report of Stotsenburg, colonel of Nebraska regiment, *ibid.*, pp. 462–63; report of officer in charge of Nebraska outpost, *ibid.*, p. 464. The soldiers of the Nebraska patrol stated that the Filipinos were only five yards away when they ordered them to halt, and that they cocked their pieces instead of replying.) John F. Bass says the Nebraska squad had received orders to "fire, if necessary" (*Harper's Hist.*, pp. 109–10). The Spanish word for "halt," used of course in all Filipino military operations, is practically identical with the English word.

A. FIRST FIGHT BETWEEN AMERICANS AND FILIPINOS

The Americans then withdrew to their outpost station in the *barrio*, some two hundred and fifty yards back from a blockhouse which stood exactly on the dividing line of the forces. At this point there had instantly gathered a small force of Filipinos, evidently intending trouble, and a volley was soon fired by them in the dark. (The picket's shot that opened the fight was fired about 8.30 on the night of February 4.) The outbreak was apparently local so far as the Filipinos were concerned, but it soon spread along the line they had besieging the city on the north, though their firing was desultory, and the few advances they made upon the Americans' outer positions were without any apparent system.

On the contrary, the entire American camp was on the alert soon after the first shots were fired. Tactical orders had all been given, and it was only necessary to send over the wires to regimental headquarters the order, "Follow the prepared plan." The general officers were speedily on their way to the outer lines, and the perfected Hospital Corps arrangements were carried out with precision and alacrity. By ten o'clock at night the American troops were engaged for two miles from the Pasig River north and west, and were pressing the insurgents out, preparatory to a more vigorous advance in the morning.[1]

When light came, the men-of-war in the bay, which had hovered on the outskirts of the city north and south for some days with a view to the deterrent effect their presence might have upon the Filipinos, began sending their shells inland upon the Filipino

[1] General MacArthur's testimony (*Sen. Doc. 331*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 898–901) will be found interesting as bearing on the completeness of the American preparations. It also sheds further light on the Santa Mesa outpost troubles. He says the Filipino subordinate officer who had been the chief source of annoyance at the blockhouse, who had taunted and defied Colonel Stotsenburg in person, and had declared he would not obey Colonel San Miguel's orders, was one of those killed by the first shots. The official reports, cited further on, all evince the completeness of the American preparations, both of staff and field commands.

trenches in accordance with a prearranged plan. The Third Artillery and Utah light battery also opened fire from their advanced positions and moved forward with the American attack, which had been initiated promptly at daybreak, on the north side of the Pasig. The Nebraskan troops, who had the closest contact and most advanced positions, in successive rushes, following artillery fire which demoralized what organized resistance there was, soon passed beyond the outer line of the city's defenses, crossed the San Juan tributary of the Pasig, and captured the heights a half-mile beyond where the city waterworks reservoir stood. In the center and near the bay, north of Tondo, there was less consecutive contact, with many thickets intervening, and there was only desultory skirmishing until early in the afternoon,[1] when an advance was ordered. The Montana volunteers speedily occupied the old Chinese church outside of Manila, and, with equal dash and impatience, the Kansas men pushed out from Tondo toward Kalookan, being recalled at night from territory they had taken without orders, but being allowed to retake it the next day. Additional troops had to be drafted from the provost guard to reinforce this thin line. On the 6th, a force of Nebraska, Tennessee, and Colorado infantry and Utah artillery, under Stotsenburg, took the waterworks pumping station, four miles beyond the reservoir on the Marikina River, with little opposition, and in two days machinists from the volunteer forces had the plant at work.[2]

On the south side of the city, the Filipinos, on the night of the outbreak, had fired only a few sympathetic shots on the Pako outskirts. The American forces were, however, all

[1] Of Sunday, February 5, which was the real day of what might be called, for the Americans, the "third battle of Manila." The naval battle which determined American control was fought on Sunday; Manila was taken on Saturday, but most of the details of the occupation were arranged and effected on Sunday.

[2] The plant had been operated under the direction of an engineer officer since the agreement was reached with Aguinaldo the preceding August. The Filipino workmen fled at the outbreak of hostilities, first removing cylinders and valves from the engines. These parts were found buried in a coal-heap.

called out, and assumed the positions assigned to them on the outer line. They took the offensive at about eight o'clock on Sunday morning, after the Monadnock, lying off Malate, had shelled the insurgent neighborhood beyond Pako. The California, Washington, and Idaho troops, in charges which frequently carried them beyond the reach of the regimental commanders, but which worked out fairly well in accordance with the prearranged plan for enveloping the strong insurgent forces in front of the important river suburb at Santa Ana, carried a strong redoubt which the Filipinos had constructed facing a canal close up to the American lines near Pandakan, cleared the east side of the Pako district, and, without a real halt, swept the large opposing force out of Santa Ana and into such full retreat that the very impulse of the movement carried the Californians into San Pedro Macatí, the next town up the river. The enveloping movement was carried out so energetically, in fact, that hundreds of Filipinos rushed in their headlong retreat into the Pasig River, and a great many were drowned in its swift current. Two hundred prisoners in arms and twenty-five thousand rounds of ammunition were taken at Santa Ana, and a great many fugitives who had not been able to escape into the country or across the river with the fleeing hordes were directed by the Americans toward Manila, as fires had been started in Santa Ana, Pandakan, and parts of Pako.[1]

[1] Major McConville, leading his Idaho battalion upon the strong redoubt near Pandakan, was killed outright. This redoubt had been constructed under the very noses of the American troops during the previous weeks, the situation being held to be such, until the treaty should be ratified, that they could not interfere to prevent it. The Filipinos had two eight-centimeter Krupp guns here, of which they made small use; besides these, five small field rifles, of modern design but in an unserviceable condition, were captured. Santa Ana and its suburbs had been made the chief Filipino stronghold south of the Pasig, and large granaries of rice were accumulated there as well as ammunition. In all, some thirty-five thousand rounds of Mauser and Remington ammunition were captured during the day by this brigade, a blow from which the Filipino forces on the south did not speedily recover. Only seventy-five rifles were taken, however, it being noticeable here, as always later, that, when one Filipino fell, there were always from two to six unarmed men to take his place.

More serious, or at any rate more successful, resistance was met by the regular troops of the Fourteenth Infantry and unmounted Fourth Cavalry in moving southward from Pako, the same region of thickets which had bothered the attacking army on August 13 giving the well-intrenched insurgents assistance as the Americans this time sought to force their way outward instead of inward. There was also some confusion of orders, but, when it was straightened out and a battalion of the provost guard was hurried out from the city to help, the opposition here was brushed aside as it had been everywhere else, and before dark a short and quite direct line had been established south of the city from San Pedro Macatí on the river to Pasai on the bay, the latter town being peacefully occupied after the Monadnock and the army artillery in Fort San Antonio de Abad had shelled its vicinity.[1]

The American casualties on the night of the 4th and on the 5th were 234, of whom over 50 were killed or died of wounds. More than 500 of the enemy were buried in their trenches on that afternoon and the following day. How many more were shot or drowned, and how many were wounded, it was impossible to say, as later always proved to be the case in engagements or skirmishes with the Filipinos, since some of the wounded, and to a certain extent the dead, were borne away by the surrounding friendly population.[2]

[1] Some insurgents remained in the Pako church tower until late in the afternoon, picking off Americans, and seeming especially to direct their fire at ambulances and members of the Hospital Corps as they passed and repassed in range. They were shelled out, after order had been restored to the somewhat disorganized movements in this region. Colonel Ovenshine, who commanded this brigade of the division on the south, was held back for some time by a real or apparent contradiction between the orders sent to him by the division commander, General Anderson, and those brought to him personally by officers sent out from General Otis's headquarters, the latter taking an active part in directing all the details of the day's movement from the end of the wire in the old governor-general's palace.

[2] The Filipinos, so long as their organized warfare lasted, and especially in the fighting around Manila, always had from one to six extra men on hand for every rifleman there was, ready to take his place if he fell, to remove the bodies, unless they were pressed too closely, to bring food and ammunition, to pack supplies, etc. These extra men carried bolos. Frequently, also, there were women and boys as-

Perhaps 200 wounded Filipinos were brought into the American military hospitals as the firing lines advanced, and both then and subsequently the Filipino wounded were given care and treatment the same as the American soldiers.[1] The very first engagements brought out the fact that the Filipino soldiers were not well disciplined in civilized warfare; also that some of their officers needed schooling in this respect as badly as the masses. The red cross was deliberately disregarded many times, and the white flag was sometimes intentionally abused.[2] The American advance covered some looting, especially in the well-to-do suburb of Santa Ana, Chinese burden- and litter-bearers generally being the offenders in this respect; and there was a good deal of burning of houses, some unavoidable, some accidental, and some perhaps wantonly indulged in.[3]

sisting in the camp work, if it was in a well-intrenched place which they had occupied for some time. The same had been the case in Cavite in 1896–97. No official returns of Filipino casualties were ever made; their commanders systematically exaggerated American losses and minimized their own. The American reports of Filipino casualties were generally guesswork, except when, as in the early fights, they left their dead in the trenches; and American estimates of the wounded were merely proportional guesses, as a rule. General Otis, in this case, puts the number buried on the field at 700 (based on overestimates from some commanders) and the total casualties at over 3000. This figure is probably too great, but at any rate the disproportion of losses between the two armies was very marked. In later engagements, it generally ranged much higher still. The Filipinos fired high, taking no aim, as a rule, or, if they did so, using only one of their rifle-sights; many of their rifles were captured from which the rear space sight had been removed.

[1] *Otis's Rept., 1899*, p. 528, shows 85 Filipinos admitted to the American hospitals during March and 180 Filipinos being treated at the end of that month.

[2] For some of the instances of this sort, see *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 385, 396, 483. Lieutenant E. S. French (Montana volunteers), on February 23, was shot and killed after he had ordered his men to cease firing and had stood up to talk with some Filipinos who, he supposed, had signified a desire to surrender (*ibid.*, p. 500).

[3] In the suburbs, the houses, churches, etc., were used by "snipers," and it was necessary in some cases to burn the houses of lighter material as the advance was made, in order to protect the rear of the American troops. As the day advanced, too, the policy was adopted of burning houses wherein rifles or ammunition were found. Part of Santa Ana caught fire accidentally during the early engagement, and part of San Pedro seemed to have been set on fire by the Filipinos themselves. The American regimental commanders were all vigilant to prevent wanton destruction. The Chinese were subsequently watched more closely to prevent looting, which they regarded as legitimate respite from their work. For Colonel Stotsenburg's repeated orders explicitly forbidding at the very outset looting or

B. THE TREATY RATIFIED AND "ANTI-IMPERIALISM" OUTLINED

On January 4, the President had sent to the Senate the treaty signed at Paris, together with the protocols of the conferences in which it was negotiated, the testimony taken by the American commissioners, etc.[1] February 6 had been set as the day for the vote on the treaty. There had been some doubt as to whether or no the two-thirds vote necessary to ratify it would be secured by the party under whose administration it had been negotiated. Several Republican Senators were outspoken in opposition to the acquisition of sovereignty over the Philippines; but among the Democratic members there were not a few who, either because favoring this territorial expansion or being unwilling to reject the treaty and reopen the possibilities of war, were known to be ready to accept the treaty as a whole. The real question as to its ratification lay with the Democrats and those Senators who virtually were identified with the opposition party, whether as Silver Republicans or as People's Party men, who together constituted almost half the membership of the upper house. The Sunday before the day set for a vote brought the news of the outbreak of fighting around Manila, and on Monday

burning except by orders, and commanding the careful burial of Filipino dead, see *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 464–67. On February 7, General Otis issued a general order of the Eighth Army Corps, providing: "The burning of the houses or other property of the native or other inhabitants of this island is prohibited." (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 985.) On March 15, in another general order, he enjoined upon the division the necessity for protecting private property, saying: "The burning or looting of houses or buildings of any description or the abuse of unarmed citizens on the part of the troops will be punished with the utmost severity known to military law. Individual soldiers detected in committing such crimes will be promptly arrested, and in case they attempt to escape will be shot. The seizing of street vehicles by enlisted men for any purpose whatever is prohibited. (*Ibid.*, p. 985.)

[1] The following week, the injunction of secrecy was removed, and these documents were published as *Sen. Doc. 62*, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. On January 6, the Senate by resolution called for the instructions of the President to his commissioners and all correspondence between them; these documents were forwarded in the report of the Secretary of State on January 30, but the injunction of secrecy was not removed from them till January 31, 1901, when they were published as *Sen. Doc. 148*, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., already frequently cited.

morning, before the vote, came more definite news of the Sunday battle, with its indication that a war of more or less seriousness had begun — a thing much hinted at in the United States, but not really expected, so optimistic had been the prevailing tone of comment, based in large part upon official news.[1] The downright opponents of Philippine annexation were only more confirmed in their opposition. Those who were wavering between a desire not to reject the treaty *in toto* and an objection to having their country assume extensive possessions in the Far East now were inclined to feel that to reject the treaty was more or less like refusing to vote supplies when their country was at war. The Senate consented to the ratification by a vote of 57 to 27. Senators Hale and Hoar, Republicans, and Pettigrew, Silver Republican, voted with the Democratic opposition. The affirmative vote was recorded by 39 Republicans, 10 Democrats, 5 Silver Republicans, and 3 Senators of the People's Party. A change of two votes would have defeated the treaty.[2]

[1] Andrew Carnegie (*North American Review*, May, 1902) says he had an interview with President McKinley shortly before the conflict occurred and said to him that the Americans would be shooting the Filipinos in thirty days, but the President replied, in effect, that the Filipinos regarded the Americans as their "best friends," and in thirty days there would be no vestige of trouble remaining. This would indicate that the President relied upon the optimistic reports of General Otis, for it is known that he had some time before this had private information from the islands that the situation was most delicate.

[2] Six members were absent and paired, four Republicans with two Democrats. The Democrats voting for the treaty were: Clay, Faulkner, Gray, Kenney, Lindsay, McEnery, McLaurin, Morgan, Pettus, and Sullivan, all from the South (in which there was much sentiment for annexation), except Faulkner, of West Virginia; Kenney, of Delaware; and Gray, of Delaware, the last of whom had helped negotiate the treaty and had yielded his opinion in opposition to annexation of the Philippines in behalf of an assurance of peace. Senators Mason and Wellington, Republicans who were afterward quite pronounced in opposition to retaining the Philippines, also voted for the treaty. The Silver Republicans who voted "aye" were: Jones, of Nevada; Kyle, of South Dakota (also called an Independent); Mantle, of Montana; Stewart, of Nevada; and Teller, of Colorado. The People's Party members voting "aye" were: Allen, of Nebraska; Butler, of North Carolina; and Harris, of Kansas. For the vote on the treaty and the subsequent resolutions regarding the Philippines in the Senate, see, besides the *Congressional Record* for the third session of the Fifty-fifth Congress, the summary of all these votes in *Sen. Doc. 182*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.

Before it came to a vote, Senator Vest, of Missouri, had moved a number of amendments changing Article III and subsequent articles so as to harmonize with his proposition to treat the Philippines as Cuba had been treated, requiring Spain merely to "relinquish," not to "cede," her sovereignty over the Philippines, and making a part of the treaty itself the declaration that the United States assumes control "for the time being" and "as far as such control may be needful" for the purpose of enabling the people of the archipelago to establish a government "suitable to their condition," and of assuring the rights of life and property and the maintenance of order. These amendments, voted on as a whole, were lost, 30 to 53.[1] After the treaty had been ratified, Mr. McEnery, of Louisiana, one of the Southern Senators who were supporting the treaty, not merely in spite of its provision for the annexation of the Philippines, but in part because of this opportunity to secure an Oriental outpost for trade, introduced a joint resolution declaring that, by the ratification of the treaty with Spain, it was not intended "to incorporate the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands into citizenship of the United States, nor to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States," but to establish there "a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants," to "prepare them for local self-government, and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands." This was virtually a declaration for annexation "outside of the Constitution" (as it afterward came to be called), and of an intention never

[1] Messrs. Hale, Hoar, Jones (of Nevada), and Pettigrew voted with the Democrats; Messrs. Butler, Gray, Harris, Kyle, Lindsay, McEnery, Mantle, Morgan, Pettus, Stewart, Sullivan, and Teller with the Republicans. There was also a proposition before the Spanish Cortes to amend the treaty as regards the cession of the Philippines, aimed, however, at preserving the sovereignty of Spain. It was defeated, on February 28, by a vote of only 120 to 118. On March 3, the ministry was reorganized under Señor Silvela, and on March 20, the Cortes gave its consent to ratification.

to admit the Philippine Islands to statehood in the Union. Senator Hoar proposed two amendments to this joint resolution: One required the consent of the people of the Philippines to the kind of government to be established in their islands, and was laid on the table, 45 to 34 votes;[1] the other, declaring it not to be the intention of the United States "to force a government" on the Filipinos "against their will," was laid on the table, 46 to 30 votes.[2] Senator Bacon, of Georgia, thereupon proposed to add to the McEnery resolution a clause formally disclaiming "any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control" over the Philippines, but instead, when a "stable and independent government" had been established, to turn over to it the rights ceded by Spain. In effect, this proposition looked to the same end as the amendments of Senator Vest, without being open to the objection that it perhaps would throw the whole treaty open for re-negotiation. When it came up for final action on February 14 (the McEnery resolution having, of course, been postponed along with it), only 58 Senators voted on it; the result was a tie, 29 to 29, and Vice-President Hobart cast the deciding vote against it.[3] The McEnery resolution was then passed in unamended form by the meager vote of 26 to 22, barely a majority of the Senate.[4]

[1] Messrs. Gray, Kenney, Lindsay, McEnery, Mantle, Morgan, Pettus, Stewart, and Teller voted with the Republicans to lay it on the table; Messrs. Hale, Hoar, Jones (of Nevada), Mason, Perkins, Pettigrew, and Wellington voted with the Democrats.

[2] In addition to the Democrats and Silver men voting with the Republicans on the preceding motion, Messrs. Allen and Butler this time voted to table.

[3] The Democrats, McEnery, Mantle, and Morgan, and the Silver men, Kyle, Stewart, and Teller, voted with the Republicans against the Bacon amendment. The Republicans, Hale, Hoar, Perkins, and Quay, and the Silver Republicans, Harris, Jones (of Nevada), and Pettigrew, voted for it, as did also Senators Gray, McLaurin, and Pettus.

[4] On this vote, Messrs. Faulkner, Gray, Harris, Kyle, McEnery, McLaurin, Mantle, Pettus, Sullivan, and Teller, Democrats or Silver men, were in the affirmative; Messrs. Hoar, McBride, Pettigrew, Platt (of Connecticut), Ross, Simon, and Stewart were on the negative side. Indeed, party lines were broken on the vote against assimilation of the Filipinos into the body politic of the United States, as varying views were held regarding the significance, as well as regarding the expediency, of such action at the time.

This joint resolution never reached a vote in the House of Representatives. However, at a caucus, attended by 93 Democratic members of the House, a resolution was adopted declaring against a "colonial policy" and instructing the minority membership of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House to urge a vote on the so-called "Bacon resolution," as given above.[1] Nevertheless, the bill appropriating the $20,000,000 to be paid to Spain in carrying out the treaty had passed the House on February 20 by a vote of 219 to 30, there being 62 Democratic and 2 People's Party, along with 155 Republican, "yeas."[2] Similarly, but a small number of Democrats in the House, opposed on the ground of principle to anything that would seem to sanction a "policy of conquest and imperialism," carried this opposition to the point of voting against the bill temporarily reorganizing the army, the

[1] See *Public Opinion*, March 9, 1899. The caucus was not entirely unanimous, however. As already indicated, commercial expansion in the Orient had a great many Democratic friends, especially in the South and in the West. Mr. William J. Bryan, the Democratic candidate for the presidency in 1896, and at the time the most probable candidate for the nomination in 1900, had hastened to Washington and urged upon Democratic and Silver members of the Senate that they should ratify the treaty. One of these men, ex-Senator Pettigrew, said in an interview in the New York *Evening Post*, February 4, 1904: "The chief argument Mr. Bryan used was that, if the Administration did not give the people of the Philippines their independence, and that at once, but, on the contrary, undertook to conquer their country and annex it to the United States after they had been our ally in the war with Spain, such a course would and ought to drive the Republican party from power. . . . I did not glean from anything he said that he thought the Republicans would take any such course [as granting independence to the Filipinos]." In his speech of August 8, 1900, accepting the Democratic nomination for President, Mr. Bryan said: "I thought it safer to trust the American people to give independence to the Filipinos than to trust the accomplishment of that purpose to diplomacy with an unfriendly nation. . . . I believe that we are now in a better position to wage a successful contest against imperialism than we would have been had the treaty been rejected. . . . If the treaty had been rejected, the opponents of imperialism would have been held responsible for any international complications that might have arisen before the ratification of another treaty." On February 12, 1899, the newspapers of the United States published a manifesto of Mr. Bryan, outlining "Anti-Imperialism" as the coming political issue. Quite promptly thereafter, a number of the leading Democratic newspapers of the West and the South changed their attitude, gradually veering around to be "anti-expansionistic."

[2] See *Cong. Record*, vol. 32, part 2, p. 2119; also *ibid.*, vol. 35, part 8, p. 7454.

most urgent call for it being the necessity of replacing the state volunteers in the Philippines; and this bill passed the Senate on February 27 by a vote of 55 to 13, Messrs. Hoar and Pettigrew joining a few Democrats in opposition.[1]

The occurrence of the outbreak in Manila on the eve of a doubtful vote upon the treaty in the Senate has given rise to various charges entirely unsupported by any known evidence. The plain record of facts as related above has indicated that

[1] This act, approved on March 2, 1899, is recited in *General Orders No. 36, Headquarters of the Army, 1899.* It did not deal with the details necessary for that effectual reorganization of the army which was on all hands conceded to be necessary at the close of the war with Spain, the opposition to the plans of the Administration which was mustered in the Senate being strong enough to compel the adoption, at the very end of the short session, of a makeshift, calculated primarily to supply needs in the Philippines. It provided that the President could maintain the regular army, according to the skeleton outline of the act, at 65,000 men, and could enlist 35,000 volunteers, divided between 27 regiments of infantry and 3 of cavalry; but this increase of force, both volunteer and regular, should be maintained "only during the necessity therefor, and not later than July 1, 1901." The state volunteers enlisted for the war with Spain must, by the terms of their enlistment, be mustered out, at the very latest, by the date of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty (which proved to be April 11, 1899). The act provided, however, that the President could enlist temporarily volunteer troops already in the Philippines for a period not extending beyond the time necessary to replace them with new troops, and not more than six months at the most. The War Department had heard from General Otis on February 12: "If regular troops en route were here, could probably end war or all determined active opposition in twenty days"; and aimed, after the passage of this act, not to use the authority it gave to enlist the state volunteers for six months, but instead to have them returned as rapidly as transports then on the way should arrive with regular regiments. But to instructions of March 3, to send back the state troops on these returning ships, Otis replied that he could not yet dispense with them, and he repeated this information on March 21, though he "hoped to do so soon." When asked, on February 19, what reinforcements he needed, he had merely repeated his estimates of November 27 preceding: "To hold islands, 25,000; if must conquer them, at least 30,000," adding only that "Spanish abandonment of southern islands had rendered conditions there difficult," and he wanted to occupy Aparri, Dagupan, and Legaspi in Luzon, and Iloilo, Sebú, Samboanga, and Joló, in the south, as soon as possible. He felt sure that "when the United States is able to furnish full protection, men of property and education will give adherence; now fear the assassin." (See *Corr. Rel. War.*) It was his information of November 27 which led the War Department, in response to a query of the House of Representatives as to the number of troops required in the reorganized army, to put the Philippines down for 25,000, out of a force of 100,000 (of whom 17,000 should be held as reserves for the relief of those serving in tropical countries). (*H. R. Doc. 85*, 55th Cong., 3d Sess.

the strained condition of affairs between the American and Filipino forces, having reached a climax, virtually brought on trouble of itself; that a subordinate Filipino officer, unchecked by the discipline of his superiors, was the chief *deus ex machina* of the affray of February 4; and that the American authorities in Manila, having taken a more positive stand at the close of that week regarding encroachments upon their line, let loose the dogs of war they had been holding ready, and promptly followed up the provocation given. To go beyond this statement, in accusing either party, is to go beyond the facts as known. Based upon a misunderstanding as to the time when the outpost firing of February 4 began and the hour when the message announcing the outbreak of war was started from Manila to Washington, the charge has been made in the United States Senate that the message was sent before the firing began, with the plain implication that the latter was prearranged and the message announcing it prepared beforehand and sent prematurely. The facts are that no official messages were sent from Manila regarding the fighting until the evening of Sunday, February 5; that the first official message was then sent by Admiral Dewey; that newspaper "extras" in New York had announced the Saturday night outbreak shortly after midnight, and further and more detailed accounts of the fighting were published by some newspapers on Sunday; and that, impatient at not receiving news from General Otis, the War Department had sent him a query on Sunday afternoon, asking for particulars.[1]

[1] The charge of a prearranged conflict being brought on by the American army was most explicitly made in a speech in the Senate by Mr. Rawlins, on April 23, 1902. He said, among other things: "In order to get time for the message to arrive here, it was necessary to have the hostilities begin at half-past 8, whereas, according to the testimony of General MacArthur, they did not actually begin until half-past 10. . . . There was the overwhelming political necessity. There was the war that Congress did not declare." (*Cong. Record*, vol. 35, part 5, p. 4573.) Speaking in the same vein on May 26, 1902, Senator Patterson said: "The treaty had to be ratified, and there was no way to bring that about except by precipitating the battle of February 4 or 5, and it was precipitated. It was but another case of American duplicity. This time it was practiced upon the American Senate and the

On the other hand, the charge that the Filipinos, by the advice of their representatives in Washington, precipitated the conflict of February 4, thinking it would have the opposite effect upon the vote regarding the treaty, is not substantiated by any positive evidence. The Filipino representatives in Europe or America may perhaps have advised an attack; it is certain that they kept the Malolos Government informed about the American reinforcements on the way.[1] But the flight from Washington of the Filipino representative, Agoncillo, during

American people, and not alone upon the Filipinos, as had so often been the case before." (*Ibid.*, p. 5915; see also pp. 5912–13 and 5959–60, as to first accounts of the battle in the United States.) General MacArthur's own official report and a dozen subordinate officers' reports, published three years before, had shown that the outpost trouble occurred at 8.30, and that it was two hours later when the firing became general along the outer line on the north and the troops were ordered to the firing line in earnest; General MacArthur's testimony in 1902 (*Sen. Doc. 331*) had reference to the time of this order from headquarters, as being 10.30. In reaching his conclusions Senator Rawlins evidently reckoned Manila as being a half-day later in time than Washington, whereas it is thirteen hours earlier. Hence the message put on the wire by Admiral Dewey at 6.02 P.M. on February 5 was received in Washington at 8.05 A.M. on February 5. The correspondent of a New York paper had, however, sent a brief message on the outbreak which reached New York before midnight on February 4; "extras" were on the streets soon after, and the news was wired to Washington about midnight. The War Department authorities continued to make the statement that they had no official advice of the outbreak until they received their first message from Otis at 10.52 P.M. on February 5 (filed at Manila at 8.32 A.M. on February 6), and the newspapers of the country generally contained no word of the outbreak until Monday morning. A message to the Signal Corps from its chief in Manila had preceded Otis's first message. After the first, a half-dozen others from him came along in close succession. For these messages, see *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 893–96. For the investigation at Manila into the records of the cable office, with regard to Senator Rawlins's charges, see *ibid.*, p. 1339; also the answers of Secretary Root and General Otis, as quoted by Senator Spooner, in *Cong. Record*, vol. 35, part 6, pp. 6107–08.

[1] The American secret-service agents in Manila were informed during January, from various Filipino sources, that members of the "junta" abroad had advised an attack; this may have referred to information about the reinforcements. Felipe Buencamino says (*Hearings Comm. Ins. Aff.*, pp. 231, 286) that Agoncillo had cabled in October, 1898, that President McKinley would not receive him or recognize their government, and they ought to make preparations for war. General Otis, after cabling at first that the insurgents attacked "contrary to the wishes of their government," cabled on February 10: "Reported that insurgent representative at Washington telegraphed Aguinaldo to drive out Americans before arrival reinforcements. The dispatch received Hongkong and mailed Malolos, which decided on attack to be made about the 7th instant. Eagerness of insurgent troops to engage precipitated battle."

the night of February 4, does not necessarily imply a knowledge on his part of the time when the outbreak was to begin, or that he had received warning from Malolos; he may have heard the news of the fighting that came to a New York newspaper that night.[1] And whatever may have been the intentions of the Filipino chiefs as to making an attack before or after the ratification, or before the arrival of the American regular troops on the way, it is certain that they were not ready to attack on the night of February 4. The officers in command at Santa Ana and San Juan del Monte were attending a ball, and other officers in command of districts around Manila were either at Malolos or had gone to spend Sunday with their families.[2] While, therefore, it has been shown that the Malolos

[1] This "scoop" has been mentioned above. For a discussion between Senators Foraker and Patterson regarding this episode of Agoncillo's hurried flight to Canada, which received much attention in the American press at the time, see *Cong. Record*, vol. 35, part 6, pp. 5914, 5958, 5960. Agoncillo went alone, Sixto Lopez and Juan Luna, who occupied merely "secretarial" positions, staying with their companion Losada, who had rheumatism. Lopez told the Washington reporters that Agoncillo had only gone to Baltimore, but the latter did not stop until he was across the Canadian border, whence he was occasionally thereafter heard from. In a statement in 1902 about this incident (*ibid.*, pp. 6217–18), Sixto Lopez cited the letters which Agoncillo had addressed to the State Department on January 6, 11, and 24, repeating his requests to be accorded an interview with the President as the "envoy of the Philippine Republic." The last letter was also virtually a protest against the sending of more American troops to Manila. The New York *Tribune*, February 6, 1899, contains an interview with one of the Filipinos at Washington, who said that they had had a cable from Aguinaldo only the night before and that he had said the Filipinos would not move until action had been taken on the treaty; in a second statement (*ibid.*, February 7), the Filipinos declared that Aguinaldo had given special orders to his commanders to prevent hostilities "unless the Americans violated their agreement by forcing the Filipino lines." The evident desire to cover up by this statement the admission that they had heard from Aguinaldo at the very moment of the outbreak, and just before Agoncillo left, is one thing that gives color to the charge that they were warned from Malolos. The London *Times*, February 8, 1899, contained a statement as to the battle of Sunday which showed the ignorance of the so-called Filipino "envoy to England" as to the location of the waterworks and of other suburban points mentioned in the cabled accounts of the fighting; this Filipino, then known as "President of the Filipino Junta in Europe," Antonio Regidor by name, was a Filipino *déporté* of 1872, and hence left Manila before the waterworks were constructed.

[2] See Aguinaldo's *Reseña verídica*, wherein he exaggerates the commanderless condition of their army on that night; also Buencamino's testimony (*Hearings Comm. Ins. Aff.*, p. 232). General Otis, in sending his first cablegram on the fight,

party and their military commanders were practically ready to break the peace,[1] the evidence at hand goes to show that they were caught off their guard by the fight of February 4. Nevertheless, Aguinaldo seems to have had a draft of a proclamation of war all ready, and at the first tick of the telegraph reporting the trouble in front of Manila, it was reeled off the old press at Malolos.[2] When the expected warfare had once begun, each party stood on its dignity and declined at first to make propositions for peace or an armistice.[3]

said he understood the insurgents "attacked contrary to wishes of their government."

[1] Further evidence to this effect than that already cited herein is afforded in the letter written by Aguinaldo on January 7, 1899 (at a time when thousands of people were moving out of Manila), to Benito Legarda, who had severed his connection with the Malolos Government, but who still transacted personal business for Aguinaldo at times (with the full knowledge of the American authorities), saying: "I beg you to leave Manila with your family and come to Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you — I merely wish to warn you for your satisfaction, though it is not yet the day or the week." (*Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 4, p. 2.)

[2] For translations of this document and the supplementary exhortation to the Filipinos on February 5, see *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 95–96; also *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, pp. 104–06. For facsimile of the original of the February 4 proclamation, see *Harper's Hist.*, p. 123. Any one suspicious of American official reports as to the hour of the outbreak might at least have accepted this declaration of Aguinaldo: "Nine o'clock, P.M., this date, I received from Kalookan a message . . . that the American forces . . . attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte. . . ." Aguinaldo charged the Americans with beginning an attack without provocation. Yet he speaks of the Americans attacking the Filipino forces "garrisoning the blockhouses," when it was well understood that the blockhouses were not to be occupied, being on the division line.

[3] Judge Torres, much distressed by the sudden outbreak, came to General Otis on the afternoon of Sunday, February 5, asking if an armistice could not be arranged and a "neutral zone" proclaimed between the two forces, while an attempt was made to come to an understanding. Otis cabled to Washington on February 8: "His [Aguinaldo's] influence throughout this section destroyed. Now applies for cessation of hostilities and conference. Have declined to answer." When the Senate made special inquiry upon this point in 1900, Otis corrected his 1899 dispatch and explained further this episode (*Sen. Doc. 337*, 56th Cong. 1st Sess.); and he gave further testimony on the subject in 1902 (*Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 787–88; also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 6–7). Judge Torres's associate on the Filipino peace commission, Colonel Argüelles, who was in Manila at the time of the outbreak, was also anxious to do anything possible in the interest of peace, and General Otis had him passed through the American lines with the informal message to Aguinaldo that, as the hostilities had been inaugurated by the Filipinos, propositions for peace should come from them, and that they be of a specific sort. Argüelles reported that Mabini and

C. THE FILIPINOS REORGANIZE AND TALK OF "MASSACRE"

When the trouble began, there were in the Philippines nearly 21,000 American soldiers, officers and men. Of these, however, 2400 were in Iloilo Harbor and others were in the garrison at Cavite, while the number of those sick or drafted for civil duties in connection with the military government further reduced the force in Manila available for effective military service to about 14,000 men. Of these, some 3000 were necessary for the police duties of the provost guard and to be readily available in various parts of Manila to check the expected efforts to revolt and burn the city. With about 10,000 men for active operation on the outer line, where they were opposed by perhaps 15,000 rifles in all, and plenty of extra men to carry them as their bearers fell,[1] it is apparent that movements on this line could not be unduly expanded. When things had settled down after the 5th and 6th of February, the American line on the north of the city was about ten miles long, running from Manila Bay at a point west of Tondo through the Chinese church to the river Pasig at a point south of the waterworks reservoir, not counting the waterworks pumping station, four miles out, which required a strong separate detachment to hold it. On the south of the city, Anderson's division had a straight line to protect, less than four miles long, from the bay near Pasai to the river at San Pedro Macatí. But the zealous California troops, on the 8th, pressed on up the river, taking Pateros and Guadalupe on its south bank; and, as the insurgents had quitted the important town of Pasig on the north bank, its president surrendered it to Colonel Smith on the 9th. The little river

Aguinaldo said they "had no objection to a suspension of hostilities," but their attitude was such that he feared to advocate a proposition of peace, lest he be accused of cowardice.

[1] There were never any means of getting accurate figures as to the Filipino forces, as their own commanders did not possess them. General Otis's estimate that their army around Manila, when the trouble began, comprised from 20,000 to 30,000 men, is reasonably correct, for practical purposes, though it is safe to say they had not over 15,000 rifles in that neighborhood.

steamboat, which had been ironclad before the outbreak, could coöperate with the troops, and jointly they could command both banks of the river to the Laguna de Bay. But they could not effectively patrol it, as appeared after the issuance of a general order on the 8th, reopening traffic to the city and encouraging the bringing of native products from the lake region down the river, thus inviting ambushes by the Filipinos of the craft so engaged. The Filipino forces, which had been scattered toward the hills by the vigor of the first American advance, began gathering again, and commenced a series of night attacks, which were only firing-bouts, but which kept the small American detachments nervous and exhausted. On the 18th, Colonel Smith's troops were recalled to San Pedro Macatí, the intention being to hold a short line merely defending the city on the south, and to confine offensive operations for the time being to the north. Renewed activity in this direction, on the part of the Filipinos, who were beginning to show some reorganization after the confusion of the first days following the battle, led to the authorization of MacArthur's troops to reform and straighten their line toward the bay and to extend it through the swampy region toward Kalookan. The latter town, three miles out of Manila on the railroad, was taken on February 10, after the navy had shelled it and the Filipino positions for half an hour in the afternoon, the succeeding army movements being executed as tactically planned in a little over an hour. Here the forces rested for the remainder of the month, awaiting the arrival of the reinforcements on the way, engaged in more or less constant skirmishing, especially on the Marikina River near the pumping station. The only other forward movement was the taking of San Roque on the Cavite peninsula on the 8th, at Dewey's request, the Iowa troops, which had been brought back from Iloilo, executing the movement and endeavoring to save the burning town when they entered, the Filipinos having set fire to it.[1]

[1] Many of the workmen at the Cavite navy-yard lived in San Roque, and were

The confusion and disorganization of the Filipinos after the first onslaught upon them had been manifest. Just as American optimism had continued to the last to indulge the hope that somehow the Filipinos would not be "so foolish" as to enter upon an actual conflict with the United States, so now the seriousness of the blow that had been dealt to them was overestimated and the significance of their disorganization was not entirely comprehended.[1] Aside from the fully aroused determination to resist, carefully nurtured by the leaders of that sentiment for months back, there were certain more material explanations of the reorganization and renewed activity which had just compelled the Americans to rectify their line on the north, extending it to Kalookan, and to abandon the premature attempt to control the river to the lake. Chief among these was the assumption of command in the field by Antonio Luna, the most warlike of the Filipinos and by some thought to be the man with greatest capacity for war among them. Though still nominally Director of War, he had seen his plans continually subjected to revision or rejection by the Secretary of War, Baldomero Aguinaldo, which meant by Emilio Aguinaldo, who was unwilling to give him direct superior command in the field; and Luna had found vent for his feelings and his activities principally in a virulent newspaper campaign against the Americans. Aguinaldo, who had held under his own direct control the commanders of the "zones" about Manila, and whose incompleteness of preparations — in fact, utter lack of comprehensive plans — had now been revealed by the American advance, was at last induced, a few

being drafted into the insurgent army. For the official reports of all the military operations of February, see *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 92–103, 365–528. Correspondent Bass's accounts of the fighting of February 4–6 will be found in *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 109–18; of the taking of the waterworks and of Kalookan, *ibid.*, pp. 128–29.

[1] Otis's cablegram on the 7th, that "Aguinaldo's influence in this section is destroyed," has been quoted. On the 11th, he cabled: "Belief of old residents that Aguinaldo will be unable to gather in future any considerable force." And on the 12th: "If regular troops en route were here, could probably end war or all determined active opposition in twenty days." (*Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 901–02.)

days after the outbreak, to give Luna the direct charge of the forces surrounding Manila. The latter's accession to command had at once been felt by the Americans, and he utilized their enforced non-aggressiveness after February 10 not merely to make a display of his activity in meaningless skirmishes, but also to burrow with trenches the country for some miles northward along the railroad.[1] His efforts were also at once directed toward a more formal organization of the different "brigades" under him, as well as to the introduction of something like discipline among officers and men. On somewhat different lines, also, Aguinaldo was endeavoring by governmental measures to realign his organization and prepare it for a prolonged struggle. Abler men by far than either Luna or Aguinaldo, even if working together and possessing much more competent and better-trained assistants than they could command, must have made a failure of the undertaking they had on hand; but, in addition, they differed widely in ideas and aims (probably, too, in character), and, above all, their personal jealousies and

[1] Chapter x, of the yet unpublished work of Apolinario Mabini, *La Revolución filipina* (this detached chapter appearing in *El Comercio*, Manila, July 23, 1903), contains this description of the Filipino military situation at the time: "Little accustomed to war, the Filipino officers scarcely comprehended the value of military instruction and discipline; for this reason, the duties of the detachments were kept up in a manner far from regular or strict. The Filipino General Staff had not worked out and established a plan for movements in advance or retreat in case of the rupture of hostilities; and Señor Aguinaldo, who very little appreciated the advantages of unity in command and in movements, had not made the necessary preparations for the quick reëstablishment of communications between the separate factions of the army whenever a sudden retreat might give rise to the interruption of the telegraph line. Señor Aguinaldo wished to retain the immediate command of the forces surrounding Manila, directing them from his residence in Malolos, although he could not devote himself entirely to the proper fulfillment of the obligations of this charge, on account of his duties as chief of the government and his caprice for dispatching by himself many matters that ought to have been handled in the departments of the central administration. Only after the outbreak of hostilities, when telegraphic communication was already interrupted, did he name General Luna chief of the forces operating around Manila; but then the separate fractions of the army had already deserted their old positions, and communication between them was difficult and slow. Moreover, because the Secretary of War had disapproved one of his measures, Luna soon afterward resigned his post, but returned to the command of defensive operations north of Manila when the Filipino Government was obliged to withdraw from Malolos to San Isidro."

ambitions forbade unity between them either in success or in defeat.[1]

It had been the dream of certain of the revolutionary leaders

[1] It is difficult to make any fair comparison between Aguinaldo and Luna as military leaders of the Filipinos (and in any event, a low estimate must be put on the military abilities of both). Luna's ideas were for the organization of an army according to European methods (as he conceived them, from reading various military treatises), which should fight pitched battles and maintain encampments and the routine of regular troops. Aguinaldo, more nearly of the people, and with no small amount of sobering experience in set fights against the Spanish troops in Cavite in 1896–97, was more disposed to resort to a guerrilla organization and to guerrilla warfare, distributing his "leaders" loyal to him here and there, and letting them operate more or less independently within their "zones." Luna had a better understanding of military discipline and a higher military standard; Aguinaldo's talents, such as they were, lay mainly in the line of improvisation and tenacity, but he understood the characteristics and capabilities of the Filipino masses, and the sort of semi-organization suited to them, better than did Luna. On February 11, he sent Trias, still nominally "Secretary of the Treasury," back to Cavite, to take independent control there, as he had in 1897. On the 7th, he had issued a general order, beginning with an appeal to all the "old revolutionary commanders" to come into the field (the troops were cast down by the first American victory, he said, but those bands which were completely demoralized were to be disarmed), and enjoining upon all the chiefs of "zones" the organization of guerrilla bands, whose leaders would be given commissions in the "territorial militia." An order of the Secretary of the Interior, on February 17, shows that the "territorial militia" was meant to comprise the forces organized under the local *presidentes* in each town, primarily for defense, but also to act, under the military chief of that "zone," in conjunction with the regular forces, "providing means of communication, unceasingly attacking, and making ambushes against the enemy." Men not needed for the military preparations should be "kept at work in the fields," but when the enemy approached, all men who could bear arms were to be so used. Aguinaldo himself had, on February 13, issued a decree to the municipal councils, ordering them to organize themselves as "juntas of defense" to establish also "juntas of aid" to provide quarters and food for the soldiers, collect funds for their relief, etc. The women who had organized Red Cross societies (in some of the more important provincial towns) should be called on for help. One of the first duties of the local *presidentes* was to see that there was no shortage of crops, but in their capacity as local militia officers, they were to have the "assimilated rank of commanders of guerrillas." Friction in this respect constantly occurred, and in further orders of Aguinaldo the local *presidentes* were made subordinate to the military commanders, though it was provided, "not in civil affairs," a provision which the military commanders, having the power, frequently made a dead letter. It had to be repeated, on March 1, with threats of punishment, to recalcitrant *presidentes* who did not coöperate with the military commanders. On February 21, a decree regarding enlistment of recruits for the army virtually gave the municipal officials power to draft whom they chose; prior to that, the old Spanish regulations had supposedly been in force. For these decrees, orders, etc., see *Taylor's Rept.*, pp. 44–47.

to produce a revolt inside the city, which should occur simultaneously with the movement against the Americans on the outside. It was a reversion to the Katipunan plans of 1896, and there was about it the same unreasoning element of race hatred which made its harebrained projectors see success for their plans by merely growing enthusiastic about them. They spent more time exchanging felicitous messages about the time when they should rout the Americans in all the outskirts of Manila, pen them in the walled city, and do as they pleased to them, than they did in really perfecting the working details of their plan, which was, however, quite serious enough, merely in its conception, to keep the provost-marshal and his forces on the alert. As already seen, the work of forming "militia" in the various districts of Manila, under the guise of "popular clubs," had begun the preceding October, under the leadership of a young Filipino race enthusiast, somewhat educated, at the time a confidant of Aguinaldo, Teodoro Sandiko, by name, who, being able to speak English a little, had sought employment under the provost-marshal in Manila in order to further his plans. All Filipinos knew in a general way what was going on, but it was a long time before the Americans paid serious attention to the matter. When the unrest of January in Manila led to the searching of houses, and to the discovery here and there of arms, etc., the conspirator's plans were considerably upset. However, Sandiko continued to hold his mysterious conferences with Aguinaldo, the secrets of which, if such there were, were not divulged even to the members of the latter's cabinet. He and some of his "district chiefs" were as lavish in promises of overturning American authority in Manila as were some of the bombastic commanders of troops on the outskirts, and his plans were about as coherent. When the outbreak of the night of February 4 occurred, comparatively few arms had been smuggled inside the city, and most of those had been seized by the Americans. The poor ignorant bearers of bolos were ready to comply with their or-

ders, but were almost leaderless, as the firing on the outskirts, which was to be the signal, had come ahead of time. Hence, beyond a few attempts to slash American officers in their carriages and to set fires in different districts, the night of the 4th passed without there being realized any of the terrible things the city guerrillas were to do. The effective organization of General Hughes contributed to this end, as it also promptly squelched the renewal of these efforts in different parts of the city on the 5th. The alertness of this organization could not be relaxed, however, and, on the 18th, an attempt was made to burn the Pako district, beginning with the barracks of the Washington troops. It was not until the night of the 22d that hostilities inside the city assumed a really serious aspect; and then, although they resulted in rendering homeless some thousands of natives in the Tondo and Binondo districts, through fires repeatedly set by their fellow-countrymen from outside or by themselves, they were so conspicuously a failure that no really comprehensive plot of an uprising inside the city was thereafter attempted.[1] The performances of the city "militia" on this occasion were mainly confined to setting fire to buildings, attempting to cut the hose of the fire companies, and shooting at the American soldiers from houses. The fighting, which occurred mostly during the day of the 23d, on the outskirts of Tondo, was with the five hundred or so armed Filipinos whom Luna had managed to get into the city around MacArthur's left, either across the swampy ground or by canoes in the bay. They barricaded themselves against MacArthur's men on the north, but could only flee when the provost guard moved out on them from behind. It was an exhibition of bravery on the part of the native soldiers, this placing themselves between two fires, but was altogether a foolhardy and useless movement, unless the conspirators inside the city could put the Americans

[1] There were frequently rumors of such uprisings, however, and the "curfew law," forbidding any one to go on the streets of Manila from 7 P.M. to 6 A.M. without a pass from the provost-marshal, was enforced.

there in a panic or Luna could drive in MacArthur's lines near Kalookan. The result in the city was merely a disorganized bit of incendiarism, which the coolness of the American volunteers successfully checked; Luna's attack on the north was, though zealous, desultory and unavailing.[1]

Such is the history of the actual events connected with the attempted uprising in Manila. Some documents which came to light both before it and afterward have given good ground for the charge that certain revolutionists hoped to make it a massacre, if not of all whites in Manila, at least of all Americans. On February 15, General Hughes obtained what purported to be the partial copy of an order, issued, it was declared, by Sandiko, directing an uprising by the militia in Manila in combination with attacks from the outside: the first move was to capture, if possible, the Bilibid prison and release its inmates, arm them and harangue them to "take revenge upon the Americans, annihilating them"; at the signal of rockets and paper balloons, Filipino servants in American or Spanish houses should set fire to them, the object being to start the whole city blazing at once; the lives of Filipinos only should be spared (and not of them, if they had been "designated as traitors"); "all others, of whatsoever race, shall not be given quarter, but shall be exterminated, thus proving to the foreign countries that America is not capable of maintaining order nor of defending any of the interests they have

[1] Luna's report to Aguinaldo (*Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, pp. 46–47) was made somewhat bombastic to conceal his failure. He reported 15 Americans killed and 70 wounded; the numbers were 5 and 37, both inside and outside the city. The American official estimates of 500 Filipinos killed and wounded were also probably exaggerations. Luna's report indicates something of his plan for moving troops from Pampanga and Bulakán across the swamps into Tondo, also that troops came across from Cavite in canoes. He blames the Cavite companies (Aguinaldo's own men) for not coöperating in accordance with his plan. The American official reports are as follows: That of General Hughes, *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 6–20; of General Otis, *ibid.*, part 4, pp. 109–10; of General MacArthur, *ibid.*, part 4, pp. 426, 499–500. For a graphic account by John Bass, see *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 137–42. General Hughes's later testimony about the affair is in *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 506–507, 510–11.

undertaken to defend"; finally, the cry was, "Death to the tyrants! War without quarter upon the false Americans who wish to deceive us! Independence or death!" The American authorities expected the attempt to occur that same night, but it did not; and, in some measure at least, the undertaking directed by Luna on the night of the 22d was the abortive result of this order.[1] The authenticity of the order itself had

[1] The order as originally cabled to Washington by Otis, is found in *Otis's Rept., 1899*, p. 109, and in *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, p. 157. The subsequent Senate inquiries as to its authenticity and the developments of the investigation made in Manila are contained in *ibid.*, p. 158, and in *Sen. Doc. 286*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (reproduced also as pp. 1903–16 of *Sen. Doc. 331*), which contains a facsimile of the order obtained in 1901 and signed, apparently, by Luna. General MacArthur's testimony on this investigation is found in *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 1887–1900. The quotations in the text above have been taken from this "Luna order," brought to light in 1901; it is practically identical with the order obtained by Hughes on February 15, 1899, though the latter was incomplete and did not contain the passage assigning as the reason for exterminating all foreigners the desire to prove that the United States could not maintain order. The order obtained in 1899 (which was ascribed to Sandiko because he had been the organizer of the Manila militia) was brought to Dr. Frank S. Bourns by a Filipino who had at one time been connected with the "popular clubs," but had recently protested pro-American sentiments. When the Senate made its inquiry in 1901, it was he who found the full copy of the original over the signature of Antonio Luna. In reaching the conclusion that this order, or some virtually identical order, was actually written and distributed, the writer has had the benefit of the opinions of some of the Filipinos and Americans connected with the episode. Luna's bloodthirsty disposition was many times evidenced. This order harks back to the Katipunan days of 1896; and, precisely because suspicion had been cast upon some of the documents regarding massacre and extermination used in the Spanish courts-martial, care should be employed, if this order is accepted as virtually authentic, in arguing from it too comprehensively as to the aims and plans of the Filipino revolution. Aguinaldo's denial in 1901 (*Sen. Doc. 286*) that he knew of the order must be noted, but also his cautious reserve in speaking about it. He was in full complicity in Sandiko's plans, and Sandiko worked in harmony with Luna regarding the Manila uprising, after the latter assumed active command; yet Luna may have decided on such a harangue to the militia leaders on his own account. The instructions issued by Aguinaldo on January 9 to the *Sandatahán* (meaning "armed men," probably here also "bolomen," or, as their Spanish name was, *armas blancas*, "white arms") of Manila are characteristic of the sort of warfare employed in 1896–97 (see *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 4–6; Otis says the captured original of this document was in Aguinaldo's handwriting). Yet it must be noted that here Aguinaldo, while sanctioning the use of treachery (in fact, commanding it as a consistent policy toward the Americans), the killing of sentinels by men dressed in women's clothes, the use of hot water, hot oil, etc., from the roofs, the use of barbed arrows, etc., against their enemy, commands that all foreigners and foreign property, including Spaniards and Chinese, must be spared, and that there be no looting, in order to show the civilized

been called in question, and cannot be regarded as circumstantially established; it is, however, safe to say that it had at least the foundation in fact that such projects were at the time bruited among the militia leaders in Manila and that several (probably as many as twelve, one for each of the "zones" of Manila) copies of this or a practically identical order were in existence and were seen by a considerable number of Filipinos. It should be stated that this barbarous plan failed, not only because of the vigilant precautions of General Hughes, but also because the militia leaders in Manila were neither bold enough nor inhumane enough to follow its mandates, even had their organization been effective enough to do so. It is chiefly of value as showing the disposition and ideals of certain of the more bloodthirsty Filipinos. How far Aguinaldo may be charged with knowing and sanctioning such a plan is a matter of doubt; his skirts may be clear of authorizing massacre, but at any rate he had full complicity with Sandiko in the preliminary preparations (which Luna seems to have seized upon, and to which he may have added a final touch of savagery). Certainly, Aguinaldo had himself counseled, in fact outlined, a policy of duplicity, not untouched with barbarity, in his countrymen's relations with the Americans in Manila. But such a programme was not officially adopted at Malolos, nor did it represent the sentiments of the majority of even the radicals then prominent in the affairs of the Revolutionary Government; the very secrecy and mystery surrounding the whole affair is an indication of this fact.

nations "that we are men of culture and patriotism, honorable and very humane." This document is, in fact, a curious compound of childish cunning and naïve semi-barbarism. It was dated on the very day (January 9) when Mabini was sending the Filipino peace commissioners to Manila. And it will not do to overlook such appeals to race hatred and such slander of the Americans as characterized the official campaign at Malolos at the time (e.g., see supplement to *Heraldo de la Revolución*, February 24, 1899, reproduced in *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, p. 106).

CHAPTER XIII

THE AMERICANS TAKE MALOLOS

During the last week of February and the first week of March, two regiments of regular infantry arrived at Manila, and a "flying column" was organized, which, under Brigadier-General Lloyd Wheaton, proceeding along the river from Manila, took Pateros, Pasig, Kainta, and Taitai, thus restoring to the Americans the control of the river to the Laguna de Bay. Thenceforth it remained permanently in their possession, one little ironclad gunboat, which had coöperated in this movement, remaining as a permanent patrol of the river, and another being placed on the lake for the same purpose. This cut off the Filipino army on the north from that on the south, except for such communication as they might afterward be able to make across the lake and around its eastern shores.[1]

The two regiments of infantry which comprised the expedition under Brigadier-General Henry W. Lawton arrived at Manila from New York at this time.[2] On March 17, he was given command of the first division, General Anderson going home to be retired as a brigadier-general of regulars. The two divisions were enlarged to their normal size of three bri-

[1] Otis's account of this movement is found in his *Rept., 1899*, pp. 110–11; Wheaton's, in *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 364–66. John Bass describes it in *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 144–53.

[2] At each stop after he passed the Suez Canal, Lawton received urgent messages from Washington or Manila, asking him to hasten the voyage. General Lawton, who, like several other officers conspicuous in fighting in Cuba, had suffered some disappointment after the fighting there was over, had had an interview with the President before his departure for the East, and there were rumors that he was to be given chief command of the troops in the field, in case of a war being necessary, and that Otis would be left in control of the military government proper, thus reverting to the plan originally made for Merritt and Otis in 1898. Yet Lawton was kept waiting in Manila Bay nearly a week before being given a command, and it was some time before he got into action, being used, when that time came, for a dash here and a dash there, with no chance at first for an organized campaign.

gades each; Wheaton's provisional brigade was placed in support of the second division, making nearly 12,000 men available for effective service on the north, and MacArthur was authorized to start a movement which he had elaborately devised after the approved technique of warfare. On the night of March 24, the movement began, from the waterworks on the east to Kalookan on the west, the object being to turn the Filipino forces with sufficient rapidity on the right so that, if possible, they might be enveloped at the center and driven in upon the town of Polo. The plan reckoned well so far as regards the ease of flanking and outmaneuvering the Filipinos was concerned, but it failed to take into account the roadless and swampy condition of much of this country, which had uniformly spoiled any elaborate plans of warfare the Spaniards had attempted to carry out therein.[1] Before the direct charges or the flanking movements of the Americans, the Filipino intrenchments were usually emptied without much resistance. At the Tuliahan River, the thin American advance line had some rather sharp fighting at several bad crossings.[2]

[1] The movement was well under way before the Americans discovered that there were no roads where they had counted on finding them. The difficulty of operating in the Philippines, even in the very environs of the capital, owing to the faulty and imperfect maps, has been referred to in connection with the Spanish campaign of 1896–97. In September, 1898, the Military Information Bureau of the War Department had brought out a three-hundred page, large octavo book, *Military Notes on the Philippines*, made up from some of the more unreliable and imperfect of the always defective Spanish sources of geographical information on the Philippines, and mainly valuable for reproductions in little of British Admiralty charts of Philippine seas and harbors. The Engineer Corps in the islands was at first, of course, compelled to rely entirely on the faulty Spanish maps. However, there was, during the whole campaign of 1899, a lack of the diligent effort to supplement these sources of information by investigation on the outside such as might have been expected, and when the Americans were in November plunged into a northern Luzon campaign, Otis's headquarters seemed sometimes at sea in following them.

[2] Here was the first river exploit of the Kansas regiment. Colonel Funston's report of it is on p. 421, *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, part 5. The Third Artillery, under Major W. A. Kobbé, was more fully engaged than the Kansans, and did its full share of swimming and fording (*ibid.*, p. 429). The report of Major Bell, who served indiscriminately as chief of scouts, engineer officer, adjutant-general of the division, and free-lance generally, shows the part played by the Fourth Cavalry and a Utah battery (*ibid.*, pp. 577–78).

The operations of the 25th had failed to envelop the Filipinos at Polo, owing to the retarding of the American right by natural obstacles, but they were driven in full retreat beyond Polo and Maikauaian on the railroad, when the American advance continued on the 26th.[1] These towns, including the railroad stations, were found burning when the Americans reached them, and this was the policy henceforward almost uniformly followed by the Filipinos when they were forced to abandon their towns.[2]

From here, two brigades moved along the side of the railroad, the forcing of the Marilau River on the 27th being less of a military problem than the repairing of the bridges over it, that the wagon-trains might accompany the advance, which was thus delayed nearly two days.[3] Resuming the advance on the 29th, Bokawe, Bigaá, and Giginto were occupied with scarcely enough effective opposition to interrupt the Americans, the Filipinos leaving the railroad bridges virtually intact in the haste of their continued flight, but starting the towns to burning. The chief delay was at the bridges, but Wheaton's brigade

[1] Colonel Harry C. Egbert, a regular army veteran of the Civil War, was killed near Malinta while leading a portion of his Twenty-second Infantry in a bayonet charge.

[2] The general understanding is that Luna, having read of the burning of Moscow and the retreat of Napoleon from Russia, decided to adopt this plan of campaign in the Philippines, thinking thus to render impossible the American advance into the heart of the country, but apparently never reflecting that climatic and other conditions in the Philippines were very different from those of Russia in the winter-time. His general order commanding the burning of all towns as abandoned, dated February 15, was found posted on the station at Maikauaian (pronounced "My-kow-f-an" and dubbed by the American soldier, who will have his joke, "Michael Ryan," just as San Pedro Macatí had been called "Saint Peter McCarthy"). See *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, p. 385. It also orders the shooting without court-martial of "spies and those who give news of us to the enemy" and of those "who commit robberies and those who violate women."

[3] No pontoon-train had been provided, though the frequency of river-crossings on the railroad north of Manila is the first thing to be noticed on the map of the region. Five men of the Kansas regiment swam the Marilau River at one point, protected by the heavy fire of their comrades and of a Utah gun and a Colt's automatic under Lieutenant Davis, of the navy, against the opposing insurgent intrenchment, bringing back a raft, on which Colonel Funston and some of his men crossed for a flanking movement (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, p. 422).

guarded the trains, and the artillery was dragged across by hand, its mules swimming the rivers.[1] The American headquarters were now thirty-three kilometers from Manila on the railroad, and only three kilometers from the railroad station of Malolos, the Filipino capital. Elaborate and formal plans were made for the attack on this town, which was defended by earthworks, barricades along the railroad, etc., and General MacArthur expected a "premeditated battle." But the careful tactical movements, covered by artillery fire begun at 7 A.M., March 31, were only so much display, as most of the trenches were abandoned without resistance, and to their surprise the troops in advance found themselves in front of Aguinaldo's former headquarters, after a few skirmishes with handfuls of men about the town's approaches, their principal work for the day being to put out the fires that had been started.[2]

The campaign which ended in the taking of Malolos, twenty miles from Manila, seems to have been definitely planned, except for the first few days' movements; the intention was merely to "reach out" to the north, take all possible advantages, establish a secondary base for supplies, then return the bulk of the troops to Manila for a similar movement toward the south. We find Otis wiring MacArthur, after his last quick advance to the outskirts of the Filipino capital: "You advanced further than I supposed." But he added: "Washington watching eagerly. Must have no reverse now." [3] The idea of making Malolos a water-base, communicating with Manila by river and bay, was promptly adopted by Otis. He disapproved MacArthur's plan

[1] The artillery was found unusually effective against the Filipinos, though hauled some of the time by hand (owing to the uncertainty of the mules, the only animals available), fought without cover, and frequently at ranges so close to the enemy as to be considered impossible in warfare (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, pp. 523–24).

[2] The full reports of the movements of the second division during March, April, and May, 1899, are found in *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. II, part 5, pp. 21–29, 372–597. General Otis summarized the campaign from Kalookan to Malolos in his *Rept., 1899*, pp. 111–13. The casualties in the seven days on the American side were 46 killed and 305 wounded.

[3] *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, p. 391.

of moving at once on Kalumpit, five miles farther north, at the important junction of the railroad with the Rio Grande de Pampanga, thus capturing the largest bridge on the railroad before it could be destroyed, acquiring sure river communication with the bay and having the railroad as a natural line of communication and defense from Kalumpit to Manila. Otis thought it inadvisable to stretch the conquest farther at the time, on account of the need of troops in the city and south of it, and was disposed to abandon the railroad line and rely upon communication by river with Malolos. More than two weeks were spent in an effort to render passable the bar at the principal mouth of the Malolos River, before the idea was finally abandoned and regular railway train service was established between Manila and Malolos.[1]

APRIL–JUNE OPERATIONS DRIVE THE FILIPINOS FARTHER FROM MANILA — LAWTON IN ACTION

General Lawton and his reduced first division had remained quiescent, pursuant to orders. With the now greatly lengthened line on the north, and the pressure from Washington for the return of the state volunteers at the earliest possible date, it was impracticable to begin any campaign on the south. Lawton remained chafing in inactivity, until, on April 8, Otis ordered him to collect from the fragments of various commands a force of 1500 men and take them for a raid upon the town of Santa Cruz, on the Laguna de Bay, where the Filipinos were

[1] See *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, pp. 394–96; also *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 113–14. A detail of soldiers and Chinese laborers were used to put the railroad line in condition once more. The Filipinos had carried most of the rolling-stock back along the line in their retreat, but some few cars and two disabled engines had been captured at Kalookan after the outbreak of February 4. It was felt to be significant, as indicating possible collusion between the British management of the railroad and the Malolos leaders, that practically all the rolling-stock in good condition was removed from Manila well within the insurgent lines before the trouble began. Chinese coolies were employed in numbers with the American columns during the early days of warfare in the Philippines, especially as litter-bearers; this was done primarily for lack of animals suitable for draft purposes, the Filipino pony being too small.

gathered in force, and, as they thought, in security, since the masses, even some of the better-educated, believed the reports sent to them about Aguinaldo's victories and his virtual blockade of Manila. It was Otis's plan that the expedition should capture Santa Cruz, if possible surrounding the force there, reconnoiter the shore of the lake to the east and northeast, capture some steam launches and a little gunboat, then reëmbark and capture Kalamba, farther westward along the south shore of the lake and a natural point of departure for a campaign southwest into Batangas and Cavite provinces. The conditions existing made the surrounding of the force at Santa Cruz impossible. They made a brief resistance, then took to flight. The town itself had been virtually deserted, as were the four towns to the northeast which were occupied by reconnoitering columns during the next two days. When the American troops departed, the people returned to their homes. The launches were hidden in a river, and a dredge had to be secured from Manila to get them over the bar in this dry time. Otis also discovered that his plan for a disembarkation at Kalamba was rendered at least extremely difficult by the shallowness of the water on this shore, and recalled Lawton and his entire force to Manila. The ten days' work had no further result than to introduce the American troops to those few inhabitants who stayed to become acquainted with them and to show that the Filipino army's hold upon this section could be loosened at any time when the Americans should choose to come. The insurgents promptly moved back into their headquarters at Santa Cruz, and Otis postponed the plan of controlling the south shore of the lake until the rains had raised its level and he had a bigger force of troops to use both on the north and on the south.[1]

[1] General Lawton's report, prepared in the careful and complete manner in which he and his adjutant, Major Clarence R. Edwards, covered every article of the varied operations which were executed under Lawton in the Philippines, is found in *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 30–74. *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 166–71, contains John Bass's account with some hints of the outside criticism that was

Some skirmishing with little bands of Filipinos outside of Malolos indicated that their army had not retreated as a whole, but that there were guerrillas in the swamps south of that place. The American line along the railroad was more particularly threatened by the hidden bands which appeared from time to time from the north and east in Bulakán province; they attacked in unison along the line from Marilau north to Giginto on the night of April 10, and were repulsed only after some sharp fighting, directed by General Wheaton. Their movements had been directed from Santa Maria, a few miles east of the railroad, where they had gathered a force; on the 12th, this force was driven in retreat in several directions, not stopping to engage the Americans.[1] Before the advance could be made from Malolos, it was felt necessary to start a parallel movement east and north of the railroad, both to draw Filipino troops from a concentration in front of MacArthur's division and to obviate the possibility of assaults in numbers on the railroad when the detachments of troops should be weakened in consequence of a forward movement. This difficult and detached piece of work was assigned to Lawton, who gathered about 4000 men for the purpose, including Oregon and Minnesota troops from MacArthur's division, with whom he effected a junction on his march northward from Manila, starting on

made of this practically resultless raid. The Hongkong and Shanghai news agencies, with the inaccuracy that characterized them throughout the Filipino-American war, spread reports which implied that the American forces were virtually compelled to abandon the captured territory because of inability to hold it. Lawton's column was able to release a few of the Spanish prisoners taken at Santa Cruz in August, 1898; most of them were marched inland. In accordance with the American policy of the time, the Filipinos taken prisoners were set free to return to their homes. Even for his five-day occupancy of Santa Cruz, Lawton had a provost-marshal installed at the very outset, and enforced a rigid prohibition of looting, burning, or misconduct in general, every effort being made to counteract the stories about American brutality that were generally believed in that region.

[1] According to the reports of prisoners, Aguinaldo himself came down to Santa Maria and organized the united attack of the 10th and 11th. MacArthur had much to say in commendation of Wheaton's "splendid warlike ferocity," which inspired "the pertinacious and rapid action which was manifested by the commands engaged, and which was indispensable to the situation."

April 22. He did not quite reach his first objective, Norzagaray, on the 24th, the day fixed for MacArthur's advance. The region north of Manila had been found to contain roaming bands of armed Filipinos, but Lawton's column brushed them off without their delaying its advance; the condition of the country, with its wretched roads or no roads at all where they were expected to be, offered the chief obstacles to progress. The North Dakota volunteers were assigned the duty of getting through the transportation, — a wagon-train with *karabaus* for animals, — and they literally carried it across streams, and even took turns in the shafts as the *karabaus* died under their unwonted labor. Once at Norzagaray, Lawton wished to push on immediately to Baliwag, on a tributary of the Rio Grande, clearing the country before him, and ending his difficulties of transportation by having the river for communication with Manila. Otis vacillated, entertaining first the project of ordering Lawton back to the railroad line, and finally recalling him from an unordered but successful advance, thus necessitating a rewinning of the same ground later on, under the hot sun and at the cost of several lives, besides giving the Filipinos the opportunity to spread over the country news that the Americans had been "driven back"; — all this, because a fussy man behind the telegraph at Manila was trying to direct to the last detail every movement, and was blundering nearly every time he formed hypotheses about roads upon the poor maps he had.[1]

[1] The correspondence between Otis and Lawton, when the latter was in the field in the Philippines, was always interesting. Pertinent to this frustrated movement from Angat on April 27 are the letters between these two in *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 133–35; also the telegraphic correspondence, pp. 143–48. Lawton was sure he had in front of him the extreme left of the Filipino army, in very disorganized form, and by prompt movements could "double it up" and help drive the entire opposition in a rout. Otis constantly made him wait for MacArthur. He clung pertinaciously to his plan of studying out Lawton's movements and prescribing him details about roads, although he confessed, in his letter of April 27: "I have lost all confidence in any map I have yet seen, and two weeks' effort have been unsuccessful in getting the services of a guide who knows the country." Any really intelligent effort should very speedily have located more than one such

MacArthur's advance on Kalumpit had been timed for April 24, but his right became involved in a fight near Kingwa on the 23d, a fight brought on prematurely by a reconnoissance that developed into a charge of the insurgent trenches, and in which Colonel Stotsenburg, of the Nebraska volunteers, was shot through the heart when but two hundred yards from the Filipino trenches.[1] This movement, resulting in the capture of Kingwa, changed the plans of the advance of MacArthur's right, composed of Hale's brigade, and, after more or less fighting around the juncture of the Bagbag and Kalumpit Rivers, near which is a railroad bridge across the Bagbag, the two columns came together at this point on the 25th. The Filipinos held strong positions behind these two rivers, positions which were naturally defensible and which had been strengthened by the extensive intrenchments made under Luna's direction. They had let down into the water of the deep Bagbag the last span of their side of the bridge; the Kalumpit River was fordable, though up to the necks of the Nebraskans, who waded it. The Filipinos did not, however, make a strong stand in these positions, but retreated in disordered movements before the Ameri-

guide, if it was not to be permitted to the man on the spot to work out the details of his own movements. Lawton's full report of this campaign, Manila to San Isidro, April 22 to May 30, is found in *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 75–288. *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 181–91, contains some accounts of this expedition by William Dinwiddie and other correspondents.

[1] Major J. F. Bell, leading a small party of unmounted Fourth cavalrymen sent to reconnoiter the town of Kingwa, which it was not intended to attack, got into such close quarters that the Nebraskans had to come to his help. A second reconnoissance in greater force involved this wing so completely that a retreat, with its consequent emboldening of the enemy, was deemed inadvisable. When Colonel Stotsenburg, who had so repeatedly led his troops in charges to turn the left of the enemy, all the way during the advance from Manila, appeared on the field, his men, who had been for several hours lying flat in the sun, immediately rose with a cheer and began, unordered, a charge which would have been pronounced impracticable in warfare against an enemy who could shoot and would stay to make use of his trenches. They were already too far along to be stopped, and the officers could only attempt to reform them and hold them steady. They had 4 men killed and 27 wounded, but drove the enemy in panic, and the town of Kingwa was occupied and held for the advance of the succeeding day down the Kingwa River toward Kalumpit. See John Bass's account, *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 191–94.

can advance, across the wide and deep Rio Grande, where, as Luna thought, their position would be impregnable. Some allowance must be made for the utter panic that now seemed to be inspired in the Filipino troops every time an American charge was directed at them; and the appearance also on the railroad, with Wheaton's brigade, of several freight-cars, clad with iron plates to protect the machine-guns inside, and pushed along the track toward the Bagbag bridge by Chinese coolies, led to their withdrawing from the trenches on their own right with nothing like a real resistance.[1] The town of Kalumpit, on the south bank of the Rio Grande, was occupied on the 26th, as also were all the sheltered positions on this bank facing the insurgent earthworks. Luna had prepared for himself another crushing blow to his pride at this point, by advertising his position as one which the Americans could never take. The railroad bridge had not been destroyed, but the rails, ties, and upper girders had been removed, leaving only the lower girders, seven feet apart, to cross on. With the Filipinos, gathered in force and encouraged by the personal direction of Luna, well protected on the other side by bomb-proof intrenchments and supported by a Maxim machine-gun and several old cannons, passage of the bridge, in daytime at least, was impossible without great loss. The Americans had no pontoon-bridge, for use above or below, where crossings might have been made, and the Filipino commander had concentrated all his troops and was sending for all the reinforcements he could get. At Colonel Funston's request, the problem of getting across the river was turned over to him; a reconnoissance by one of his non-commissioned officers on the night of the 26th

[1] A small band of Kansas soldiers, led by Colonel Funston, crossed the Bagbag bridge, under a desultory fire, dropping into the water at the broken span, and swimming or wading the remaining distance, which was very short. This insurgent position, however, was really forced by the artillery in the armored cars and by the advance of Hale's brigade on the right. It was the following day before the troops of Wheaton's brigade crossed the easily extemporized repair of the bridge. For Funston's account, which says he and his companions *swam* the remaining portion of the river, see *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 423–24.

having shown the impracticability of attempting to cross a force on the bridge under cover of the night, he tried to get a raft rigged up several hundred yards down the river and cross in the darkness; but the insurgents were aroused by the noise that was made, and opened a brisk fire. This plan was, however, put into effect the following day at noon. Privates White and Trembly, of the Kansas regiment, swam the river six hundred yards below the bridge, under the Filipino fire (which was kept down as much as possible by the fusillade of the Kansas and Montana regiments), fastened the rope they carried to a stump on the very edge of the Filipino intrenchments, and capped the climax of this amazing performance by throwing mud balls over the trench at the already fleeing Filipinos, armed with rifles and opposing merely two naked and unarmed Americans. Two armed companions from the Kansas regiment speedily joined them in a dugout; then Colonel Funston and eight men pulled themselves over the rapid current in a raft, hand over hand on the rope. When some forty men had got across in this way, it was necessary to move on the Filipinos' strong position near the railroad track, as they were turning their Maxim gun on the little band of Kansans, and could have annihilated them had they known how to use it. Crossing a small, but deep, creek, the Kansans charged; Wheaton and some of his troops were already working their way across the bridge, aided by the diversion and the Filipino panic; the Filipinos were moving the Maxim gun to the rear, for fear they might lose it; and even the band of one thousand or more Filipinos, marching up from the south just then as reinforcements to Luna, were speedily driven in flight and confusion. On the one side, it had been a most daring display of courage and coolness of nerve, aided, of course, by the contempt the American soldiers now had for the Filipinos' marksmanship or willingness to stand steady and fight, although it was, furthermore, a really reckless and foolhardy performance, from a military man's point of view; on the other side,

it was a ridiculous rout, which revealed only too plainly the difference in *morale* between the two forces, as well as the wretched lack of leadership among the Filipinos.[1]

The Filipinos sent emissaries within the American lines, proposing an armistice and expressing their admiration of the swift execution of what they had deemed impossible. Aside from this cause for delay, the bridge had to be made passable for troops and the wagon-train, as the torn-up track could not be at once repaired, and delay was also caused by inadequate preparations at Manila to open up communication by the bay and river. It was a week before MacArthur advanced from Kalumpit. Some sharp fighting, in which the Kansans again figured under Wheaton, was necessary to take Santo Tomas, which also was on the north side of a river, across a bridge badly disabled. Luna was understood to have commanded in person here, and when his men again fled, Santo Tomas was, by his orders, in flames. San Fernando, one of the most important towns in Pampanga province, was also set on fire, and, when the Americans advanced upon it, was evacuated without a fight. Here MacArthur set up division headquarters, and the first field hospital of a permanent character was established.

[1] Funston's modest and perfunctory account of the exploit, for which he was very soon after made brigadier-general of volunteers by the President, is contained in *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 424–25; Wheaton's, pp. 417–18; MacArthur's, pp. 405–06. MacArthur characterizes the passage of the river as "well calculated to fix the attention of the most careless observer and to stimulate the fancy of the most indifferent"; but he used identically the same language about the presence of the United States in the Philippines in his report of 1900 as military governor. A very lucid narrative of this river exploit is that of John Bass (*Harper's Hist.*, pp. 195–98). The information on the American side was that Luna had 4000 men in the intrenchments facing Kalumpit. He and other Filipinos afterward excused this rout, on the ground that they thought the reinforcements coming up from the south were American troops who had crossed the river far below and were marching to flank them; if true, this would be a sufficient comment on Luna's generalship, as it was broad daylight and his position should have been so taken as to avoid the possibility of such a surprise. However, the Filipino flight had begun before the reinforcements came up, and the Americans were able to give separate attention to the latter. Because Luna, unlike most of the other Filipino generals, did not run away when a fight began, he gained a reputation among his opponents greater than that to which his abilities entitled him.

Troops were not available for a further extension of the American line, and the month of May was spent quietly for the most part, though toward its close there was some evidence of Filipino reorganization. Mascardo planned ambuscades and organized a spy system among the people living within the American lines, being well informed in advance of their plans to reconnoiter his positions at Bakolor, the capital of the province, and Santa Rita, west of the railroad. Both these towns were evacuated after slight opposition, but their principal buildings had been gutted by fire. Everywhere, the Filipinos gave way at the first contact, or without awaiting contact at all; but there were indications that the guerrilla methods of 1896–97 were being resumed, with the shattering of the last well-organized force under Luna.[1]

The first request for an armistice having been refused, Lawton also was allowed to resume his advance from Angat on May 1. He speedily routed Gregorio del Pilar's forces, and took Bustos and Baliwag, capturing near here the big supply-depots of the Filipinos.[2] Here he was again halted, new proposals for temporary peace having been received, and Otis kept him busy for some days scouting in a roadless country and running to earth Manila-born rumors about attacks on his right flank from the mountains near Biak-na-bató.[3] When he had demonstrated their baselessness and was urging an advance before rains should spoil the road, declaring he had "no faith in the peace negotiations," he was further detained by Otis's determination to send a column from MacArthur's divi-

[1] For some of Mascardo's orders, see *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 411–12.

[2] In Baliwag and its suburbs, 150,000 bushels of rice, 265 tons of sugar, and other supplies were found, and were put under guard and distributed to needy inhabitants. In subsequent scouts on the hills near by, 100,000 tons of rice were burned (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 170, 202).

[3] *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 178, 184–86, 189–93. Said Lawton to MacArthur, in a friendly interchange, on May 9: "My movements are directed in detail, and I have not been advised as to my future disposition; as a result, am not altogether happy."

sion to coöperate with him along the Rio Grande.[1] On May 11, he was authorized to take up the advance on the 14th; but his command was restless, and, when 20 scouts were sent to "reconnoiter" San Ildefonso on the 12th, they engaged the enemy, charged him without awaiting their support of 84 Oregon troops, and took the town. The next day, just after Lawton had excused himself to Otis for this occurrence, the scouts took San Miguel in the same fashion.[2] Manila headquarters were fairly forced into acquiescing in a movement, but still delayed it twenty-four hours beyond the time set.

[1] *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 91, 93; also p. 164, for Lawton's statement to Otis on May 3 that the enemy's strength was greatly exaggerated; that his forces were demoralized and scattering in small parties; that he could drive him in rout with only a squadron of mounted men, but the single mounted troop he had was not enough, and men on foot could not stand the extra exertion in the great heat. Lawton had only 50 mules, and had to use coolie transportation as far as possible. His current dispatches reveal also constant complaints of the slowness of the Quartermaster's Department at Manila in supplying those things it did have in stock.

[2] *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 91–92. One gathers that Lawton felt a grim sense of humor and satisfaction in recording: "The expedition, which was still (May 13) being held at Baliwag, waiting for supplies, reinforcements, and what had been most frequently requested, and was most desired, namely, orders to advance, thus reached its objective — San Miguel — as a result of two reconnoissances by less than a score of picked men supported on both occasions by less than a full company of infantry." These scouts were a score of men picked from the Western volunteers by William H. Young, a Western giant, in the Philippines for adventure. Seeing this civilian far in the advance at the beginning of his expedition, Lawton ordered him to the rear; "Something in the man's bearing and appearance caused a change of intention," says Lawton, who was quick to see the value of the man. The subsequent adventures of the little band led by Young rendered this campaign picturesque. Young was shot in the knee at San Miguel; he died at Manila just as Lawton paused from his labors as division commander to telegraph him a message of good cheer, while telling him of the death of Harrington, Young's chief rival in daring. They were after Lawton's own heart. Besides references to them in his own report (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 92, 95, 96, 104, 212–16, 238–39, 245), see William Dinwiddie's description of their exploits and their deaths (*Harper's Hist.*, pp. 186–89). Captain W. E. Birkhimer, judge-advocate of Lawton's division, was out with the scouts whenever possible, and Colonel Summers and Captain Case, of the Oregon volunteers, kept their "support" close enough to participate in the scouts' movements more than once. In MacArthur's division, a similar body of scouts was organized under Major J. F. Bell (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, p. 398). These forces supplied in part the lack of good military information of the country wherein the commands were operating.

When it began at last, it resulted in the swift sweeping aside, by the Oregon and Minnesota troops in the advance, of all opposition between San Miguel and San Isidro, while the main column came up to San Miguel. The scouts had routed the Filipinos on San Isidro's outskirts and saved the main bridge there from burning on the 16th, and, on the 17th, the whole command took the town with little opposition. It had been the headquarters of Aguinaldo quite steadily since the fall of Malolos, though the headquarters of the Filipino Government had finally been set up at Tarlak, on the railroad, behind the main force under Luna. Several prominent members of the Filipino Assembly here came within the American lines to stay, and they reported a strong desire for peace in Filipino official circles, promising that efforts to that end would speedily be renewed.[1] Orders were promptly received from Manila, announcing Arayat, down the Rio Grande, as the next objective. After several reconnoissances from the important town of San Isidro, capital of Nueva Écija province, almost at the apex of a triangle of thickly populated Tagalog territory lying north of Manila, on the navigable Rio Grande, Lawton abandoned it on the 20th, with regret, we may be sure, as he heard of Aguinaldo eighteen miles away, the insurgent organization rent by jealousies and disappointments, but with new plans forming to prolong the resistance. His main command, having moved back down the river-banks, brushing off some opposition, met at Arayat the column of regulars for which Otis had kept the movement waiting a number of days.[2] For a time troops were kept along the line from Baliwag to San Miguel, but only Baliwag, with a strengthened garrison, was retained permanently in American possession after Lawton's force had gradually been added to MacArthur's command and he himself had been recalled from Arayat on May 27. When these troops were withdrawn, the Filipino forces speedily resumed

[1] *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. 1, part 5, pp. 244–45, 249–50, 252.
[2] *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. 1, part 5, p. 100.

control, and, indeed, gathered in sufficient force to cause the retreating Americans several rather sharp engagements. But General Otis desired Lawton to command "the troops in and about the city," and back to Manila he went.[1]

Though there were now about 35,000 troops in the islands, it was necessary to send back as rapidly as possible all the volunteers, over 16,000 in number. The rainy season was also due to begin in June or July. Hence, no further comprehensive movements were inaugurated. During the first week in June, General Lawton was put in command of another "raid," in the country north and east of Manila, near the Laguna de Bay. The object was to scatter the forces of Pio del Pilar, who, making his headquarters at the little town of Antipolo, famous for its shrine of the Virgin, to which annual pilgrimages were made in the Philippines, was indulging in his old thieving operations under the mask of his title as a general of the revolution. If possible, these forces were to be surrounded with sufficient rapidity to be driven into the peninsula running into the lake at Morong. Lawton disposed his 2500 men with his usual precision, and they moved with the dash and "go" displayed on all his expeditions, despite the bad roads encountered. But the Filipinos, whose organization in this region had become entirely that of a guerrilla force, simply melted from sight, and no opportunity was given for hemming them in with gunboats at the lake's edge. The towns, including Antipolo and Morong, were easily taken, but only Morong was occupied, and that but for a time, for the making of reconnoissances.[2]

South of Manila, the short and straight line from San Pedro Macatí to Pasai by the bay had been maintained just as it was established after the first advance of February 5. The Filipino forces grew bolder with the long period of American inactivity. On June 10, Lawton took command of two scant

[1] *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, p. 266.

[2] For Lawton's detailed report with appendices, see *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 289–321.

brigades, under Wheaton and Ovenshine, for what was mapped out only as a brief "punitive expedition" to induce the insurgents on the south to cease from troubling the outer lines; Otis did not wish it to involve the necessity of garrisoning any of the towns in Cavite, Batangas, or Laguna, as he had not the troops to spare. The first two days' advance, in columns supposedly parallel, but which were speedily disaligned by the nature of the territory traversed and by the resistance encountered, developed contact everywhere, both to the southeast of Manila near the shore of the Laguna and to the south of Pasai near the bay. The worst opposition to deal with, however, particularly for some few of the troops which had just arrived in the islands, was the fearful heat, intensified by the absence of anything but stagnant and putrid water in the swamps which were traversed.[1] The two columns were reformed and reorganized on the 12th; their movements on Parañake and Las Piñas, which had been shelled by the gunboat Helena, had already given them possession of both towns and the surrounding country, Wheaton's brigade, which administered punishment along the lake as far as Muntinlupa, having swung westward to the assistance of Ovenshine's entangled forces. On the morning of the 13th, the Filipino force, estimated variously at from 3000 to 5000 riflemen, confronted the American advance from across the Sapote River, which runs north into the bay; ready to make a determined stand, not alone because they were excellently intrenched in their naturally strong position, but also because they were full of confidence, remembering that in 1897, when they had not nearly so many firearms, they had held off the Spaniards for days along this river and had made the advance on Imus very costly for a Spanish force of some 6000 men. They soon learned

[1] A better idea of the climatic conditions and of the demoralization of some of the troops during these two days can be obtained from officers' letters (in *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 213–15) than in the official reports. Some of the men threw away all their equipment, and even all their clothes, except belts and rifles. One force was in the position of having to report 500 "stragglers" out of a total of 700.

that they had a different sort of leader to oppose. Lawton had personally reconnoitered their left flank, near the shore of Manila Bay, the night before. The first thing in the morning, he threw a small flanking force out along the beach, which soon drew on a sharp fight, but, backed by reinforcements of soldiers and a band of marines from the Helena, kept its position, and, when the time came, made the ground untenable for the Filipinos in the most northerly line of intrenchments. By afternoon, the American line was in close contact with the intrenchments all along the river, and, although Lawton had only 1200 men directly engaged with the enemy, part of them at points where the river was not fordable, their use of artillery completed the destruction which the attacks on the flank and directly in front were producing, and the Filipinos abandoned their trenches and fled from the river. The American loss was 14 killed and 61 wounded, and an estimate of the Filipino loss, made on the battlefield the next day, was 150 killed and 375 wounded.[1] The main American force at once moved along the beach road to Bakoor. The president of the important town of Imus came to Lawton, asking that American troops take possession of that town, asserting that the inhabitants wanted protection and the opportunity to plant their fields. Otis consented that troops be placed there, though only "for temporary purposes." He checked further movements, however, especially one projected westward upon San Francisco de Malabon, because he was sure that his information about the roads and the movements of the Filipinos was more

[1] Lawton himself pronounced this a real "battle," and rejoiced that he had at last found an opponent who would stand and fight. His account of this whole expedition, which chiefly centered about the Sapote River fight, is contained in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 273–385. There were many instances of conspicuous bravery during this day's engagement, notable among them Lieutenant W. L. Kenly's advancing his battery of the First Artillery, with its little machine-guns, to the river's edge, opposite the Filipino intrenchments near the main bridge, a span of which had been removed, and fighting these guns less than fifty yards from the enemy's earthworks, without cover. Lawton also had great praise for the coöperation of the navy, and made them share in the congratulations he received from President McKinley.

reliable than that Lawton obtained on the spot.[1] On account of a rumor of an attack from the Filipinos at Dasmariñas, south of Imus, the American force at the latter place was strengthened and put under the command of Wheaton, who, on the 18th, moved on Dasmariñas, his advance drawing the Filipinos into quite a sharp fight, with a loss to them of 100 or more. Dasmariñas was occupied, and effort made to discover a Filipino cartridge-factory near there; but, owing to the bad state of the roads, this place was abandoned on June 21. The expedition was broken up on June 22, leaving garrisons in Imus, Bakoor, Las Piñas, and Parañake.

[1] *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 313–14. Otis had also undertaken, on the morning of the 13th, to outline the plan for the fight on the Sapote. Some of his information, received through Filipino sources from Cavite and ascertained through reconnoissances of the American troops stationed on the Cavite peninsula, was of value to Lawton. As always when he had Lawton out in the field, however, he betrayed great anxiety to keep him all the time at the end of a wire, and to dictate in detail just what movements he should make, lest he should do more than had been "set down." In this case, as generally elsewhere, Lawton managed to do more than was "set down." Reluctantly consenting to the occupation of Imus, Otis told Lawton he had information that Baldomero Aguinaldo had ordered the people of eastern Cavite to conceal their arms for the time being, turn *amigos* of the Americans, and plant their crops. Yet he cabled Washington: "Inhabitants rejoiced at deliverance and welcome with enthusiastic demonstrations arrival of our troops." (*Corr. Rel. War*, p. 1012.)

CHAPTER XIV

ARMY REORGANIZATION — THE AMERICAN COMMANDER HAS TROOPS FORCED UPON HIM

THE merely military problem of replacing some 16,000 volunteer troops in the islands with troops of the regular army had by this time become involved with the further and more important question of how large the Philippine army ought to be made in order effectively to cope with the situation in a vigorous manner when the rainy season should come to an end. General Otis had clung to, and persistently repeated, his estimate of November, 1898, that 30,000 men were necessary for the Philippines in case of hostilities against the United States. To him, no matter how developments might belie original expectations, the revolt was only a Tagalog affair, ephemeral even in the Tagalog provinces, and sure to collapse in the other provinces whenever the Americans found themselves really ready to take hold and govern them. His attitude was for a long time officially reflected at Washington. The half-smothered dissent from Otis's opinions by military subordinates and the open denunciation of his optimism by the correspondents in the Philippines and by part of the press in the United States, as well as the more palpable facts of the situation themselves, compelled a determination on the part of the Washington authorities to increase considerably the army in the islands; and, at the last moment, Otis himself ceased to be so economic of troops, though not toning down his roseate picture of the situation.

After the taking of Malolos, his picture of the insurrection falling to pieces was so vivid that he was even asked if some of the artillery ordered sent to him could not be spared; he promptly requested all the troops he had been promised.[1] Yet

[1] *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 957–60. Otis had cabled: "Insurgent Government in

he did not ask for more, though it was well known in the islands that the volunteers were overworked, and many of them discontented and not in sympathy with their task, and that the expeditions both of MacArthur and of Lawton had been illy and insufficiently equipped.[1] It was only on April 19, in promising once more that the movement of volunteers homeward would speedily be started, that Otis ventured mildly to hint that, if this movement were kept up during June and July, his force would be "too weak to meet demands." When told

perilous condition. Army defeated, discouraged, and shattered." The people returning to their homes and "desire protection of Americans. . . . News from Bisayan Islands more encouraging every day." It was Lieutenant-General Miles who thereupon suggested that Otis be asked if he could get along without the artillery under orders to join him. Replying in the negative, Otis said: "Insurgents, though demoralized, holding together fairly well."

[1] See *Harper's Hist.*, p. 176, for an Associated Press dispatch (through Hongkong) on May 12, 1898, stating that the Nebraska volunteers had petitioned to be released from the firing-line for a spell, alleging that they had been worked beyond endurance from the very beginning of trouble on February 4, had lost 225 in killed and wounded, and had only 300 men fit for duty. The facts as to insufficient equipment of the northern expeditions have been brought out in the above descriptions of their events. The advance along the railroad, in particular, was plainly an engineering problem (in the light of the Filipino weakness, it became very much less of a military problem than it might have been); yet there were no pontoon-bridges, no pack-trains (the first nucleus of a pack-outfit arrived in April), no cavalrymen with mounts, and a shortage of animals generally. Luna could command at any time thousands of men, women, and children to tear up track, destroy bridges, etc.; hence, he was not driven rapidly enough to prevent his carefully intrenching position after position. MacArthur had less than one company of engineers to make repairs or prepare the advance along the railroad; Lawton had no engineers at all, and he had only 50 mules, while he had been able to mount about that number of infantrymen on native ponies. The state volunteers were equipped with the old Springfield rifle, and, had the Filipinos known how to use their Mausers and Remingtons, they could at times have picked the volunteers off before they were within Springfield range. There was not sufficient artillery, and much of what there was was not adapted to the conditions, especially owing to a lack of artillery horses and mules; hence the constant overworking of some of the batteries of small guns. Nor was the artillery ammunition always up to the mark. Captain W. E. Birkhimer, reporting the wounding of five American soldiers by the bursting of shrapnel in a gun at Arayat, said (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. 1, part 5, p. 265): "It is deplorable that the army should be compelled to haul ammunition around the country, the use of which can only excite the derision of the enemy. The bad character of our shrapnel has long been known from our peace practice. It was hoped, and, as now appears, vainly hoped, that war would find the evil corrected."

that he would have 22,000 regulars when all had arrived that were under orders for the Philippines, he pointed again to his November estimate of 30,000. There was much cabling back and forth during the following month with regard to the military situation and to the return of the volunteers; yet so frequent were Otis's assurances that the volunteers would serve cheerfully while required, and so optimistic was his view of the future, that, as late as May 31, the Secretary of War, informing him that he would have 24,000 regulars when all the troops on the way had arrived, again asked if he would need more than that number.[1] Once more Otis repeated his charmed figure, 30,000, and said he would need "25,000 to govern islands after all opposition by large armed body has ceased," hinting at the probability of future ladronism. It had been the suggestion of Washington that, in order to provide until the reinforcements of regulars could be moved to the islands, and to obviate technical difficulties in the keeping of the state volunteers after the exchange of ratifications of the treaty on April 11 (these men having enlisted only till peace should be declared), as many of these volunteers as possible should be enlisted for six months' service, under the clause of the Army Act of March authorizing such enlistments. Otis's evident reluctance to resort to this step in some degree at least belied his frequent assurances that the state volunteers would serve as such until the regulars arrived. To the constant pressure from Washington to begin the movement of volunteers homeward, Otis had finally fixed May 5 for the departure of the first in-

[1] It was on this same date that the President and Secretary of War assured the press that there was no need for calling for the enlistment of the volunteers which had been authorized by the bill temporarily reorganizing the army (see New York *Tribune*, June 1, 1899). The talk of the necessity for calling for volunteers had led to the offer of troops by various governors of States. Military criticism by subordinates of Otis in the Philippines and by several prominent volunteer officers who had returned home was also circulating in a somewhat garbled form; Lawton was reported as saying that there ought to be 100,000 troops in the Philippines. The *Army and Navy Journal*, the New York *Herald*, and the Springfield *Republican* (itself anti-imperialist) were foremost in urging a larger army in the Philippines.

stallment; he then gradually postponed it to the last of May, and the Oregon regiment, the first to sail, did not get away until June 14. It was plain, at least to observers in the islands, that, unless the Americans were to abandon some of their positions, with consequent loss of prestige, the presence of these troops was absolutely necessary until they should be replaced by an equal number of regulars. But reflecting the criticisms of the press of the United States and the demands from the States to which these troops belonged, Washington was constantly urging their withdrawal. The President also instructed Otis that the retention of the state troops must be "voluntary." Obviously, to poll the regiments on this question would be to invite the appearance of quasi-mutiny on the part of their discontented element, whereas their officers and probably the majority of their rank and file saw the absolute necessity for their remaining. It would be impeaching the patriotism of these men to doubt that they would have stuck by their posts under the circumstances; yet Otis's assurances to Washington that they would "willingly serve" were based only on the expressions of some of their superior officers, who saw the necessities of the situation. The published correspondence between Washington and Manila during these months shows no frank interchange of opinion about the real situation. When it was at last reluctantly suggested to Otis that he try to enlist as many of the state troops as possible in a new volunteer force, he could only hold out the possibility of getting two regiments from among them, stating that most of the men wanted to go home and "enjoy a reception from their friends"; and this number was finally reduced to merely the skeletons of three regiments.[1]

[1] The total number of men reënlisted in the Philippines was: Thirty-sixth Infantry, 476 officers and men; Thirty-seventh Infantry, 475; Eleventh Cavalry, 228. In response to word from the President about the pressure from the homes of the volunteers and the necessity of consulting their preferences as to staying, Otis had said, on April 19, that the "better class of Filipinos were tired of war"; but the insurgent element built its hopes on the return of the volunteers, who were willing to stay but would not reënlist. He suggested also the possibility of

The decision had at last been reached at Washington to enlist a new volunteer force for service in the Philippine Islands, supplementing the increased army of regulars and giving General Otis troops enough to "crush out the insurrection," as was hoped, in a very brief campaign following the close of the wet season. Up to the latter part of June it had been hoped to meet the situation by recruiting the regular army up to its full strength and by quietly enlisting three regiments of volunteers in the Philippines, filling up their ranks with recruits from the States.[1] But, on June 26, the admission had been

future guerrilla warfare, and the difficulties of campaigning on account of heat and bad roads. Implying that 22,000 regulars would not be enough for the future, he said again, on April 20: "Majority people, better classes, wish peace and stable government"; but the insurgents preferred to live by looting rather than by labor, and while he could capture any place easily, he must leave garrisons everywhere. May 11, the War Department again urged the speedy moving of the volunteers, and Otis replied: "They accept the sacrifice which United States' interests make imperative." The idea of enlisting the state troops in a new volunteer force being insistently urged upon him, he said, on June 3, that he doubted if he could get two full regiments from them, and that the concession of travel-pay in cash would not induce many of them to stay. June 5–8, the President expressed quite plainly the desire to avoid enlisting volunteer regiments in the United States, and wanted to make up Otis's army of 30,000 by reënlisting 1000 of the state volunteers, to form the nucleus of three regiments, the rest of the recruits to be sent from the United States; Otis then thought he could get this nucleus of three regiments. The full record of cablegrams is contained in *Corr. Rel. War*, under the dates cited; many of Otis's cablegrams were given to the press at the time, but not always in complete form, and optimism was always the salient note of those given out. On April 7, Otis had employed well-worn phraseology: "City very quiet. . . . Confidence restored." On May 8, after the refusal of the first request for an armistice and the renewal of Lawton's and MacArthur's advance, he cabled that the people on the north were returning to their homes "cheerful and contented," and "signs of insurgent weakness were more apparent daily." In reporting the passage of gunboats up the Rio Grande on May 11, Otis made much of the fact that the Makabebes (who were always at outs with the neighboring Pampangans and the Tagalogs) had cheered the Americans, and said: "Signs of insurgent disintegration daily manifested." On June 14, reporting the Sapote fight, he said: "Enemy . . . will not probably make any determined future stand in southern provinces."

[1] On June 13, orders were issued from Washington for the pushing of enlistments for the regular army in the Philippines, a large number of cities being selected for the effort. This coincided with a ruling of the Comptroller of the Treasury that the maximum of 65,000 men in the regular army need not include recruits in transit to replace soldiers ready for discharge, or members of the Hospital Corps. This permitted of the increase of the regular force to over 68,000. (See daily press of the time.)

squeezed from Otis that he really wanted a force of about 40,000.[1] Two days later, the definite announcement was made in the American press that resort would be had to the authorization by the law for the enlistment of volunteer regiments, and, on July 6, a War Department order fixed their number at ten, not mentioning the regiments that were being skeletoned in the Philippines. On August 12, just after Elihu Root had become Secretary of War, this message went to Otis:—

Secretary of War especially desires to know what, with all the light you now have, you consider an undoubtedly adequate force for complete suppression of insurrection during the coming dry season. In view of the impatience of the public, which may affect legislative provision for conduct of war, rapid and thorough action is important. The Secretary would rather err on the safe side in sending too many troops than too few. He desires to know what conclusion you reach, after full consultation with your general officers as to forces required, especially of cavalry.

As usual, Otis found himself unable to make a reply in plain figures. However, after indulging in an "if" with regard to the possibility of having to fight the Joló Moros (in which case,

[1] He did not say so outright, but, as if it were an afterthought, he followed up a long dispatch, giving an optimistic view of the situation, with a short message, in which he said: "Troops should be sent until 30,000 are on hand effective for the field. This requires from 35,000 to 40,000 troops of the line. That number is sufficient and is based on calculations of last November." Yet Washington had repeatedly indicated that it accepted his total of 30,000 as including all men of the staff corps, soldiers on detail for civil duties, etc., and Otis had never gainsaid it. His long message had been elicited by a request from Washington for a report on conditions. He said the insurrection was "scattered"; its only force of any size being about 4000 men under Luna, while not more than 2000 could be got together in Cavite and Batangas; that the great mass of the people desired peace and American protection, merely having been terrorized by the insurgents, while in southeastern Luzon the inhabitants were getting together actively to drive out the insurgents; that the other islands only awaited the time when the United States authorities were not so busy in Luzon; that the insurgent cause was only held together by the hope of political changes in the United States, etc. Yet he said also: "Our troops have worked to limit of endurance"; moreover, sickness had lately increased, but was "nothing alarming," 12 per cent of the command being in hospital. In his postscript message, he said the volunteers were "suffering from nostalgia." But, as if to take away the unpleasant taste of this news, he added: "The insurgent cause may collapse at any time, and the ablest Philippine citizens expect it soon. I am not sanguine." (See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1019–20.)

he would need 15,000 more troops than otherwise), and saying that none of his general officers placed the force necessary higher than "50,000 effectives" (or over 60,000 troops, counting in sick men, men on detail, and men of the staff corps), he himself made the estimate at "40,000 effectives for the field"; but, mentioning further along the necessity for occupying all captured territory, he asked that fifteen more volunteer regiments, in addition to the thirteen that were already being enlisted, be organized and sent to him merely "for garrison purposes." This was equivalent to asking for at least 60,000 men.[1] On August 17, the War Department issued orders for the enlistment of ten more regiments of volunteers.[2] Already, in July, there had been some evidence that the Administration no longer relied implicitly upon Otis's estimates of the needs of the situation; Secretary of War Alger had virtually forced mules, wagons, and horses, and more artillery, upon him, also overruling his view as to the undesirability of sending out mounts for cavalry.[3]

[1] These dispatches will be found in *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1051–53.

[2] Subsequently, two more regiments, the Forty-eighth and Forty-ninth, were organized with Negro soldiers, with some Negro officers. The Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry, Negro regiments, had been ordered to the Philippines in June, 1899, and the Ninth Cavalry, also a Negro regiment, was later sent there.

[3] On July 4, Otis was informed of the existence in stock of mules trained to the campaign in Cuba, and invited to requisition for everything needed in this line of supplies; yet, in spite of all the future needs of the situation and the history of the Lawton march to San Isidro, he asked for only 50 escort-wagons and 300 mules, one third of them for the pack, and said he had ordered horses enough. In further correspondence, Alger insisted upon the need for 4000 or 5000 cavalry, including some mounted infantry, saying: "Let us get a full ready for a fall campaign." Otis would, even then, ask for only 2000 American horses, saying he could buy native and Chinese ponies for the rest. Nevertheless, the War Department decided to send more cavalry. Later in the month, Otis came round to ask for 500 more mules, 100 wagons and 100 packs. For some reason, he did not want packers or teamsters sent with them, saying he could get better men in Manila; he also declined later on to take more of the pack-animals trained in Cuba, saying they would "break-in pack-animals" from the mule-teams. In October, when the fall campaign was fully on, he was forced to ask again for more mules. It took two cablegrams offering him new dynamite guns, etc., to draw from Otis a requisition for the following additional artillery, suitable for use in the Philippine campaign: 12 Gatling, 12 Colt automatic, and 12 Hotchkiss mountain guns. The newspaper correspondence from the Philippines at the time contains much evidence that economy of public funds was an object of preëminent importance with Otis.

A. THE "ROUND ROBIN" — OFFICIAL VERSUS UNOFFICIAL NEWS AND VIEWS

Just before Secretary Root came into office, the accuracy of the news sent from the Philippines to the United States, both through official and through newspaper channels, had been called into question in a most sensational fashion, by a "round robin" from the leading correspondents in Manila, representing non-partisan press associations and several important newspapers which were supporting the Administration. This document, which was cabled from Hongkong on July 17, was in effect an impeachment of the fitness of General Otis for command, under the conditions existing in the Philippines. It was charged that the official dispatches had persistently conveyed "an ultra-optimistic view that is not shared by the general officers in the field"; that the dissension and demoralization among the insurgents had been overestimated; that a greatly increased force was needed; that the correspondents themselves had been made to repeat these misrepresentations, through the manner of enforcing the censorship under Otis, so as to exclude from transmission any statement that would "alarm the people of the United States"; and, finally, it specified: "Prohibition of hospital reports; suppression of reports of field operations in the event of failure; [of] numbers of heat prostrations in the field; systematic minimization of naval operations; and suppression of complete reports of the situation." For drawing up this statement, General Otis charged the correspondents with "conspiracy against the Government"; declared that he would have them tried by general court-martial; and also, for almost the hundredth time, that he "could put them off the island." He cabled to Washington that they "courted martyrdom, which unwise to give"; that he was "willing to remove censorship and let them cable anything"; but that he really thought his dispatches were "at times too conservative." Upon receipt, at the same time, of the Depart-

ment's request for his statement, he further said that the charges were untrue, that he had the support of all officers, and that army and navy relations were most harmonious, adding: "Future will show my dispatches very conservative." A week later, the President told him the matter was "left to his discretion and judgment," but "suggested that all consideration within limits of good of the service be shown." The "round robin" elicited very conflicting comments in the American press; the general tendency of opinion, however, appeared in a confidential dispatch which Secretary Root ordered sent to Otis on September 9, advising that, in view of the public criticism, he grant the correspondents "most liberal treatment, even to the point of practically meeting your expressed willingness of July 20 that the censorship be entirely removed, only continuing the requirement that all matter be submitted in advance, that you may deal as you may deem best with any liable to affect military operations or offending against military discipline." This action, he was told, ought to appear to be taken of his own motion: "Do it without announcing that you are going to do it." Acknowledging this message, Otis replied: "Course therein outlined, practically followed now." It was presumably in consequence of this confidential correspondence that, shortly afterward, the War Department made the official announcement that the censorship had been removed at Manila. No such action was ever taken by Otis, and the official censor at Manila stated in writing that it was unknown "upon what the statement [in the American press] as to the abolition of the censorship was based"; also asserting that the censorship was quite as distasteful to the Manila authorities as to the correspondents and the editors of Manila newspapers, but was maintained "under War Department instructions." In the fall of 1899, "La Democracia," a Filipino newspaper started by the pro-American element among the conservatives who had originally sought to prevent trouble between the two peoples, and the only newspaper then printed in Spanish in Manila that

was favorable to the Americans, was suppressed by the provost-marshal-general, because, for some reason not made plain, he conceived it to be harmful to the interests of the military government.[1]

[1] *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 973, 1023–25, 1027, 1029, 1034–36, 1065–69, contains the cablegrams above cited, also others of interest bearing upon this matter. On April 25, the War Department had suggested a change of censors, owing to newspaper complaints. On July 4, Otis reported that he expected soon to close negotiations for the surrender of Cavite, which "consummation will break power of insurrection," but which was never heard about afterward; that everything in the south looked rosy; that the ports of Sámar, Leite, Bohol, Sebú, Negros, and southeastern and northwestern Luzon were opened for trade, to accomplish which very thing, expeditions were organized four, six, and eight months later respectively. At the same time, Secretary Alger told him: "Some newspapers report you are to be relieved. Pay no attention to such reports. There is no truth in them. The President and myself are absolutely satisfied with your conduct of affairs." Otis asserted in reply his entire disinterestedness, spoke ambiguously of the Filipino lack of confidence in "republican institutions" and in "humanity," but declared that in the central islands the native factions, let alone, would fight it out among themselves, though there was "still some hard fighting necessary in Luzon." Several weeks before the "round robin," there had been complaints by Associated Press Correspondent Collins at Manila of discrimination against him, and the War Department cabled (June 30): "There is no desire here to interfere with your censorship of matter sent from Manila, but it is necessary that all shall be treated alike." (Otis had justified himself by saying that Howard Bray had in 1898 sent false reports to the Associated Press from Hongkong.) For statements about the situation which had gone out from Lawton's headquarters, the latter had been censured both from Manila and from Washington. In September, Lawton had Adjutant-General Schwan confidentially cable his denial of another interview ascribed to him; as the American press was not satisfied with the denial, the War Department, on September 13, got Lawton to disown specifically the words that "it was time for diplomacy." (See *Harper's Hist.*, p. 327, for William Dinwiddie's account of an interview with Lawton in December, 1899, when he said: "They have got me cowed. I am afraid to talk for fear of saying the wrong thing, and if I don't talk, some newspaper man prints an interview with me anyway.") For newspaper comment on the "round robin," see *Public Opinion*, July 27, 1899. A full account of the "round robin episode," of the subsequent action as to the censorship, and of the state of opinion in the army under Otis in the summer of 1899, is contained in Albert G. Robinson's *The Philippines: The War and the People* (New York, 1901), chapters V and VI. See also *The Forum*, June, 1901, for an article on the Manila censorship by Harold Martin, Associated Press correspondent. See also the June, 1899, letter of John F. Bass on the military situation (*Harper's Hist.*, pp. 218–22). One of the commonest assertions of the correspondents was that Otis persistently minimized the amount and seriousness of the sickness in his command, and even prevented the provision of suitable and sufficient hospital accommodations until his medical officers in Manila virtually forced their needs upon him. (See *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 396–99.) There was much newspaper humor in the United States about Otis's reports regarding the men on the northern

Aside from the constant effort of the Spanish press of Manila to put the United States in its worst light before the Filipinos, there was enough misrepresentation of the situation and of the American aims coming from other sources to explain the desire upon the part of a general commanding under such circumstances to exercise an effective censorship over all publications in the islands. Obviously, such a censorship might need to assume to itself the supervision over more than merely news about military operations. Indeed, it would necessarily do so to some extent, especially in the absence of courts competent to enforce the laws against libelous and seditious utterances; how far it should go in this respect was a question of general policy, as affecting the wished-for good relations between the Filipinos and the Americans. It is easy for a censorship under such conditions to defeat its own ends, even in a country long used to censorship, by an undue strictness of interpretation which shall give the color of truth to the wildest exaggerations. What the correspondents complained about, however, was not such an exercise of military authority as would keep away from the Filipinos news or comments calculated to prolong the resistance, but an employment of the powers existent under martial law in a manner calculated to keep information from the American people or to color the information they received. Conceivably, to be sure, the publication of unfavorable news reports in the United States would reach the Filipinos in garbled form, and the peaceful agitation thus strengthened and given new material in the United States might furnish "aid and comfort" to the armed opposition in the Philippines. Under

expeditions being affected with "irritable heart," though having no specific ailment; but that the "irritable heart" (which was known in Civil War times) was a very real condition may be seen in Chief Surgeon H. F. Hoyt's report on MacArthur's division in July, 1899 (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, p. 397). See particularly *Sen. Doc. 426*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., for figures regarding casualties, deaths, sickness, etc., and the enrollment figures of the American army in the Philippines, 1898–1900. Surgeon-General Sternberg there says (in 1900) that the proportion of sick men in Otis's force, between February and July, 1899, sometimes rose as high as 25 per cent of the total.

the theory of military power which prevailed of old, and which still prevails under some governments, — under strict military law, indeed, — the commander in the field could assume authority to regulate to his taste, even to suppress, all information for the people at home about affairs within his jurisdiction. But was this such an exercise of military authority as the people of the United States, who consider the army to be merely an agent for the execution of the popular will, would sanction? Evidently, the correspondents proceeded on the belief that it was not. There is a vital question here involved as to the extent of military authority under a popular government, underlying all the objections raised at the time, but never fully met and settled. The practical question at issue, namely, as to whether an effective censorship could be maintained at all under the conditions, was negatively answered in various ways. It was in no way concerned with the keeping of military plans and movements from the Filipino enemy; it is doubtful if ever a case arose where a correspondent's telegrams to the United States would have affected military results in one way or another, and, in any event, any reasonable correspondent would readily coöperate with restrictions calculated to prevent such an outcome. But no censorship in the world, short of an absolute blockade of the entire archipelago, the cessation of all commercial relations, and the complete stoppage of the mails, could prevent misrepresentations of American plans, or of conditions in the United States, or of the intentions of European governments, from reaching the Filipino leaders through their "juntas" in Hongkong and Europe and through over-excited individuals elsewhere. It was a very practical question whether full and free communication of news might not better have been in every way facilitated for them, in order that they should have been less subject to deception by impostors of their own race and ill-informed zealots of other races. At any rate, the censorship did not prevent their being so carried away by one-sided reports. It was even more futile

in so far as it aimed to control the information sent to the people of the United States and to restrain the opposition there to the course being pursued by the American Government in the Philippines. The very fact that the censorship of news dispatches existed, and that the official outgivings at Manila and Washington had been impeached, made it the more easy for all kinds of distorted tales to be circulated in the United States and to obtain there more or less credence. The censorship could not stop the wild assertions of boasting or dissatisfied soldiers in their letters; the inaccurate and often malicious news about the situation which emanated from the rumor-mongering ports of neighboring China (much of it set in motion by the "junta" of Filipinos at Hongkong); and the dozen-and-one similar sources of inaccurate stories about the Philippines which were seized upon by the more rabid anti-Administration partisans, and were given much color of truth by the very common suspiciousness of all "official" assertions. There were also, among the correspondents in the Philippines, sensation-mongers and representatives of newspapers whose only policy was "anything to make opposition"; but the men who used the cable to any extent, and whose letters carried most weight, were sober and sane, could certainly have been relied upon for patriotism, and would not intentionally be unfair, while their mistakes of misinformation or of judgment would be corrected through their acting as a check on each other. Every one could send letters by mail, anyway, and it is certainly open to question whether prompt, free, and full transmission of news and comment by cable (the public knowing that it was getting information from all sides) would not have been the saving grace of a situation which speedily became "confusion worse confounded." This question is raised with reference only to the public's knowledge as to the facts of the situation, not as to its differing views upon the policy to be pursued.[1]

[1] A catalogue of the inaccurate, biased, or malicious publications of 1898, 1899, and 1900, in books, magazines, newspapers, etc., would make a formidable list.

In connection with the claim that the facts were being suppressed in the Philippines, charges and countercharges of political partisans in the United States became all the more fierce and bitter. On one side, all sorts of base motives were ascribed to the American officials principally connected with the Philippine undertaking, while Aguinaldo and certain other Filipinos were magnified into great statesmen, as well as heroes and patriots. On the other side, some of the anti-imperialists were vociferously denounced by part of the press, and even by officers of the Government in unofficial interviews, as "traitors," "copperheads," etc. There was evidence to support the charge, in a general way, that the anti-imperialistic agitation, or at least the certainty that the issue would go into American politics, bolstered up the cause of the Filipinos who were most determined to resist the United States.[1] But the very situation itself was primarily to blame if their resistance was encouraged by differences of opinion among the American people;

The books of this sort are here only condemned by omission. One conspicuously inaccurate review deserves mention, namely, John Foreman's "The United States and the Philippines," in the *National Review*, September, 1900, partly because its author had been treated by many as an "authority" on the Philippines. He misquotes the Treaty of Paris, and makes such blunders as stating the area of the Philippine Archipelago to be 52,000 square miles (which is not much more than that of Luzon). His assertions as to the situation (1900) in the archipelago are woefully unfair and inaccurate, being based on bad guesses or equally bad information. He quotes the *Overland China Mail* (Hongkong) as saying, in May, 1900, that over three hundred American volunteer officers had tried to resign to escape the rainy season, and if all resigned that wished to do so, not fifteen officers would be left to a regiment. This is a fair sample of the misinformation about Philippine affairs that was spread by the British newspapers in China.

[1] *La Independencia*, March 8 and 28, 1899, and in subsequent issues, contained much with regard to Candidate Bryan's February manifesto (mentioned above, in connection with the ratification of the treaty), the anti-imperialists' mass meetings in New York soon after, etc. As will be seen below, the idea of political help from the United States was kept more prominently yet before the Filipinos after the failure of peace negotiations in June, 1899. See *ibid.*, October 8, 1899, for Aguinaldo's manifesto "praying God that the Democratic party may win the next presidential election"; and for the American press comment on same, see *Public Opinion*, October 19, 1899. The Anti-Imperialist League was organized at Chicago on October 17–18 (*ibid.*, October 26, 1899). Banquets in honor of Mr. Bryan and the anti-imperialists were held at Tarlak and other Filipino military headquarters on October 29, 1899 (*Republican Campaign Textbook, 1900*, pp. 343–44).

the United States was now involved in a war to establish its sovereignty over territory six thousand miles from its nearest shores, and no American ought to expect that such a condition of affairs would not invite discussion and dissent. It was not strange if this reflection did not have so much force with army men in the Philippines, who, acting in the plain discharge of their orders, were not prone to remember that, under the system of government prevailing in the United States, every national venture must be open to free discussion, but who did see that the Filipinos, in their ignorance of the workings of government by peaceful argument and ballot, were misled by the very vehemence of the criticisms directed at the administration in the United States.[1] There was never brought to light any evidence that the men of real prominence in this campaign of opposition by agitation in the United States offered, or desired to offer, any direct encouragement to the Filipino military leaders to continue the warfare; indeed, though they openly expressed their sympathy with the Filipinos in arms, they have always disclaimed any direct communication with them, and have stated that, when indirect means of communication were offered, they advised the laying-down of arms and reliance on the fairness of the American Government and people. But some few fanatical circulators of petitions and organizers of "anti-expansion clubs" did write harebrained letters to Aguinaldo, the texts of which would reveal the mental status of the authors to their fellow-countrymen, though not so to the unsophisticated Filipino leaders, who took these men seriously.[2] It was quite publicly charged, in April and May, 1899, that the anti-imperialists were endeavoring to stir up discontent among the United States troops in the Philippines and to induce the state volunteers not to

[1] For General Lawton's strong, yet temperate, protest, see *Republican Campaign Textbook, 1900*, p. 345; also, for press comments on same, *Public Opinion*, January 4, 1900.

[2] See *Republican Campaign Textbook, 1900*, pp. 344–45, and *Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, p. 174.

reënlist; three cablegrams were addressed respectively to the Nebraska, Washington, and Pennsylvania volunteers, advising them not to reënlist, apparently from home friends, but betraying no specific connection with the anti-imperialist agitation.[1] At the same time General Otis was ordered by the War Department to take from the mails at Manila and destroy all copies of a pamphlet by Edward Atkinson, entitled "The Cost of a National Crime," dealing primarily with the expense that would be involved, though also using strong terms regarding the policy to be followed, in putting down Filipino revolt. This action was taken in order to keep the document from the soldiers in the field, the author having indicated to the War Department his intention to mail them to the "volunteer regiments who were being held against their will beyond the term of their enlistment." A few copies that had been mailed were taken from the Philippine sacks in the San Francisco post-office. The authority for this action rested upon precisely the same grounds as that for cable censorship at Manila, and the same question as to the wisdom of the action was involved. One of its results was that contributions were raised and 132,000 copies of the document were printed and distributed in place of the 2000 of the original edition.[2]

B. ARMY CONDUCT AND TREATMENT OF THE FILIPINOS

Very much exaggeration and not a little downright falsehood were connected with charges in the United States about the conduct of American soldiers in the Philippines. There is misconduct by soldiers, sometimes petty, sometimes serious, in

[1] See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 970, 972, 973.

[2] For the dispatch to Otis, see *Corr. Rel. War, supra.* This pamphlet and another by Dr. Atkinson (a resident of Boston, well known as an economist and statistician before the anti-imperialistic agitation began) had, at the time of this action, already been ordered by the Senate to be printed as public documents. (See *Sen. Docs. 82* and *163*, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., the latter being entitled *Criminal Aggression.*) In the third of a series of compilations as to the cost of warfare from 1898 onward, issued on July 4, 1904, Dr. Atkinson relates the circumstances of his applying to the War Department in 1899 for the addresses of the volunteers in the Philippines.

every war. In this particular war, it was most important to restrict it to a minimum because of the peculiar relations between Americans and Filipinos; and yet it was perhaps exceptionally difficult to do so because of the attitude which small-minded men of one of the so-called "superior races" will inevitably display when brought closely into contact with an "inferior race." That the American soldiers had provocation for retaliation (for such of them as were not mentally and morally superior to retaliation upon a people who had not had their advantages of civilization) is in the plain record of the facts; and the longer the strife lasted, the more bitter the feeling between the parties in actual conflict grew.[1] From the first, there was a necessity not only for the most stringent injunctions against misconduct in formal orders by the superior officers, but also for the sort of spirit among their subordinates which would strictly enforce such orders. During the advance of MacArthur's column, orders forbidding all looting and enjoining the proper treatment of wounded enemies were sufficiently frequent to indicate a realization on the part of the superiors that there was necessity for them.[2] Unfortunately,

[1] Even before the conflict degenerated into guerrilla warfare on the Filipino side, there were well-authenticated instances of treacherous conduct on the part of the Filipino armed organization. The firing on flags of truce (besides various military reports, there are in *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 165, 183, accounts by John F. Bass and William Dinwiddie, eye-witnesses of such occurrences in the presence of Generals MacArthur and Lawton) tended to confirm the stories as to what happened to comrades caught by the Filipinos.

[2] See *Sen. Doc. 331*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 982–89, for orders from Otis's headquarters, from MacArthur's and Lawton's division headquarters, and to the expeditionary forces in the central islands, during 1899–1900, regarding misconduct of all sorts. General Order 27 of Military-Governor Otis, July 17, 1899, warns inhabitants of Manila against paying duties, license fees, etc., to "soldiers or others" who impersonate the lawful collectors. For cablegrams between the authorities at Washington and Otis in September, 1899, regarding the alleged desecration of churches by American troops, see *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1070, 1072. Otis said but sixteen churches were then occupied by American soldiers, ten of which had previously been occupied by the Filipino forces. In entering towns which had been burned by the Filipinos, it was often hard to find any suitable quarters for the garrison except the large stone church and *convento* (priest's dwelling). Nevertheless, later on, there were cases of retention of these buildings longer than merely temporary necessity could justify, and public worship

there was, at least in one case, that of the killing of Filipino prisoners at Kalookan, evidence of a shrinking from the strict enforcement of the Army Regulations covering the conduct of the troops. This gave some show of truth to the charges, afterward made in the United States, that the orders published were not lived up to; and, it is to be feared, laxity in this respect at an early stage of the campaign brought its consequences later on, in the disposition on the part of some, both officers and privates, to feel that offenses in this line would be winked at.[1] General Lawton, who prosecuted vigorously the

in some few towns was interfered with. There are no authenticated instances of the desecration of the churches by American soldiers, but there were charges of such desecration that would have justified careful investigation. According to a private letter of Associated Press Correspondent Collins (cited in the anti-imperialistic pamphlet "Marked Severities," Boston, 1902, p. 11), he and Correspondents O. K. Davis and J. F. Bass told Otis, in a conversation regarding the "round robin," that the stories of looting had been little exaggerated in soldiers' letters and that they had personally seen the bayoneting of wounded Filipinos.

[1] It would appear to be certain that one or two, perhaps more, prisoners were shot at Kalookan by officers or men of the Kansas regiment. It is difficult to decide what were the facts of this case, inasmuch as the charges subsequently became involved with personal jealousies and political strife between certain officers of this regiment. The whole matter was the subject of a senatorial investigation in 1902, in connection with the appointment of Colonel Metcalf to a federal office; see *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 1421–84 for the report of same, and in particular, pp. 1457, 1459, for affidavits of Kansas soldiers as to the shooting of Filipino prisoners; also *Cong. Record*, vol. 36, part 3, pp. 2992–93, for further affidavits and statements. The most notable things in connection with this case are the remarks, in July, 1899, of Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. Crowder, the judge-advocate to whom the matter was referred for recommendation, and of Major-General Otis. Said Colonel Crowder: "His [Private Putnam's] only defense would be a lawful order of his superior officer. If put on trial, it is probable that facts would develop implicating many others. I doubt the propriety of his trial, and am of the opinion that considerations of public policy, sufficiently grave to silence every other demand, require that no further action be taken in this case." (*Sen. Doc. 331*, p. 1447.) Said General Otis (p. 1448): "After mature deliberation, I doubt the wisdom of a court-martial in this case, as it would give the insurgent authorities a knowledge of what was taking place, and would assert positively that our troops had practiced inhumanities, whether the charge should be proven or not, and they would use it as an excuse to defend their own barbarities; it is not thought that this charge is very grievous under the circumstances then existing, since it was very early in the war and the patience of the men was under great strain. Nothing of the kind has happened of late, and the attendance we give to captured and wounded Filipinos is now giving rise to a great deal of comment on the part of the friendly Filipinos, who think we carry our kindnesses to an unnecessary ex-

war against the Filipinos when he was not kept idle, yet from the outset laid the utmost stress upon the importance of convincing the people, by scrupulous conduct and kind treatment, that the Americans were not "barbarians." Every expedition which he headed contains the record of some painstaking work in this respect. His orders on the matter of soldiers' conduct contained specific penalties for offenses. Moreover, he did not content himself with merely the issuance of orders, but, when possible, gave the matter of conciliating the population his personal attention, and repeatedly, both in verbal and written form, gave his subordinate officers, down to the company commanders, to understand that he would hold them personally responsible for the observance of these orders.[1] At Angat and Baliwag, his distribution of rice captured from the insurgent granaries (except where its location made it necessary to burn it) to the people in need was not merely a restoration to the people of their own, but also had a great influence in bringing them more quickly back to their abandoned homes and fields. When authorized to pay thirty pesos (from Philippine public revenues) for each rifle brought in by a Filipino, he made every effort to spread the news far and wide among the people; it had, however, very little influence then, or for months thereafter, in procuring the surrender of rifles.[2]

tent. I hear the best of them criticize our action as the result of too much sentiment." This was General Otis's recommendation to the Adjutant-General of the army, and it does not appear that the matter was ever further considered. See also a review of the charges made within the Kansas regiment in the anti-imperialistic pamphlet, "Marked Severities," pp. 15–21.

[1] Among the orders on conduct cited above will be found one of Lawton's, under which the pay of soldiers infringing certain rules would be stopped and applied to meeting the damages they caused. So also Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young, then under Lawton, finally forbade enlisted men to enter any Filipino dwelling without the authorization of a commissioned officer. In his San Isidro expedition, we find Lawton personally attending to such details as having tags put on all the Chinese coolies employed with his column, that they might not wander about irresponsibly and commit robberies (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, p. 87). From Angat he himself, on April 28, sent to Manila for trial an American teamster who had robbed native women (*ibid.*, p. 146).

[2] See *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 93, 210–13, for the beginning of this policy, on May 13, 1899, at Baliwag.

The first Filipino towns organized with native office-holders under American authority were organized under Lawton's personal supervision and encouragement: Baliwag, on the northern expedition, and the Cavite towns occupied as a result of the brief June expedition into that province. Professor Dean C. Worcester, of the Philippine Commission, actively coöperated with General Lawton in this work, and later also with Major W. A. Kobbé, commanding the garrisons along the railroad in Bulakán.[1] These gentlemen outlined a simplified scheme of local government based upon that which had been created by the Maura Law of 1893; this scheme was the basis of a general order from military headquarters in August, 1899, governing the organization and government of the towns in American control along the railroad. The officers of the town, a president and a headman for each *barrio*, formed its council, and had, in general, the powers formerly held by such officials under both the Spanish and the brief Filipino régime, subject, however, to the supervision and approval of the senior American military officer in the town, a feature which must have seemed to the Filipinos like the customary viséing of everything by the friar curate. These officers were also made elective by the whole populace, by *viva voce* vote,

[1] For a statement by Lawton on the Baliwag election, which he would seem to have held on his own initiative, see *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, p. 88. For the organization of the Cavite towns, see *Harper's Weekly*, September 30, 1899, and November 18, 1899 (the latter a contribution by D. C. Worcester). For the work done under Kobbé, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, pp. 140, 141, 143–44; and for that done later in the year in towns in Pampanga, *ibid.*, pp. 164–65, 189 (the latter a letter from a Filipino, asking the postponement of the election until the better class of inhabitants, who, he said, did not yet dare to assert themselves publicly, could return to their homes and take part). The general order in question, which was the new "municipal code" of the Philippines, remaining in effect in many towns until 1901, is No. 43, Headquarters Department of the Pacific, series of 1899, and, except for its introductory clause, is quoted in *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 144–45, and in full in the preliminary number of the *Official Gazette*, Manila, January 1, 1903. It took away the jurisdiction in civil suits which had been conferred upon the municipal councils by the Revolutionary Government, except in cases where both parties to the suit gave their consent. In criminal cases, the municipal president was to conduct the preliminary investigation, remanding the prisoners held by him to the provost courts for trial.

instead of by the chosen delegates of the *barrios*, or the *principalia* merely. This brought out no more votes, however, as a rule; the humbler natives were not ready to assert their right to a voice in affairs.

CHAPTER XV

INTER-ISLAND TRADE

MANILA itself remained under strict military government, except for the partial establishment of a civil judiciary.[1] The city had been without civil courts since the preceding October, when the Spanish officials of the *Audiencia* (Supreme Court) refused to serve under the supervision of the American military authorities, while the latter had been compelled to terminate the jurisdiction of the lower courts of the city because of well-defined charges of corruption. Judge Arellano was, in May, induced to coöperate with the military government in the reëstablishment of civil jurisdiction, and was made President of the *Audiencia* (or Chief Justice). The civil branch of this court was reorganized with two Filipino judges and one American, and the criminal branch with three Filipinos and two Americans.[2] The new Solicitor's Department, quite elaborate according to the Spanish system, was officered entirely by

[1] General Otis several times planned the reëstablishment of civil government in Manila province, on the old Spanish lines. There were, however, too many features of the Spanish governmental system in the capital that would be complicated or anomalous under American rule. Moreover, the city's population was too complex, and, as the financial center of the insurrection, its connection with the war was too direct, to permit of the premature establishment of civil government. It remained under military rule until August 7, 1901.

[2] The American judges were Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. Crowder, of the Judge-Advocate-General's staff; Major R. W. Young, of the Utah Volunteer Artillery, a prominent lawyer of his State; and Captain W. E. Birkhimer, of the Third Artillery, an authority on military and international law. The Filipinos appointed judges, besides the President, were Manuel Araullo and Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Tagalog half-castes, and Gregorio Araneta, Raymundo Melliza, and Julio Llorente, Bisayan half-castes, all of whom had served as subordinate judges or officials of the Solicitor's Department under Spain. Of these five, Señor Araneta became Solicitor-General of the Philippines, and Señores Llorente and Araullo became judges of courts of first instances, while Señor Arellano is still Chief Justice. Florentino Torres, another of the Filipino conservatives often mentioned in this work, made Attorney-General under the Otis reorganization, is now a justice of the Supreme Court.

Filipino attorneys. The courts of first instance and of the peace were also reorganized for the four judicial districts of Manila as previously constituted, the judges and prosecuting officers and two registrars of property for Manila being Filipinos, some of them reappointees from Spanish times. These courts, which were opened on June 21, 1899, were to administer the existing Spanish laws (along with the orders of the military government, which had the effect of laws), and to have the same jurisdiction as formerly, except as to "crimes prejudicial to military discipline," which were to be dealt with in military courts. On the other hand, some of the offenses triable, under the Spanish code, only by a military tribunal were, according to the spirit of American law, restored to the civil jurisdiction.[1]

Outside of the reorganization of the judiciary, the military government continued throughout 1899 to be administered on the lines laid down right after the American occupation.[2] Work in the score of wretched Spanish public schools in the primary

[1] For the steps taken in this matter, and the orders in question, see *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 145–48 ; *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 253–56 ; *General Orders, Military Governor in Philippine Islands*, Series of 1899, nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 32, 40, 46, 54, 64, 70, 72 ; and a report by Chief Justice Arellano, appendix GG to *MacArthur's Rept., 1900* (in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10). In October, 1899, Manila's provost court, styled a "Superior Provost Court," was given power to impose penalties up to two years' imprisonment or $5000 fine, or both; criminal jurisdiction was really absorbed into this court and the minor provost courts of the city, since, while the city remained under military government, virtually all offenses were treated as "prejudicial to military discipline." Brief rules of practice, governing also the admission of attorneys, were adopted in July; American attorneys, showing a license to practice before the United States courts or the highest court of any State or Territory, were admitted to practice in the Philippines. Later on, in accordance with the Spanish notarial law, notaries were appointed for Manila and also for Iloilo; the Spanish language was recognized as official for legal purposes, but an American lawyer was made a notary for the English language in Manila.

[2] The Bureau of Patents and Copyrights, re-opened in 1899, simply attended to the investigation and registry of rights already secured under Spanish administration. By a War Department order, American patents were also given the right of registry in the Philippines. (See General Order 24 and Circular 5, Military Governor, 1899; also Circular 12, *Division of Customs and Insular Affairs, War Department, 1899.*)

grades in Manila had been resumed, and was continued on practically the old lines. Under Spain, the city treasury had paid the Jesuit order for the maintenance of the Municipal Athenæum, a secondary school for boys, and this subvention was continued, merely as an act of justice to the inhabitants under the temporary exigencies of the circumstances; this school was attended, however, mainly by the children of the upper classes, and to no extent at all did its influence reach the ignorant masses.[1]

The customs receipts for the year ending August 31, 1899, were over $7,000,000 Mexican, the largest revenue from this source ever received by the Government of the islands up to that time, and that, too, despite the fact that the Americans had during that period administered the ports of Iloilo and Sebú but six and five months respectively. Making all allowance for the collection of duties on goods from Spain, formerly free, and for an abnormal stimulus to trade in certain lines, through the presence of a large army of occupation and the crowding of Manila by adventurers from America and all parts of the Orient as well as by the Filipinos constrained to abandon the disturbed provinces, one must yet, in view of the existence of a state of war interfering with inter-island trade, find in this statement of receipts a very pointed reflection upon the honesty of the previous administration of the customs service in the islands, and particularly in Manila. Receipts from customs had been second to personal taxes as a source of revenue under the former régime, but, owing to

[1] The Spanish Government's subvention to the Manila Observatory (also conducted by the Jesuits) was also continued under the military government, as a temporary exigency. The storm-warnings of this observatory are much depended upon by shipping interests in the China Sea, and in the Pacific Ocean at large, and the service was essentially public and humanitarian. The Manila primary schools, at first re-opened under Chaplain McKinnon, were in 1899 put under charge of a volunteer soldier, an ex-teacher. *Otis's Rept., 1899*, p. 152, gives a highly favorable view of their accomplishments. In some of the towns garrisoned by American soldiers, good results were early accomplished with the schools; it all depended upon whether the officers of the garrison took any interest and the soldiers detailed to teach were capable and enthusiastic.

conditions already explained, they constituted almost the entire source of revenue of the American military government. This revenue was expended not only for the maintenance of the government in Manila and the other few places at first occupied, but also for purely military purposes, such as temporary barracks and hospitals and a large government ice-plant. The regulations governing the dispersing and auditing of this money were at first far from precise, and considerable laxity crept in, with the inevitable bad results later on; it became, before a sharp corrective was applied from Washington, a state of affairs which invited scandal, though there was no scandal.[1]

The possibility of official scandal lay also for a time in the lax conditions surrounding the conduct of inter-island trade from Manila. General Otis, meeting the pressure of the foreign and native commercial houses of Manila for the resumption,

[1] See *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 159–60; also pp. 190–91, for a recital by the Chief Quartermaster at Manila of the various uses to which the public civil funds were put, most of them purely military. It appears that, of $385,000 spent by the Philippine Quartermaster's Department in June, 1899, over $303,000 came from the insular treasury, for purposes not covered by army appropriations. See also General Order 71 (*Military Governor of the Philippines*), December 23, 1899, reciting the rules prescribed at Washington in the preceding May for the disbursal of civil funds. Such funds were to be disbursed, it appears, "for collecting the revenues, auditing the accounts, and such other legitimate expenses connected with the military government of these islands as are not specifically appropriated for by the Congress of the United States." Also, General Order 37, of August 10, 1899, reciting the President's order of May 3, making the Philippine Archipelago and Guam a customs district, with Manila the chief port; and Circular 6, *Division of Customs and Insular Affairs*, wherein Assistant Secretary of War Meiklejohn instructs customs collectors in the Philippines to make monthly reports of exports and imports, comparing the figures with those of the same port for the corresponding months of the years 1893 to 1897, the purpose being "to afford the War Department the necessary data in order to prepare comparative statements of the results obtained under the administration by the United States of the customs business of the islands." Assistant Secretary Meiklejohn also proposed at the time to turn at least one officer in every army post in the islands into a purveyor not only of military, but also of commercial, information. Among the things to be minutely reported upon were "mineral resources and mines operated; extent of forests and forest trees; character and products of soil; . . . principal crops, with markets and value, if known; . . . general observations as to opportunities for investment." Department commanders were to discourse in general upon all manner of questions, economic and political. (Circular 10, March 25, 1899, *Division of Customs and Insular Affairs.*)

so far as possible, of trade with the provinces, especially under the stimulus of war-time prices for Manila hemp, was desirous of permitting this trade and pleasing everybody so far as he could; moreover, he seems to have believed that this appeal to the self-interest of the people in the provinces would make them eager for full American control and ready to resist "Tagalog domination." Admiral Dewey, looking only upon the military aspect of the situation, was firmly convinced that every effort should be made to shut off trade with any port or island not in American possession, thus cutting off the aid which the revolt received from the sale of food-supplies and other crops, and also preventing (at least in many cases) arms and ammunition being carried from one island to another or brought in from abroad. The army authorities for a time gave clearances to many ports not in American control, for trading not only from Manila but also from Iloilo and Sebú. Finally, Dewey (between whom and Otis differences of opinion on the Philippine situation and methods of meeting it, and consequent personal friction, had been increasing as the months went by), after he had urged upon Otis the stoppage of all legalized trade except between Manila and Iloilo and Sebú, gave emphatic orders in May to his subordinate commanders throughout the islands to disregard all clearances except for these three ports and, so far as possible, to break up all inter-island traffic. Otis acquiesced, more or less under a feeling of compulsion, and, for some time, no clearances were given to ports not in American possession. The incident led, however, to an open rupture between the respective commanders of the army and navy in the islands terminating in a sensational and stormy scene between the two which was not unconnected with internal dissensions in the Philippine Commission, of which Otis and Dewey were *ex-officio* members. Reluctantly, Otis turned over to the navy the thirteen inter-island gunboats which he had in April purchased from the Spanish authorities in the southern islands, and which he had at first proposed to

man with native crews under army officers and use as an inter-island patrol fleet independently of the navy. With these gunboats the naval commanders established a more effective blockade of the hemp ports of southern Luzon and the islands of Sámar and Leite, which were now being employed by the revolutionary organization as centers of tax-gathering operations.[1] As has been brought out, the Revolutionary Government's coffers were enriched by the collection of 5, 10, or 15 per cent *ad valorem* on all cargoes entering or leaving ports in its pos-

[1] See *Magoon's Repts.*, pp. 322–24 (in connection with Germany's protest at Washington against the stoppage of trade with the Sulú Islands), for the instructions of Dewey to his vessel commanders in May, 1899, and for fragments of his correspondence with Otis. His orders were especially directed at the trade between Sámar, Leite, and Sebú. In a letter of May 7, Dewey said to Otis: "If we are to see the end of this struggle during our lifetimes, I cannot urge too strongly that orders be given to clear no vessels except between ports in our possession, as I am convinced that nearly every one of the vessels engaged in trade with insurgent ports is carrying aid and comfort to the enemy." Both Otis and Dewey used very emphatic language in their famous interview, but afterwards met each other halfway in a sort of *modus vivendi*, for the brief time before Dewey's departure for home on May 20. Dewey is reported to have threatened to seize the purchased gunboats if they were manned as Otis proposed. (See *Public Opinion*, October 5, 1899, for the anonymous letter of a naval officer on this clash.) For Otis's mild statements about the contraband trade, see his *Rept., 1899*, pp. 158–59. For his account of the purchase of the Spanish gunboats, see *ibid.*, pp. 130–31. He at first authorized a bid of $150,000 (Mexican) for them, but eventually $315,000 (Mexican) was paid for them (*ibid.*, p. 194), out of the Philippine public funds. Later, a transport and two gunboats which the Spaniards had used in the Caroline Islands were bought for upwards of $200,000 (Mexican), in the same manner. (The civil government of the islands later forced its claim either for a return of the money thus paid or the possession of the gunboats.) The Spaniards turned them over at Isabela de Basilán to the private purchaser (a go-between), and, the navy escort not appearing, the Samboanga insurgents seized them and held them long enough to strip them of their armament. This they used in May in an attack on the Spanish forces in Samboanga, thus stimulating the Spanish request to be relieved by American troops. Otis, in a message to Washington on May 2 (*Corr. Rel. War*, p. 980), virtually laid the blame on the navy for this fiasco, also insinuating that the Spaniards had connived with the insurgents in the matter. See also *ibid.*, p. 1019, for Otis's cablegram expressing doubt as to the wisdom of blockading insurgent ports: "People . . . without food and merchants suffering losses; meditate restoring trade privileges, although insurgents reap benefits." See also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 335–43, for a later statement about the blockade, etc.; and *Foreign Relations, United States, 1899*, p. 102, for the refusal at Washington of Belgium's request that citizens of that nationality be allowed to send chartered vessels along the Philippine coasts to gather the tobacco and other crops in which they were interested.

session (as import and export dues, which were later called fees "for pilotage"); they were so enriched, that is, when the money (sometimes more, sometimes less, than the amount legally stipulated) did not enter private pockets, which was probably not oftener than might have been expected, considering the laxity of the Revolutionary Government's accounting methods, its loose hold upon the distant commanders of districts (especially after the American advance began), and the previous customs as to "squeeze" in the Philippines as in other parts of the Orient. In no small degree, the corrupting conditions lying about this new Filipino management of inter-island commerce were due to the large trading firms with headquarters at Manila and branches throughout the archipelago. These firms, the most conspicuous of which were British, with some Spanish and Spanish-*mestizo* houses also, did not, bearing in mind that they were living and directing their operations under the American flag, cease their connections with the Filipino Government and their efforts to "control" individual Filipino officials after the beginning of war in February, but instead purchased immunity for their operations in the provinces by acting as the Manila bankers of the insurgents, by paying taxes to the latter for their inter-island traffic, and even by direct contributions to the insurgent cause. When, in July, 1899, the American blockade of Filipino ports had become more effective (though boats from Manila, Iloilo, and Sebú were constantly taking their chances of running it), and the Filipino Government forbade the entry into its ports of ships flying the American flag (as all inter-island steamers and many sailing-craft then did), the trading houses often sent in their boats under a white flag.[1]

[1] This matter of surreptitious aid to the insurgents by foreigners operating under American protection in Manila has been touched upon in chapter VI (p. 276), and is a thing impossible to overlook in connection with events in the Philippines down even to early 1902. These firms faced a conflict between their immediate selfish interests (in time of war prices and conditions) and their broader material interest in a restoration of peace (without considering the moral arguments in favor of

FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE

The negotiations for peace which were instituted by the Filipinos during the advance of Lawton's and MacArthur's columns were so interwoven with these differences between Dewey and Otis and among the members of the Philippine Commission as a body, as well as with more serious dissensions at the time in the Filipino camp (about which dissensions, moreover, the accounts vary), that it is not easy to determine whether or no there was a *bona fide* opportunity for peace at this juncture, which was spoiled by the failure of the two parties to understand each other. That they did not really come to an understanding of each other's motives and desires, is fairly plain.

The Filipino peace party, most of whom at the outset were residents in Manila, had been silenced for the time being by

straightforward conduct). Having chosen to pursue the more narrow-minded course, they certainly distinguished themselves for shamelessness in presenting various claims for damages against the United States on account of an insurrection which they had themselves helped to support. In *Magoon's Reports* will be found legal opinions regarding several of these; the one treated on pp. 261–64 thereof shows the protest of a British firm in Manila because of the seizure by the military government of $100,000 which its agent in Albai had covered by a draft in favor of the Filipino treasury. *Taylor's Report* was drawn up to aid the Government's defense of another British firm's claim against it, and is mainly devoted to proofs of the support of the insurrection by these business houses; pp. 58–60, 65, 77–85, contain many data bearing on such operations in 1899. One steamer which, under the American flag, went into San Fernando de Unión, Luzon, was seized in August, in consequence of the Aguinaldo decree of July 24, and was burned when American cruisers appeared to release it. For the bombardment of San Fernando and other evidences of the activity of the navy vessels from July to October, see *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 253–57. (The Navy Department Reports so far as published give practically no information at all on such operations, nor on the running of the cruiser Charleston on a reef off northeast Luzon, in comparatively quiet weather, on November 2, 1899. She was abandoned by officers and crew without securing adequate rations, the records and maps of their recent harbor surveys, or $25,000 in cash that was in her safe. See *ibid.*, pp. 312–14.) For the condemnation by an army board, in November, 1899, of two steamers seized by the gunboat Princeton, under Dewey's orders, the preceding May, and the order by General Otis for their confiscation, see his General Order 53 (*Military Government, 1899*). See also Tariff Circular 69 (*War Department, May 24, 1899*), for the regulations designed to prevent contraband trade in the islands.

the failure of the efforts for a *modus vivendi* in January and of the brief parley over a truce immediately after the outbreak in February. Some few of them, however, did not relax their efforts in the way of argument with the better educated of the Filipinos who had taken the radical course; and the rapid overwhelming of the Filipino organized forces in the field north of Manila had convinced many of the prominent men who retained their connection with the Malolos Government of the futility of armed resistance to the United States. The issuance of the conciliatory proclamation of the Philippine Commission, following upon the taking of Malolos, had been seized upon by some of these men, partly at the instigation of the partisans of peace in Manila, as an opportune moment for reaching an arrangement which, in modified form, should meet the Filipino aspirations as to their government. There was still a strong party of irreconcilables, composed mostly of the military commanders, but backed by the influence of the real chief of the now shattered governmental organization, Mabini. The best argument which this party could employ to retain the allegiance of those who doubted the advisability of further warfare was to point out that the terms employed by the Commission were only of the most general sort, and were simply a repetition of Spanish methods of fair promising, with no guaranty of fulfillment, in order to secure a submission which would leave the sovereign power in condition to do as it pleased. This, aside from an appeal to race-feeling, was the keynote of the counter-proclamation which Mabini issued on April 15.[1] Nevertheless Mabini's power was at the time wan-

[1] The Philippine Commission's proclamation, issued on April 4, 1899, is cited, in the English text, in *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. I, pp. 3–5. Versions in Spanish and Tagalog were issued at the same time, being pasted all over Manila and distributed in the provinces so far as possible; these versions, as distributed by General Lawton on his Santa Cruz expedition, are given in *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 70–74. Insurgent emissaries defaced the copies pasted up in Manila. The proclamation, of course, conformed to the lines laid down in the President's instructions to the Commission (which was only an investigating body), affirming the intention of the United States to establish its sovereignty, with the

ing, just as repeated defeats had placed Luna under a cloud. Hence, the emissary sent out to the revolutionary camp as the delegate of Filipinos in Manila, who had held a peace meeting and had also conferred with the Philippine Commission,[1] found

repetition in various forms of general assurances of future liberal government, synthesized as follows: "The most ample liberty of self-government will be granted to the Philippine people which is reconcilable with the maintenance of a wise, just, stable, effective, and economical administration of public affairs, and compatible with the sovereign and international rights and obligations of the United States." Further, there was promised protection for civil rights, religious freedom, prevention of "exploitation," an honest civil service composed of Filipinos "to the fullest extent possible," honest and economical levying and administration of the revenues, a better administration of justice, promotion of public works, commerce and agriculture, reforms of the educational system and in general of the whole governmental system. In reporting its issuance in a cablegram to Washington, Professor Schurman, president of the Commission, sent in postscript his "personal" views, "after a month's observation" (in Manila), adopting without qualification the belief that the Tagalogs had really "enforced submission" to the revolution on the part of other tribes, "as robbers hold up a train," and that, when American troops could be sent to the other provinces, the people in them "would doubtless declare for the United States." In a letter just afterward, he spoke of the impatience of the Filipinos for a detailed statement of the form of government proposed by the United States, something the Commission had no authority to offer, and said the Commission counted on "patience on their part." (*Sen. Doc. 208*, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, pp. 153–55.) The significant portions of Mabini's counter-proclamation (for which see *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 158–59, and George F. Hoar's speech in the Senate on April 17, 1900), are: "These promises, when examined, amount to nothing in practice. They are such as political parties ordinarily use to secure power, and wholly disregard once their object is obtained. For it is very easy to promise when no obligation or legal responsibility to fulfill the promise is incurred. . . . It is a clever and ingenious scheme, to promise us the amplest autonomy and the fullest political liberty, that afterwards they may oppress us at will, under the pretext that the concessions of liberty are prejudicial to their rights of sovereignty and international obligations. We were the equals of the Spaniards before the laws of Spain, but we in no case obtained justice without recourse to vile and underhand means and without incurring an interminable series of humiliations, for wherever we betook ourselves race-hatred pursued us, and that hatred is much more violent, cruel, and pitiless among the Anglo-Saxons. . . . Annexation, in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us forever to a race whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation which hates the colored race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war." Otis cabled, on April 9 (*Corr. Rel. War*, p. 960): "Insurgents consider Commission's proclamation sign of United States' weakness. Has produced good effect among better classes, pacifically inclined."

[1] For a stenographic report of this conference, see *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. II, pp. 60–67. The instigators of this movement for peace were several men who had been of the conservative party from the first, but they discreetly put for-

a peace party already existent, in rather incoherent form, in the now scattered Filipino headquarters (in Nueva Écija, Pampanga, and Tarlak). Two Filipino officers came within MacArthur's lines under a flag of truce, on April 28, and were escorted to Manila for a conference with General Otis and the Philippine Commission.[1] Their request for a three weeks' armistice, in order to get together the scattered members of the Filipino Assembly to vote on the conditions under which their arms should be laid down, was refused by Otis.[2] But as a result of conference with the Commission, the Filipinos returned within their lines to present the Americans' arguments in behalf of confidence in the American Government as one which would do them justice without a resort to arms. Colonel Argüelles was, a few days later, sent back by Mabini with written instructions and a repetition of the request for an armistice, this time of three months', instead of three weeks', duration, and for a subsequent conference to be held in a manner which would imply the recognition of the Filipino Government.[3] Otis again insisted that there should be no discussion prior to the laying-down of arms.[4] There was further conference with the Commission, and, as the requests from

ward some Filipinos in Manila who still retained more or less connection with the revolutionary organization, and the delegate sent by them to Aguinaldo was a pronounced radical (a man arrested in 1904 for connection with the abortive effort of Ricarte to stir up a revolt). The notes of this conference show that even the Filipinos most friendly to the United States were desirous of something more definite than the Commission's proclamation.

[1] The principal of the two was Colonel Manuel Argüelles, who had been connected with the peace negotiations of January and February. Luna seems to have instructed him to express his admiration for the forcing of the Rio Grande at Kalumpit (a feat deemed impossible by Filipino commanders), and this was therefore made to appear as the pretext for the request for a truce (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, p. 406). He was regarded by the Americans as Luna's emissary; in fact, Luna had been instructed by Aguinaldo or Mabini to send him in to propose negotiations.

[2] See *Corr. Rel. War*, p. 978, for Otis's cablegram reporting to Washington his refusal, with promise of "full amnesty on surrender."

[3] For these documents, see *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. I, pp. 187–88. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–10, contains the Commission's statement of its peace negotiations.

[4] *Corr. Rel. War*, p. 981 (cablegrams from Otis, May 3, 1899).

the revolutionary headquarters for a more definite statement of American intentions were yet more insistent this time, the Commission proposed to Washington that it be authorized to offer a definite form of government with extensive participation by Filipinos. President McKinley, thus urged (and assured by Professor Schurman that the prospects for peace were good), authorized, on May 5, "pending the action of Congress," under his military power as commander-in-chief of the army then governing the Philippines, the following political organization: —

> A governor-general appointed by the President, a cabinet appointed by the governor-general; a general advisory council elected by the people, the qualifications of electors to be carefully considered and determined, and governor-general to have absolute veto; judiciary strong and independent, principal judges to be appointed by the President. Cabinet and judiciary to be chosen from natives, or Americans, or both, having regard to fitness.[1]

Two weeks passed before any answer came from the Filipino camp to this more definite proposal as to the Philippine government. Meanwhile, Lawton's column had, as has been related, pushed on beyond its original objective into Nueva Écija, again scattering the men who carried about with them the "Filipino Government." It was after his taking of San Isidro that a delegation of Filipinos presented themselves from the latest temporary Filipino "capital," and were escorted to Manila.[2] Having been told by General Otis that they must sur-

[1] *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, pp. 155–56, contains both the Schurman dispatch to Washington and the above reply. In *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. I, p. 9, only the scheme authorized in the cablegram from Washington is given, which, it is stated, was "in substance" that proposed to Schurman. But the latter's cablegram had proposed a "house of representatives," elected by the people, with property or educational qualifications on the suffrage, and an absolute veto for the governor-general; and this was the plan outlined to Argüelles before his return to Nueva Écija. The interviews with Argüelles are not given in volume II (the Commission's hearings).

[2] Lawton had, before his capture of San Isidro, received a communication from General Gregorio del Pilar relative to the renewal of negotiations at Manila, and had, on Otis's authority, offered to pass a committee of Filipinos through his lines (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 207, 216–17). After he took San Isidro,

render their arms before hostilities would cease, they requested the civilian members of the Philippine Commission to intercede with Otis for the granting of an armistice, during which their Assembly might be called together and the President's plan of government discussed. The Commission declined to interfere with matters under military jurisdiction, and the discussion, which was not renewed on the part of the Filipino organization, ended inconclusively.[1]

Two conflicting views as to the course to pursue had developed within the American camp, accentuated by personal differences. On the one side, Professor Schurman stood almost or quite alone in the belief that he could, by the continuance

it was a different committee which came into the lines, and he was able to report to Otis considerable news about the dissensions in the Filipino camp (*ibid.*, pp. 244, 245, 247–52). As early as April 27, he had, at Angat, independently made an effort for peace, addressing General Pantaleón García (*ibid.*, pp. 140–41); but, on May 13, he wired to Manila (*ibid.*, p. 209): "I have no faith in the propositions to discuss terms of peace; believe it only a scheme for time to enable enemy to gather supplies, strengthen their position, and bring us into the rainy season. The delays in my movements disturb me very much." Part of this correspondence is also reproduced in *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, pp. 68–72.

[1] For the report of one of the conferences between these delegates and the Commission, see *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. II, pp. 116–27; in the body of the report (vol. I, p. 9) it is stated that two interviews were had, but only one has been made public. The Filipino delegation was composed of two civilians, members of the Assembly and also executive officers, and two military officers, including the youthful General Gregorio del Pilar. It appears that they had some difficulty in understanding that the plan of government proposed by President McKinley could not be final, but only provisional, pending the action of Congress. They also hinted quite strongly that the concessions offered were not liberal enough. The American commissioners demanded that they lay down their arms, as a condition, *sine qua non*, to the establishment of the new government. The Filipinos acknowledged that the government they had set up must be recognized as something impossible to maintain, yet declared that it was representative and there should be some consultation of the "voice of the people" before its administrators ventured to abandon it. *Otis's Rept., 1899*, p. 119, mentions briefly his refusal to "treat." He cabled, on May 22, that he had "denied request of Aguinaldo's commissioners for armistice." At the same time he said that Luna was being deserted by officers of rank and "conditions were improving daily." He had cabled, on May 18, the fact of the request for a conference, and said: "Great majority of inhabitants of provinces over which troops have moved anxious for peace; supported by members insurgent congress. Aspect of affairs at present favorable." On May 20, he said it was "unsafe to grant" the armistice asked for. (See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 991, 993–94.)

of personal negotiations with the better-educated class of Filipinos, put an end to the armed strife. Other Americans remembered that the strife had been brought on not by this class (though acquiesced in by at least a majority of them), and believed that the "military party" of Filipinos were still at heart bent on war and only willing to temporize that they might not altogether lose the support of the "intellectuals"; and also that they wished to reap all possible advantages from a delay which would give them opportunity for recuperation, aided by climatic conditions seriously handicapping the American advance.

The military commanders in the field were, almost to a man, skeptical of the peace negotiations; indeed, most of them were, as military men are wont to be, restless of any interference on the part of civilians, and grew more and more sarcastic with each succeeding cessation of armed operations. General Lawton himself, a keen student of the situation wherever he went, and one of the first to essay negotiations for peace, had, from the information which he was constantly obtaining in the field, become convinced that the negotiations were, so far as the real Filipino chiefs were concerned, merely a play for time.

General Otis, whose repeated optimistic prognostications of insurgent collapse might well have led Washington to believe that he would find in these negotiations the basis for a restoration of peace, yet received from his various informants, American military men and civilians and Filipinos, so many bits of evidence in regard to Filipino efforts to secure more arms and ammunition during the respites of fighting and to the effect that the hope of "European intervention" or of a political change in the United States was still cherished, that he was constrained to demand "absolute surrender" as being the attitude most likely to end the fighting. With him in this belief, in all essential points, stood the other two civilian members of the Philippine Commission, Mr. Denby and Professor

Worcester, the latter of whom had in previous years gathered by personal experience some knowledge of Filipino character, and who had been in the field a great deal since arriving at Manila, especially in company with General Lawton. In effect, this belief was that, whatever might be the truth as to the cause of the outbreak of fighting between Americans and Filipinos, and whether or no it might have been prevented, now that it had begun, there must be a more thorough demonstration of American power before any lasting peace could be secured that should be based on conditions consistent with the real and effective exercise of American sovereignty in the Philippine Islands.

In the opinion of nearly all the Americans on the ground, Filipino aspirations (whether the selfish personal ambitions of some of the leaders, or the visions of a "Filipino nation" of the more patriotic believers in independence) had, in the course of events, expanded to such an extent that, to put it baldly, more effectual chastisement would have to be administered. The Filipino conservatives, of one set of views or another as to American sovereignty, had lost control of the situation before the end of 1898, had, indeed, never really gained it; it was not believed that matters had yet come to a point where they could assert control. It is not in point to consider here what might or might not have been the effect, or the desirability, of acknowledging at that late date the independence of the Philippines under American protection as to foreign relations or in some other form which would virtually meet the extreme Filipino demands of 1898. Both Professor Schurman and the party which demanded that the Filipinos yield submission, relying upon the promises of fair treatment that were made to them by the President, proceeded upon the assumption that the sovereignty of the United States would and must be effectively established in the Philippines. In the language, presumably, of Professor Schurman himself:[1]

[1] *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. I, pp. 7–8. The American newspapers of May 7,

"One matter [the Filipino emissaries were told] could not be discussed; that was the sovereignty of the United States. That matter, it was said, had already been settled by the Treaty of Paris, and being so settled was a fact which was now beyond the realm of profitable discussion. . . . They were told that, after a careful consideration and study, it was the opinion of

1899, gave prominence to the statement of "a high official of the Government" that "our information justifies the belief that there will be a cessation of hostilities within forty-eight hours." The basis for this belief seems to have been Professor Schurman's cablegrams with regard to the probable success of the offer of a definite form of government to the Filipinos. After the conclusion of direct negotiations on May 23, he continued to believe in the possibility of an immediate peaceable arrangement, and the differences between him and Otis and between him and the other civilians of the Commission became more pronounced, culminating in the sending of separate cablegrams to Washington: one, sent by Professor Schurman, outlined elaborately his plan for obtaining peace and for future government; the other, sent by Messrs. Worcester and Denby, expressed, in effect, the belief that no certain peace could be built out of present conditions (at least without making concessions which would nullify it), and that General Otis should be supported in his programme for enforcing American authority. These messages have never been made public. On May 27, Secretary Alger cabled to Otis: "Reports not credited by the President are being circulated that you and commissioners disagree. What are the facts?" Otis replied that Schurman had sent the request (of May 3) for instruction without his knowledge, and he had not known of Washington's reply until he was called on to unite in a proclamation promulgating the scheme of government offered; he had then declined to do so, believing the "time not opportune." Worcester, he commended, as understanding the situation, and Denby, as rapidly learning it. Leading Filipinos, he said, agreed with him that there must be "continued applications of force," and eventually the "establishment of a strong United States government." On June 4, Otis cabled: "Informed that Mr. Schurman has cabled his policy for terminating war and establishing civil government. He stands alone, unsupported by a single member of the Commission. Only know from report what his opinions are, and don't know where he obtained them. Negotiations and conference with insurgents cost soldiers' lives and prolong our difficulties. Advise no action on part of authorities. Policy apparently dictates that Commission quietly continue its labors until discontinued by natural and inherent reasons. Ostensibly, it will be supported by War Department authorities here, and to outside world gentle peace shall prevail." The President then directed that no evidence of the internal dissensions of the Commission should be allowed to appear. (For these messages, see *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 996, 998, 1002. See also *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 148–49, for his brief mention of the Commission's labors, and his implied condemnation of Professor Schurman.) Aside from personal differences, the other members of the Commission seem to have believed that Schurman was unduly influenced in his views as to the Filipinos and of the situation by the opinions of the educated class with whom he came in contact, and by the evident intelligence of many of these; also that he was misled by some of them, who did not talk to him with real sincerity and frankness.

the Commission that the Philippine people were not capable of independent self-government, and that independence, for which some of them said they were fighting, was, in the opinion of the Commission, an ideal at present impossible, not only because of their unfitness for it, but because of their inability to preserve it among the nations even if it were granted."

CHAPTER XVI

FILIPINO DISSENSIONS

LUNA IS SLAIN, AND AGUINALDO'S SUPREMACY NO LONGER DISPUTED

To pronounce as to the merits of these opposing views of the situation, it would be necessary to know positively what were the real attitude and aims of the Filipino revolutionary leaders at the time. Not only did they, with scarcely an exception, fail to put themselves clearly and frankly on record (unless we accept Mabini's proclamation of April 15 as the true statement of his position and his subsequent acquiescence in the peace negotiations as merely a yielding to the pressure of those about him; and unless, with regard to Luna, we assume that he was all the time, even when partly sharing in the negotiations, really only biding his time to assert himself in opposition), but there was division and discord among them to a degree even theretofore unprecedented — a dissension, indeed, which ended in the bloody removal of one of the chief actors from the scene.

The Filipinos who had first broached the peace negotiations to the Commission had, at its request, drawn up a "National Constitution of the Philippine Islands," wherein the sovereignty of the United States and its intervention in the government of the islands were recognized (though not in explicit terms) as essentials of the situation. To be sure, some of these were men who had from the first looked upon Filipino independence as neither practicable nor possible, but there were also associated with them Filipinos who had for a time sided with the war party among their people.[1] Argüelles had said,

1 This "National Constitution" is reproduced in *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900,* vol. I, pp. 216–28. It is another interesting example of Filipino constitution-making. It contained the new conception of a "federal republic," dividing the entire archi-

at the beginning of May, that the Filipino revolutionists now recognized independence as an impossibility, and, speaking in behalf of Aguinaldo, that "they were not fighting for the sovereignty of the islands, but for the honor of the army."[1] The commissioners who came in three weeks later said that their people had "lived under an illusion in the hope of independence"; this with reference to the proclaimed desire of Aguinaldo that there should be some opportunity for consulting the people's will if the ideal of independence was now to be abandoned.[3] The handful of members of the Assembly whom it was possible to get together at San Isidro on May 5

pelago into twelve districts, in the main following the lines of tribal and dialectic divisions, but in some cases disregarding these, as well as natural geographical lines, in quite amazing fashion; and especially aggrandizing the Tagalog communities (perhaps as a concession to the leaders in the revolution), which should have four of the twelve separate districts, including two large provinces in which Tagalog was scarcely spoken. Each region was to enjoy "complete legislative, governmental, and administrative autonomy, having power to dictate its own political constitution peculiar to itself." Nevertheless, the taxing power was, apparently, to be vested entirely in the central government, which should consist of a governor-general, appointed by the President of the United States, with his cabinet, the latter responsible to a legislature composed of 22 senators and 110 deputies, organized after Spanish legislative methods, with the powers ordinarily conferred upon the legislatures of sovereign nations, including that of overruling the governor-general's veto, the deputies to be elected as the constitutions of the separate regions (of which one was Mindanau–Joló–Palawan) should provide, while 11 senators should be appointed by the governor-general and 1 should be elected by the legislature of each region. Mabini's "bill of rights" was copied, also without specific remedies for executive or judicial abuses, such as is afforded by the writ of *habeas corpus*. The absolute impossibility of such an elaborate federal system was manifest to any one competent in matters of government and acquainted with Philippine conditions. Professor Schurman rejected it as containing also extreme concessions designed at the time to placate the "Tagalog party." Instead, he laid great stress upon the "diagram" of Philippine "autonomy" drawn up by Pedro Paterno in June, 1898, which had been the object of Spanish sarcasm and of the derision of all but a few of the Filipinos (see vol. I, p. 195); this scheme, Professor Schurman pronounced "the work of a highly educated man, a politician known both in Manila and Madrid, a distinguished publicist, the trusted negotiator between insurgents and Spaniards, and the latest prime minister of Aguinaldo." (*Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. I, p. 94.) When Paterno succeeded Mabini in May, he had resurrected some copies of this derided document of the preceding year and sent them to Professor Schurman, who, as seen, took it very seriously.

[1] *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. I, p. 8.

[3] *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. II, 117.

or 6 had voted unanimously in favor of coming to an agreement with the Americans on the basis of the proclamation of the Philippine Commission. Of more significance than this vote of a minority was the action taken at the same time by these leaders of the movements for peace within the revolutionary camp, forcing Aguinaldo to substitute the Mabini cabinet by another cabinet which avowedly entered into office with the intention of securing an "arrangement" with the Americans. This cabinet was headed by Pedro A. Paterno, the "negotiator" of the Biak-na-bató surrender, and its Secretary of Foreign Affairs was Felipe Buencamino, equally active with Paterno at the time in the plans for a peaceable settlement.[1] The first step

[1] Only incomplete and somewhat conflicting accounts have been published of this action of the Filipino Assembly, taken after several meetings which were the first held by that body since the formal approbation of the constitution in January, 1899. Thereafter, the Government had been entirely in the hands of the Mabini cabinet and the military commanders. The members of the Assembly had scattered, the military chiefs who formed part of it going to their commands around Manila or to distant provinces, to assume the direction of affairs, some of the leading civilian members remaining in Manila after the outbreak, while only those who held executive posts in the Government followed the fate of Aguinaldo in his own camp. April 15 had been named as the day for the renewal of their sessions, but before it arrived the "Government" was in flight, Aguinaldo and the civilian members retiring to San Isidro from Malolos. Hence, of the 110 members of the Assembly (the number had been at first 94, but had been raised to 110, though it is not certain that all these 16 vacancies and those caused by defections had ever been filled), only 15 or 16 could be brought together at San Isidro. (The reports published in the United States, at the end of May, 1899, of 56 members of the Assembly having held a session, 20 voting for peace and 20 for war and 16 for negotiations with the United States for better terms, were not correct; they perhaps had their origin in the fact that it was given out at one time, on behalf of the new cabinet, that 56 members, or a quorum, had attended the session wherein Mabini's resignation was demanded, and in the further fact that some action may have been taken at San Isidro to make a quorum, "for war purposes," consist of only 16 members.) The following statement about the May 6 meeting was made in a personal letter to the writer by José Albert, one of the members present: "It was unanimously resolved to enter into an understanding with General Otis, upon the basis of the proclamation of autonomy offered by the Schurman Commission. A copy of this resolution was delivered to President Aguinaldo by the Secretary of the Interior and the writer; in the said resolution there was contained, moreover, a request for the substitution of the Mabini cabinet by one which should inspire in the American Government absolute confidence in the securing of a peaceful arrangement. Aguinaldo, having expressed his agreement, immediately set out on the same day for Kabanatúan, where Mabini was, to inform him of the resolution of Congress. In view of this resolution, Mabini wrote

toward carrying out these plans was the appointment of a committee to negotiate at Manila, composed of five civilians allied with the peace party and two military commanders agreeable to "accommodation," together with Judge Florentino Torres, of Manila. Lawton's advance, however, compelled the withdrawal of the "Government" to Kabanatúan, and the committee of Filipinos which passed within his lines on May 18 was composed of four men, two civilians and two military leaders, only one of whom had been named on the previous committee. They were authorized, as has been seen, to ask only for a suspension of hostilities, during which the Assembly might be convened, and (so the general opinion was) their conditions of defense might be strengthened.[1]

In the interim between the change of cabinet and the sending of a committee to Manila to negotiate only for a truce, General Luna had partially executed a *coup d'état* which, if

a letter, declining the post of President of the Council of Ministers, and declaring that he resigned only at the demand and by the will of Congress and the President, not having done so before, in order that history might not set him down as a coward in the face of the very grave situation of the Philippine Republic." The decree of Aguinaldo, bulletining the change in cabinet on May 7, is reproduced in *Taylor's Rept.*, p. 52. Severino de las Alas was announced as Secretary of the Interior, and General Mariano Trias as Secretary of War in place of Baldomero Aguinaldo; no Secretary of the Treasury was at the time appointed.

[1] See *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. 1, part 5, pp. 244–45, 249, 252, for the information obtained by Lawton at the time about the appointment of the first committee to negotiate for peace about its overthrow, and the simultaneous change of plans in the Filipino camp. The seven men originally designed to go from San Isidro to Manila were: Felipe Buencamino, Pablo Ocampo (a personal adherent of Aguinaldo), José Albert, Maximino Paterno (brother of Pedro) and Arsenio Cruz Herrera, civilians connected with the Assembly and the executive administration; Gregorio del Pilar and Manuel Argüelles, military officers. After the sudden change in affairs which left them off the peace committee (indeed, offered some danger to their lives), José Albert (a prominent Manila physician, later president of the Federal Party) and Cruz Herrera (a Tagalog lawyer, later chairman of the municipal board which governs Manila) remained in San Isidro when it was taken by the Americans, and soon after proceeded to Manila, where they remained, afterward being prominent advocates of the acceptance of American sovereignty. The second committee was composed of Gregorio del Pilar, the popular young general; Gracio Gonzaga and Alberto Barretto, civilians; and Lorenzo Ziálcita, a military aide, all four still quite enthusiastic for independence, although Del Pilar, at least, had been willing to join in the movement for peace.

fully carried out in the manner which reports credited him with planning at the time, would probably have saved him his life, though its effect upon the revolutionary cause might have been speedily fatal. After the fall of Malolos, Luna, who had resigned his place as military chief on account of differences with Baldomero Aguinaldo, returned to command. After he failed to stop the American advance at Kalumpit, he had not gone north to join the authorities of the Filipino civil organization in Nueva Écija and to make that province the chief ground for a defensive stand, but had withdrawn northward along the railroad, very soon establishing his headquarters at Bayambang, Pangasinan province, which he intended to make the principal military depot, though gathering some forces also around Tarlak.[1] Except at the very first, he paid little attention to the defense of Pampanga province, in which, after MacArthur's column had crossed the Rio Grande, they never met the main body of the troops which had confronted them at Kalumpit. Aguinaldo had the year before placed his friend, General Mascardo, in command of a military district comprising most of Pampanga and Bataán provinces; and, in April, there had been some sharp differences between Mascardo and Luna, in which threats against each other were interchanged and, at least on Luna's part, the effort to execute his threat seems to have been made.[2] Aguinaldo made Mascardo civil as well as military governor of Pampanga, whereupon Luna left the Tagalog general to look after things in MacArthur's im-

[1] Hearing strange reports about the withdrawal of the Aguinaldo headquarters into Nueva Écija, a Tagalog province, Otis repeatedly insisted in his correspondence with MacArthur and Lawton, until they produced conclusive contradictory evidence, that the main body of the Filipino army would turn northward into Nueva Écija, not withdrawing into Tarlak, because it was not a Tagalog province. This view neglected the obvious desirability, for the Filipino main army, of retaining its possession of the railroad, most of the rolling stock of which it still had; it also showed a lack of information about the situation in the Filipino camp, as regards the rivalry between Luna and Aguinaldo, the former of whom was an Ilokano, in more or less constant friction with the leading Tagalog commanders in Aguinaldo's confidence.

[2] See *Hearings Com. Ins. Aff.*, p. 233.

mediate front as best he might, and concentrated his efforts upon a defense farther north. Upon resuming control of the army, Luna had set out to "discipline" it, — something it sorely needed, both in rank and file; but his arbitrary punishments, by no means exempt from cruelty, seemed to point in some cases to the entertainment both of personal jealousies and of ulterior motives on his part. When summoned to San Isidro to attend a conference of military chiefs with the civilians of the first peace committee, he had apparently, though unwillingly, like the rest of the military leaders, acquiesced in the verdict in favor of an abandonment of the demand for independence. At his request, however, after his return to Bayambang, the journey of this committee to Manila was delayed. His next move was to appear suddenly in Nueva Écija, where he forcibly arrested one of the members of the committee (Argüelles), and sent out orders for the arrest of the others, and also of Pedro Paterno. The charge against them was treason, based upon clauses of the Malolos Constitution, but principally upon sections of the Spanish military code (which, along with the other substantive laws of Spain, was, under the Revolutionary Government, continued as the law of the land, except as modified by decrees). Whether not daring or not having the force to do so, or (as seems more probable) being reduced to a less belligerent state by some temporary compromise among the leaders, Luna did not carry out his plan to jail Paterno, Buencamino, and the rest.[1]

[1] Luna was able to bring a more definite accusation against Argüelles, under which he had him tried by a council of war (according to the Spanish military code), condemned to death on May 24, and thereafter kept him *incomunicado* within his own military jurisdiction. A revolver was sent twice to Argüelles, with the suggestion that he kill himself before the expiration of a certain period. He did not do so, and the implied threat was not carried out. After Luna's sudden death, though with several weeks' delay for the observance of formalities, Argüelles was set free and his sentence annulled by Aguinaldo. Not long after, he came to Manila for safety, and became identified with the "Americanistas," eventually being one of the chief promoters of the organization of the Federal Party in late 1900. In the review of the case upon which Aguinaldo based his decree of annulment of sentence, it is related that Luna's accusation against Argüelles was the having

The "peace cabinet" was thus cowed at the very outset. Mabini being overthrown, Luna himself, who was credited at first with the intention of overthrowing Aguinaldo and proclaiming himself dictator, seems, during the temporary truce between the leaders, to have expected to secure Aguinaldo's consent to another new cabinet, in which he himself should be made chief minister. Mabini has since intimated that Aguinaldo gave some encouragement to this expectation on the part of Luna. Considering past differences between them and their mutual irreconcilability, however, it is evident that such an outcome was almost impossible, and the two men faced each other at the time at the very height of their rivalry.[1] It was the old Aguinaldo-Bonifacio rivalry reproduced on a greater scale. During the first week in June, Aguinaldo telegraphed to Luna at Bayambang requesting his presence in Kabanatúan. At the same time, he himself set out with an armed body for Tarlak, where, upon his arrival, he immediately established himself as

said, in a private conversation between the two on the road to Guagua a few days before the loss of Kalumpit, that, " in view of internal disorders and the probability of civil war," he thought it best to accept autonomy (like that of Canada) under American sovereignty. It appeared, according to Luna himself, that Argüelles expressed his willingness to continue the fight so long as the leaders should think necessary. Such an expression of private opinion, it was held, was no violation of the provisions of the Spanish code against inciting to a division among the troops in the face of the enemy; moreover, it was declared, the constitutional rights proclaimed at Malolos were not suspended, among them being that of free speech. There were irregularities, too, in the form of the accusation; in the holding of the trial; in its being ordered by Luna, who was not the competent authority ; and in the arbitrary treatment of the prisoner afterward. This review of the case is interesting as an exposition of the close dependence of the revolutionary authorities upon Spanish forms as well as Spanish laws ; it explicitly declared that the "only step in advance" upon the Spanish military procedure made by the Revolutionary Government was in the concession of an appeal, which Luna had in this case effectually prevented. It is also interesting to note that the man who, on June 28, 1899, signed this review as " Auditor-General of War," addressing it to Aguinaldo in his newly assumed title of " Captain-General and General-in-Chief of the Republican Army of the Philippines," was Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, who had been appointed by General Otis, on May 21, a justice of the new supreme court. He did not come in from the revolutionary camp until afterward.

[1] It was reported in Aguinaldo's camp at the time, too, that Luna had fixed June 13 as the date for his final *coup d'état*, when he would proclaim himself dictator and seize his opponents if they did not acknowledge his authority.

"Captain-General" of the military forces of the revolution. Luna, arriving at Kabanatúan, accompanied only by his aide-de-camp, Colonel Francisco Roman, became engaged, in some manner, in an altercation with the armed guard at the entrance of Aguinaldo's house. Both men were slain in front of the house (wherein, it is said, Aguinaldo's wife and mother were at the time), their bodies being mutilated with many pistol and knife wounds. Henceforth, however the partisans of the revolution might fall away from it, there was never again an open division of authority in its ranks.[1]

[1] Data regarding Luna's methods of enforcing discipline in the Filipino army, his interference with the peace negotiations in June, and his reported plans for declaring himself dictator, may be found in the testimony of Dr. José Albert and of Felipe Calderón, *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900,* vol. II, pp. 128–30, 135–36 ; in that of Arcadio Ziálcita, a Bisayan who was in Kabanatúan at the time, *ibid.*, p. 148 ; in F. Buencamino's statement about the Federal Party, exhibit B with *MacArthur's Rept., 1901;* and in Buencamino's testimony at Washington in 1902, *Hearings Com. Ins. Aff.*, pp. 233–34 ; *ibid.*, pp. 283–85, contains some hints by Buencamino as to the factional differences in the revolutionary camp being reflected at the time among the members of the "Filipino junta" in Europe. On May 2, the London members, addicted to Aguinaldo, asserted that he had cabled to them disclaiming all connection with the peace negotiations and declaring that they were opened by the "Luna party." The testimony in *Sen. Doc. 331* and the speeches in the Senate in 1902, regarding Luna's death, are of no value as revealing the facts in the case ; they centered about the incomplete reports regarding it which came to various American commanders at different times. In view of the reluctance of the Filipinos who were connected with affairs in Nueva Écija and Tarlak to make any clear statements about the Aguinaldo–Luna affair (and also in view of the attacks made upon Governor Taft in the Senate in 1902, for his having said that Aguinaldo was generally regarded in the Philippines as being responsible for Luna's death), the posthumously published chapter of Mabini's memoirs which bears on this period of the revolution is of great importance. Speaking of Luna's return to command after the fall of Malolos, and praising his efforts to enforce discipline, Mabini says : —

"Luna would have been able to maintain discipline . . . if Señor Aguinaldo had supported him with all the power and prestige of his authority. But the latter began to be afflicted with jealousy as he saw that the former was making his influence felt by his valor, audacity, and military knowledge. All those who were displeased by the conduct of Luna were urging upon Aguinaldo that Luna was conspiring to seize from him the supreme authority. After the taking of the Kalumpit bridge by the American forces, principally on account of the scarcity of ammunition, Luna came to see me at San Isidro to beg me to help him convince Señor Aguinaldo that the time had come to adopt guerrilla warfare. [Luna did not lack ammunition at Kalumpit, or at any rate his forces did not fire off a fraction of what they had ; and it is certain that Aguinaldo had, in February, laid down rules

In effect, though it was not formally granted, the Filipinos secured the armistice they had asked, through the coming on of the rainy season and the necessity of exchanging the American volunteer troops for a new and considerably enlarged army of occupation. But no propositions for peace came from Aguinaldo, who was now undisputed master in the new headquarters at Tarlak, nor was there any attempt to summon the members of the Assembly to Tarlak and lay before them the question of accommodation with the United States, or, indeed,

for something similar to the Cavite guerrilla campaign of 1896–97, while Luna had stuck to the idea of organized combats.] . . . I could not keep my promise [to help Luna in urging guerrilla warfare], because I was not able to see Aguinaldo until some time afterward, when he came for the express purpose of consulting me as to whether or no a change of cabinet was desirable. Not being able to disregard the delicacy [of personal feeling?], even in the midst of these circumstances, I answered in the affirmative, and, after having yielded up my office . . . I went to Rosales, near Bayambang [where Luna was]. Some weeks later, Señor Aguinaldo telegraphed to Luna, asking him to come and see him in Kabanatúan, to confer with him; but, when Luna arrived in the appointed place, he did not find Aguinaldo in his residence, and was traitorously assassinated by the soldiers on guard there. . . . While Luna was meeting his death by assassination, Señor Aguinaldo was taking upon himself in Tarlak the command of the forces which the dead man had organized. . . .

"I cannot believe, even now, that Luna was working for the overthrow of Señor Aguinaldo from the elevated position which he occupied; but it is certain that he aspired to be the chief of the cabinet, in place of Señor Paterno, with whom he was not in agreement, because the autonomous programme of the latter was an infraction of the fundamental law of the State and as such constituted a punishable offense. This is shown by an announcement which the newspaper *La Independencia*, under the inspiration of Luna, published a few days before his death, in which it was said that the Paterno–Buencamino cabinet was going to be replaced by another, of which Luna was chief and at the same time Secretary of War. When, a few days afterward, he received the telegram from Señor Aguinaldo, summoning him to Kabanatúan, Luna may perhaps have thought that the object of the conference would be the new cabinet; he did not expect that they were planning to assassinate him, precisely at the critical moment when the revolution had the greatest need of his strong and intelligent arm. He could not suppose that a lawful and proper ambition would inspire fears on the part of Señor Aguinaldo, who had named him general-in-chief of the Filipino army. . . .

"The death of Andrés Bonifacio [vol. I, p. 120] had plainly revealed the possession by Señor Aguinaldo of an unrestraining ambition for power, and the personal enemies of Luna, by means of clever intrigues, exploited this weakness to ruin the latter.

"If Señor Aguinaldo, instead of letting Luna be slain, had aided him with all his power, . . . the Americans would have had a higher idea of the valor and military capacities of the Filipinos. . . . Señor Aguinaldo, in order to get rid of

any other question; for the fiction of a popular and representative government had now been laid more bare, and the grasp of a dictatorship was felt, even though covered up by borrowed Spanish formalities of administration. Mabini regained in some degree his old position as chief counselor, though an unofficial adviser. Aguinaldo himself had seemed like the merest figurehead, wavering this side or that with the apparent majority, during the events of May; whether the killing of Luna had indicated that he was the real master of events, or was in the leading-strings of others, can only be determined by an intimate knowledge of his motives and of the intrigues at the time. Whatever may have been the real intentions of the "peace cabinet" in May, it was soon associated with plans for continuing the war, and indulged the old hope of foreign intervention or of internal political changes in the United States. The reputed willingness of the Spanish Government to pay some millions for the release of the Spanish prisoners, and the known anxiety both at Madrid and at the Vatican to rescue the friars in particular, were shortsightedly conceived to strengthen the probabilities of European interference. Wonderful tales about the certainty of such interference were also continually being told to the authorities at Tarlak by the

Luna, made use of the same soldiers whom Luna had punished for infractions of discipline; Señor Aguinaldo, then, slew discipline, destroying his own army. . . . The fall of Luna, coming back with full force upon the head of Aguinaldo, caused in turn his own moral death, a thousand times more bitter than physical death. . . .

"To sum up: the revolution came to grief, because it was badly directed; because its director gained his place, not through meritorious, but through opprobrious, acts; because, instead of supporting the men of most usefulness to the people, jealous of them, he rendered them useless. . . . For having thus contemned the people, the people abandoned him; and, because the people abandoned him, he had to fall, like an idol of wax, melted in the heat of adversity."

The omissions above are unimportant details or comments. For the full Spanish text of the chapter, see *El Comercio*, Manila, July 23, 1903. Its publication after Mabini's death aroused a storm of comment in Manila: various prominent ex-revolutionists, not in agreement with Mabini's glorification of himself and Luna, pointed out that Mabini had been the chief counselor of Aguinaldo, and as such could not escape part of the responsibility for his acts; it was also asserted that Mabini had become, in some degree, mentally unbalanced, as a result of his physical defects; but the facts as related by him were in no case called into question.

members of the "junta," who felt it necessary in some way to justify their bills for "expenses." An elaborate address to the Congress of the United States was made in August, and the claim that Aguinaldo had been promised an "alliance" with the United States was rehashed in a pamphlet over his own signature, but not written by him and, it would be charitable to his reputation for veracity to assume, not examined by him before being printed.[1] With the respite from fighting, the revolutionary chiefs recovered their spirits, and some amazingly sanguine and boastful reports were again circulated throughout the provinces, especially those distant from the scene of affairs, to reanimate the people.[2] The so-called "Autonomist" party in Manila did not altogether despair, and, as related, for a time published a periodical, "La Democracía," not only to present arguments for peace, but also to combat the campaign of detraction and abuse of the Americans which had been conducted in the provinces. As they learned, gradually, of the occurrences preceding and following the death of Luna, they comprehended that the war would have to go on to a more thorough conclusion, and no organized efforts for peace were again made until June, 1900.[3] They also de-

[1] These documents have both been cited frequently in the foregoing pages, as reproduced in English translations in volume 35 of the *Congressional Record* (the address to Congress in part 6, pp. 6178–83, and the *Reseña veridica* ("True Review") of Aguinaldo in the appendix, pp. 440–45). Both were designed primarily for consumption in the United States. Felipe Buencamino, who prepared the address to Congress, said, in 1902, that 50,000 pesos were granted to members of the "junta" abroad to print and circulate it, and hints that they neither did this nor rendered account for the money (*Hearings Com. Ins. Aff.*, p. 283). The *Reseña veridica* was to be published in numbers at Tarlak, but, owing to the American advance late in 1899, was instead printed at Nueva Cáceres in a very small edition.

[2] For a sample of the false reports circulated throughout the islands regarding wonderful Filipino victories, see *Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo*, pp. 47–48, for a telegram from Colonel Tirona, commanding in the Kagayan Valley, to Aguinaldo, on February 24, 1899, congratulating him on his "brilliant victories," implying that he understood that the Filipinos had taken Manila, and saying: "When Japan conquered China, they said, to diminish her glory, that China was a worn-out nation; but now that we have conquered the United States, what will they say?"

[3] General Otis, getting partial reports, cabled to Washington on June 13 and 14 (*Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1009, 1011) that Luna's death was "received with satisfaction by all influential Filipinos" and "will be attended with important results

clared that the demoralization of the Revolutionary Government and the internal dissensions among its leaders would have their influence in bringing about its downfall. The corruption and demoralization were probably overstated by dissatisfied Filipinos who from time to time came within the American lines to stay, often for their own safety or that of their families, and some provinces, under the control of the better sort of revolutionary leaders, were by no means the scene of such abuses as were others. Testimony as to internal misgovernment, through incompetency, dishonesty, or personal rivalries, is borne, however, not only by witnesses who saw or experienced it, but also in the incomplete records of the revolutionary organization itself. Their revelations of looseness in the methods of handling large sums of money taken from the people, of a continuance of the petty oppression by local officers which had characterized the Spanish régime, of discord between civil and military officers, and of a total lack of public improvements, in places even of the few ordinary, time-honored functions performed by the Government for the people in the towns, carry their own commentary.[1]

not derogatory to United States interests." In *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 7–10, are cited some interesting letters of July–September, 1899, regarding the situation and the aims then entertained in the Filipino camp. Aguinaldo's answer to Benito Legarda's argument for a recognition of the inevitable, asserting an "independence or death" determination, reads as if written by Mabini; neither the diction nor the ideas are such as would, or could, come from Aguinaldo. The various Filipino proclamations cited in *ibid.*, pp. 165–68, and there interpreted by Otis as evidence of Filipino duplicity, are rather to be interpreted in the light of Filipino factional politics at the time. The exhortation of Sandiko, on May 16, 1899, was really an attack on the peace party within the ranks. June 2, when the latter party had abandoned its plans for negotiation, Paterno throws the blame for the continuation of the war on the Americans, and indicates the tendency of the Filipinos in power to rely upon the "great political party" in the United States which "asks for recoguition of our rights." Aguinaldo's manifesto of August 31, in a further exhortation to the Filipinos along the same lines, warning them that, if they do not hold out or the anti-imperialists in the United States do not win, their conquerors will collect a large "indemnity" from the Philippines, having gone into the war for "exploitation."

[1] The operations of the Revolutionary Government, central and provincial, as revealed by Filipino documents, have been fully considered in vol. I, chap. VIII, especially as regards taxing methods and fiscal administrations. As to the continuance

Ostensibly, this Revolutionary Government, which had, in its new headquarters at Tarlak, entered upon another stage of decrees, controlled preparations for national defense and regulated the affairs of civil government, down to the merest details of the *barrios*, from the Batanese Islands at the extreme north of the archipelago to Samboanga on the south. In reality, its jurisdiction as a regulator of civil affairs did not reach outside of Luzon, and was by no means coextensive with the boundaries of that island. In the Tagalog provinces, its decrees carried, except where there were American garrisons, and even under their very noses, in the matter of unifying the people so as to recruit men or to collect funds for the revolution; there was, nevertheless, some disaffection with the Aguinaldo party in Batangas and Tayabas, in Nueva Écija, and even in Cavite itself. In Pampanga, a wealthy rice- and sugar-planting province, a large number of the influential men had never been more than half in sympathy with the Cavite leaders, as they would show when an opportunity came to do so

of the old methods of caciquism, a further evidence is the order of the Secretary of the Interior, addressed to provincial governors, on February 28, 1899, forbidding the use of corporal punishment by local officials. Other signs of internal disorder are: February 17, an order to local officials to suppress robbers, using force "if persuasion will not serve"; March 15, the appointment of a special commissioner to investigate abuses in northern Luzon and bring offenders to trial; March 21, appointment of a commissioner to hold new elections in disturbed Tarlak, where civil and military officials were still at outs and were also suspected of disloyalty to Malolos; April and June, the appointment of similar commissions to investigate abuses in Nueva Écija, Nueva Vizcaya, and Pangasinan; September 6, an exhortation to the parish priests to "support the Government in the campaign it is waging against disorder," urging "people of evil life who are upsetting public tranquillity, to return to a life of industry," now, "when it behooves us to show to the world our cultivation and probity." (See *Taylor's Rept.*, pp. 46–50; for a military proclamation of Aguinaldo, in August, 1899, directed at abuses committed by armed forces in the towns, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 792–93.) The deliberate judgment of a cool-headed, cautious, and conservative Filipino, Judge Florentino Torres, writing in 1901, is contained in these clauses descriptive of the Aguinaldo Government (*MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, exhibit C): "The dictatorial proceedings which were predominant in and characteristic of" it, "under a rule which was outwardly parliamentary and constitutional; a certain amount of lawlessness displayed by the armed revolutionists, who, to distinguish themselves from the civilians, called themselves military men, and the awful immorality which was rampant in all ranks from the highest to the lowest. . . ."

safely. In Tarlak, Pangasinan, and Sambales, the masses themselves were divided, some being organized fanatically in religious societies which dated back to friar domination of those provinces, and hence could be counted against the revolution; others being organized in similar fanatic bands in opposition to the quasi-religious clans, indulging in retaliatory operations which were sometimes to be counted as in behalf of the revolutionary cause, sometimes as simply the acts of marauders and highway robbers; among the upper classes in these provinces, there was a strong, influential anti-Aguinaldo party, dating back on one side to the existence of a party loyal to Spain in these provinces, on the other side to the dissensions in the Aguinaldo camp in 1897–98, at Biak-na-bató and Hongkong. The Ilokan provinces had not yet become the center of active interest, but the strife between the local civil authorities (Ilokans) and the military commanders (mostly Tagalogs) continually offered the prospect of developments not favorable to the revolutionary organization. The Kagayan Valley was, as usual, submissive to the authority which asserted itself; but the abuses of some of the Tagalog military leaders, and the self-aggrandizement of some of the local chieftains who were supported in power under the new régime, were preparing a welcome for new masters. Like the tobacco country on the north, the great hemp and tobacco regions of southern Luzon, the Bikol provinces, were hardly more than subjected to the military and tax-gathering authority of the Revolutionary Government, and local governments ran on quite independently, somewhat chaotically where in bad hands, but in places quite effectively, through the force of inertia and the peaceful disposition of their inhabitants. The tobacco provinces of the north were still pretty fully under the control of the large foreign corporations, and were not such favorable soil for reaping contributions as the regions of the more independent hemp and tobacco producers in the south, where the foreign buyers and shippers of the crops, the

Chinese merchants, and the wealthy natives were very effectively bled.[1]

In civil matters, the Luzon revolutionary organization never, from first to last, controlled the course of events in the central islands (though, had it not been occupied in warfare, it would undoubtedly have sought to do so, with what probable results we can only speculate). Sámar and Leite, being important hemp-raising islands contiguous to southern Luzon, were early reached by a mixed Tagalo–Bikol military expedition. Tax-gathering was the main object of this expedition, headed by Vicente Lukban, a Bikol from Manila, and Bisayan local officials were recognized for civil affairs, which ran on in about the same way as they had under Spanish control of these provinces.[2] The people of Sebú, except for a minority (composed, however, of men of great influence, through their ownership of property and possession of education and social position), were, as subsequent events showed, in sympathy with the idea of a Filipino nation, but had not been reached directly by any military expedition from the north, had very little communication with the Aguinaldo camp, and were, for the moment, ready to accept quite peacefully either party, American or Filipino, which should first take control determinedly, and with force enough to sustain its pretensions. With the exception that the leaders in Negros had been more forehanded in organizing the affairs of their island for themselves, and, when they saw the drift of affairs, had come out openly in the request for the establishment of American authority in their midst, the same remarks will apply to Negros as to Sebú. Panai had been the seat of the Iloilo fiasco; had, before that and

[1] On October 28, 1899, the Chinese tax-collecting "general," Paua, wrote to the treasury at Tarlak, forwarding 220,000 pesos in drafts on the foreign houses in Manila, and saying that he had, since May 18, 1899, sent "about" 400,000 pesos to the central treasury (*Taylor's Rept.*, p. 78).

[2] On July 8, 1899, Lukban informed the treasurer at Tarlak that, during the preceding three months, he had sent 178,000 pesos to him, and had in hand in Sámar over 47,000 more (*Taylor's Rept.*, p. 87).

subsequently, been the object of attention, in the way of armed expeditions, on the part of the Revolutionary Government in Luzon; and the war party there, headed at first by Tagalogs, but undoubtedly supported by a considerable faction of residents, could no longer be disposed of by "accommodation," but must first meet some fighting. It was significant, however, that the "Federal Council of the Bisayas," the nearest approach in the central islands, outside of Negros, to an organization representative of the sentiments of the residents of influence, could not be held together in its entirety after the clash with the Americans occurred, and was, moreover, suspected of disloyalty by Aguinaldo. In April, he "abolished" it by a decree, because "it never had a representative character, never having had its members elected by the different islands which form the Bisayas," and set up certain military commanders as both civil and military governors, being careful to place the Bisayan officer, Martin Delgado, at the head in Iloilo province.[1]

[1] For this decree, see *Taylor's Rept.*, p. 48. Diokno, the Tagalog who had come down from Luzon, was removed from the scene of Tagalog friction with the Bisayans, in the camp outside of Iloilo city, and given civil and military command of Kapis province. Later, Fullon was given similar command in Antike province, western Panai. The "Panai Committee" of the "Federal Council of the Bisayas," composed of prominent residents of Iloilo and its suburbs, never considered itself abolished, and subsequently General Delgado's attempts to assume the full authority granted him by Aguinaldo led to some degree of estrangement with the Bisayan civilians, who also indulged in further negotiations with the Americans during 1899. Delgado never exercised any thorough supervision over the municipal government of Iloilo province. The slight degree to which the Luzon organization was able effectually to direct affairs in the central islands is indicated in the fact that, of the 25 tax-collectors sent out to gather special war-contributions in October, 1899, only two were sent to provinces outside of Luzon, and they to Antike and Kapis, commanded by Tagalogs. (*Ibid.*, p. 78; contributions from Manila had also been aimed at in a July decree (p. 49), appointing a special representative there.) For some evidence regarding the dissatisfaction of the residents of Leite with Lukban's dominance, and their desire to have their ports opened so as to get rice and avert a famine, see the testimony of one of their number who was sent up to Luzon in 1899 to report on the condition of the Revolutionary Government, and found it moribund. (*Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. I, pp. 146–52.)

CHAPTER XVII

THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ISLANDS IN 1899

Iloilo had been forcibly taken by the Americans on February 11, under instructions given by General Otis, upon authority granted from Washington. Tennessee volunteers had already been sent down to take the place of the Iowa regiment. On the 10th, twenty-four hours' notice was given, after which the city was to be bombarded unless surrendered to the Americans. When the Filipinos began throwing up defensive positions on the beach on the following morning, the Petrel fired on them, and, receiving a return fire, the Boston and Petrel both opened on the little shore batteries. After that, the army not being ready to effect a landing, marines were put ashore by the navy. The party of forty-eight men from the Boston really took the town, without opposition. They, and the Petrel's thirty men and the army forces which were landed an hour later had fighting to do, however, not with men, but with the fire which enveloped the best portions of the town, and had also to repress efforts at looting. The oil which the Spaniards had prepared for the purpose of burning the town the preceding November had been stored by the Filipinos, against an effort to take the town by the Americans, and, as soon as the notice of bombardment was received, it was distributed in the places agreed upon. A good part of the best business and residence sections of the city was burned, but the premature landing of the navy probably resulted in the arresting of preparations which would have set the entire town afire, beyond possibility of saving it; hence, while the foreign residents did not have the time promised them to seek a place of safety, their property undoubtedly fared better than it would have fared had the landing been delayed according to schedule. The purpose seems to have been to render the place un-

inhabitable and useless to the American troops, and the Filipino mayor set the example by applying the torch to his own valuable residence.[1]

Iloilo is situated on a strait, like a miniature New York, and a little circle of inland towns which surround it are virtually its suburbs, Jaro and Molo being the favorite residence portions of the wealthy. Jaro was taken on the 12th, after a skirmish; and during February there was a little reconnoitering on the outlying roads, bringing on an occasional skirmish of no consequence, also a half-hearted "attack" by the Filipinos on Jaro in March. Iloilo was equipped with the paraphernalia of military government.[2] On March 1, it was made headquarters of the "Bisayan Military District," which at first included only three garrisons in the central islands, but was soon expanded considerably in Negros and Sebú islands. General R. P. Hughes left the post of provost-marshal-general of Manila on May 25, to take command of the Bisayas. As he had, during the summer months of 1899, only about 5000 troops, of which the California volunteers were started home in June and the Tennessee volunteers in August, and as the

[1] Claims for losses by this fire aggregating over one million pesos were afterward presented by foreign residents and merchants, and also by some Filipino half-caste citizens of Iloilo, to the American military government, which refused to admit its responsibility for damages for any such claims. (See *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, appendix OO, and *MacArthur's Rept., 1901*, appendix DD.) A committee of the United States Senate also reported adversely on certain claims of British firms in Iloilo for damages from this fire (*Sen. Doc. 224*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., and *Foreign Relations of United States*, 1903, pp. 479–83). For a statement by the "Committee of Panai" (of the "Federal Council of the Bisayas"), admitting the firing of the city, and naïvely placing the blame on the Americans, see *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 330–32. Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 523–24, tells of how the Spaniards stored the petroleum to fire the city. The army accounts of the taking of Iloilo and events immediately following are found in *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 103–07, and in *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 334–37. Not the best feeling existed between the army and navy over the affair. For a naval officer's letter about it, see *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 129–31.

[2] See General Order 5 (*Military Governor in the Philippines*), February 22, 1899, extending the provisional customs tariff to Iloilo and appointing customs and other fiscal officers, and General Order 23, of June 24, organizing a provost court in Iloilo with jurisdiction and procedure in civil cases similar to Manila's provost court.

rainy season rendered operations practically impossible in wooded and mountainous Panai, a policy of inaction was adopted on the latter island. Hughes aimed to use his small force to the best advantage possible in restraining disorder and supporting the new provisional government on Negros, and in occupying, as troops for garrison purposes became available, the principal towns on Sebú, which is a narrow but very populous island almost bare of forest. His only move near Iloilo was to occupy the suburb of Molo. He allowed no reconnoitering outside of Jaro, hoping to embolden the surrounding Filipino army until they would make a stand in numbers sufficient to repay a sortie; but they only tried to "shoot up" Jaro in August, and again in October, without abandoning in force their outlying circle of intrenched towns. Hughes also fostered, so far as he could, the jealousy between Bisayans and Tagalogs.[1]

The leaders in western Negros, who had expelled the Spanish authorities and set up a provisional government of their own at Bakolod in November, 1898, repeated to General Miller, after he had taken Iloilo, the request they had made in November to Commander Glass of the Charleston that United States sovereignty should be established in their island, giving recognition and protection to the government they had set up in return for their peaceful adherence to the new sovereign of the islands. They had already rejected the efforts of the Malolos organization to extend its sphere of influence to their island government, and the men mainly responsible for bringing the latter into being afterward quite uniformly rejected the appeals of the Panai revolutionists to join in the revolt.[2]

[1] See his testimony, *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 533–34. Also, *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 230–33, and *ibid.*, part 6, p. 405.

[2] The story that has had wide currency in the United States, to the effect that the leaders of the revolution in the Bisayas definitely set apart Negros as an island which should hold aloof from the revolution, ostensibly accepting American sovereignty, in order that it might serve as a source of food-supply, is probably untrue. It was founded on the fact that there was in Negros undoubted sympathy — a natural racial sympathy, as well as to some extent a sympathy in ideals — with

General Miller forwarded a delegation of these men to Manila, and, after a conference with General Otis, the latter sent down, at the beginning of March, James F. Smith, recently made brigadier-general of volunteers, with one battalion of his California volunteer infantrymen, under instructions to hold a convention which should propose a provisional constitution reconciling American sovereignty with the Negros aspirations for home rule in all local matters. While the matters of government were being worked out, General Smith found the provisional organization of Negros to be in serious need of help in quelling disorder. In so far as this disorder was caused by the general unsteadiness of conditions in the islands, resultant upon the overthrow of Spanish authority and the uncertainty as to the future, it was the legitimate problem of the new leaders of Negros. Such disorder was due not only to the predatory raids of the bandits from the mountains (some rousing their followers by preaching a crude and fanatical religio-socialistic régime, some being out-and-out robbers, — though no worse thieves than the fanatics), — but was also due to the dissatisfaction of the lower classes (mere *peons* on great estates) with the *hacendados*, their lords, and to the resentment of the small but growing middle class against all the efforts to reassert the dominance of the Spanish régime, whether by Spanish or half-Spanish landed proprietors or by the Spanish friars. The police force of the temporary government was far from capable of coping with the traditional ladronism alone, especially under the prevailing conditions, when such fanatical

the revolution, and in the further fact that the men chiefly instrumental in adopting a conservative and peaceful course in Negros were the men of property, owners of large estates, while some of the men active in keeping up the insurrection in Panai from 1899 to 1901 also owned sugar estates in Negros, and were not unwilling to see them spared the ravages of war. That there was no concerted plan to keep Negros peaceful is proved by the consecutive abortive attempts to produce a revolt on that island, resulting three times in considerable bloodshed, and being wholly distinct from the trouble caused by the traditional robber bands of the island; these attempts at revolt were stimulated from Hongkong, from Luzon, and from Panai respectively, and the wealthy class of Panai revolutionists had some share in them.

leaders as "Papa Isio" (who posed as an emissary of God)[1] were able to domineer and cow the masses the more easily with the talk, which was going about, of a communistic paradise. In addition, the establishment of American authority at Bakolod, across from Iloilo, had drawn the revolutionary lightning, adding to the disorder a further element which could not justly be called "ladronism." It struck first in eastern Negros (which, owing to the almost impassable spine of mountains, leads a life apart from the western and larger part of the island), where a separate provisional government had established itself and which was in March inclined to accept the overtures of Aguinaldo's emissaries. But General Smith, who by traveling about and meeting the leaders of the discontented element in western Negros had gained a personal hold upon the influential people which was most serviceable for the succeeding year and a half, and who had the help of the original advocates of American protection, disarmed the movement in eastern Negros by first sending there one of these laborers for peace, who convinced the influential men at Dumagete of the wisdom of the course adopted at Bakolod. Smith followed up this emissary with another battalion of the Californians, which had been sent down from Manila at his request on March 22. This force found two towns of eastern Negros flying the flag of the Revolutionary Government, but not enough opposition left to make a fight; and the unimportant leaders who had clung to the movement when the more influential citizens abandoned it, were set free when captured. The native police force organized in Negros under American military control worked effectively and was loyal, giving the first promise of what might be done in the way of a Filipino constabulary. Quite the contrary proved to be the case with the semimilitary police force of the natives' provisional government, which had

[1] "Papa Isio" was not disposed of until 1903; he was the most famous of the leaders of Babailanes or Tulisanes of Negros, whose depredations were never effectually quelled under Spanish rule.

transferred the old Spanish civil guard almost bodily into its own service, but maintained no adequate system of military discipline. These bands were poorly led, unreliable for service, and prone to desert, and the increase of ladronism was not a little due to their swelling the ranks of the marauders, carrying their arms with them.[1]

Having now shouldered the responsibility for restoring order in Negros (something which the original petition of the provisional government assumed could be left to itself, but which in reality the petitioners felt might require American authority to accomplish), General Smith secured, on May 21, the remaining battalions of the California regiment. Raids on the estates were, under the more effective distribution of troops, held in check, until, at the end of June, the detachments of Californians were assembled in order to sail for home. During the interval of confusion caused by the exchange for them of the Sixth Infantry, there was an outbreak of burning *haciendas*. The fact that the property burned was in some cases that of men known to be in sympathy with the revolution, as well as of Spaniards or of half-castes identified with the new government, indicated that political motives did not inspire these marauders and fanatics. The Sixth Infantry, under the leadership of energetic company commanders, at once began a vigorous campaign against the bands of outlaws, carrying it repeatedly into their very rendezvous in the mountains in a manner quite new to the bandit chiefs who had theretofore been undisputed masters of the mountains.[2] Three

[1] The murder of Captain George H. Tilly, of the United States Signal Corps, engaged in investigating old cable connections, at Escalante, Negros, on May 27, 1899, was a piece of treachery performed by a band of the Negros government's police which had deserted in a body near Silai (*Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 342–43).

[2] For an account of the most notable raid of this sort, led by Captain B. A. Byrne, resulting in the surprise, after a night's march, of several hundred bandits in their mountain stronghold, wherein they had a stockade of stolen *karabaus*, and in the killing of over one hundred of them, see *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 353–63.

months of such operations put quite an effective check on ladronism in Negros, though its utter extinction is a matter of time and internal development. During September and October, 1899, there was an effort on the part of the revolutionary leaders in Panai to utilize the police deserters and outlaws of Negros in an uprising; but the hard usage received at the hands of the Sixth Infantry, in one or two cases of detachments commanded by non-commissioned officers, put a damper on the movement before it could assemble anywhere the 400 or 600 rifles of which there was talk. There were, in December, disturbances in Negros which threatened to become more general and more serious. They followed the election and establishment of a new island government under American authority, and were in part stimulated by agents sent over by the "junta" in Hongkong, aided by two or three scores of rifles which crossed the strait from Panai. The trouble was soon localized, however, and, as most of the new volunteer regiments had arrived in Manila, a battalion of the Forty-fourth Infantry was added to the force in Negros, in order more effectually to garrison the island. Subsequent disorders in Negros, so far as they had a political character, were nipped while yet they were only plots, including one in 1900 which had at least the encouragement of two of the officers of the new government.

The proposed constitution for Negros had been finished by a committee in April, and the convention held in Bakolod (with the attendance of delegates also from eastern Negros) adopted the draft, with a few changes, in June. It copied largely the framework of government of a State of the United States, with eight executive officers, a legislature of two chambers, and superior and circuit judges, all elective, the suffrage being qualified by education or property tests. Distrust of the courts, and of the legal profession, coming down from the Spanish régime, was expressed in the provisions giving the insular senate full impeaching power over all officers of gov-

ernment charged with abuses or malfeasance, and in the lack of any provisions which would prevent laymen serving as judges; some of the leaders of Negros opinion were outspoken in favor of courts presided over by Americans. The hand of General Smith was shown in the very specific safeguards (such as *habeas corpus*, prohibitions on *ex post facto* legislation, on being placed twice in jeopardy, etc.) introduced into the long "bill of rights" which was given the position of honor in the proposed constitution. General Otis forwarded it to Washington for the consideration of the President. Obviously, it provided a form of government altogether too complicated, top-heavy, and expensive for the not yet fully developed island, with its fewer than 450,000 christianized inhabitants, the masses of whom were merely *peons*. Aside from this, though it fully recognized American control of methods of communication, of commerce, customs, and general taxation for the archipelago, it did not provide adequately for that degree of American intervention in the affairs of the islands themselves, which even a few months' experience had shown to be essential in order to assure peace and order — at any rate, in those disturbed times. Hence, General Otis, who had private information from General Smith and others as to the conditions in Negros, promulgated, on his authority as military commander, a modified form of provisional government, which provided quite fully for American intervention, but still gave the island a pretty elaborate organization to maintain, since it carried a salary list of nearly 50,000 pesos for officials, not including clerical employees or any constabulary force. There were a civil governor and an advisory council of eight members, elected by voters of education or of property, and they were authorized to regulate education, internal taxation, and municipal governments (which governments were, however, put under the direct supervision of the military governor of Negros). But the military governor of the island was made the supreme executive, and exercised authority over all matters not

specifically granted to the civil officials. He had a final veto, unless overruled by the military governor at Manila. Moreover, he appointed the six members of the cabinet (Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, and Public Instruction, and Attorney-General and an Auditor), and also the three superior judges, from whose jurisdiction all "offenses prejudicial to military administration and discipline" were reserved for trial by military courts. It was a system whereby the military governor could, if tyrannically inclined, nullify the much-advertised "home rule" of Negros, or could, if wisely willing to direct things from the background, foster real self-government into being, provided, that is, he had the right sort of coöperation from the native officials; for the civil governor and cabinet members could, under this arrangement, become, if capable, the real rulers, advised by the American military authority, while, if they proved to be men out of their sphere, they could readily be made mere figureheads. General Smith, who had already served as commander of the California infantry in action, and as peace negotiator in Manila, and was to serve as Collector of Customs, Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Philippine Commissioner in charge of the Department of Public Instruction, was not concerned with pride of position when named military governor of Negros, but instead with getting results, and made himself a very effective advising director without displaying the power he really held. Five or six thousand registered voters participated in the election in October. The result was a surprise (not unmixed with well-founded suspicions of a facility at manipulation and "election dodges" hardly to be expected among first voters), the candidate for the conservative party which had brought about the acceptance of American sovereignty being just barely defeated for governor by a man certainly not conservative. However, the cabinet members selected were men deemed reliable in private affairs, as well as being taken mostly from the pro-American faction. The new government, though thus reflecting factional

feeling in politics as well as personal differences, if it did not always display the utmost efficiency, yet ran along with a fair approach to smoothness, controlled by its balance-wheel, the representative of the military power in the background.[1]

Shortly after the capture of Iloilo, the Petrel was sent over to Sebú, to proclaim American authority in the other Bisayan port of entry for foreign commerce. After a little parley, the counsels of the foreigners having business interests in the city, the desire for peace on the part of the citizens with property, and the lack of arms in the hands of the revolutionary element, led to a peaceable surrender to Captain Cornwell of the Petrel on February 22. He landed a little party of marines, and he and his subordinate officers assumed general supervision of governmental affairs, leaving the Filipino officials in their posts, until the military government at Manila should be able to take charge. The Filipino officials had surrendered after filing, in regular Spanish style, a formal protest against the establishment of American sovereignty in the face of their powerlessness to resist; in part, this document represented the real sentiments of the Sebuans upon the purchase of sovereignty from Spain and the negation of Filipino nationality by the United States, but in part also it represented merely a

[1] The data used above are found in *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 122–28 (including General Order 30, establishing the government); *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 208, 213, 215; *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 336–37 (by Hughes), 337–49 (by Smith); *ibid., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 231–33, 241–42, 251–52 (military operations); *ibid., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 416–17, and part 10, appendix TT (Smith's keen and humorous report on Negros government for 1900). Appendix UU to *MacArthur's Rept., 1901*, comprising the report of Smith's successor in Negros, Colonel Miner, which tells of the failure of the revolutionary plot in which the civil governor himself was involved, was printed only in the Manila edition of that report. The provisional constitution for Negros apparently was left to slumber in the files at Washington; it is reproduced in *Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900*, vol. I, pp. 202–15. In the Commissioner's preliminary report of November 2, 1899, it was intimated that a member of the Commission prepared the way for peace in Negros and drafted the form of government set up by General Otis (*ibid.*, pp. 179–80). This was Professor Schurman, who visited the central islands and Joló in June and returned home two months in advance of his civilian colleagues. The Negros scheme of government was deemed too burdensome and pretentious by its own citizens, and was abandoned as a failure by the American authorities in 1901.

desire to "save their face" before their brothers in Luzon, should the Filipino Government, after all, become established in the archipelago.[1]

The same interpretation is to be placed upon the subsequent protests against "the forcible establishment of American sovereignty" which were submitted with considerable regularity as other towns of Sebú were occupied by American troops.[2] They might not necessarily mean that their makers were all of them partisans of the Luzon organization; for some men signed them through motives of caution, in communities where the revolutionary party was in the majority. They might not indicate a desire to do entirely without American protection, even

[1] For the surrender of Sebú, see a naval officer's account, in *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 143–44; also *Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, p. 148, for this protest. The Spaniards, upon departing in December, had formally turned over the town to a prominent half-caste of Sebú, but a committee of citizens had been formed to coöperate with the "Federal Committee of the Bisayas." Fourteen pesos were in the treasury when the Americans took charge. The Sebú radicals had scarcely one hundred rifles, and the bolomen, remembering their experiences during the Spanish bombardment of April, 1898, fled from the city on the arrival of the Petrel. Two Filipino priests secured possession of almost all the petroleum in the city, so there was no repetition of the Iloilo conflagration or of that which destroyed part of Sebú in 1898. The British gunboat Pigmy and the German battleship Kaiserin Augusta were in the harbor, looking after their respective citizens, who were fearful of fire and looting, and possible massacre. This was the last occasion on which a German man-of-war figured in the Philippines; on February 20, it was announced that Germany had withdrawn all her vessels and placed her interests in the islands in the hands of the United States. (See *Foreign Relations of United States, 1899*, p. 302, for the diplomatic exchange at Washington on this subject.) In March, Prince Henry of Prussia succeeded Admiral von Diederich in the command of the Asiatic squadron. Admiral Dewey's request for the Oregon, on February 24, 1899, "for political reasons," had attracted much comment.

[2] The "protest habit" became so well established in Sebú that in 1900 the revolutionary leaders adopted it as a harmless means of warfare. A revolutionary leader went about arranging protests against the organization of the towns under the new municipal code of the military government, the signers being both real and fictitious officers of twenty-seven towns. These documents uniformly stated that their signers had of their own will sworn allegiance to the Filipino Government and considered the oaths of allegiance to the United States as not binding, being taken under duress. The Sebú town governments had never been formally organized under the authority of the Revolutionary Government of Luzon, and if the Sebuans had taken any oath to that Government it was long after it was driven from Malolos. These documents were intended primarily for American consumption. (See *Cong. Record*, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3491–95, for English translations.)

against internal disorder; but they were at least evidence of a widespread desire among Filipinos, shared also by the peacefully inclined Sebuans, for the opportunity to run their own local affairs, without either clerical or military dictation — a desire capable of rapidly expanding, under circumstances which should foster a fear that the Americans would reëstablish the old régime, into a more decided and more pretentious aspiration for nationality, such as the radical Sebuan leaders already upheld. Like the rest of the Bisayas, Sebú was behind the Tagalog provinces in the sentiment for nationality. Circumstances, however, were now favorable for forcing its growth. Most of all, the course of events depended upon American management in this island.

Upon learning that Sebú had been taken, General Otis sent down a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, to support, if necessary, the maintenance of order by the navy, which remained in control of affairs for three weeks. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Hamer arrived on the scene about the middle of March, to take command of the new sub-district of the Bisayan military district. Army officers were appointed to serve as port officials, the provisional tariff being extended to Sebú. It was not, however, at first designed to assume very much more direct control of internal affairs in the city and in the island than the navy had exercised; for it was hoped that the example of Negros might be copied and a native government of Sebú be organized under military protection.[1] On April 16,

[1] General Order 8 (*Military Governor in the Philippines*), of March 14, 1899, extending the provisional tariff to Sebú, contained these clauses: "The collection of internal revenue, the issuing of licenses, the imposition of fines, etc., and all other measures which concern strictly the interior economy of the island, will be held in abeyance for future consideration. It is probable that duties of this character can be conducted by natives of the island who desire to become United States citizens, and by such measures that a quasi-civil administration within the island, under military supervision, tentative in character but looking to permanency, can be organized. This matter will be made the subject of mature deliberation. In the mean time the internal revenues will be collected by the civil officers now performing that duty, and will be held subject to necessary internal expenditures. It is desired that the citizens of the island, acknowledging the supremacy of the

a "popular junta" at Sebú, attended by representatives of forty out of fifty-eight towns on the island, chose Julio Llorente, one of the conservatives generally understood to recognize the necessity for American superior control in the archipelago, to be chief of the province, in place of the leader of the party which had assumed the upper hand after the departure of the Spaniards and was generally credited with desiring to keep it. Colonel Hamer called for troops with which to garrison the principal towns of the island, being confident it could be done peacefully. But the commanding general at Manila felt he could spare no more forces from Luzon. So, to use his own comment a few months later: "We permitted Sebú to drift and foment opposition."[1] In Sebú city itself the native police force became unable to cope with the disorder, and the American soldiers there garrisoned were put on patrol duty at night. Early in June, a prominent advocate of accommodation with the Americans was assassinated before his own door, and a long list of other conservatives was reported to be marked for slaughter. A battalion of the Tennessee volunteers and a platoon of artillery were then hurried over from Iloilo. Colonel Hamer decided to extend the scope of American authority, so far as his force would permit, and beginning with San Nicolás, adjoining the capital, four or five towns lying to the southward were occupied in June and July — peacefully, except for

United States Government, may be enabled under United States guidance to put in operation a form of civil representative government which the United States can approve, and which may insure the peace and prosperity of the inhabitants." General Order 23, of June 24, 1899, prescribed the organization of a provost court in Sebú as in Iloilo; this was one sign that the hope of another Negros government had already been abandoned.

[1] *Otis's Rept., 1899*, p. 129. His further remark (*ibid.*, p. 130) that control of Sebú would be easy to gain, "when the Tagalog is driven out," should be checked by the remark that the revolutionary party on Sebú was always officered and composed of Bisayans, natives of the island, and no Tagalog force ever landed there as in Panai, though some rifles were obtained from Luzon or from Lukban in Samar. The request for more troops for Sebú was made by Hamer in April. Until July, Otis continued to cling to his estimate of 30,000 troops as sufficient for the archipelago.

the firing of protests.[1] During July and August, however, the American troops stirred up a few skirmishes as the result of scouts through the hills which overlooked the city of Sebú. The opposition appeared to have obtained a more definite organization by the beginning of September, and also some reinforcement of arms. They had taken a stand on a hill four miles back of the capital, had planted a half-dozen old brass smoothbore cannon in their crude fortifications, and were reported to number 2000 or more men, though no more than 250, and probably not that number, had rifles. When a battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry arrived to relieve the Tennesseans, whose regiment was assembled in the harbor of Sebú ready to sail for home, the latter volunteered to remain long enough to clear these hilltops, which was done, after a little rough marching, on September 21. The *status quo* was thenceforward maintained in Sebú until more troops were available in December, 1899, when bushwhacking, aimless warfare began, to last for more than two years.[2]

Immediately after the exchange of ratifications of the treaty in April, the Spanish commander in the Philippines asked that his garrisons in Mindanau and Joló be relieved, that they might be sent home. General Otis had not the troops to spare and was compelled to procrastinate. Late in April, the little Filipino party which was organizing for coöperation with the Revolutionary Government of Luzon in the towns of Chris-

[1] Colonel Hamer's instructions to the officers sent to occupy the towns are worth quoting : " Respect the rights of persons and property in the territory occupied ; treat the inhabitants thereof with equal and exact justice, at all times tempered with kindness, with a view to establishing friendly relations between the people of this island and the United States ; set a good example for the natives by enforcing strict discipline in your own command ; . . . meet such other and future emergencies as may unexpectedly arise . . . by the exercise of that God-given intelligence that an officer is presumed to possess as a prerequisite to holding a commission in the Army of the United States."

[2] The data regarding Sebú in 1899, after it came under army control, will be found in *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 122, 128–30 ; *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 350–52 (Hamer's report, also given in *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, pp. 147–48) ; *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 231–33 (Hughes) ; *ibid.*, part 6, pp. 405–15 (the September fight); *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 164–66, 171–72, 174.

tians at the end of the Samboanga peninsula obtained a dozen little machine-guns and several hundred rifles from the eleven small gunboats they boarded off Basilán after their sale by the Spaniards to the American military government through an intermediary.[1] If the Spaniards at Basilán did not connive at this capture, as Otis believed, they at least manifested no displeasure at seeing the prospect of opposition to the Americans thus strengthened; and they were then told that their garrisons could not be relieved for a time. In May, the Filipino revolutionaries outside of the town of Samboanga attacked the Spaniards themselves with the weapons they had secured from the gunboats. The Spaniards then announced their intention to withdraw at once from soil which was no longer their own to defend. Otis was authorized by Washington to meet the situation as he thought best, after conference with Dewey,[2] and decided to send American troops to Joló but to let Samboanga take care of itself until later. Two battalions of the Twenty-third Infantry exchanged places with the Spanish troops at Joló on May 19, and the Spaniards at the same time left Samboanga, wherein their garrisons in Mindanau had already been consolidated. In July, General J. C. Bates was sent to Joló to arrange a treaty with the Sultan of that group, whereby he should recognize American sovereignty and the Spanish system of subsidizing him should be continued. Over a month was occupied in coaxing the Sultan's humors and in investigating conditions in the southern Philippines. In September, General Bates returned with troops which he decided it was better to place at two other points in the Sulú group than at Samboanga. The latter point was watched by Com-

[1] See above, p. 75, and footnote.

[2] Upon receipt of Otis's message of May 14, Secretary Alger telegraphed to President McKinley at Hot Springs, Virginia, suggesting that a gunboat and battalion of troops be sent to Samboanga, relieving the Spaniards. The President's reply is worth quoting: "I fear it would not be prudent at this great distance to give orders concerning affairs at Samboanga. General Otis has such knowledge of the situation and of the strength at his disposal that the largest discretion should be left to him." (Perhaps Iloilo was in mind.)

mander Very with the little gunboat Castine, until its factions quarreled in November and one seized the town and invited the Americans to land and establish order. The navy also maintained the Balabak light on Palawan Island, and patroled that island and the Sulú group in the endeavor to enforce the prohibition of all trade from Singapore, Borneo, and other points, until the southern Philippines were garrisoned with more troops and their ports were opened, in December, 1899.[1]

[1] In connection with the above summary, data as to the relation of the southern part of the archipelago to the general military situation in 1899 may be obtained from *Otis's Rept., 1899*, pp. 130–34; *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 335–43; *Sen. Doc. 136*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (the Joló treaty and negotiations); *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 418–30, 579–84. Professor Schurman claimed some credit for the Joló treaty, as being, like the Negros government, originally a recommendation of his (*Rept. Phil. Comm.*, 1900, vol. I, p. 101); it also is now quite uniformly recognized to have constituted a hindrance rather than a help toward consistent governmental policy.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FILIPINO "GOVERNMENT" AND ITS ELUSIVE ARMY

The fact that, in the very midst of the rainy season, the fall campaign was finally begun, and for the most part carried out, indicates that the quiescence in Luzon during the summer months was imposed rather by the lack of troops than by climatic conditions. In the vicinity of Manila the chief breaks in this tranquillity were produced by efforts to reopen and render secure traffic with the regions bordering on the Laguna de Bay. Late in July, there being plenty of water for a successful landing at Kalamba (from the move on which General Lawton had been recalled in April), troops were withdrawn from Morong, on the north side of the lake, and, under Brigadier-General R. H. Hall, took and occupied both Kalamba and Los Baños, where the Spanish army had had a sanitarium and mineral baths. Contraband operations were, however, so actively conducted between the lake ports and Manila, and between points on the north and south shores of Manila Bay, where trading had been allowed to be resumed, that restrictions on the nature of the articles of trade and the manner of conducting it were adopted. These only served to check, not to prevent, contraband operations; but General Otis regarded this as preferable to an entire abolition of the trade, on account of the reports he received about the privations of the inhabitants of regions it was expected would soon be placed under American authority.[1] Attacks on Kalamba were quite

[1] The navy maintained its efforts to establish an absolute blockade between the islands of the archipelago. In September, the Charleston having been fired upon by the Filipinos at Subig (where they had mounted one of the four 15-centimeter guns the Spaniards had uselessly transferred to Isla Grande in April, 1898), the navy forces silenced and destroyed this battery and tried to find the other Spanish guns which had been left there when Admiral Dewey had, in July, 1898, virtually bestowed control of Subig Bay upon the Filipinos. During the same month, one

frequent, and seemed to be connected with a general renewal of activity all along the American line south of Manila, as the Filipinos saw that more troops were arriving and that preparations were being made for another campaign against them to the north.[1] Frederick D. Grant, who had been sent over as a brigadier-general of volunteers, and was placed in command in Cavite, had to do a good deal of scouting and petty skirmishing to keep his garrisons at Imus and Bakoor from being put on the defensive.[2] Early in October, General Lawton personally surveyed the situation in front of this portion of his command, and it was deemed necessary to conduct another "punitive expedition" in Cavite before beginning the northern campaign. Brigadier-General Theodore Schwan, then General Otis's chief of staff, conducted this operation, from October 7 to 14, having 1800 men, and being assisted by the navy, whose gunboats engaged the attention of the towns west of Bakoor along the bay and whose marines drove inland the Filipinos west of Novaleta. The country was found fully intrenched, as it had been against the Spaniards in 1897, and it was estimated that General Trias had some 1500 rifles under him. But, except during the first day's advance westward to Old Cavite, little opposition, deserving even to be called skirmishes, was encountered, and the towns were abandoned when entered, most of the population, as well as the armed Filipinos, giving way in accordance with the plan of action

of the little gunboats went aground off the shore of Bataán and was attacked by a Filipino force, who killed Naval Cadet Wood and four seamen and made four other American seamen prisoners. For these incidents, and the naval force in the Philippines at this time, see *Rept. Sec. Navy, 1900*, p. 1114; *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 253–57; and Albert G. Robinson's *The Philippines: The War and the People*, pp. 362–65.

[1] For the Kalamba–Los Baños movement, contraband traffic, and the recrudescence of hospitality on the south, see *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 11, 16–17, 20–21; *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 166–69; and *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 225–28. There are also reports of another "uprising" to be attempted in Manila, with a view to seizing the arsenal in the walled city.

[2] See Grant's report of these affairs, September 29 to October 8, *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 431–64.

they had adopted before Primo de Rivera in 1897. The prisoners taken were released, and no burning was allowed. The roads were in such shape as to make the expedition no light undertaking, regardless of the lack of opposition. Turning further inward, Schwan took the populous towns of Malabon and Dasmariñas with little trouble, and wished to garrison them permanently; but General Otis forbade this, and the column withdrew again to Bakoor and Imus.[1]

At the end of August, the American army in the Philippines numbered about 31,000 men, of whom some 3000 were state volunteers about to be returned home.[2] In October, 8500 men and officers of the new United States volunteers reached Manila, raising the effective force to over 35,000. In November, the arrivals numbered 5660, the effective force at the end of that month being 41,000 (excluding the sick, but not men on the staff corps and detailed for civilian duties); but out of the reinforcements two regiments had been sent to the central and southern islands.[3] Of, perhaps, 35,000 rifles in Filipino hands, about 25,000 were thought to be in that part of Luzon which lay north of the Pasig, mostly concentrated in the central provinces, as 2500 would probably be an outside estimate of those carried by the Tagalog and other forces in the Ilokan provinces and the Kagayan Valley. Hence there arose the idea of hemming in the forces centering about Aguinaldo's headquarters at Tarlak, which, it was thought, would make it possible all the more easily thereafter to deal with the limited number of rifles in the northernmost provinces of Luzon, in southern Luzon, and in the cen-

[1] See Schwan's full report in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. 1, part 6, pp. 465–527; also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 17–18. For the work of the marines at Novaleta, see *Rept. Sec. Navy, 1900*, pp. 1105–09, 1142–43.

[2] The Tennessee volunteers, the last of the state troops in the service of the United States during the war with Spain, were mustered out at San Francisco on November 23, 1899.

[3] In December, the additions to the force numbered nearly 13,000, and in January, 5500, including the last two regiments of the volunteer force authorized by law, the Forty-eighth and Forty-ninth Infantry, for whom the President had issued a call on September 2, 1899. This brought the effective force up to 55,000 men, and here General Otis thought it would rest (*Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 14).

tral islands.[1] With the troops arriving in October and the further reinforcements to follow, and under the stress of cablegrams from Washington urging active operations,[2] such an encompassing movement was planned in September, and was set on foot as soon as the Schwan scouts in Cavite had restored temporary quiet to the south of the city. It was only then, apparently, that Lawton could be detached from his supervision of the minute and rather purposeless operations in the neighborhood of Manila. After MacArthur had moved a little farther up the railroad, Brigadier-General S. M. B. Young, one of the recently arrived general officers, had been sent to San Fernando, Pampanga, to supervise the preparation of transportation, supplies and troops for a second advance by Lawton through Nueva Écija.[3] Several companies of native

[1] See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 15.

[2] Secretary of War Root, who had given especial attention to the recruiting and hurrying forward of reinforcements, cabled Otis on September 16, calling attention to the latter's plan for occupying ports in northern Luzon to "cut off insurgent supplies" and "supplant Tagalog domination" (as announced by Otis in cablegrams of February 20 and July 16 preceding), and giving a hint that celerity in executing these movements would be appreciated; Otis was told that he could have the assistance of the navy, both with ships and by the landing of marines. He answered rather vaguely as to the necessity of having more troops, but said he still thought he could "occupy northern Luzon latter part of month [September]." On September 18, the Secretary reiterated his belief in the desirability of occupying Dagupan, thus controlling both ends of the railroad, to which the Filipino organization was clinging; he also wished to make the Philippines a military division. He asked Otis again, on September 28, for a reply and recommendations on this point, and the latter thereupon named as headquarters of the four proposed departments of the division Manila, Iloilo, Dagupan, and Samboanga, the last two points not yet occupied. See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1069–70, 1076–77. (This military division was not created until the following March.)

[3] See *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, part 5, pp. 220–34, for Young's account of his first campaign experience in the Philippines, a movement in August, 1899, on the Filipinos north of Manila beyond the waterworks, resulting in the occupation of San Mateo, which was not held (and in a precisely similar movement against which Lawton lost his life the following December). The hostility of the whole population of the Marikina Valley and the firing on white flags in two instances are features to be noted. But the most interesting feature of the report, in connection with the campaign Lawton and Young were to begin in October, is this bit of prophecy (p. 222): "It is my belief that with 3000 to 5000 men such as I saw engaged on August 12, assisted by 2500 cavalry, the whole force, of course, being properly equipped with transportation and supplies, it would be possible in thirty days to

scouts were organized among the Makabebes who had seen military service under the Spanish flag and who had been ready to reënlist and to declare themselves for the new sovereign as soon as American authority was established in their district of Pampanga. Part of them were for use with Lawton's column, and part for service which American soldiers could not perform in patroling the bayous of lower Pampanga and Bulakán, south and west of the railroad in MacArthur's division, where guerrilla warfare had already begun.[1]

About a week after Aguinaldo had put himself in direct command of the Filipino army in June, a pretentious demonstration had been made against the American headquarters in San Fernando, Aguinaldo himself being in the neighborhood, and hoping, if not to cut off this advanced American post from Kalumpit, at least to make his followers feel that they had an active commander. His repulse did not stop the Filipinos from putting on the appearance of an aggressive front, though no further attack of so extensive a character was attempted.[2] Despite the policy of inaction, it had been necessary to

disperse the armed forces of the enemy and irretrievably break the power of Aguinaldo in this island." Indeed, in view of the disappointments and delays which Lawton and Young suffered in their fall campaign, and the ease with which Aguinaldo's forces were put to flight, this passage seems almost like pointed retrospect. (The report in question, though dated August, 1899, seemed not to reach Washington till 1901.)

[1] Natives, including Tagalogs and other Pampangans besides the Makabebes, had already been used to some extent as guides, and even, in petty squadrons, as scouts, it not being difficult to secure their services as operations progressed in 1899. This, however, was the first move made toward the formal organization of such auxiliaries. The Makabebes had gained under Spanish rule a reputation for cruelties and excesses when armed for service among their neighbors, and the fears entertained about them on this score were not long afterward realized in Tayabas, where they so terrorized the populace that they were withdrawn. See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 13–14.

[2] General MacArthur declared (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, p. 18): "Historically, this demonstration must be classified as a decisive event, although from a purely military point of view, it was lacking in pretty nearly every element of military sagacity. . . . It evinced a degree of recuperative pertinacity amounting almost to temerity, which encourages the belief that the natives, if ever organized, trained, and led by skillful American officers, will insure to the United States a military force in these islands equal in quality to any troops in the East."

keep the country to the front well scouted, and, moreover, some of MacArthur's subordinates were officers who chafed under the restraint and were quite happy if they could turn a "reconnoiter" into something more exciting. The Filipinos, however, whenever an American force of any size went out, in general adopted a non-resistant, elusive policy, but harassed the towns by night and destroyed the railroad directly in front of their opponents. Early in August, a general advance upon the enemy was ordered by MacArthur, but with no definite objective. Several towns in the immediate front of San Fernando, on either side of the railway, were then occupied permanently. On the 16th, Colonel Jacob H. Smith, who had taken Angeles, an important town on the railroad and at the junction of various wagon-roads running through Pampanga, after a fight with 500 Filipinos, was allowed to remain there, and MacArthur soon moved his headquarters forward to that point.[1] James F. Bell, who had been made colonel of the Thirty-sixth Volunteers, enlisted from the state troops already hardened to service in the Philippines, continued further spectacular scouting and reconnoissance work beyond Angeles, as he had before the advance thither, and his brigade commander, Joseph Wheeler, the Confederate veteran of Alabama, who had secured from President McKinley an assignment to service in the Philippines, supported him in the continual stirring-up of the Filipinos around Porak, Florida Blanca, and Guagua, the old but wiry little general himself pushing into a skirmish whenever he could. Much useful information about the country was obtained, and the Filipino commanders in front were kept on the move; but otherwise no advantages were gained, as these movements were not followed up, and, when an ad-

[1] This place had previously been reconnoitered twice, and found practically deserted by the Filipinos, who afterward decided to return and make a stand there. Four Americans were killed and a dozen wounded in these movements, whose only result was the abandonment of Angeles. The reason assigned for the withdrawal was the necessity of repairing ten miles of torn-up track in order to supply troops at Angeles, but Smith's troops were finally left there and the track repaired as it could be.

vance began in force, sufficient resistance developed over this same ground to cost a number of American lives.[1]

The towns of Pampanga were given a quasi-civil organization under military control, on the pattern of the municipalities under Kobbé in Bulakán.[2] The disposition of the inhabitants of Pampanga was, in general, more favorable to the success of attempts of this sort than was the case among the Tagalogs of Bulakán; nevertheless, while Pampangan territory was still harassed by Filipino commands which maintained the semblance of a real military organization, though actually resorting to guerrilla methods, little real headway could be made in securing coöperation of the inhabitants with the Americans.[3]

[1] For full reports on these operations, see the report on the Second Division of the Philippines for June 1, 1899, to May 6, 1900, in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, especially General MacArthur's summary (pp. 18–33). In a report on some of his operations, we find General Wheeler saying (p. 210): "If I could have two or three troops of cavalry, I could get behind these attacking forces [those making night attacks] and win decided success." See, also, in connection with the capture at Angeles, *ibid.*, part 6, pp. 563–78. Porak was entered and abandoned so many times that Bell's soldiers used to say: "When there is n't anything else to do, we go out and take Porak before breakfast."

[2] General Wheeler took much interest in this work, both while in command at San Fernando and later on, as he occupied successively districts in Pampanga, Tarlak, and Pangasinan. For a correspondent's contemporary description of one of these local governments (that administered by Provost-Marshal H. M. Reeve at San Fernando), see Albert G. Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 292–311.

[3] In Pampanga, General Venancio Concepción was the head of a so-called "division," with four "brigades" (on paper), under Mascardo, San Miguel, Hizón, and Aquino, which were supposed to be effectively disposed to prevent the American advance along the railroad, but which were really scattered commands, operating rather independently over an unduly prolonged and thin line, with some regard to natural strategic points, but no comprehensive, practicable general plan of defense, and wasting their energies in night attacks. Such bombastic plans of campaign as those submitted to Aguinaldo by Concepción and Génova (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, pp. 87–90) were not evidence of efforts really to be made so much as mere explosions on paper. The recuperative power of Filipino optimism is indicated by such remarks as these of Concepción: "If we were dealing with an army other than the American army, the danger would be great; but with Anglo-Saxon soldiers, it is not to be feared that any general, whatever may be his pluck, would ever run the risk of advancing through a rugged country in order to get at our positions" and . . . "the ridiculous pride which distinguishes their chiefs in the absence of other military gifts."

A. LAWTON AND YOUNG PRICK THE FILIPINO BUBBLE

Lawton's advance on San Isidro (which he had, as already noted, taken in May and abandoned under orders for a concentration about Manila) began almost immediately after he arrived at the front. Young had moved out of San Fernando and taken Arayat, on the Rio Grande de Pampanga, seventeen miles below San Isidro, on October 12, skirmishing beyond and occupying Kabiau, while Arayat became, on the 16th, Lawton's headquarters and the base for supplying the advance column via river from Kalumpit. The force consisted of seventeen troops of the Third and Fourth regular regiments of cavalry (Young's branch of the service), not quite all mounted as yet; two battalions of the Twenty-second Infantry, two battalions of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, two companies of volunteer infantry with a mountain-gun, picked infantrymen mounted as scouts, the Makabebes and some Tagalog scouts and guides, less than 3000 effective fighting men, but a force essentially mobile, having, besides the lightly equipped native scouts, a large proportion of cavalry, something no previous American expedition in the Philippines had had. On October 19, the Makabebes clearing the country west of the river and the main body advancing along the road on the east bank, the seven miles to San Isidro were covered, Filipino trenches being run over at two intermediate points, while a skirmish took place in the outskirts of the town.[1]

Here a halt for a week was imposed by the necessity of accumulating supplies and more transportation facilities, before Young's column should leave the Rio Grande and strike north

[1] The movement was handled by Captain John Green Ballance, who was put in charge of a "provisional brigade," and whose personal services, as well as those of his trained battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry, were repeatedly lauded by General Young. This battalion went through to the coast of the China Sea by November 25, keeping up with the main body throughout, frequently being on the heels of the cavalry scouting parties, and felt hurt when, on arrival at San Fabian, shoeless, half-naked, and malaria-stricken, it was not allowed to follow Young into northern Luzon. Besides Young's report, cited below, see Ballance's account, in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. 1, part 6, pp. 294–306.

and west into a country of miserable roads, in a time of year when they were veritable sloughs, having, besides, to cross the numerous streams, little and big, which come down from the mountains north of Nueva Écija. Lawton, who expected to find transportation and supplies fully prepared for him, had been obliged from the very outset to devote his personal attention almost entirely to this question at Arayat. When he arrived there, the river had so subsided as to be treacherous and uncertain for the comparatively large launches used to supply him; and the merest beginning had been made in the accumulation of stores, ammunition, etc., for his movement, while the farther his column advanced up the river, the more uncertain became the volume of water. From the very beginning of the expedition, he was constantly exhorting his staff assistants, and stimulating them by personal example, to the most strenuous exertions to keep things moving for a column operating in a more difficult country than American troops had yet occupied in the Philippines, in the worst season of the year, and everywhere off the river, with *karabau*-carts and Chinese burden-bearers the main reliance, in the matter of transportation, except for what the troops could carry themselves. Not infrequently he thundered complaints at what he considered an easy-going Quartermaster Department at Manila, and occasionally sent very pointed complaints to his superior in the capital.[1]

[1] Lawton's correspondence with Otis and with his own subordinates, from which citations will be made hereafter, are found in incomplete form in *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 23–43, 67–78, and in the full report of this expedition, *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 6–403, the dispatches in connection therewith occupying pages 39–261. On October 22, Lawton wired his chief quartermaster, Major Guy Howard, to "go to Manila and secure such river-transportation as we need . . . find what you want, and make the chief quartermaster buy, beg, borrow, or steal it; come up with it yourself and see it properly stationed and running." Having evolved some sort of supply system, Lawton objected vigorously, on November 3, when at San Isidro, to having his lower line of communications transferred to MacArthur's division, thus passing out of his own control. He informed Otis that there were practically no supplies at Kalumpit and the launches last sent him drew five feet of water, despite assurances to the contrary from Manila, and said: "Supplies should have been placed here during the rainy season, when for more than

Moving northward out of San Isidro on October 27, Young's column crossed, in going the nine miles along the Rio Grande to Santa Rosa, six tributary streams, having to construct temporary bridges and ferries. He had only thirty-five engineers, under one officer; hence the soldiers of the column had to do a large part of the pioneer work. At one of these streams, some sharp firing took place, but the Filipinos were both flanked and driven out of their trenches on the opposite shore. Kabanatúan, farther up the river (a temporary "capital" of Aguinaldo in May), was next occupied, and small parties of cavalry and Makabebes moved northwestward into Talavera and Aliaga, the Makabebes driving off a force sent out from Tarlak. Small scouting parties felt out in every direction, and frequently got contact, but rarely a fight, out of small bands of armed Filpiinos, whose general tendency seemed to be toward the northeast from Tarlak.

The information developed made both Lawton and Young sure that Aguinaldo and his main force were preparing to move across the mountains into Bayambang, Nueva Vizcaya. Hence Lawton proposed to organize an advance on Bayambang, and perhaps into the Kagayan Valley, with cavalry and scouts, cutting loose from his supplies, but leaving men at San Isidro and Kabanatúan to scout westward from the river.

three months there was from ten to twenty feet of water in the river." Major Howard was killed, in an ambush of a launch on the river, on the very day Lawton ordered him to Manila to stir things up. Captain W. E. Horton succeeded him temporarily, then Major John F. Knight. For their reports, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 384–89 (also exhibit AA with appendix D to *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, Manila edition); 359–62, 389–403, for reports of other staff officers and photographs showing the difficulties of the campaign; also *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 299–304, for William Dinwiddie's account. From San Isidro to Kabanatúan, eight mules to a wagon (Lawton had no pack-mules, but a few army wagons with mules had been borrowed from MacArthur's division) could not, at one stage of the campaign, average one mile an hour; and they were using chiefly the much weaker *karabaus* with their small carts. Lawton had a most loyal corps of assistants, and inspired all his followers with his own determination. Says his chief ordnance officer, Lawson Fuller, speaking of the Filipinos' belief that the country through which this column operated was impassable : "Their knowledge of the country was perfect, but they had no more conception of the indomitable will of the man who commanded the troops than he of an impossibility."

This move Otis forbade, because convinced that Aguinaldo would not abandon the railroad until compelled; and he assured Lawton that the "west coast road north from Dagupan would soon be blocked" by an expedition under Wheaton, leaving the force in Nueva Écija simply to cut off Aguinaldo's retreat through that province.[1]

But Young urged that he be allowed to move out independently of the slow-going supply-trains, for a few days at least, and, as Otis's instructions required a further covering of strategic points in Nueva Écija, Lawton let him go, apparently wishing he himself had like authority. Cutting loose with five days' rations on November 7, Young's column, after a hard struggle passing a bad ford, reached San José, heading off a Filipino movement from Tarlak to occupy it. From here, a party was advanced to Karranglan, on the edge of the divide from Nueva Vizcaya; but the information gained from captured correspondence and the baggage of detachments scattering from Tarlak made Young decide on a forced march westward into Pangasinan to cut off a movement by Aguinaldo up the valley of the Agno. His cavalry forced its way, on November 10 and 11, through mud-sloughs to Tayug, where, from assurances transmitted to him from Manila before his departure, he hoped to get communication with Wheaton's troops and thus make certain the surrounding of Aguinaldo. When he captured in this vicinity the Filipino Government's official press, the personal baggage of the Filipino chief, and part of the escort coming down to conduct him to Bayambang,

[1] See telegrams and Otis's letter of November 2, in *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 27–30, and *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 117, 120–21, 134–35. Lawton communicated these orders to Young, who replied they were "very disappointing and depressing." MacArthur had, on October 31, sent to Manila Aguinaldo's order of October 5, designating Bayambang as the next capital, on account of the "hygienic and geographic conditions" of Tarlak. While assuring Lawton that he would have "full liberty of action" within the territory to which he was restricted, Otis had directed a move far up the river to Karranglan, and was sending information from Manila regarding the roads over which Lawton's troops were already scouting. In reply to his query, Lawton answered him: "I have no cipher code, and am rather glad of it."

he sent a small detachment up the valley of the Agno to close the only trail north of him that was not now guarded. Crossing the Agno, Asingán was occupied, after resistance from a force of Filipinos just sent to occupy it, and scouting parties explored the country still farther toward Dagupan.

Still, Young was unable to get in touch with Wheaton, or anything more than a rumor about his having landed on the coast at San Fabian. Young's advance force, itself small, was now scattered in little bands of one hundred or so men in half a dozen posts, running the risk of contact at any time with a large Filipino force about which rumors were in circulation; and there was danger, too, that Aguinaldo would get through to the west of him, if Wheaton did not close up, or on the east of him, if he himself did not maintain an effective cordon on his line back to San José and Karranglan. On the 13th, Ballance marched his slender infantry battalion up to the Agno, along which the cavalry were operating, fording its swift current with great difficulty and heading for Urdaneta to cut off Aguinaldo, in the face of information (subsequently proved to be correct) that a force of 1200 to 2000 armed Filipinos had been gathered there to proceed northward with their chief, but finding the town already abandoned. The next day, Young crossed the river to the north, on the strength of a captured letter from Aguinaldo to his wife saying Tarlak had been deserted on the 8th, and started for Pozorrubio, in the foothills, the last point from which Aguinaldo might skirt the mountains going northeast to Bayambang. He had various petty engagements en route and was led over the wrong road to Manawag by his guide, who promptly escaped. Here, he was only two hours behind Aguinaldo (as was subsequently discovered), and the brisk skirmish he had at this point cut off and scattered the rearguard, or main body, of Aguinaldo's escort of some 1200 men. Major Swigert's detachment of the Third Cavalry, which had pursued the remainder of this escort for a way in the dark, moved on toward Pozorrubio the next

morning (the 15th), flanking two small bands of defenders out of hastily constructed intrenchments south of the town, while the little force now remaining with Aguinaldo was moving out on the north to strike into the foothills of Benget.[1]

Redisposing his scattered force, Young moved for Pozorrubio, but was unable, owing to delays and bad fords for his horses, to reach it on the 16th. Batson, whose Makabebes were better than cavalry at fording rivers, pushed on ahead. The next day, Aguinaldo's movements from Pozorrubio onward were learned, and, after an effort once more to unify his scattered command and a final conference with Lawton, who had come up during the night across the Agno, Young started north on the 18th, in pursuit of Aguinaldo, the Makabebes having preceded him by several hours. His troops had been then living off the country for five days, making at times night marches on supperless stomachs; the men were many of them hatless and coatless, as well as barefooted, their shoes having rotted off in the mud and rain, but Young wired Otis that "their hearts were right." Part of the cavalry horses were entirely shoeless, and had to be sent to the coast, with orders to follow on; here it was expected they would get help from Wheaton, with whom communication had now been obtained, but who had not made contact with Lawton's column nor given it other assistance.[2]

B. MACARTHUR MANEUVERS NORTHWARD ALONG THE RAILROAD, WHILE THE FILIPINOS SCATTER FROM HIS FRONT

The main body of the Filipino army was to be surrounded, and if possible captured with its principal leaders, by an en-

[1] This fact was not, of course, known at the time, though Swigert was sure he was close to Aguinaldo and believed the latter was being defended by a strongly intrenched force at Pozorrubio. Two days later, natives of this town gave Lawton and Young full details of the narrow escape Aguinaldo had had from capture (*Rept. War Dept., 1909*, vol. I, part 6, p. 166). The so-called "Diary of Aguinaldo" (to be cited below) confirms these statements in general.

[2] See Young's dispatch to Otis (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, p. 318), beginning: "Aguinaldo is now a fugitive and an outlaw."

veloping force of Americans coming from three directions. Young's column had, as we have seen, performed considerably more than the part assigned to Lawton in the plans of Otis. Leaving for the moment the story of that struggling little column, and postponing consideration of the force under Wheaton, which was sent by sea to seize the upper end of the railroad and shut in the Filipino army to the northwest, we return to Pampanga. Here, in the latter part of October, MacArthur's division, facing the main Filipino force between it and Tarlak, was preparing to move forward at last, having been quiet since June, except for spreading itself through about half of Pampanga in August and September. MacArthur had 7000 troops, of which number some 5000 were available for the firing-line. He had three regiments of regular infantry (the Ninth, Twelfth, and Seventeenth) and two regiments of volunteer infantry (including Bell's Thirty-sixth, seasoned by service in the islands), two batteries of regular artillery, and only two troops of cavalry, though picked scouts from the volunteers were also mounted. He had two companies of engineers and a good wagon-train, while a pack-train was soon added to his equipment. The railroad was torn up in the immediate front, but there was always a chance of capturing it intact by a raid on the enemy, who employed only crude methods of destruction on his retreat. This roadbed offered a good line of advance, and was generally paralleled by country roads between towns, while, once railroad repairs were made, the question of supply and support from the rear would be settled. The difficult crossings of the Paruau and Tarlak Rivers offered the chief obstacles; these quickly rising streams and their treacherous sands frequently interrupt railway communication by washing out bridges and tracks, and the insurgents were sure to aid the elements by artificial means of destruction unless rushed backward so quickly that they could do little damage to these points.

Whether or no they could have been so rushed, at any rate

they were not. MacArthur prepared and conducted his campaign as precisely as he made his daily toilet. Having his main force concentrated at Angeles, the Thirty-sixth, on the left of the railway, moved through Porak, and the Seventeenth, on the right, through Magalang, meeting little resistance, as the Filipinos were giving way in accordance with their plan. These operations occupied the entire first week of November. In the face of the laughable routs of bands of Filipinos by little handfuls of men under Colonel Bell, and of the indications that any opposing force in strength would give way and scatter without a fight wherever even a battalion of Americans appeared, and despite the fact, already known, that the track to Mabalakat and beyond there to Bambang had been torn up, MacArthur prepared a most elaborate technical order for the occupation of Mabalakat. He deployed practically his entire command in this movement, on November 8, but "unfortunately such of the insurgents as remained in front of Angeles slipped away during the night in small parties," and there was no one to fight in Mabalakat.[1] MacArthur had already proposed to Otis that he be allowed to prepare an expedition through to Dagupan, organizing wagon-transportation to serve until the railroad could be repaired northward to Angeles. But he had indicated sixty days as the time necessary to complete this movement; and now (November 8), when Otis instructed him to move on Bambang, and thence on Tarlak, he replied that he would have to accumulate ten days'

[1] This campaign of MacArthur's is described, with the correspondence, in *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 43–64, 78–90, and in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8 (cited also as part 6, *Rept. Lieutenant-General Commanding, 1900*), which covers MacArthur's division from May 31, 1899, to April 6, 1900. MacArthur's own description of the November-December campaign is found on pp. 33–68, and the special citations below are from this volume unless otherwise stated. The tactical order and incidents connected with the Mabalakat movement are on pp. 38–40. See also *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, part 6, pp. 585–600, for Colonel J. H. Smith's report of the Seventeenth infantry's operations in November, and *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 67–68, 79, for mention of Bell's and Smith's regiments by General F. D. Grant, who succeeded General Bates in command of the brigade along the railroad when the latter returned to the Moro country.

supplies at Mabalakat as a "base," and would be ready to move in two or three days — this in pursuance of an order which he understood to require him "to initiate something on the spur of the moment." His advance began again, as a matter of fact, on November 11, though Otis had suggested that he had mule transportation enough to haul a week's rations and he might "to some extent live off the country."[1] On the 11th, Bell easily flanked the Filipinos out of Bambang, but they had run the rolling-stock of the railroad to the north and wrecked the bridge over the Paruau River, a mile north of the town. Having a mule pack-train, Bell went on to "reconnoiter" Tarlak on the 12th, and found it deserted when he entered that evening. MacArthur's headquarters were moved into Aguinaldo's latest "palace" the following day, when Aguinaldo himself was already in flight to the north.

In late October, before MacArthur's advance began, the Filipino authorities had failed in another rather clumsily conducted effort to secure recognition (even though it be of an entirely superficial sort) from Spain or the United States, in return for the prisoners whom they held, and from that time on prepara-

[1] After taking Mabalakat, says MacArthur, it was decided "to undertake systematic operations with a view to certain definite results, the first stage of which was the capture of Tarlak." This and the context might imply that MacArthur had not until then considered it time to plan with any objective for his movements, or that he had not been given any precise instructions or authority from Otis. Replying to the latter, MacArthur said: "So far as I understand, movement is contemplated involving the idea of continuous action of indefinite duration. You, of course, understand that I have a limited amount of transportation, which has not been organized with a view to any special service." He indicated that the drafting by Lawton of some of his wagon-transportation at San Fernando had disturbed his plans, and says also: "Simultaneously with logistics, preliminary questions of exploration and reconnoissance were receiving attention and careful solution." See *MacArthur's Report*, above cited, pp. 39–44. On November 8, when MacArthur indicated the necessity of waiting several days before moving on Tarlak, Lawton's advance was in Aliaga and Talavera, already fully flanking Tarlak and scouting toward it, having small encounters with Filipino troops sent out from there to feel their way to Bayambang, while, as was subsequently learned, Aguinaldo was at that very time evacuating his "capital." In consequence of MacArthur's outline of actions to be carried out, Otis informed Lawton, on the 12th, that MacArthur would "make a dash" on Tarlak the next day (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, p. 157).

tions were made for abandoning Tarlak. Such civilian officers of the Government as were still there began to scatter in various directions, Aguinaldo and his closest advisers moving up the railroad on November 8 to Bayambang, Pangasinan, preparatory to following his personal and official outfits and his family to Nueva Vizcaya, from which, however, Young's troopers had already cut him off. The "Filipino army" had really had little more than a haphazard semi-guerrilla organization during the months when its positions had not been pressed by the American force in front, and now the time had come for its leaders to yield or for it to take to the hills and repeat the tactics of 1897 against Spain. Beyond desiring to get as large a force as possible through with himself to Nueva Vizcaya, Aguinaldo's plans were quite inchoate; and, when he was driven too hard for that, he consulted primarily his personal pride and his desire to retain his prestige with his liberty. From the moment of his flight, all semblance even of united command or coöperation in resistance disappeared from the revolutionary campaign, as well in central Luzon and around Manila as in those places where it had never existed except in form; but, for that matter, the bubble had only awaited contact to burst since the American victories of the preceding April and May and the internal dissensions which had ended in the death of Luna.[1]

[1] The negotiations regarding the prisoners will be dealt with farther along. Otis had refused to let prominent Filipino civilians at Tarlak, including one of the peace commissioners of the preceding May and a brother of General Luna, come through MacArthur's lines on October 30, but allowed the women of their family to come to Manila; he was suspicious, fearing the effort to stimulate an uprising in Manila (*Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 45–46). In spite of the failure of the negotiations and the imminent breaking-up of their army, the Filipino leaders continued to preach to the masses, and in private messages to assure their commanders in distant provinces, that their triumph was sure, through a foreign coalition against the United States or an electoral overturn in the latter country. While the Director of Communications was preparing for telegraphic connection through Nueva Vizcaya to the Kagayan Valley, before Aguinaldo should enter Bayambang, he sent word, on November 5, to the commander in Kagayan: "The quadruple alliance between Germany, France, Russia, and Spain is a fact [some of Agoncillo's messages about "seeing the German Emperor in person" being the only foundation for this asser-

The railroad bridge and much of the track were washed away at the crossing of the Tarlak River in his front where the current had shifted and divided, and MacArthur's main column remained at Tarlak for four days, endeavoring to make up a train for his advance from the burned cars and battered locomotives found at Tarlak and to repair the washout. This, despite Otis's insistence that Gerona should be reached at once, in order to prevent the destruction of large stores of rice there, and his almost peremptory order on November 15 for an advance, in order to prevent the concentration of the enemy on Lawton's scattered detachments.[1] Eventually, the repairs here were not completed so as to permit even of a temporary crossing of supplies until November 21, though an additional engineer force was sent up from Manila; and continuous railway communication across the Paruau and Tarlak Rivers could not be restored until late in December.[2] Fording the Tarlak on

tion]. Before December we shall know our fate. Throughout Europe, there is sympathy for our cause. American Democrats declare in our favor. They are sure of Bryan's triumph next election." See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 151–52; *ibid.*, p. 114, for message to Aguinaldo, on October 31, that Lawton had been killed at San Isidro; also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 163, 168, for similar evidences of Filipino optimism. Mabini, in his posthumous memoirs (*El Comercio*, Manila, July 23, 1903), speaking of Luna's plan of the preceding May of retiring to Benget's mountains, says: "Nevertheless, Señor Aguinaldo established himself with his government in Tarlak and occupied his time with political and literary labors, a piece of carelessness which General Otis took advantage of by disembarking troops in San Fabian, while the cavalry, winding its way through San José and Umingán, took possession of San Quintín and Tayug, thus cutting off all the lines of retreat for Señor Aguinaldo and dealing the revolution a mortal blow."

[1] MacArthur (pp. 49–55 of his *Report*) then promised an advance only after thirty-six hours, saying the towns occupied had been swept bare, and he must prepare the railroad train to move supplies forward. He pronounced the Tarlak washout "the crisis of the campaign"; if fixed up, he could probably "finish the war within a week," so far as northern Luzon was concerned, and anyway he could not move rapidly enough with wagons to help Lawton or Wheaton by a diversion. He was hearing at the time of American cavalry near Bayambang (on which he was to advance), part of Young's scouting parties, which had already found Wheaton's force on the coast, having gone entirely around MacArthur's division, as well as flanking the former army of Aguinaldo.

[2] For the reports of the engineer officers in charge of the restoration of the railway, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 601–12, and the following reproductions of photographs; *ibid.*, part 8, p. 61, *re* work of officers and men of the Thirty-sixth Volunteers in repairing engines, etc.; also *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 159–64,

the 17th, MacArthur reached Gerona without incident, finding little destruction wrought there. The scouts preceding up the railway, he entered Bayambang on the 19th, a week after Aguinaldo's departure, using improvised trains, the railroad being intact. Moving up to Kalasiau, near the end of the railroad, a scout on the 20th showed Dagupan unoccupied, though some of Wheaton's force had entered it. Only the last few miles of track were destroyed, and the country had not been "swept bare" of supplies. The population of the Pangasinan towns that were occupied appeared very friendly; except in sections, these people had not been strongly allied with the revolution, and internal dissensions between the Tagalog leaders and their own had to a considerable extent shattered the allegiance of these followers. Various Filipino officials, in hiding near the towns, presented themselves or sought assurances in case of surrender. MacArthur received information regarding the plan to conduct in future guerrilla warfare, but also learned that a considerable force had gone west into the Sambales Mountains.[1]

for reports of the engineer work on the track south of Angeles in October. General Wheeler was left behind to aid in the reconstruction and push supplies across the Tarlak, when the advance went on into Pangasinan. He chafed under the inaction, and wrote MacArthur on November 17 (*ibid.*, part 6, p. 229): "I beg you will pardon me for again asking for active service against the enemy when I have completed this work. . . . My reason for making this request is not from motives of personal ambition, but because it will aid me very much in a cause which forms a paramount issue in our country. I feel confident that the view I express is concurred in by the President of the United States." In the move upon Tarlak, Wheeler, who had been warned that he would ruin the infantry he was commanding by marching it three miles an hour, himself took a gun and marched in the ranks, entering Tarlak upon the heels of MacArthur with his cavalry escort (*ibid.*, p. 250). To raft supplies over the river from the partially reconstructed bridge, he swam the Tarlak on the night of the 20th and helped make a temporary pontoon-bridge of bamboo (*ibid.*, p. 257); he was then sent forward, and at Paniki took measures at once to prevent looting. See also *ibid.*, p. 351, for this significant, or at any rate remarkable, statement of Colonel A. S. Burt about the occupation of O'Donnell, a Tarlak town off the railroad on November 17, by a battalion of the Twenty-fifth Volunteers (colored), which had been brought forward from Pampanga: "No peaceful citizen, woman or child, was in any way molested by them, no property destroyed without orders, and no looting. I have not heard of a parallel instance to it during the advance on this island."

[1] *MacArthur's Report*, as cited, pp. 55–59.

CHAPTER XIX

MILITARY MOVEMENTS

WHEATON LEAVES THE CIRCLE OPEN

The expedition by sea to shut the Filipino army off from a retreat along the coast into the Ilokan provinces was supposed to be a great secret in Manila until its final departure in the early morning of November 6. Nevertheless, the fact that General Wheaton had been called in from MacArthur's division early in October to prepare for some such expedition was known in that city, and at Washington government officials had spoken freely of a speedy occupation of Dagupan and other ports in Luzon.[1] Wheaton's force was composed of about 2200 infantrymen, a platoon of artillery, and a Signal Corps detachment, borne on transports, which were met in Lingayen Gulf the next day by the gunboats Princeton, Bennington, and Helena, and three of the little island gunboats. The naval force shelled the Filipino trenches at San Fabian, and then landed the troops,[2] which drove the small force of the enemy, without resistance worth mentioning, toward Dagupan, twelve miles south. Scouting parties reconnoitered towns close by during the next few days, but occupied none of them. On the 11th, a force of some size, moving northward under Tinio, was encountered at San Jacinto, only six miles from San Fabian, and severe loss was inflicted upon it, 134 Filipinos afterward being buried there; but the American force, com-

[1] This was doubtless in consequence of Secretary Root's messages (already cited) urging speedy action for the occupation of Dagupan and other strategic points, and Otis's replies promising such action, first in September and then early in October.

[2] General Wheaton put himself entirely in the hands of the naval officers, who landed his 2500 men in a little over two hours. For his report of his expedition, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 528–61; see also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 64–66, and *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 305–07 (account of Dinwiddie).

posed of the Thirty-third Volunteers under Colonel Hare, lost 7 men killed and 15 wounded, Major John A. Logan being killed while marching at the front of his battalion in the advance. The same scouting operations were continued on subsequent days, with no encounters worthy of mention. Wheaton seems to have regarded his instructions as limiting him to watching the coast road itself and the roads which lead directly into this old Spanish "King's Highway" along the China Sea; for he informed Otis, on November 11, that he had closed the avenues to the north of the "mountain trails by way of Pozorrubio." One of his detachments entered Pozorrubio on the 16th, and he himself conducted scouts to the east of San Jacinto. The only result was the capture of Felipe Buencamino, late "Secretary of Foreign Affairs," and the mother and son of Aguinaldo, besides the digging-up, through the assistance of an informer, of 75,000 pesos buried by Aguinaldo's column near Pozorrubio.[1] Dagupan was not reconnoitered until the 19th, and no detachment was placed there until the 26th. From that time until this region was incorporated into MacArthur's command, Wheaton's force was employed in provisioning or reinforcing the various columns operating further inland or to the northward. Lawton, who had lost three men drowned, including his aide-de-camp, in fording the Agno by night, and who had begun another day in the saddle at 4 A.M., pushed on, after bidding farewell to Young at Pozorrubio on the morning of the 18th, across the country to San Jacinto, expecting to find Wheaton there that night, but had to ride on to San Fabian, where Wheaton had landed, to get conference with him. The next day, Lawton's feelings were let loose in a long dispatch to Otis's chief-of-staff, in which he said: —

. . . I greatly regret that the insurgents were not "shut up in the railroad country" by the troops "at the north," as I was assured

[1] Information was also obtained of Aguinaldo's wife having had 20,000 pesos with her when she left, in advance of her husband, for Nueva Vizcaya. Aguinaldo's other child had died just before the flight began.

would "probably be," in General Otis's communication of the 2d instant, or that said troops were not extended to Binalonan and Tayug, as I was informed they would be in your message of the 9th instant, or that they did not hold the points occupied by them, and from which they were almost immediately withdrawn. [He indicates that, instead of limiting his operations to the east side of the Agno, as Otis's instructions contemplated, Young had covered the territory north and west, supposed to be closed by Wheaton, and had thus got close on Aguinaldo's trail.] It is my opinion Aguinaldo should be followed every moment from this time. He should not be permitted to establish himself at any point or again organize a government or army. Wherever he can go an American soldier can follow, and there are many who are anxious to undertake the service. . . .[1]

A. YOUNG PURSUES AGUINALDO AND INVADES NORTHWESTERN LUZON

Leaving Pozorrubio on November 18, Young proceeded, with a remnant of cavalry (less than one hundred troopers), preceded by the Makabebe scouts, on a forced march after Aguinaldo. He was sixty hours behind him on the mountain-trail, when it was found that the Filipino chief had turned back to the coast road for faster and easier traveling with the five women of his party, among them his wife. Aringai, on the coast, was intrenched, but the little force of Makabebes took the defensive positions by assault.[2] Aguinaldo's party

[1] For this message and others between Lawton and Otis, regarding the failure to get in contact with Wheaton, see *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 31, 34, 35, 41, 42, 67–68, 69–70, and *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 151, 155–57, 164, 165–66. On November 7, Lawton was informed: "Wheaton should effect lodgment to-day at or near San Fabian. Corps commander hopes that your advance troops at Umingán or beyond may soon communicate with his command. You may be able to draw supplies from his base for part of your troops." See also *ibid.*, pp. 316–18, for Lieutenant Thayer's cavalry scout to get communication with Wheaton, taking Asingán, across the Agno, on November 12 and moving on through Binalonan and Manawag to San Jacinto, which had been occupied by Wheaton on the 11th, but abandoned. Feeling sure that Wheaton's troops would be in Magaldan, two miles beyond, and only four miles from San Fabian, Thayer pushed on, and nearly ran into an ambush there on the night of the 13th. Camping in the field, he reached San Fabian the next day, finding Wheaton's adjutant one day off the calendar.

[2] Lieutenant Batson, their leader, who had been recommended by Lawton for a commission as major of volunteers for his efficient work with the scouts at Ali-

meanwhile struck in from the coast road to Nagilian, at the foot of the rough mountain-trail into Benget, and rested there on the 8th; but hearing how close the Americans were, they abandoned this line of retreat, and turned back to the coast road, meeting reinforcements from the troops under Tinio's command in the Ilokan provinces and pushing rapidly forward to Kandón.[1] The Makabebes promptly learned that Aguinaldo had not gone into Benget. A navy gunboat had on previous days shelled San Fernando, where there was a Filipino force of some size, and, on the 20th, Captain G. F. Chase and thirty-seven of Young's Third Cavalry escort charged the Filipinos, stationed to check the pursuit of Aguinaldo, out of their intrenchments and took possession of this important port.[2] Sev-

aga on November 3, had one foot badly smashed by a bullet at Aringai, and had to be sent in to Manila. His full report of the organization and operations of the Makabebes up to this time is in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 123–37. The Makabebes, who showed such bravery when active operations were going on, required strict attention on the part of their officers to prevent their abusing their Filipino kin, and, being scattered and not always under the eye of the officers who knew them from this time onward, soon gave the superior commanders concern by their conduct. Charges that they were committing rape and other abuses by the wholesale had, as appeared by captured dispatches, been communicated to Aguinaldo on October 31. Lawton was loath to believe such reports, in the face of their brave conduct, and, as late as November 19, believed the crimes were committed by other natives passing themselves off for Makabebes. But on November 30, he wired Young in South Ilokos to send back some of the Makabebes' own officers to take charge of those left behind sick when the chase began, for they were "terrorizing the country and destroying the good record earned by them"; he had tried and convicted one of rape, and placed them all under guard. Young replied that it was best to recall them all from the Ilokan provinces, and this was soon done. See *ibid.*, part 6, pp. 114, 166, 204, 230.

[1] According to Mabini, Luna had personally reconnoitered Benget, with a view to making it a stronghold, fortifying the trail from Nagilian, which is one of the steepest and hardest in the precipitous mountains of central Luzon. Certainly, the simple Igorrots, who are marvelous burden-bearers on the mountains, were compelled by their Ilokan taskmasters to drag up this steep trail some eight or ten bells taken from churches on the coast, and parts of an old foundry's machinery, the intention being to forge "cannon" for the defense of the trail at its most difficult point; the bells and heavy machinery still lie there. This plan had been abandoned, however, and probably Aguinaldo only hoped to pass through Benget to Nueva Vizcaya, but desisted because he feared the American cavalry would overtake him on the exhausting trails he would have to pass over. Pedro Paterno, however, used Benget as a hiding-place for a time.

[2] See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 319–20. General Tinio and Colo-

eral other troops of cavalry, which had been sent to San Fabian to have their horses shod, caught up with the pursuit as it went along, scattering the remnants of Filipino opposition in Young's rear. He was able to leave only the scantiest detachments to hold the line behind him, but, counting on the support of fresh troops he was calling on Wheaton to send him, and having evidence that Aguinaldo was heading for the mountains of Abra, hoping to get through with a good-sized force (about 1000 of Tinio's command now being with him, and half that number more being under arms farther north), hurried again northward on the 23d. The troops were being received in a very friendly manner by the Ilokans, who remained in their towns and even appeared enthusiastic over the arrival of the Americans; hence, Young borrowed a supply of money from the agent of a large tobacco company at San Fernando, in order to pay cash for supplies as he went along, instead of leaving indorsed bills for later settlement, as he had done in Pangasinan and Unión provinces.

Learning that Tinio was protecting the retreat of Aguinaldo with 600 men at Tagudin, and that not only was Wheaton not sending fresh troops, but had peremptorily recalled from the towns south of San Fernando the infantry forces which he had sent up the coast to reconnoiter and which Young had seized upon, the latter halted, to send an urgent call back to San Fernando for the hurrying-up of fresh troops and to have a force landed by steamer to occupy Bigán, in Aguinaldo's rear, commanding the river passage to Abra. Not being able to get an infantry battalion on board immediately for transportation to Bigán, Lieutenant-Colonel James Parker, the officer sent on this commission, boarded the Oregon and proceeded up the coast, where, on the 26th, fifty marines

nel Villa were in San Fernando when the little party of Americans rushed it, but the main party of the fugitives was then twenty miles farther up the coast. For Young's full report on the pursuit of Aguinaldo and the prisoners held by the Filipinos, see *ibid.*, pp. 262–88, and reports of subordinates appended; also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 115–29.

landed and occupied this the most important town of northwestern Luzon without incident.[1] A small force of infantry came up from Dagupan two days later, and, on the night of December 4, the 84 well men and 153 sick men under Parker stood off an attack upon the city, and in its streets, by a force of three or four times their number under Tinio.[2] The latter commander had left Young's front at Namakpakán, when Aguinaldo, learning of the taking of Bigán, abandoned his Abra plan and started inland from Kandón to pass the western mountain-range (here virtually a coast range, parallel with the Cordillera Central) and seek refuge in Lepanto or Bontok. When Young reached Kandón on November 28, Aguinaldo was across the mountains, with a small force under Gregorio del Pilar guarding the trail. The two immediate objects of the American commander were to prevent the main force of Filipinos under Tinio, then near the mouth of the Abra River, from joining Aguinaldo, or Aguinaldo from joining them in Abra province, and to compel the release of some thirty American prisoners who had been hurried up the river to Banged, capital of Abra. Reinforcements had at last begun to arrive from the south, the first being a battalion of the Thirty-third Volunteers under Major Peyton C. March, then a battalion of the Thirty-fourth Volunteers under Lieutenant-Colonel Robert L. Howze, while Colonel Luther Hare was on the way with the remainder of the Thirty-third, a hardy regiment, made up mostly of frontiersmen from Texas and the Southwest, including some ex-Rough Riders. This assistance made it possible to call up more of the Third Cavalry so as to deal with the force under Tinio, immediately in front, which sought to distract attention from the pursuit of Aguinaldo, and made it

[1] For a brief account, see *Rept. Sec. Navy, 1900*, p. 1114. The navy rendered Young effective assistance throughout the march up the coast, reconnoitering towns, shelling intrenchments, furnishing clothing and money, and maintaining communication.

[2] See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 229, 239; *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 138–51.

possible also to send March's force on the trail of the latter chieftain.[1] With three troops of cavalry and the three-company battalion of the Thirty-fourth, only 260 men in all, but with 270 men under Hare near at hand, Young attacked Tinio, on December 4, in a supposedly impregnable mountain-pass south of the Abra River. The infantry struggled over the hills for eight hours before they reached a flanking position, and the fight, coming on meanwhile, lasted five hours, until ended by a charge under Howze, Hare's force having arrived in support. Only one American soldier was killed, and Tinio was

[1] Wheaton felt obliged to consult Manila before sending the reinforcements Young was asking. Under Otis's instructions, the entire Thirty-third was sent up the coast, except one company, already landed to relieve the marines at Bigán; but Otis directed the holding of 1000 men, cavalry and Ballance's infantry, at San Fabian, to refit and recuperate, and sought to recall Howze's battalion of the Thirty-fourth, which subsequently played so important a part in releasing the American prisoners. See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 116–17. Otis says: "At that time it was not supposed that General Young would meet with very determined opposition, as the Tagalogs at the north were deserting and passing southward in small detachments. It was believed also that the mass of the northern Luzon population was friendly and would assist our progress." Otis had not, until November 26, accepted the very positive and detailed information from Lawton and Young regarding Aguinaldo's movements, but believed he had gone into the Sambales Mountains with the main force from Tarlak, relying upon the opinion of Manila Filipinos that Aguinaldo would remain with the Tagalog forces and probably try to cross to Cavite (*ibid.*, pp. 71–72). On November 24, he told Lawton: "Aguinaldo and most of his officers are in hiding in central and western Luzon to the south of you . . . operating as banditti." A cablegram to Washington also stated this as Otis's opinion, and, on November 26, he told Washington that most of Aguinaldo's 1000 men in Ilokos would desert him. See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1107, 1109. (Otis's messages from October 20 onward to the end of 1899, *ibid.*, pp. 1087 *et seq.*, are interesting, as reflecting the official view of the campaign's results adopted at Washington; most of them were published in the daily press of the time, and are reproduced in *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 288–96.) Lawton, furnishing further details regarding Aguinaldo's retreat northward, said he "hoped the information [as to Aguinaldo being in Sambales] was correct, but doubted it," and wired Young: "You will see that General Otis insists that Aguinaldo has not escaped north. The only way he can be convinced is to catch him." See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 179, 182, 187, 193; also pp. 241–42 and 287, for Young's complaints regarding the poor assistance furnished him from the south (the last incident being the sending forward of part of his cavalry without their horses), and his praise for the navy's efforts. Lawton replied: "I can appreciate the annoyances to which you are subjected. I have had my share of them. . . . I hope with all my heart you will get your man, and believe you will, if permitted."

driven inward.[1] Hare moved to cut him off from joining Aguinaldo, and Howze pushed on to Banged, the Filipinos abandoning the sheer-walled cañon of rock through which the Abra passes out to the sea, when San Quintín was taken in their rear.

Young moved into Bigán and began sending cavalry scouting parties into the mountains in every direction. Fearing Tinio would head for North Ilokos and recruit his force with the small armed commands there, he sent a little band of cavalry through to Lauag and, with the help of the navy, himself landed on the coast with a company of men below that large town, finding gathered there about 1500 Spanish prisoners, including civilians, friars, and soldiers, who had been released during the scattering of the Filipino forces, in addition to those found at Bigán (among them a Spanish general and a civilian governor of a province) and those coming into other towns from day to day. Proceeding farther up the coast, the navy landed him at Bangí, in the very northwest corner of Luzon, with a platoon of artillery and a few marines. His little parties of cavalry found slight opposition here and there, but their operations served to make the main body of Tinio's troops hug the mountains of Abra, in detachments on the rough mountain-trails. Not counting the innumerable scouts of small parties in every direction through eight different provinces, Young's own "headquarters" had, from San Fernando on October 11 to Bigán on December 5, marched 308 miles.[2]

B. RELEASING THE FILIPINOS' PRISONERS

The course of operations in Luzon at the end of 1899 and the beginning of 1900 was somewhat directed by the determination to secure the prisoners held by the Filipinos, but a

[1] *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, 229–30, 283–84. At this point, Young's supply-train also joined him. His advance force had been living off the country since November 7.

[2] See his itinerary, *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, p. 346.

mere handful of whom had up to then been set free. Besides the thousands of Spanish captives, a few Americans had fallen into the hands of the Filipinos, including soldiers who had strayed from the lines, camp-followers with a curiosity for exploring, and some deserters. Besides the men of the gunboat Urdaneta, captured in Bataán in September, the Filipinos besieging Baler, on the almost deserted east coast of Luzon, had in April attacked a landing party sent from the Yorktown to reconnoiter the town, with a view to releasing the little Spanish garrison; the ship's launch ran aground, and the Filipinos killed or mortally wounded seven sailors and captured Lieutenant J. C. Gilmore and eight sailors, hurrying them to Nueva Écija.[1] Most of the prisoners in central Luzon were concentrated in Nueva Écija, Sambales, and Nueva Vizcaya before the fall of Malolos, but the Americans and some of the Spaniards were marched northward when Lawton advanced the first time on San Isidro.[2]

After their loss of the sovereignty over the Philippines was finally established by the ratification of the treaty, the Spaniards sought, at first by indirect means and then by direct negotiation, to secure the release of their countrymen. Friendly letters of Archbishop Nozaleda to the Filipinos he had known; an appeal from the Spanish and other European business houses of Manila; and, finally, visits of regularly authorized Spanish commissions to the revolutionary camp in June–July

[1] See *McClure's Magazine* for August and September, 1900, and *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 324–25, for Gilmore's account of their capture and subsequent experiences, and *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 1350–52, for the trial, in December, 1900, of a Filipino officer charged with having been responsible for burying one of these wounded sailors before he was dead. Also Archbishop Nozaleda's *Defensa obligada*, pp. 38–39 and appendix 13, for his correspondence with Admiral Dewey (opened through Chaplain Rainey) regarding the effort to relieve the garrison at Baler. (Note the difference between Nozaleda's flattering phrases about Dewey's humanitarian sentiments and the expressions he employed about the American "barbarians" in his pastorals of April and May, 1898.)

[2] In May, the Filipinos accepted food and clothing from MacArthur for the American prisoners. See *Rept. War Dept., 1899*, vol. 1, part 5, p. 406; also p. 243, for the prisoners' complaints about ill-treatment. Reference has previously been made to the conflicting statements on this point.

and in October, resulting in nothing more than the securing of safe conduct for the men of the famous Baler garrison and the release of less than a score of sick Spanish civilians and military officers. Aguinaldo's decree of January 23, 1899, proclaiming the release of the Spanish civilians, promulgated three times during subsequent months in different forms, was not carried out. The Filipinos (those, at least, who had the final word in the matter) clung to the contention that the civilians should be kept as "prisoners of war," along with the soldiers, even after Spain had formally renounced sovereignty over the islands; and, when at last they were ready to treat for the release of all prisoners (except, perhaps, the friars), they imposed conditions which the new sovereign in the islands could not sanction. When asked to release the civilians whose liberty had been decreed, they demanded that the boats sent to various ports to get them should fly no flag but the Red Cross. General Otis contended that these boats should not lower the American flag in any port of the islands; but the point of honor was not important, for the other conditions imposed by the Filipinos could not be met. They demanded 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 pesos as the price of the Spaniards' release. Spain appeared ready to give 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 pesos; but the American Government interposed a veto upon any such recognition and aid to the Filipino revolution. When the last negotiations were held in October, the Filipinos clung to their price, and demanded, besides, formal recognition of their independence by Spain.[1] Making a final effort, as already mentioned,

[1] In a message from Tarlak to the Filipino commander in Kagayan were the words: "Take great care about prisoners, as therein lies our greatest hope." (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, p. 151.) Besides the Spanish sources cited in chapter V, regarding the treatment of prisoners, see for the events of 1899, Sastrón, *op. cit.*, pp. 549–62; Nozaleda, *Defensa obligada*, appendix 10 (the Archbishop's correspondence with Premier Silvela); and D. J. Pellicena, *La verdad sobre Filipinas* (Manila, 1900), the latter Spaniard maintaining that Aguinaldo desired to have the Spaniards well treated. Filipino sources on the decrees for the release of civilian prisoners have been cited; see also, for the texts of those of July and October, *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 330–34. Baron Dumarais, a Frenchman, bearer of the appeal of Manila business firms for the release of the prisoners, was mysteri-

to squeeze a quasi-formal recognition out of the American commander at Manila, and failing in this, they took the high hand, and dismissed the Spanish commissioners from their camp. Their proclamations showed the belief, either most fatuously entertained or else assumed, that the long-promised "European intervention" was now assured, and they seemed to think that clinging to their prisoners would help to this end.

Some hundreds of Spanish prisoners had been sent up the Abra River from Bigán, before the American troops entered South Ilokos. When Howze pushed on to Banged, most of the Spanish prisoners were abandoned under stress, but a Filipino force dragged the little band of Americans (twenty-five soldiers,

ously assassinated while on his errand, his body not being recovered until 1901. For American official messages on the June–September negotiations, etc., see *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1008, 1011, 1043, 1045, 1046–47, 1049, 1050, 1053, 1070, 1072. The Filipinos at first asked from Spain 7,000,000 pesos; the Spanish commissioners talked of giving them 2,000,000 (Sastrón). Washington, at Madrid's request, ordered that the latter's commissioners be passed through the lines and given all facilities. (See *Foreign Relations of United States, 1899*, pp. 682–93, for the diplomatic correspondence on this subject.) Otis, who had in June charged that the Spaniards had sold $200,000 worth of arms to Filipinos in the central islands, and also suspected them of connivance with the opponents of the United States at Samboanga, now feared that they would surreptitiously pay the revolutionists $3,000,000, or some large sum, if ships were sent under the Spanish flag to Luzon ports, despite assurances from Madrid that the Spanish Government had refused to pay any money. (Apparently, the suspicion was quite justifiable: though the American minister at Madrid was assured that the Spanish Government would not give the Filipinos money, as being equivalent to providing them with arms, yet the Spanish Minister of State naïvely admitted that his Government had quietly assured itself that the Cortes would authorize the payment of two or three millions.) Later, permission was given to carry supplies to the prisoners in ships flying the Spanish flag. Washington also vetoed the money payment, on August 8. For American reports, etc., on the October negotiations, see *ibid.*, pp. 1088, 1090, 1096–98; *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, pp. 72–76, and *Sen. Doc. 208*, part 1, pp. 73–81 (besides *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 330–34). The Spanish commissioners acted under a telegram from Premier Silvela, which quasi-recognition the Filipinos at first accepted (putting forth again the extreme demand for 7,000,000 pesos, and a promise of formal recognition), then suddenly rejected, claiming that only the new Spanish consul at Manila could negotiate (Sastrón). This peremptory action and the last effort to cajole a "recognition" from the United States seem to have been mere steps in a final determination to hold the prisoners as long as possible. Secretary Root, approving Otis's refusal to treat with the revolutionists, said, on November 9: "Inform the insurgent leader . . . giving him to understand that any harm that comes to any of these prisoners will be visited upon him and his immediate followers, as fast as they fall into our hands."

sailors, and civilians, besides Lieutenant Gilmore) deeper into the mountains of the Cordillera. With the 1700 Spaniards released by Howze in the Abra Mountains, Young's advance had set free, in about fifty days, 4000 Spanish prisoners, most of them in the Ilokan provinces. Howze's small force had reached Banged shoeless, and many of them fever-stricken. Hare, arriving in Banged with his thinned-out battalion, started after the American prisoners; but Howze, getting shoes furnished by the navy a day later, picked out 70 well men and moved at once on Hare's trail. All told, they were only 159 men, and they struck into disheartening trails of the Cordillera which the Spaniards had generally regarded as "impassable," into the country of wild mountaineers, without satisfactory guides, and with only a few days' rations, borne by Chinese carriers and native mountaineers. The force which Tinio had dispatched across the main ridge with the prisoners betrayed unusual tenacity of purpose in dragging their famished and emaciated prisoners along, forcing them to keep up under threats of death; and, though Hare and Howze got frequent traces of them and came up with several prisoners who had escaped along the trail, it was not until December 18, when on the Kagayan Valley side of the Cordillera, that the prisoners were loosed and the exhausted Filipinos sought safety in flight. On January 2, the gunboat Princeton, patroling off northern Luzon to look for the party, which it was half feared was lost, met them in the scantily populated country northwest of Aparri, they having descended the valley of the Apayau River, rafting its many crossings and moving slowly because of the condition of the prisoners for whom they had no suitable food.[1]

Major March's battalion of the Thirty-third, leaving Kandón on November 30, with the object primarily of preventing Aguinaldo joining Tinio in Abra, the next day ran upon Gregorio del Pilar's little force guarding the steep and tortuous trail through the Tilad Pass over the range into Lepanto

[1] For Hare's and Howze's reports, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. 1, part 6, pp. 322–28, 341.

province, where Aguinaldo had rested a week at Angaki, at the foot of the mountains on the east, then moving on to Cervantes, a little town, the chief Spanish headquarters in the but half-conquered hill-country of the Igorrots. Good rifle-shots, well posted, might have made the pass impregnable, and Del Pilar's force killed two and wounded nine of March's men when the latter suddenly came into an exposed position directly below them; but Lieutenant Tompkins's company, after two hours' vertical climbing, reached a flanking position, and their fire, followed by March's rush up the trail, speedily drove those Filipinos who were not shot down behind their barricades into a run back over the mountains. Their leader himself, a mere youth like Tinio, and one of the idols of the revolutionary cause, was killed while mounting his horse.[1]

Getting the news by courier from Angaki, the Aguinaldo party started the next day over the higher mountains into Bontok. In Lepanto, March set free 575 Spanish prisoners, including 150 friars. On the road behind Aguinaldo several days later, General Venancio Concepción and staff, with the little force designed to protect the retreat, surrendered to March. Having less than 100 men fit for the trails, and learning that Aguinaldo and his officers had fresh ponies and were far over in Bontok, March abandoned the chase on December 7. On December 24, the six women with the fugitive party, including Aguinaldo's wife, who had to be borne on a litter, were sent under escort of several subordinate officers to Cervantes, and thence transported to Manila For over six months thereafter,

[1] John McCutcheon, who was acquainted with Gregorio del Pilar (not to be confused with Marcelo del Pilar, the Tagalog propagandist, who died in Barcelona in 1896, and much less with Pio del Pilar, assumed name of the bandit and so-called "general" of the Morong Mountains), wrote a vivid description of this fight and pursuit, and an appreciative sketch of Del Pilar for the Chicago *Record* and New York *Herald* (see Chicago *Record's Stories of Filipino Warfare*, pp. 11–27; also *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 317–21). The Filipino leader's body was absolutely stripped by souvenir-seekers, and remained unburied by the trail several days. The Filipinos found at Angaki said that 52 were killed or wounded out of their force of 60, a significant commentary on the difference in marksmanship between the opposing forces. For March's report of this fight and the pursuit of Aguinaldo, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 330–34.

Aguinaldo, with a few officers attached to him and a personal escort of 100 Tagalog and 30 Ilokan soldiers, was wandering back and forth in the mountains of central Luzon, now in the Kagayan Valley near American detachments, and again moving to join Tinio, once, indeed, meeting Tinio in Abra. He was no longer a prime factor in the resistance to the United States, though stimulating it whenever, at intervals frequently long, he could get communication with the leaders.[1]

Lawton, whose project of marching across the divide into the Kagayan Valley had been vetoed on November 2, chafed to get into action again as soon as the scene of operations was transferred from his immediate front, especially since there was for a moment no evidence of active opposition in Nueva Écija and Pangasinan. From San Fabian, he asked to "go and clean out everything" around Manila and to the southward, the territory really assigned to his division. No orders coming, he proposed, on November 22, to organize three columns to march into Nueva Vizcaya, one through Benget, the others over the south trails to Bayambang. But Otis seemed to suspect the campaign might spread over more territory, and replied: "We are not yet ready to enter the Kagayan Valley." Further requests for orders not being heeded, Lawton sent word he

[1] Further reference to Aguinaldo's wanderings will be made in connection with the two later expeditions sent out to capture him. A most interesting document is the diary of Simeon A. Villa, one of his companions, published separately by the War Department as *Flight and Wanderings of Emilio Aguinaldo* (Washington, 1902), and reproduced in *Sen. Doc. 331*, part 3, pp. 1986–2060, generally known as "Aguinaldo's Diary." Its statements of fact are not always blindly to be accepted, but passages like these are interesting, as shedding light upon the character at least of its author: "On a moonlight night, the honorable president [and the others] were discussing the matter; and once the independence of the country is declared, we shall take a trip to Europe, with an allowance of a million dollars to pay our expenses" (December). . . . After supper the honorable president, in conversation with B[arcelona], V[illa], and Lieutenant Carrasco, told them that, as soon as the independence of our country was declared, he would give each one of them an amount of land equal to what he himself will take for the future of his own family; that is, he will give each one of the three señores 13,500 acres of land as a recompense for their work. . . . In all probability they will be located in the San José Valley, province of Nueva Écija, and the principal products will be coffee, cacao, sugar, rice, and cattle" (March 16).

would leave for the north to join Young in running down the prisoners. He was then given orders to come south, turning the territory he occupied in central Luzon over to Wheaton.[1] Meanwhile, he had, on his own authority, sent Castner's scouts over the south trail to Bayambang, and had also directed Captain Joseph B. Batchelor to proceed in that direction across the fringes of Benget's mountains, with an incomplete battalion of the Twenty-fourth Infantry. Lieutenant J. N. Munro, with 50 men of the Fourth Cavalry, sent by its colonel, arrived before Bayambang just in advance of Castner, and the Filipino "general" who had been posted at Bayambang to await Aguinaldo had already pacted his "surrender," which included 60 arms and fewer men, most of his force having been dispatched toward the Kagayan Valley. Over 100 prisoners, including 7 Americans, were set free here. Another infantry battalion was then sent across the mountains, Bayambang was occupied permanently, and scouting parties felt out northward, in the direction Aguinaldo might take.[2]

[1] For the dispatches in question see *Otis's Rept. 1900*, pp. 70, 76–77, 91–99, and *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 166, 175, 180, 185, 190, 194, 203–05, 209. On November 26, Otis's chief-of-staff said: "It is not thought he [Aguinaldo] can cross to Bayambang. Certainly he cannot do so with his transportation." (Lawton had already furnished evidence that Aguinaldo's little party were on foot or pony-back.) On November 24, Lawton, hinting again for orders, said: "It is difficult to know exactly what is wanted." On November 27, Lawton issued a field order forbidding the seizing of material and supplies and the impressing of labor and transportation, the necessity having ceased, and directing steps to be taken to pay for all supplies seized in the places occupied (*ibid.*, pp. 192–93).

[2] Various reports of the move on Bayambang are: Castner's, *Rept., War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 342–44; Munro's, pp. 355–58; and that of Major J. A. Baldwin, sent to establish the garrison, pp. 364–72; and pp. 179–81, 186, 190, 196, 208, 211–13, 217, for Lawton's correspondence on these movements. Castner's scouts included some mounted infantrymen, but were made up mostly of Tagalogs. It is worthy of note, in connection with subsequent discussions about the capture of Aguinaldo, that these native scouts were provided with clothing like that worn by the revolutionary troops (only part of whom had a real "uniform"), upon General Lawton's order (*ibid.*, p. 342), with the design of securing as many arms as possible. The Filipinos at Bayambang feared the depredations of their own countrymen in arms and sought to stipulate that no native troops should enter with the Americans. Complete good feeling reigned at Bayambang at first, but a typical Filipino religio-fanatic movement (possibly also political) soon puzzled the American commander (*ibid.*, pp. 369–70). The Filipino headmen there (Ilokans and Kagayans) had fraternized with

Captain Batchelor had been shown by Lawton a dispatch from Young, asking that a rapid-marching force be sent up the east side of the Cordillera to cut off Aguinaldo's retreat to Bayambang, or the Kagayan Valley. Having arrived at Bayambang, he added Castner's little band of scouts to his 300 men and started for Isabela province, sending back word of his intentions, refusing to stop for the orders of subordinate commanders, and getting beyond the reach of peremptory orders from Otis through Lawton. The latter said Batchelor's move was "as much a surprise as though he had started for San Francisco," but he doubtless derived a certain grim satisfaction out of seeing the Kagayan Valley invaded. Otis anticipated disaster for the entire force, for the military commander of the Kagayan district, still Colonel Daniel Tirona, commanded over 1000 rifles and considerably more than that number of men. Tirona, however, in spite of former associations with Aguinaldo, had become dissatisfied with emissaries of Aguinaldo who had sought to carry things over his head, and there was, besides, considerable sentiment in the valley against resisting the new sovereign, partly influenced by commercial reasons (especially the desire to have the traffic in tobacco freely resumed), and partly by the deeply imbued disposition of the Kagayans to submit to the hand that holds the power, whether a local cacique or a new and unknown sovereign. On the border of Isabela province, Batchelor had a little fight, ended by several of his Negro infantrymen swimming a swift stream and rigging a crude raft, whereupon a mere handful of naked men chased the opponents out of trenches. But from the time he reached the Rio Grande de Kagayan, his progress was very much a triumphal procession through the towns. Reaching Ilagan, capital of Isabela, on December 8, he received a message from Tirona, who had gathered the bulk of his force at the mouth of the river, tendering his "submission

the Spanish prisoners, including the friars, and Baldwin reported the latter to be well fed and hearty, wearing collars and cuffs and laundered suits (*ibid.*, p. 366).

to the United States." On December 12, the civil officers of Kagayan province surrendered to him at Tugegarau 420 Spanish prisoners, about half of them friars, and the "homage of the entire province," with all due formality, followed by banquets, etc. At the same time, however, the cruiser Newark appeared off Aparri, and Captain McCalla received the surrender by Tirona of the 1100 men, 800 rifles, 4 field-guns, 1 steamer, 1 launch, and 100 river-lighters gathered there. Batchelor's plucky command was soon after relieved and sent down the river, having covered over three hundred miles to its mouth.[1]

A few Spanish prisoners had been found by Wheaton's landing party at San Fabian, and several hundred more were released by the further operations of MacArthur's division in Pangasinan and Sambales,[2] bringing the total number set free in northern Luzon up to about 5000, including over 300 friars. Over 1500 more, soldiers, civilians, and friars, were released when southern Luzon was occupied, early in 1900. The remainder of perhaps 8000 who had fallen into the hands of the Filipinos had, from time to time, escaped and reached the American lines, or secured their freedom by bribery or favor, and some had died. Except for some few individuals released

[1] Batchelor's success, due to whatsoever cause, saved him censure. He summed up the expedition thus: "About 350 men, insufficiently clothed, marched without guides into an unknown country; . . . made 123 deep fords . . . ; crossed 80 miles of precipitous mountains in five days, where the daily average of ascent and descent was not less than 8000 feet; ferried twice and once forced a passage over unfordable streams; lived three weeks on unaccustomed and insufficient food. . . ." For his report, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 373–81; for Lawton's correspondence on the expedition, *ibid.*, pp. 206–07, 213–14, 220, 238–40; for Otis's dispatches and comments, *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 98–106, 113–14.

[2] A Filipino guerrilla commander who ordered the killing of one Spaniard and several Filipino prisoners (of the party opposed to the revolution) when his column was hard-pressed in the mountains of Sambales, in February, 1900, was hanged in December, 1900. For summary of his trial by American military commission and his sentence, see General Order No. 143, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, December 13, 1900 (reproduced in *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 1083–84). He pleaded irresponsibility, declaring he had a peremptory order from General San Miguel that "those prisoners who had committed acts against the Filipino Republic should be killed," but could not produce the order.

by favor or by special negotiation, in only one case did an official of the revolution set free the prisoners of Spain during the year following that nation's formal renunciation of sovereignty in the islands; this was General Trias, who, proceeding upon the authority of Aguinaldo's decree, set free 197 Spaniards held by the forces subject to him in Tayabas. General Otis furnished transportation to Spain for the prisoners who reached the American lines during their advance in the early part of 1899, through a "spirit of comity"; but, when the thousands of them were released at the end of that year, he took the position that the United States was not obligated under the treaty to send them home, as it had done with its own prisoners of war, taken at the fall of Manila, and that Spanish civilians at least did not fall under the meaning of the treaty. He was overruled on both contentions by the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of War.[1]

[1] See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1040, 1119, 1121, 1129, 1133–34. Otis seems merely to have refused to assume the responsibility for so large an expenditure, ruling adversely and referring the question to Washington. The treaty plainly made it the duty of the United States to repatriate "prisoners of war" released by its efforts. The Filipinos had contended that Spanish civil officials, including the friars, were "prisoners of war," the contention, however, not being accepted as valid either by the United States or Spain; but the Administration at Washington preferred to raise no question over this point. Over 5000 prisoners were sent home at the expense of the United States (the Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1899 carrying $1,500,000 for the purpose, and that of 1900 carrying $750,000 more); of the rest, some were Spanish civilians who had had no official position, and some preferred to remain in the islands. Sastrón (*op. cit.*, pp. 575–76), who was a member of the Spanish "committee on liquidation," says the Americans refused to pay the passage of the 877 Spanish marines who were released, among them being those who surrendered to Coghlan at Isla Grande in July, 1898, and were then turned over to the Filipinos at Olongapó. He also says (p. 564) that the Americans would not repatriate the friar priests (who were, under the Spanish system, salaried employees of the Government). Otis (*Rept., 1900*, p. 278) says that some friars were returned at the expense of the United States. If there was, either at this time or in August, 1898 (when, as stated in chapter III, the religious orders were reported to be desirous of abandoning the Philippines and being transported to Asia), a *bona fide* opportunity to eliminate most of or all the friars from the situation, both Americans and Filipinos have, in the light of subsequent events, reason to regret that it was not improved. Otis cabled to Washington that the prisoners arriving in Manila in December, 1899, were "in much better physical condition than the Spanish troops surrendered when Manila capitulated." This generalization would certainly not apply indiscriminately.

The occupation of all the civilized provinces of northern Luzon was completed about December 1 by the very effective scouting operations of Colonel Bell and his Thirty-sixth Volunteers in southern Pangasinan and Sambales and by a double-column movement under General Grant in to Bataán and Sambales. Bell, besides investigating disturbed conditions in some of the Pangasinan towns, pushing into Sambales and releasing 100 Spanish prisoners, chased into the Sambales Mountains a considerable force which the commanders Alejandrino and San Miguel were trying to keep together, scattering it in several directions on November 27, and destroying an arsenal headquarters which had been set up on top of a ridge.[1] Grant's two columns, one going through the mountains from Tarlak to Iba and Subig, the other through Bataán from Pampanga to Olongapó on Subig Bay, had only a few skirmishes, and left garrisons in some of the principal towns. The Oregon and Baltimore and several gunboats coöperated for the movements along the coast, and Olongapó, where the Spaniards had spent considerable money on the beginnings of a navy yard, was turned over to the navy to occupy as they were already occupying Cavite.[2]

[1] See MacArthur's and Bell's messages of the time, *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, pp. 65–68, 315–22 ; also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 82–89. Bell was made brigadier-general of volunteers shortly after this culmination to his brilliant campaign with his regiment. Subsequent events belied the following opinion by MacArthur on the results of the movements against Alejandrino and San Miguel : "The insurgents can make no more powder and no more cartridges, and as the supply of ammunition in the hands of insurgent soldiers is very limited, Colonel Bell's success practically puts a limit to the duration of the war in this zone of action [meaning west central Luzon]."

[2] Besides the correspondence cited in the preceding note, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 68–76, 96–113, 159, for Grant's summaries and reports of subordinates. The inhabitants fled at first, but soon returned to their homes ; the columns were provided with money to pay for all material or supplies taken, and Grant issued stringent orders for the enforcing of good discipline, including the destruction of all *vino* (an alcoholic drink, made from the nipa-palm, and productive of deadly effects upon the American soldiers) and a prohibition upon the entering of native houses except by search-parties (*ibid.*, pp. 98–99). For the navy's coöperation, see also *Rept. Sec. Navy, 1900*, pp. 1114–15, 1143–46.

CHAPTER XX

LAWTON'S LAST "SCOUT"

LAWTON's and MacArthur's troops had but fairly started on their way north in October, when Filipino bands, occasionally of some size, made their appearance east of the railroad line, and to the northeast of Manila, in the mountains of Morong — in a word, in the region to which at the last the Spaniards had confined the insurrection of 1896–97, where conditions made for the immunity of small bands, capable of quick mobilization for a raid or night attack in the populated valleys. These bands had displayed considerable activity, especially around San Miguel, in the corner of Bulakán, Nueva Écija, and Pampanga, and north and east of Manila, beyond the waterworks. South of the Pasig, their demonstrations were resumed, more particularly against Kalamba on the lake, within a week after the "punitive expedition" of October had ended.[1] Lawton, who was now awaiting a return to the territory of his division, was kept busy at Tayug with details of the movements of troops in the north until December 11, but meanwhile was moving troops and directing scouting operations north of Manila as well as he could by telegraph. He spent a few days in San Miguel, whence Colonel Charles C. Hood was directing a general dispersal of the bands gathered under Pio del Pilar, and reported at Manila on December 15.[2] There he outlined his plans for a comprehensive campaign in southern Luzon, and was waiting for General Otis to pass on them, when he was sent to drive away a force of Filipinos which had become

[1] See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 151–62.

[2] For telegraphic correspondence detailing the movements and Lawton's efforts to prepare a realignment of his troops, see *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 102–13, and *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 236–61; also pp. 613–25 (*Hood's report*). The taking of the "impregnable stronghold" of Biak-na-bató, a feat much advertised in the American press, had no significance or importance.

demonstrative along the Marikina River beyond the waterworks, having gathered in some strength at the town of San Mateo.

It was just such a "scout in force" as Lawton had been sent to make, now here, now there, so many times since his arrival in the Philippines. Leaving Manila on the night of December 18, in a downpour of rain, the last "monsoon" storm of the season, Lawton, in rough campaign clothes, frontiersman's yellow slicker, and big white helmet, bade good-bye to General Otis and a party dining in the old Spanish executive mansion, and went out into the dark, ignorant of whether his plans for future action were approved, and unaware that the long-coveted honor of being commissioned brigadier-general of the regular army while in the field was soon to be his. Marching a force of cavalry and infantry through the heavy mud all night, he reached position across the river from San Mateo at daylight, meeting there additional infantry he had ordered from La Loma. The flanking and enveloping movements, executed by fording the river, were directed with the precision and care which always characterized Lawton. Opposite his center, 250 or 300 Filipinos with rifles were intrenched in San Mateo, and sharp firing at close range was opened with them shortly after 8 o'clock. Lawton was, as usual, disdainful of the bullets spattering about him, one of which struck an aide, Lieutenant Breckenridge, in the arm and back. After helping to carry him to the rear, Lawton, despite his announced intention not to remain himself in the exposed position at the front, where his troops were crowded behind hummocks of earth firing at the enemy when a head showed above the trenches across the swollen river, almost immediately started back alone toward the river-bank. While crossing the field directly in front of the Filipino trenches, his towering frame and conspicuous garb making him a veritable target, he was shot through the lungs, and died almost immediately on the muddy field, in the arms of young officers whose ideal and pattern he

was. The little "skirmish" at San Mateo had cost the life of a major-general of the volunteers.[1]

The Marikina Valley was now half-inundated, and it was evening before couriers reached Manila bearing the news to the woman who had kept close to Henry W. Lawton in all the campaigns of life — the news which a few hours later was to touch the heart-chords of a nation across the seas, to whom Lawton the general, the Titan of courage, intelligence, and strength, had also become the real "man of the hour" in the Philippines. Greater than the personal loss of the big-hearted man and of the indomitable leader, was the loss of the Lawton who had grasped the elements of the situation immediately he began operations outside of Manila; who had seen that to crush the "Revolutionary Government" was mere play for real generalship and real soldiers, but that the problem only began there; who had thought that his countrymen at home

[1] By far the best account of Lawton's "last scout," written by a personal friend and well-informed correspondent, is that of William Dinwiddie, in *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 325–31. For the official reports of the battle of San Mateo, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 155–56 (with maps), 194–206; also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 169–72. (Otis also relates the attempt of Artemio Ricarte, one of the unbalanced young enthusiasts in Aguinaldo's confidence, who had annexed to his name the appendage *y Vibora*, meaning "and Viper," to organize an uprising in Manila the day of the embarkation of Lawton's body for home; it was claimed they intended to throw bombs among the foreign consuls. See also *Sen. Doc. 208*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 3, pp. 9–10, for messages *re* the sending of bombs to Manila.) For Secretary Root's order commemorative of Lawton, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 1, p. 7. For additional information on Lawton's death, his biography, the messages of the President and Secretary of War, and the order of the Inspector-General's Corps, to which he belonged, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 3, pp. 187–91, 192–93. Lawton had enlisted as a private in the first volunteer forces for the Civil War organized in Indiana, at the age of eighteen; he became captain at nineteen, and colonel at twenty-two. He then studied law at Harvard, but accepted a commission in the regular army in 1867, being prominent on the frontier for the next twenty years, leading the column which chased the Apaches into Mexico in the campaign which resulted in Chief Gerónimo's surrender. He had repeatedly been assigned to staff duties, as quartermaster, engineer officer, and inspector, and was an inspector-general when war came on in 1898, at once asking active duty, and leading a division in Cuba. He inaugurated brigade inspections in the Philippines, as a means of vigorously checking breaches of discipline and abuse of the natives (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 3, pp. 154–55, 170). For accounts of his burial at Arlington, etc., see American daily press, January 31 to February 10, 1900.

should be frankly dealt with, not coddled with half-truths or optimistic imaginings; who had believed in providing the troops and wherewithal for the unflinching execution of a "thorough policy"; who fought relentlessly when he fought, but laid aside rancor and prejudice with the vanquishing of the adversary; who saw the necessity in the future rather for the statesman than the soldier, and, once in supreme command, would have rushed the work of conquest to its conclusion, only to make the army an adjunct thereafter to the policy of reconciliation. There is no pharisaism, no mock sentimentalism, in saying that the death of Lawton, unfortunate as it was for his own country, was as great, even a greater, loss to the Filipino people.

CHAPTER XXI

GUERRILLA WARFARE

From the time when Tarlak was abandoned by the harassed remnants of the "Filipino Government," the Philippine campaign had entered upon a new stage. In filibusterism within the towns under American control and guerrilla warfare upon their outskirts, lay the real possibilities of effective opposition by the Filipinos to any powerful nation internationally recognized as their sovereign. Abandoning their pretentious organization, which was the merest shell of the rising Filipino nationality, and to shatter which only contact and slight pressure were necessary, the leaders of the opposition to American authority relied thenceforth upon the popular sentiment against the "new masters"; upon their own individual efforts to harass the scattered American commands; upon dreams of intervention by European powers or American electors; and upon their much varied concepts of "Providence," to realize for them their ideals, more or less mixed as these were with personal ambitions, race-animosity, and sincere patriotism.

The change in the situation confronting them was only partially realized at the time by the American authorities. It soon became apparent in northern Luzon, practically all the territory of which had been made tributary to American commands at the beginning of 1900. But the first few months of the new year were taken up with military expeditions to occupy southern Luzon, to extend American authority in the central islands, and to complete the framework of military government by raising the flag over Mindanau. Scant opposition was developed, yet sufficient to give to the careless observer the appearance of a campaign. The American field commanders, to the south as well as to the north of Manila,

speedily comprehended that their tasks had only begun with the setting-up of permanent headquarters. But their superiors in Manila, who at first read the situation off the maps by their desks, did not so soon grasp its elements. Still later — indeed, never completely — did the American public, confused by the jangle of optimistic and pessimistic observers, of both official and unofficial "authorities," come to understand what sort of a fight it was rather blindly waging.

AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE ARCHIPELAGO COMPLETED

Filipino control of southern Luzon had been little disturbed from the outset. Manila was protected by a strong line just to its south, from the river to the bay. This had been extended on the southeast to Kalamba on the lake, months after the capture and abandonment of Santa Cruz, farther east along the lake shore. To the southwest, the net result of two "raids" into Cavite had been the permanent retention of a few towns near the bay or a short distance inland; but Filipino forces faced them and occasionally attacked their outskirts, and commands of Trias were stationed just outside the Cavite peninsula. In other words, American forces were posted at strategic points on the northern fringes of Cavite and Laguna, and all the rest of southern Luzon was, as it had been for a year and a half, in control of native commanders and officials, of local origin or sent down from Cavite. It was quite thoroughly isolated in a commercial sense, but the hardships of this isolation were not so much felt in the Tagalog provinces as in those at the extreme south, where there is little diversity of products, and *abaká* is the main reliance. These provinces in particular were overtaxed by the zealous collectors from the north, themselves already engaged with foreign firms in contraband trade. Everywhere, the abuses of the local *caciques* were at least as great as in former times. With the masses, however, life moved on quite in the customary channels. More men were under arms here and there, but this had been pretty

continually the case since 1896. The upper classes were in full control, with no Spaniards, either civilians or military commanders, to check their enjoyment of it; only, in the Bikol provinces, the presence of the Tagalog superior commanders was, for the native aristocracy of those provinces, a cloud on the sky. The darkest side of the picture was the retention of over 1500 Spanish prisoners, mostly soldiers, but also, besides friars and civilian officials, some women and children; though these prisoners were reasonably well treated in some places, they were, under other commanders, subject constantly to insults and abuses, and, before the story was closed, wholesale assassination of defenseless and famished captives was added to its uglier chapters.

General John C. Bates, now a major-general of volunteers, succeeded to the command of Lawton's old division early in January of 1900. A movement into southern Luzon had already been set on foot. The plan outlined at corps headquarters in Manila was in effect that which had been drawn up by Lawton, and was similar to the plan of campaign drawn up by Polavieja in 1897 and completed by the "involving operations" of Primo de Rivera. The conditions confronting the Americans, however, might reasonably have been regarded as much more difficult than those which the Spanish commanders had had to meet. The Filipinos had been much longer in uninterrupted control of the major portion of Cavite province, and held, moreover, all the rest of southern Luzon; in particular, they were in full control of Batangas, the possession of only part of which they had been able to dispute in 1897. Still more important, they now had several times as many rifles as they had been able to obtain during the revolt against Spain. But there was a notable psychological difference in their attitude now from that of three years before: then they had all their hopes centered in Cavite, the head and front of the rebellion, the seat of its foremost leaders; now, their governmental leaders were in flight or captivity, the word had

gone out for a campaign in the brush, and the degree and length of their frontal resistance depended merely upon how vigorously and how intelligently the Americans should make the attack. In this last respect, there was a notable difference between the campaign of 1900 and that of the Spaniards in 1896 and 1897. The American forces were vastly better organized, equipped, and supplied; they had modern artillery, more or less suitable for such a campaign, and used it; they did not waste men in ridiculous, if showy, frontal attacks upon positions fortified both naturally and artificially. The moment this became apparent, the Filipinos almost ceased their effort to hold the towns, and the bands in front of the American columns melted away, the movements of the latter becoming, for the most part, a vigorously conducted triumphal procession for the posting of garrisons.

Two columns, made up mostly of the new volunteer infantry regiments, were organized for joint movements designed to insure the control of Cavite, Laguna, and Batangas provinces. The column under General Wheaton was to occupy the Filipino forces in front of the American positions in northern Cavite, not pressing them hard, but engaging them sufficiently to hold them, if possible, in force, while the column under General Schwan, which had moved out from Manila to Biñang on the lake west of Kalamba, should strike thence rapidly southwestward through Cavite, establishing a line through Silang and Indang to Naik, thus hemming in Trias's forces between the two commands. The "demonstrations" in Wheaton's front, however, drew a battalion of Colonel Birkhimer's Twenty-eighth Infantry, supported by "Reilly's Battery" of the Fifth Artillery, into a little sharp fight near Old Cavite, retreat from which would have meant loss of prestige. Birkhimer was almost on the same ground where the Spaniards had so muddled their operations in 1896 and 1897; he, however, fully reconnoitered the difficult ground near Old Cavite, flanked the Filipino position at Putol Bridge, and, with the aid of the light

field battery, which Reilly ran up almost to the edge of the opposing intrenchments, took the place and put to flight the Filipinos, who had opened the fight with great spirit, after heavy loss on their part, but without a single man being killed on the American side.[1] This was the only fight of consequence in Cavite, with the exception of another sharp little engagement the same day, won quite decisively by Taggart's battalion of the Twenty-eighth, which was feeling out from Imus to Dasmariñas. Schwan's column, which had met a little resistance to its first steps southeastward of Manila, did not complete in force its projected line to Naik. Colonel E. M. Hayes's squadron of the Fourth Cavalry moved with remarkable rapidity to the western coast of Cavite; but the opposition which had been overcome near the Cavite peninsula drew Wheaton's forces into the pursuit of the main body of Filipino troops, and the latter now rapidly scattered into small detachments or melted into the general population, precisely as they had done in 1897, leaving General Bates, who was at Wheaton's headquarters directing the joint operations, somewhat dazed as to where to find the enemy. The two American columns came together at Silang and Indang, and, after various scouting operations had been conducted through the southern part of Cavite, getting contact with small bands here and there, the campaign was reorganized, Wheaton's forces being posted throughout Cavite province and Schwan's column being assigned to further operations in Batangas and Laguna. Meanwhile, however, Colonel Bullard, who commanded the position at Kalamba which the Laguna insurgents were so persistent in harassing, had struck them a number of hard blows from there and Los Baños on the lake, finally driving them in force beyond Santo Tomás toward Lake Taal, wherein the famous vol-

[1] For Birkhimer's report, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 628–30. For another report of this fight, reprinted from the *Army and Navy Journal*, see *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 347–49. Reilly's Battery, later in the same year, figured brilliantly in the China campaign, where its commander was killed at the gates of Peking.

cano of that name is located on an island.[1] Hence, two small columns of Wheaton's force were sent on scouts to the lake and into western Batangas, which province this lake divides. The navy coöperated along the coast and shelled Batangas, the capital, with a view to its occupation by the army. At the same time Schwan hastily organized his forces to take and hold the important line from Kalamba through Lipa to Batangas Bay. Though the advance, composed of cavalry, and to some extent also of infantry which followed, had skirmishes all the way, even with bolomen, Lipa and Batangas towns were easily occupied; but hostile bands remained in the neighborhood. Schwan's main attention was then directed to the movement eastward through Laguna. Serious resistance was threatened from a fortified position near Mahaihai,[2] where it was reported that 2000 to 3000 Tagalogs commanded the advance through a narrow gorge. As in most of their "impregnable" positions, however, they failed to provide fully against the possibility of being flanked, and they abandoned the place into which most of their forces in Laguna had been collected as soon as they found that detachments of the Thirtieth and the Twenty-ninth Infantry had found a way around their positions, the latter body of troops being let down the side of a gorge with ropes.[3] There was no fight to make,

[1] A detachment of the Thirty-seventh under Bullard had captured to the eastward of Los Baños, Paciano Rizal, the Filipino general in command in Laguna, and the strange relics he bore with him. After the execution of José Rizal in December, 1896, his family were at first refused permission to bury him by the Spanish authorities, who privately gave as their reasons the fear that the occasion would be seized upon for the making of some demonstration. Later on, the mother and sisters were allowed to remove the remains from the cemetery, and with the reorganization of revolt in Laguna in 1898, they were exhumed and placed in a box, which was carried about with Paciano Rizal, miraculous powers being ascribed to the patriot's bones by the ignorant populace. Paciano Rizal was sent from Los Baños to Manila, and shortly afterward took the oath of allegiance and the amnesty offered by General Otis, remaining thenceforth, so far as known, entirely passive as regards the insurrection. His mother and sisters were already living in Manila. The British wife of José Rizal had in 1897 accepted the pardon and assistance of General Polavieja, and had left the islands. See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 181–82.

[2] Spanish spelling, "Majayjay," pronounced "Ma-hí-hī."

[3] For the Mahaihai maneuvers, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 402–04, 507 (with map); *ibid.*, part 6, p. 652.

and the American forces pressed in pursuit after the now rapidly scattering bands, taking Santa Cruz on the lake. This time it was garrisoned, and the inhabitants, such as could at first be found, were informed that the Americans had now come to stay, not, as in 1899, on a mere "raid." From Lipa, Hayes and his troopers had already been sent more directly eastward into Tayabas. In the latter province, the island of Luzon narrows rapidly to an isthmus but ten miles wide. Hayes's advance was designed to prepare the way for entrance into Tayabas and, if possible, to head off the Spanish prisoners who were being carried that way. With the unexpected rapid scattering of the Tagalog forces in Laguna, it became necessary now to cut off a possible retreat in force across this isthmus into the Camarines. The Thirtieth Infantry, under Colonel Gardener, which had kept close on the heels of Hayes's lively troopers, and had made some detached day's marches not less creditable for fast troops than Hayes's movements were for cavalry,[1] was now hurried into and through Tayabas, where it was thereafter stationed. The movement was probably successful so far as cutting off from the Camarines (for the occupation of which an expedition was now preparing) a Tagalog reinforcement. It was partially successful in releasing prisoners, 331 having been set free in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas; but the greater number of the prisoners were already in the Camarines.

During a month's campaign in Laguna, Cavite, Batangas, and Tayabas, Schwan's brigade had covered 650 miles on the roads between towns (though no detachment had gone that far). Its lack of real contact with the Filipinos was shown by its loss of 11 men killed and 52 wounded, as against 180 Filipino dead (found and counted) and 46 Filipino wounded (an incomplete record, as throughout the Filipino campaign wounded natives readily escaped or were carried into the brush). Only 154

[1] Hayes's own report, showing some rather notable marches for any climate and country, is in *Rept. War Dept.*, 1900, part 5, pp. 550–64.

rifles were obtained in all—a note much more significant than the capture of various old field-pieces (including some of the bamboo cannon wound with iron that had been used in 1896–97), a few modern mountain-guns, considerable ammunition (an arsenal also being destroyed at Silang), and about $27,000 in Mexican currency.[1] Most of the towns in Laguna and all those in Tayabas were practically deserted when the American troops entered, but the towns proper gradually refilled with people, though in outlying *barrios* (subject to raids from both sides, as scouting operations were inaugurated by post commanders) the process of repopulation went on more slowly, and some *barrios*, indeed, remained deserted. Schwan sought to enlist the coöperation of the influential inhabitants in restoring normal conditions. At the outset, he had issued an order against looting, and he thought it was strictly obeyed; but at least one case of it being violated was reported by Colonel Gardener, when the wealthy town of Lipa was taken. The latter officer also reported the existence of "a spirit of lawlessness among our soldiers which is repressed only by constant vigilance on the part of commanding officers." It was soon after found necessary to send back north the Makabebes who had done excellent work in scouting through Batangas and Tayabas, but, when once permanently quartered, began to terrorize the still unsettled people of Tayabas.[2] The work of

[1] Yet before returning to Manila on February 8, and after visiting the newly garrisoned towns, Schwan telegraphed Otis: ". . . With constant vigilance on our part, the insurgents in the provinces of Laguna and Tayabas will be incapable of doing any serious mischief. Their attempts on all but individuals, mere squads or inadequately escorted trains, are feeble to a degree, and evidently induced by a spirit of bravado rather than by a hope of success." (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, part 5, pp. 497–98.)

[2] See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, part 5, p. 418, for Schwan's order *re* looting; p. 425, for his proclamation at Batangas inviting Filipino coöperation; p. 453, for Gardener's detection of looting at Lipa; pp. 508–09, for Gardener's report on the operations of the Thirtieth during the month. A great part of the looting he charged to the Chinese coolies bearing litters and supplies. Under date of February 8, 1900, these words of Gardener (who was to be bitterly attacked by brother officers in 1902 for being a "Nigger-lover") are worthy of note: "The habit of some Manila newspapers in speaking of the natives as 'niggers' is, in my opinion, largely re-

organizing new municipal governments subject to the military was promptly undertaken, and the Tagalog part of southern Luzon entered upon a period in all ways analogous to that begun already (in some provinces, indeed, six or eight months previously) in northern Luzon.[1]

On January 9, Otis had received an urgent request from Washington to open up the ports where *abaká* (Manila hemp) was waiting to be marketed, and had reported that he was short of vessels for moving troops, but would do it some time that month.[2] On January 18, W. A. Kobbé, who had been made one of the brigadiers of the new volunteer establishment, sailed from Manila with the Forty-third and Forty-seventh regiments and a little artillery, having instructions relative to promptly equipping with revenue officers the hemp ports of southern Luzon and of Sámar and Leite. Three ports of Sorsogon province were peacefully occupied and left with a garrison of one company each. The remainder of the Forty-seventh was reserved for the opening of Albai province, where Paua and Belarmino had a considerable force of bolomen and 400 or 500 rifles. At the chief port, Legaspi, which looks out of the Gulf of Albai on the old path of the Spanish galleons as they entered the archipelago on their long voyage from Mexico, there was resistance to the landing of the soldiers of the new sovereign. Two hundred or so riflemen and more than twice as many bolomen stuck to their trenches in front of the

sponsible for the contempt shown them by many of our soldiers. Even officers of high rank habitually speak of the natives as 'niggers.' I have insisted at all times that peaceable natives shall in all respects be treated as citizens of the United States are treated by United States soldiers at home, as I consider that the pacification of these islands is possible only along these lines."

[1] Guerrilla warfare and American military government will be considered further along. For the various American military reports of this January campaign, see, for that of Otis, his *Rept., 1900*, pp. 172–99; of Bates, *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 640–59; of Schwan, *ibid.*, part 5, pp. 387–564; of Wheaton, *ibid.*, part 6, pp. 625–39.

[2] See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1130–31. The dispatch to Otis, signed by Adjutant-General Corbin, read: "Urgent inquiries and anxiety here about hemp. Whenever you are in position to give definite information about opening ports, it would be great relief to Department."

hemp warehouses, as if ignorant of modern methods of warfare, or else reckless of life, despite the effective fire of the gunboat Nashville; so stubborn they were, that many were slain at almost hand-to-hand quarters by the American troops, which had landed and flanked their trenches.[1] Another company was left on the important little island of Katanduanes, in charge of its hemp port. The entire Forty-third was reserved for stations in Sámar and Leite. At Kalbayog and Katbalogan, on the western coast of Sámar, there was no resistance to the landing, but Lukban's man set fire to the latter place before fleeing to the encircling hills. The Third battalion had a skirmish in the streets when it landed at Takloban, the chief town of Leite.

A small fleet of merchant vessels had followed the American army to the hemp ports. Revenue and port officers were designated for each place before landing, blanks and regulations had been brought down from Manila, and, on January 30, the nine ports occupied were formally declared open to the inter-island trade; also Batangas and Taal at the same time. General Kobbé went back to Manila for supplies, and on his return distributed these among the garrisons established, and, during the latter part of February, opened two more ports in

[1] See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 200, and *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 10–11; also Chicago *Record's Stories of Filipino Warfare* (John McCutcheon's letters), and *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 349–52, for correspondents' accounts of the Legaspi fight. About fifty Filipinos were killed here and more were killed at close quarters near Albai town. General Kobbé says: "The resistance was so stubborn, either from ignorance or indifference to consequences, that many were killed or wounded at hand-to-hand range, without giving any sign of surrender." The correspondents were inclined to think that a new fierceness toward the Filipinos, not evinced in the fighting of 1899, was making itself manifest in 1900. Said the New York *Herald* representative (quoted by Albert G. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 378): "When Legaspi was taken, a great many bolomen were killed. This was due to the fact that they were in the Filipino trenches and therefore exposed themselves to that danger. There were also a number of hemp-workmen, armed only with wooden hemp-beaters, who were shot down in that mad, exultant carnage that our soldiers indulged in. . . . When Albai was taken, our outpost fired on everybody who attempted to enter the town. . . . As one American officer said, with an oath, 'There are no *amigos*.' . . . All the people who might otherwise have been at least passive became violently hostile. There was a reign of terror."

Albai province, two in Sámar, and five on the northern and western coast of Leite. By April 8, 300,000 bales of *abaká* had been shipped to Manila, and the administration press in the United States declared that there would be no increase in the price of binder-twine to American farmers.

The one-battalion posts of Sámar and Leite, which had been reconnoitering those islands very energetically, were too thin for the spreading-out that seemed to be required, and serious difficulties soon compelled both a more conservative policy and the sending of reinforcements. In the southernmost provinces of Luzon, it became evident that possession of the ports was not possession of the interior, nor did it insure peace in the garrisoned places themselves. Around Sorsogon town, the people all seemed favorably inclined, but not so in other parts of Sorsogon province, especially around Donsol; religious fanaticism was being invoked as an instrument of opposition to the Americans, and with easy success, Sorsogon being an especially backward community, with densely ignorant masses. Paua, with only 200 or 300 rifles behind him, stirred up trouble constantly, especially by night, around Legaspi and Albai, also burning towns. Beyond reconnoitering the country near the stately Mayon volcano, no expansion of the area of occupation could be undertaken until February 8, when Tabako, on the other side of Mayon, was taken; indeed, the Forty-seventh was not only unable to scour Albai to the northward and coöperate with the force then entering the Camarines, but had to be reinforced, temporarily, by a portion of the Fortieth, which had engaged in the Camarines expedition, and afterwards by permanent additions.[1]

[1] Paua surrendered on March 27, 1900, but Vito Belarmino kept up guerrilla warfare in southwestern Luzon for another year. Paua was sent to Manila under suspicion of being implicated in the wholesale assassination of Spanish prisoners, but, sufficient proofs to put him on trial on this charge were not discovered. For official data on the opening of the hemp ports, see *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 119–204; *General Orders of 1900, Military Governor Philippines*, Nos. 5, 15, 22, 24, 28, and 38; reports of Kobbé and subordinates in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 7–64.

As previously stated, Hayes's cavalrymen and the Thirtieth Volunteers had, by their movements in Tayabas, cut off the retreat of any large Filipino force into the Camarines (the word meaning "storehouse" or "granaries," in Spanish). The possession of this important territory (in recent years, divided into two provinces under Spain) was the next and final step in extending American authority over southern Luzon. For this purpose, General Bates left Manila on February 15, aboard the gunboat Marietta, with 2300 soldiers on five inter-island transports. The Gulf of San Miguel, which gives entrance to the heart of the Camarines, is very shallow, and the Bikol River, which flows into it through the most important valley occupied by the Bikol people (though not yet so rich agriculturally as the territory they hold to the south, around the Mayon volcano), has a troublesome bar at its mouth, up which river craft go to Nueva Cáceres, the chief town of southeastern Luzon and the seat of a Roman Catholic bishop since 1595. The landing operations, especially with the facilities provided, were considerably delayed by the natural obstacles, but were also conducted in rather leisurely fashion. In general, the entire expedition lacked effective, or at any rate vigorous, direction; but it was redeemed, if not from considerable disorder, at least from greater barrenness of results, by the energy of the subordinate commanders, and especially of Major M. M. McNamee and his battalion of the Fortieth Infantry. There was feeble resistance to the landings on the shores of San Miguel Bay, but considerable opposition developed at Libmanán, and several other towns were burned by the retreating Filipino commanders. When the Americans entered Nueva Cáceres on February 22, they found it almost a deserted town; the Spanish prisoners had been carried away, and the Filipino civil officials (natives and residents of the province) had been compelled by the superior military com-

For immediately subsequent operations in Albai, see pp. 206–09, 298–302; *ibid.*, part 6, pp. 761–71; and *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 329 *et seq.*

manders (Tagalogs) to abandon the town, as had the Chinese merchants.[1] They soon returned, however, and the Spanish prisoners who had escaped from the scattering Filipino commands also began to struggle within the American lines. Two columns of the Fortieth were sent in opposite directions around the base of Isarog volcano, having one sharp encounter, then uniting and marching south to Lagonoi Bay.[2] A small column was sent into North Camarines by water, and from Daet marched nearly the length of the province to the north. A mountain-barrier cuts off the Camarines from Tayabas, but the line of American posts was virtually made complete through southern Luzon by the occupation of Pasakau, close to Nueva Cáceres, but on the western coast of the Camarines, and fronting Tayabas on the Gulf of Ragai. Brigadier-General John M. Bell, who had been in command on shore in the Camarines, was, on March 20, made military governor of southeastern Luzon. He had found it necessary to call for more troops, and received the Eleventh Cavalry, which gave him a total of 2600 men in the Camarines, Albai, Sorsogon, and the island of Katanduanes.[3]

About 1000 prisoners of the Filipinos, including nearly 75 friars, were set at liberty, in one way and another, in this district of Luzon. The largest party of them found at any one place, numbering about 500, was taken from the shore of the Gulf of Ragai by vessels of the United States Navy, they having been turned loose by their captors when the latter were too hard pressed. Other Filipino commanders were not so humane, and endeavored to force their captives into the mountains and remoter corners of the Camarines, they being slashed with bolos and otherwise maltreated when they did not keep up. The crowning piece of barbarity was the slaughter, by

[1] *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, p. 669.

[2] For John McCutcheon's account, see *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 352–53 (also in Chicago *Record's Stories of Filipino Warfare*).

[3] For the Camarines expedition, see *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 204–06; *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 660–90; *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 192–94, 427–29; also *General Orders, Military Governor, 1900*, no. 36.

bolos and rifles, of about 115 Spaniards, mostly soldiers, in a body.[1]

The incidents in the occupation of the island of Mindanau covered a period of nearly five months, from November, 1899, to April, 1900. This great island (according to most of the recent estimates, larger than Luzon), except for a fringe of Bisayan Christians on the north and the presence of a mixed population of Christians in the main ports occupied by the Spaniards along or near the southern coasts, is inhabited by Mohammedan Malays and pagan tribes, the latter mostly in the interior, the "Moros" along the coasts or the great watercourses and lakes. Some account has been given in the preceding chapters of the capture by the Christian Filipinos at Samboanga (perhaps with the connivance of Spaniards) of small cannon and other arms from the Spanish gunboats purchased by General Otis, and of their turning these arms upon the Spanish garrison concentrated there from all Mindanau, causing the latter to evacuate quite rapidly. For six months, Commander Very, on the gunboat Castine, kept Samboanga under constant observation, and the Americans rejected the offer of Dato Mandi, the Moro chieftain on the peninsula of Samboanga, to deliver over the place to them (including the heads of the Filipino leaders), because troops to hold it could not be spared from Luzon. But the Christian Filipinos quarreled among themselves in November, and, when one leader slew another by treachery and invited Commander Very to land and take charge, the latter did so in order to keep the town and people from harm. Troops were hastily sent over

[1] This matter has been dealt with in chaptér VIII (see vol. I, pp. 338, 339), where reference was given also to the trial and execution of the Filipino commander immediately responsible. It was at first charged that he acted on the authority of Paua. For the navy's release of the party in the Gulf of Ragai, see *Rept. Sec. Navy, 1900*, pp. 1115–16, where the number is stated as 522, including 10 Americans and 460 Spanish soldiers and officers, the rest being Spanish friars and civilians; see also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 198–99, where the number is stated as 427. For Bell's report on the prisoners escaping to Nueva Cáceres, among them officers of some rank, being slashed with bolos, etc., see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, p. 669.

from Joló; and Otis, not very willingly it was thought,[1] prepared an expedition for the occupation of southern Mindanau. General Bates took the Thirty-first Infantry south in December, stationing battalions at Samboanga, Kotabato (where the Moros had assassinated the self-appointed Filipino chiefs), and Dávau. Smaller detachments were later stationed at several former Spanish posts on the south, and one also on the island of Basilán, which post, a minor Spanish naval station, was formally taken over by the United States Navy in June, 1900.

When he returned from the Camarines in March, General Bates was sent to gather up the detachments of the Fortieth Infantry in southern Luzon and take them to occupy the principal Bisayan towns of northern Mindanau. The Filipino chieftain at Surigau, on the northeast coast, who seems to have been a free-lance (called by some a pirate), had been openly hostile to the Filipino organization in Luzon, had frequently sent word to the Americans that he would surrender his authority to them whenever they came, and now organized a *fiesta* to solemnize his surrender of the place and the few arms he commanded to General Bates.[2] At Kagayan, capital of Misamis province, there was a Filipino force, partly Tagalog, which recognized the Luzon organization; but, when American troops landed, backed by the navy gunboats, the 200 riflemen struck into the interior and the town was surrendered by its civil officials. Ilígan,[3] Misamis, and Dapitan

[1] See Albert G. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

[2] This chief, by name García, had seized a trading-vessel, in which he made trips along the eastern and northern coasts of Mindanau in search, it was declared, of plunder. Because of his having defeated several small expeditions sent against him by the Filipinos in the north and his friendly messages to the Americans, sent when he wanted help, some of the latter exalted him into a disinterested patriot. Upon the recommendation of the military, he was appointed governor of Surigau province when it was civilly organized in 1901; later on, he had to be removed by the Philippine Commission.

[3] This town, on the bay of that name, is within easy striking distance of Lake Lanau. It was here that General Ramon Blanco made his headquarters for the conquest, in 1895–96, of the long undisturbed "Lake Moros." A railroad had been constructed for three kilometers toward the lake, and small gunboats had been carried inland and their pieces put together on the lake.

were also entered peacefully, thus completing the occupation of the principal points of Mindanau without a shot being fired. But the rifles at large along the Kagayan River of Misamis were to give occasional trouble for several years yet, and the following June a party of 100 American soldiers, searching for the force having these rifles, was, through failure to reconnoiter, ambushed, suffering a loss of 12 men killed. Along the shores of Ilígan Bay, there were, as there still are, various marauding bands, with factional strife among the leaders.[1] Eight American soldiers were boloed at Lokulan, an outpost of Misamis, in May. Except under Capistrano, the Filipino leader near Kagayan, there was little identity of this opposition to the Americans with a sentiment of "Filipino nationality"; it was in part race-hatred, inherited by the Americans from the Spaniards, and in part pure ladronism. The Spaniards had sought in recent years to put colonies of christianized Filipinos around the Moros, especially in Mindanau, sometimes deporting the colonists forcibly, and not infrequently taking them from the jails. The district of Dapitan, where there are five small towns of Christians, living a simple, peaceful life, away from the disturbances of the Misamis communities, has never given any trouble. It was the place of José Rizal's exile from 1892 to 1896, and a few rifles had been sent there from the north in 1898; but the judicious action of the American commander and the peaceable inclinations of the inhabitants (who, as may be conjectured, were not incited to warfare by Rizal) resulted in the surrender of these arms without incident, and they were later used by the Americans in drilling a detachment of native soldiers.[2]

[1] The evidence of one such quarrel was found at Misamis when the Americans landed, 25 prisoners being rescued from unusually inhumane stocks.

[2] The commander at Dapitan was Captain Luther Kelly, a Western scout of reputation. Instead of marching a force to capture the rifles, and thus driving them farther into the interior, he speedily satisfied himself there was no desire to fight among the inhabitants, and sent out messengers with American flags and a demand that these be hoisted, the arms be surrendered, and that those who commanded them should undertake to maintain public order. The demand was promptly complied with.

CHAPTER XXII

WITH KOBBÉ AND HUGHES

General Kobbé was put in charge of the military department of Mindanau and Joló in April, 1900. With detachments so widely scattered, and with the racial and other questions to be met of so complicated a nature, success depended especially upon the judiciousness of the post commanders. In this respect, Kobbé had, in the Thirty-first and Fortieth, two unusually well-officered regiments. A form of municipal government adapted to the conditions was established in the Christian towns of Mindanau, and schools were started, which in Samboanga and Kotabato began to draw some Moro pupils. The same thing was done in Joló. Aside from the Moro question proper, the chief trouble in the southern Philippines, and especially in the Sulú Archipelago, continued to be contraband trade with Borneo and Singapore.[1]

There had been little fighting in the central islands up to the close of 1899, partly from the lack of any Filipino armed organization of great consequence, but chiefly owing to the American policy of inaction, enforced by the want of men. Except for Negros, American authority in the Bisayas was

[1] Kobbé's report of September 10, 1900, surveys the record of American operations and policy in the southern Philippines from May, 1899, to that date (see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 255–71; also *MacArthur's Report, 1900*, as issued at Manila, the appendices to the Manila editions not all being reproduced in the Washington series). See also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 206–07, 219–25, 335–43; *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 691–705, for Bates's report on the occupation of Mindanau; *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 114, 275–76, 429–31, for the Kagayan and Lokulan fights. A very good picture of the anarchic conditions prevailing in the Christian towns of southern Mindanau in 1899 is given in a contribution by Lieutenant Horace M. Reeve to the *Independent* of April 19, 1900; details of this sort are omitted in the discussion of Mindanau and its occupation by Albert G. Robinson (*op. cit.*, chap. XII). On p. 217 of the latter work, it appears that the inhabitants of Samboanga petitioned the Americans for "the continuation of the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion" and "consideration of the rights of property," among other things.

confined to Iloilo and its environs in the island of Panai and to a little district encircling, or contiguous by water to, the capital of Sebú Island. Reinforcements for General Hughes arrived during the closing months of the year, and, as the rainy season drew to its end, he inaugurated active operations on Panai. His force in the Bisayas was never, proportionately, anything like that which had been available for operations in Luzon. On June 30, 1899, he had 5750 men in Panai, Negros, and Sebú; on December 28, 1899, 8000 in these three islands; on June 30, 1900, nearly 9000 (with the addition of one regiment in Leite), of which 30 companies were on the island of Panai, while Bohol had also been occupied. In Panai, the Filipinos had probably no more than 1000 rifles, of which 300 or more were at the outset borne by Tagalogs; on Sebú, 250 rifles, as a maximum; on Leite, a smaller number, though it might at any time be increased by reinforcements from Lukban in Sámar.

Hughes began, early in November, 1899, operations against the main force facing his lines around Iloilo. The rains persisted, and his driving and enveloping campaign was much hindered. The frontal opposition was feeble, and the movements of the next few months may be characterized as similar to those which took place in southern Luzon, the Americans having little difficulty in pushing their way everywhere, occupying the towns, then finding that their work, properly that of a constabulary, had only just begun. In December, the province of Iloilo had been overrun, except for its most mountainous or swampy parts, and a force marched northward over the divide into Kapis province. Here Hughes found that Romblon, a small island in the little group to the northward, was being used as a distributing point and means of communication and reinforcement from Luzon to Panai, so he took its little port and ended the reign of a small Tagalog military force there. In January, the rather isolated province of Antike, on the west coast, was occupied, the inhabitants of the towns fleeing

because of what they had heard about the "American barbarians," while the small opposing force, under command of a Tagalog, and composed partly of Tagalogs and partly of the inveterate ladrones of the hills who had been invited to join it, took to the shoestring of mountains which overlooks the towns along the strip of seacoast.[1]

General Otis had been quite resigned to the necessity for postponing an active campaign in Panai, as elsewhere in the Bisayas, except in Negros, where, having set up a government, the Americans were bound to enforce order; for, especially as regards Panai, he thought that, left alone, the Tagalogs and Bisayans would "fight it out between themselves." That there was some reason for so believing has already been seen in preceding chapters; and the jealousies between the commanders had finally been sufficient to result in the withdrawal of Diokno to Kapis and of Fullon to Antike, where they were virtually independent and paid scant attention to the authority of Martin Delgado, the Bisayan, whom Aguinaldo, or his advisers, had had the discernment to make supreme military and political leader in Panai. Under him in Iloilo province the chief military leader was Quintín Salas, a Bisayan, but a bandit by instinct, not a man of such character as to command the sympathy of the prominent Bisayans of education who, from within the American lines, were in constant communication with Delgado and were helping to maintain the opposition to the United States both in a financial way and by fostering it as a political sentiment. It was true that the opposition in Panai was to a considerable extent maintained by the Tagalogs, and that the

[1] They abandoned their position at San José, under the fire of navy gunboats, and did not give fight in the seacoast country, which had been fully intrenched, and where they would have been caught between the fire of Lieutenant-Colonel Scott's Forty-fourth battalion and Major Huston's Nineteenth battalion. The former vigorously pursued them northward, and they left behind about a score of Spanish prisoners. For a summary of the operations in Panai and in the Bisayas in general in late 1899 and early 1900, see *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 210–19, and Hughes's annual report (in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 230–54); also the 1900 reports of the signal service officers for the Bisayas (*ibid.*, pp. 152–81).

jealousies and dissensions between Tagalog and Bisayan commanders constituted a disintegrating force, the working of which General Hughes was able, in a rather adroit fashion, to stimulate. It was true that ladronism had for years been the chief scourge to the prosperity and advancement of Panai, and that (though from their lack of rifles rather than of men) the Filipino leaders, who pretended to represent a republic entitled to a place in the council of nations, had invited the bandits to join their forces, and had to a considerable degree so incorporated them, raising their chieftains, old adepts in robbery, assassination, and every sort of abuse of the peaceful inhabitants, to rank, as fitting representatives of the very people whose enemies they had been. But so long as the sentiment against the acceptance of American authority should be quite general among the wealthy and educated natives of Panai, and should be by them promulgated among their people in all the secret ways possible where race-feeling had always existed and where it now made for a sort of national unity, there could be no serious meaning to the expectation that they would "fight it out among themselves" until they should turn to the Americans, in sheer weariness, for protection. In time, the disastrous results of supporting a sort of warfare which made use of sequestration and assassination, and which easily lent itself to robbery and the taking of vengeance on personal grounds, would be brought home to the men of "leading families," and to some extent would become comprehensible to the generally peace-loving but ignorant masses. Upon the men of property, also, the pressure of self-interest was to become constantly greater as time should pass, bringing with it not only the destruction of crops, but the upsetting in all ways of that tranquillity which makes for progress in an agricultural community. But these influences had only just begun to work in early 1900. Said General Hughes, in summing up conditions in August of that year: "These [Filipino] commands live in small *barrios* in detachments, and go about in the usual *sini-*

mai dress, and as the people of the island are a unit against us, no case of betrayal has yet occurred. On the question at issue, no Judas has been found in the million of people."[1] Obviously, such Tagalo–Bisayan jealousies as existed were not vital. In Kapis, the Americans received the surrender of 167 Tagalogs and 100 rifles in January, 1900, and transported the men home to Batangas; but that did not end either the warfare or the hostile feeling toward the newcomers in Kapis.

The guerrilla warfare which followed the posting of American detachments throughout Panai, and lasted through 1900, was in general of the same sort as that which prevailed in Luzon, and which disturbed also Leite and Sebú, during the same period. The nature of this warfare will be discussed further along. Nowhere was it waged more fiercely than in some parts of Panai. Topographical conditions, the disposition and occupations of the inhabitants, and the pertinacity of their leaders, all played their part in determining the stubbornness of this warfare and its minor methods, in different localities in the Philippines; quite often, the personal character and the energy or ability of the American commander in a given district had considerable to do with determining these conditions. Undoubtedly, this last consideration entered into the problem at places in Panai. The conduct of the American army was, later on, an issue in the United States. It may be stated, however, that the superior commander in the Bisayas, who devoted his special attention to Panai in 1900, put in motion from the first all possible personal efforts for reassuring the people, both of high and low degree, as to the characters of the Americans and as to their good intentions. General Hughes could not be blamed if the time for conciliation had not yet come. When Fullon and Diokno sent in their commissioners, in May, 1900, he could only demand of them unconditional surrender, pointing to the reform of the courts in Iloilo and Sebú, to the organization of schools, and to the new municipal code (General

[1] See his report, cited in preceding note.

Order 40), drafted mainly by Filipinos, as evidences of the liberal purposes of the United States. They replied that the latter was only an order resting on the authority of the military governor, and might be revoked at any time. After a brief and partial respite, there was a recrudescence of Filipino hostility, witnessed especially in night attacks and in efforts to burn the Americans out of their quarters in several towns. From June to December, 1900, these conditions lasted, and longer in some places. American soldiers caught or enticed outside the lines were tortured to death with bolos, or even worse treated, one, it is claimed, being burned. Retaliation was inevitable; and some of the American officers held a share of blame for the burning of towns, in cases where it was not warranted by the general policy laid down, which contemplated burning at times, but particularly of *barrios*, and where some especially flagrant instances of treachery could thus be summarily visited upon its inhabitants. When warfare comes to this point, the conduct of both parties is sure to be involved, and there is, as experience has shown, sure to be degeneration from humane methods on both sides. Not only did American soldiers retaliate in behalf of injured comrades, and hatred of one party for the other take the place of indifference or suspicion; but American officers sometimes sanctioned torture, indeed deliberately adopted it in places as a means of securing information for their campaign.[1]

[1] Reference may be made to the following documents and reports bearing upon the conditions and character of the warfare in Panai in 1900, particularly from June to December: *Sen. Doc. 331*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 540–52, *et seq.*, especially pp. 545–47, 557–61, 576–80 (Hughes's testimony as to campaign in Panai), and pp. 1527–35, 1538–47, 1726–36, 1969–85, 2243–59, 2544–88, 2752–68, 2895–2906, (testimony of soldiers and officers in Panai); *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 121–22 (brief report of Hughes in July), 271–72, 281–95, 304–14 (burning of Dumangas, censured by Hughes), 321–22, 353–57, 360–64. For the so-called "Brownell case" (that of the death of a Filipino priest, tortured under the orders of an American officer, who could not be prosecuted by military authority in 1903, when the case was brought to light, because his commission as a volunteer officer had expired), see the charges made to President Roosevelt by an anti-imperialist committee (daily press of September 23 and 24, 1902), and the attacks of Captain

Except for the trouble with its fanatic bands of robbers in the hills (trouble that still continues, and will continue for some time yet), Negros occasioned no concern during 1900, though it was rapidly becoming manifest that she had been allowed to encumber herself with an expensive and topheavy government.[1]

Garrisons had been posted throughout Sebú, as in Panai, during December and January, when more troops had been available. Two small engagements in the mountains were brought on by scouting expeditions early in the year;[2] but in general, Sebú continued to "drift," with the difference that now the Americans held the towns of most consequence all the way around the coast of this narrow island, and the insurgent chieftains had to exercise from their mountain retreats their control over the government of the towns, enforced partly by threats of assassination, partly by a somewhat general sympathy with their campaign. The brief operations (which could not for a moment be called "active") resultant upon an extension of garrison points being over, ports were opened and the name "American" was attached to the municipal governments, after which, except when an American garrison commander made a scout on his own initiative, or when some "nationalist" or purely bandit chieftain with a few rifles behind him disturbed the peace, the towns dozed on much the same as ever.[3]

A battalion of the Forty-fourth Infantry was sent over to Bohol in March, peacefully entering the curiously sheltered

Brownell and his own defense in the Senate (*Cong. Record*, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1355–58, 1564–65). See also *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 253–58, for reports of minor engagements in Panai.

[1] See Governor James H. Smith's report of 1900 (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10 (printed as *Rept. of Mil. Gov. of Phil. Isl. on Civil Affairs*, appendix TT; also, *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, Manila ed., vol. II, appendix TT), and Military Secretary Crowder's remarks (*ibid.*, p. 30).

[2] See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 734–40, 760.

[3] The foregoing citations of Hughes's and Otis's reports of 1900 are also to be consulted with regard to Sebú, Bohol, Sámar, and Leite.

old town of Tagbilaran and receiving the surrender of the provisional government which the leading natives of Bohol had instituted to take charge of affairs after the Spaniards left, the provisional chief filing his written protest against this "act of force," in imitation of the approved style of Sebú, while he and the other Bohol leaders verbally assured Major Hale that they were glad to have him take charge. The propaganda of the Luzon organization had affected the people of Bohol quite feebly, especially, perhaps, because only a few rifles and no armed expedition came to their island; yet it had reached them to some extent, especially through their neighbors of Sebú. It was after American occupation that this propaganda made most headway in Bohol. Only a few American garrisons could be posted, and the opportunity was excellent for the organization of a small revolt in the unoccupied territory, when the Tagalog who had been made "chief of police" for the island and had been getting together an armed constabulary to assist the American troops took this force and the rifles it had received into the woods in August, 1900. He was able to make some trouble, principally preying upon the native inhabitants, for a year thereafter. Later on (after the Nineteenth Regiment of regular infantry came to garrison Bohol), the indiscretions of some of the American officers helped to create such a popular opposition in Bohol as resulted in serious trouble in late 1901 and 1902. The occupation of Bohol in March, 1900, may here be noted as completing the formal process of taking possession of the Bisayas by the Americans, though neither Bohol nor Sámar was really to be effectively occupied for some time yet.[1]

[1] See preceding note. See also, for the entry into Tagbilaran, *Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 218 (where the inhabitants are represented as eager for American government), and *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 6, p. 15, and *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1204, 1206 (cablegrams on the subject). MacArthur cabled that, in the first attacks, 100 out of 120 bolomen were killed. The reply of Secretary Root was that the deserter Samson seemed to have followed Aguinaldo's proclamation of January 9, 1899, "pretending submission and loyalty in order to secure opportunity to kill our soldiers," and that "killing brought about by these means should be

As was stated in connection with the expedition to open the hemp ports in January, 1900, the problem in Sámar and Leite soon proved to be too great for the three battalions which had been landed on those islands. From Kalbayog and Katbalogan on Sámar and from Takloban on Leite, they undertook to run over a large portion of each island near the coast, and also, with such scanty water transportation as was at first available, to reach the northern extremities of the two islands, prepare the way for the opening of the minor ports, and break up communication with the Filipino forces in southern Luzon. In part, this rapid expansion was due to the pressure of commercial interests to have the ports which traded not only with Manila, but also with Sebú and Iloilo, opened for trade. The lack of frontal opposition also misled the American commanders at first. Moreover, the official view of the situation, as imparted to them when they were sent to Sámar and Leite, was that the opposition was due only to "Tagalog leaders" and a few Tagalog soldiers sent down from Luzon. Lukban, who had organized the taxing machine in Sámar and Leite, and most of whose rifles had been brought down from Luzon, was, as a matter of fact, a member of a Bikol family, though for some time a resident of Manila.[1] The two islands in question, and especially Sámar, are scarcely developed in the interior, and the christianized population, settled on the seacoast and along the numerous large though short streams, are in the main very peaceably disposed and simple people in their habits. Yet, though docile to the point of stupidity as a rule, they

treated as murder, and persons who appear guilty of it, as does Pedro Samson, should be tried, and if found guilty, convicted and punished." Samson was, however, allowed to surrender and was given the benefit of the amnesty in 1902. This desertion of an undisciplined police force under the leadership of Filipinos did not deter General Hughes from pushing ahead the organization of native scouts as auxiliaries, led by American officers, commissioned and non-commissioned. Beginning in July, 1900, these forces were enlisted, and thereafter considerably increased in number, in Panai, Sebú, Leite, and Bohol (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 358–59; *ibid., 1901*, vol. I, part 6, p. 6).

[1] Otis called Lukban a Tagalog, and repeatedly blamed "Tagalog leaders" for the opposition in Sámar and Leite (*Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 201–02).

had been shown by history to be thoroughly capable of revolt, both very vigorous and very bloodthirsty, against their rulers, ecclesiastical as well as military. Moreover, they had shown dangerous symptoms of revolt even before the uprising against the Spaniards in Luzon in 1896, and their attitude had been such as speedily to compel the Spanish garrisons first to concentrate, then to evacuate these islands, in 1898, after Spanish power was known to have been shattered at Manila. Their attitude toward the Americans was somewhat problematical, to be sure, and their generally peaceable disposition, together with the desire of men of property to resume trade in their products and the desire of the people in general to get the rice and other food products for which they had suffered during the blockade, were elements which would make for a mutual good understanding. But to assume that there was no great likelihood of popular opposition, once those pestiferous Tagalogs were got out of the way, was to overlook or be ignorant of the history of the Sámar–Leite Bisayans.

The Forty-third Infantry themselves speedily discovered that the official view was over-optimistic. In Sámar, they could chase the bands of Lukban over the hills beyond the towns, capturing petty arsenals, stores of rice, and sometimes large sums of money; but the tremendous difficulties of the wild interior forbade the effective pursuit and destruction of these bands, except as the result of a carefully organized campaign with plenty of men. Along the coast and on the rivers in northern Sámar, the Americans occupied, in small detachments, a number of towns of some commercial importance without meeting any opposition to speak of. But such small detachments were speedily threatened and had to be constantly active; there was scant evidence of good feeling except on the part of a few who had been maltreated or threatened by Lukban or his officers; an order of Lukban's to murder all Chinese in the towns caused further uneasiness; and, very soon after the occupation, an attempt one night to assassinate

the American officers quartered at Kalbayog, the ignorant agents of the plot being moved to it by a fanatical religious oath, opened the eyes of these officers to some features of the situation not quite anticipated. So also in Leite, there were attacks by night with bolos, made by fanaticized and ignorant beings stirred up by leaders too cowardly, as well as too sophisticated, to risk their own lives in the attacks. The one battalion there soon found it had gone beyond its powers in attempting to scout northward over the island. There may have been no more than 100 rifles against them at the beginning; but small boats brought some recruits driven to taking flight from the southernmost part of Luzon, and any weak detachment invited a bolo rush, which might do serious damage from sheer force of numbers. Even Takloban itself was attacked once or twice. Despite all these conditions, the officers in charge in Sámar and Leite felt that they could cope fully with the situation if they had sufficient water-transportation to avoid the difficult land marches and to display the desired mobility; indeed, they felt that, with such transportation at the start, they could have so vigorously asserted American authority that the opposition, if not discouraged, at least could not itself have been reinforced so as to assume the initiative, and that they might thus have crystallized against any bandit campaign the rather halting sentiments of the prominent natives.[1]

General Kobbé had, on his later trips to the hemp ports with supplies, etc., endeavored to remedy the situation as regards transportation, and had also reported the necessity for more troops or a more conservative procedure in endeavoring to assert American authority and protect the resumption of trade in these islands. Early in April, he was ordered to Samboanga, in command of the most southerly of the four military departments into which the archipelago had been divided,

[1] See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 214, 243, 244, for rather emphatic statements on this matter by Colonel Arthur Murray and Major Henry T. Allen.

and Sámar and Leite were added to the territory under General Hughes.[1] The latter at once investigated the situation in person, taking over reinforcements from Sebú, returning to Sámar the battalion that had been called over to help out in Leite, and recommending that Major Allen be allowed to organize native scouts in Sámar, as he felt he could easily do, and as had been done in Negros.[2] But on the very heels of this rearrangement of troops, a little detachment of 31 American soldiers under two sergeants at the town of Katubig, in northern Sámar, having been thinned out by numerous little fights and hard marches, was suddenly attacked by 600 Filipinos, with 200 rifles and an old cannon. Fourteen were killed in an attempt to get away down the river in a boat, they having been burned out of their quarters. The rest intrenched themselves, and, though nearly burned out by fire in the tall grass about them, held out for three days until heroically relieved by Lieutenant Sweeney and 10 men. They had slain 200 Filipinos in resisting the repeated attacks, but lost their leader, Sergeant Hall, and two other men during these three days. The Sámar revolutionists seemed to have obtained more rifles, and they certainly had a re-access of courage. Attacks on the garrisons, including Kalbayog and Katbalogan, became

[1] By a general order (No. 38) from the Headquarters of the Army, dated March 29, 1900, the "Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps" was henceforth known as the "Division of the Philippines," consisting of the following four departments: Northern Luzon (subsequently made to include all Luzon north of the Pasig), under command of Major-General Arthur MacArthur; southern Luzon, under command of Major-General John C. Bates; the Bisayas, under command of Brigadier-General Robert P. Hughes; and Mindanao and Jolό, under command of Brigadier-General William A. Kobbé. This was the order projected in the War Department as early as September, 1899, but delayed by the failure to occupy all parts of the archipelago as speedily as Otis's cables seemed to assure. With occupation almost completed in March, Secretary Root again took up the matter. See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1153–55 (the cables exchanged and the order as issued at Washington), and *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 246–48.

[2] In granting authority to enlist 200 scouts in Sámar, General Otis said: "There should be a sufficient number of army officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to the organization to restrain these scouts from making depredations upon their own people, for experience shows us that they certainly will commit such depredations if they have opportunity." (*Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 204.)

frequent. Gradually, the conclusion seems to have been reached by the American authorities to concentrate efforts on Leite and let Sámar drift, though, for the looks of the thing, not entirely abandoning it. The Forty-third was, at the end of June, withdrawn entirely to Leite. Five companies of the Twenty-ninth Infantry were sent to Sámar, which was transferred to the Department of Southern Luzon. Katbalogan was held, while, except for one small garrison, the northern coast was left to itself, but blockaded from Luzon (never quite effectually) by the navy, and the eastern and southern portions of the island were left entirely unmolested. Late in 1909, General Luther Hare was sent to conduct a scouting expedition through Sámar with portions of the First and Twenty-ninth infantry regiments. But weather conditions had been overlooked; the rains caused by the northeast monsoon forbade success under the additional difficulties of the topographical conditions, and Sámar again baffled the Americans. It was left for a campaign in 1901–02 really to assert American authority in the island, and in a manner which focused the attention of the American people upon this much misunderstood section of the Philippines. Excellent work was, however, accomplished in Leite during 1900 by the Forty-third Infantry and its enthusiastic but diplomatic commanders; military operations were pushed vigorously, but surrenders by negotiations were also continually sought, and some secured; the coöperation of the inhabitants in local improvements, sanitation, etc., became also the rule, as a better understanding was brought about.[1]

[1] Scant reports of the ill-timed task assigned to General Hare, all by subordinates, are given in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 470–77, 480, 481. The transfer of Sámar to Bates's Luzon department was made by General Order 34, Division of Philippines, June 21, 1900 (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 209, 211–12). This was after MacArthur succeeded Otis as commanding general. Otis had cabled a rumor of the Katubig disaster before his departure in May (*Corr. Rel. War*, p. 1165); MacArthur cabled it in detail (*ibid.*, p. 1168); his only subsequent messages on Sámar, at least as published, had to do with the Hare expedition (*ibid.*, p. 1222, 1223, 1232). For the operations of 1900 in Leite and Sámar, be-

The creation of a military division of the Philippines, the four departments of which comprehended all portions of the archipelago, had, as has just been noted, occurred about one year after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Paris. Within this scheme, practically all the territory inhabited by the Christian natives of the Philippines was more or less effectively occupied at the time of its formal promulgation, or soon after was entered by American troops. A beginning had also been made toward the assumption of control of the Mohammedan territory occupied; but the other non-Christian inhabitants, mostly in the mountains (and especially in the mountains of Luzon and Mindanau), were to see comparatively little of the Americans until 1901 and thereafter. Before considering the opposing views of 1900 as to the attitude of the Filipinos toward American government, we have to note a few more steps in this extension of the authority of the United States to virtually the same lines as those previously held by Spain.

At the close of the Lawton–Young campaign, the newly occupied regions of Luzon north of the central provinces had been divided into two military and governmental districts, General Young taking the Ilokan territory west of the Cordillera Central, and Colonel C. C. Hood the Kagayan Valley

sides the citations already made on Kobbé's opening of hemp ports, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 49, 52–53, 55, 121–22, 210–24, 231–34, 243–47, 324–52, 377–92, 410–26, especially pp. 231–34, 243–44, and 424–26 (the Katubig disaster); pp. 245–46 (protest of leading citizens of Sámar against Lukban's campaign of burning and assassination); pp. 325, 326–31, 332, 336, 339–40, 345, 347, and 350–52 (evidence of Colonel Murray's supervision over post commanders, of the efforts to win surrenders, of the establishment of schools, and the improvement of roads and of the towns, especially as to sanitation); and p. 340 (the proclamation offering amnesty and the oath of allegiance in the Bisayan dialect); *ibid.*, part 5, pp. 247–48, by Hughes's report on the Katubig affair and his statement that Sámar was placed "in a purely defensive status," as there were not troops enough for both islands; *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 461–67 (Sámar in February–March, 1900); *ibid.*, part 6, pp. 23–129, reports on Leite for the closing months of 1900, especially for notes on municipal governments, and also (on pp. 69–77) a record of 136 engagements on Sámar and Leite from January to June, 1900, showing 38 Americans killed, 55 wounded, and 2 captured, as against 1521 Filipinos killed, 268 wounded, and 739 captured.

(with Nueva Vizcaya thereafter added to it) on the east of that backbone. Except for the contact of Hood's detachment with pagan settlements in the foothills running down to the Rio Grande, and for scouts by Young's men among the mountain settlements of the Igorrots in the effort to destroy the hiding columns under Tinio, Aglipai, and others, the American troops and the American government now being partially established had to do only with the Christian inhabitants on the coast or near it. Young's district included Benget, Bontok, and Lepanto, which, as well as a large part of Abra, are occupied by Igorrots (of various kindred tribes, some of them head-hunters); but American contact with them was, for the time being, only casual and incidental. Young and Hood were "military governors" of these districts, a foreshadowing of the organization to be more effectively extended over the archipelago at the beginning of April. Inter-island ports had been opened in their territories, beginning on January 1, 1900; revenue collections were begun in part; the civil jurisdiction of provost courts was extended to them; and municipal governments were reëstablished and placed under military supervision.[1]

When, as already noted, the entire archipelago was divided into military departments at the beginning of April, 1900, these military-governmental commands of Young and Hood fell into place as districts of the Department of Northern Luzon, three similar districts being formed out of the central provinces, four such districts out of the provinces of southern Luzon and neighboring islands, and four out of the Bisayas. At the same time that this organization was promulgated, General Otis was asking to be released from command and to

[1] See *General Orders, 1899, Mil. Gov. Phil.*, nos. 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 75, and Circular 13, for the provisions made at the end of 1899 for the extension of military government on lines subsequently followed. No. 69 (December 21), containing the appointment of Hood, dealt with the regulation of the coastwise trade. No. 71 (December 23) promulgated the rules prescribed from Washington for the disbursement and auditing of the Philippine revenues. No. 73 (December 26) opened Samboanga, Joló, and Siasi as ports for foreign trade, in addition to Manila, Iloilo, and Sebú.

return home, and a month later General MacArthur succeeded him. Under the latter, the remaining territory north of the Pasig and surrounding Manila was added to his former department (northern Luzon). In February, two companies had been placed in Baler, on the Pacific coast, almost isolated from the central valley by the rugged, undeveloped country lying between; and, the following October, an expedition was undertaken overland from the Laguna and by sea to Binangonan, farther south along this yet wild part of the Pacific coast, and to the neighboring island of Polillo, the principal object being to investigate rumors of contraband trade conducted in this quarter.[1] In April and May, 1900, small forces were sent to Marinduke and Masbate islands. On the former, occupied by a rather energetic and prosperous population having close communication with Tayabas, the Filipino commander took

[1] The three districts formed of the central provinces and their military commanders and governors were: Third district, Sambales, Pangasinan, and Tarlak provinces, Brigadier-General James F. Bell (who became provost-marshal-general of Manila after MacArthur's accession to superior command, and was succeeded by Brigadier-General Jacob H. Smith); fourth, Nueva Écija and Príncipe, Brigadier-General Frederick Funston; fifth, Bulakán, Pampanga, and Bataán, Brigadier-General Frederick D. Grant. The sixth district, added under MacArthur's revision (General Order 19, Division of the Philippines, May 12, 1900), comprised Manila province north of the Pasig, Morong, and Infanta, and was commanded by Colonel J. M. Thompson. Southern Luzon, as thus modified, and after General Wheaton succeeded General MacArthur in command over northern Luzon, was thus divided: First district, Cavite and Manila province south of the Pasig (later also portions of Laguna and Batangas), Brigadier-General Robert H. Hall (temporarily), Brigadier-General Luther R. Hare (newly appointed a general officer in June, 1900), and, after September, 1900, Brigadier-General S. S. Sumner; second district, Batangas, Tayabas, and Laguna, Colonel W. E. Birkhimer (temporarily) and General Hall; third, Camarines, Albai, Sorsogon and Katanduanes, Brigadier-General James M. Bell; fourth district, the islands directly adjoining southwestern Luzon, only Marinduke and Masbate being occupied in 1900, with no district commander until Sámar was added to the district in June, 1900, Colonel E. E. Hardin serving as such for a short time. The military-governmental districts and commanders of the Bisayas were: Leite, Colonel Arthur Murray; Sebú and Bohol, Colonel E. J. McClernand; Negros, Colonel James F. Smith, military governor until October, 1900, thereafter Colonel C. W. Miner; Panai, directly under the departmental commander, General Hughes. See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 247, and *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 196–97, 207–10. For the occupation of Baler, see *Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 226; and, for the Binangonan–Polillo expedition, *Rept., War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 294–306.

his riflemen to the hills, while the local officials, who held Malolos commissions, "agreed to accept American authority, but said that they were unable to surrender their arms."[1] Only one company was left to deal with them, and their fertile little island later on gave the Americans some concern and six months' lively campaigning. Masbate, a larger but less developed island, its backward population mixed of race, but speaking principally a blend of Bikol and Bisayan, was not disposed to make war, and the 100 rifles which had been sent there from Luzon were, within two weeks, surrendered by the Bisayan military commander, though the landing of the Americans had met a faint resistance and part of the principal town had been burned, by the order, it was said, of a Tagalog civil official. The little islands Burías and Tikau, closer to Luzon, were left alone till the following spring, when they were reconnoitered, in consequence of being used for contraband trade and as way-stations between Luzon and the Sámar–Leite group. Bates also took over from Hughes the little Romblon–Tablas–Sibuyan group north of Panai, inhabited by Bisayans;[2] a two-company garrison in Romblon port looked after the entire group, only disturbed occasionally by reports that expeditions from Luzon would try again to use one of these islands as a way-station. The large but undeveloped island of Mindoro, with a score of wretched little settlements of Christians along the coast, and its interior given over to jungles or the haunts of wild people about whom little is known, was not entered by the American troops until 1901, but the navy sought to restrict its use as a rendezvous both for sea-robbers and smugglers. Similarly, the large and also undeveloped island of Palawan, inhabited in its southern half by Moros, and with it the partially settled Kuyo and Kalamianes groups, were not occupied by troops under Kobbé, within whose department

[1] Such was the report to General Bates. For the Marinduke–Masbate expedition, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 210–11.

[2] *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, p. 211.

they fell, until May and June, 1901. The little islands Gimaras and Sikihor,[1] off Panri and Negros respectively, were, because of their proximity to Iloilo and Dumagete, kept under surveillance. The many small islands in eastern Bisayas, were, from their situation, less liable to use as recruiting stations. The Filipinos are able to travel in parties of six to a score on short sails between neighboring islands, in small boats which defy the efforts of all but the lightest draft gunboats to follow them. Obviously, they could not make lengthy expeditions of any great importance in this way, with the sort of patrol maintained by the navy in early 1900. Off southern Luzon, however, and between it and Sámar, they did maintain quite regular communication, in men, contributions, and sometimes arms, until well into 1901. To this end the Americans' failure to provide at an early date the troops necessary to guard all the towns of Marinduke, Masbate, Burías, and Tikao was of no little assistance, especially to Lukban in Sámar.

[1] Spanish spellings, Guimarás and Siquijor.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE CAMPAIGN CHANGES CHARACTER

The movements indicated had virtually completed the occupation by the American army of all the old seats of Spanish authority, with the exception only of a few outposts on the border of or within the territory of the unchristianized inhabitants; and, indeed, American troops occupied, outside of the provincial capitals, innumerable towns which had never seen a command of Spanish soldiers, but only native constabulary under Spanish officers. The sudden extension throughout the archipelago of American authority, nominal or real, brought into sharper conflict than before two opposing views as to the situation in the Philippines and the attitude of the Filipinos. Theoretically, the insurrection, for the suppression of which so large an army had little by little been gathered from the United States, was over, when the occupation of towns of importance and scouting through the smaller neighboring towns had ended all public claim by the Filipino leaders to the possession of a civil organization of government, and when the fraction of their army which had not returned to their cane huts and their fields were hiding in the mountains or thickets. Such bands might harass the towns and disturb the peace and order of the majority now settling into their old life once more; but that was mere outlawry, to take one view of the case, which the army, acting as a constabulary force, would soon end, with the coöperation of the peaceful inhabitants when they saw how their interests lay. This view was best set forth in the expressions of General Otis at the time when he turned over to General MacArthur the task of "policing" the archipelago and returned to the United States.

The other view of the case was best presented by the newspaper correspondents who had been through the campaign in

the islands, their opinions being quite unanimously and pointedly antagonistic to those of General Otis. Under their view, chief stress was laid upon the fact that the American forces had as yet secured but a comparatively small number of the rifles held by the Filipinos, having captured in fight almost none at all and receiving by surrender one rifle to six or ten men of the few commands which had surrendered. It was further pointed out that most of the Filipino military leaders were still in the field; that the bands of "ladrones" which were constantly being "scattered" in the official reports did not stay scattered; that there was a secret civil organization of the towns occupied by the Americans, such organization generally coöperating with, and (as it was circumstantially proved later on) not infrequently being identical with, the organization set up under American military authority; and that these facts, and the secret payment of contributions to the insurrection under the shadow of American army barracks, were not fully to be explained by the assertion that the people as a whole were being terrified, but indicated a genuine and strong sentiment of union in opposition to the United States.[1]

[1] We may here make our final notes on General Otis's cheery optimism. Back in December, just after Lawton's campaign had broadened into the occupation of northern Luzon and the driving into exile of the Filipino leaders, but before southern Luzon or Sámar, Leite, Bohol, and part of Sebú and Panai had been occupied, he was warned three or four times from Washington that the insurgents were, according to State Department information, contracting in England [Belgium also] for 37,000 rifles and 10,000,000 cartridges, some of which were already being shipped via Hamburg to ports in China, thence to be smuggled into the Philippines. Otis refused to take the matter seriously, saying: "Unless paid for, delivery will not be attempted, as no longer any insurgent government or authorities. If delivered, too late to effect practical result." (*Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1114, 1116, 1120, 1126, 1134.) Some (perhaps 5000 or more) of these rifles were delivered during 1900, and helped prolong the resistance in Sámar and portions of Luzon. Frequent assurances as to "conditions improving" during early 1900 led the War Department to organize "home battalions" of some of the regular regiments in the islands, and to ask Otis if fresh troops need to be sent to replace those invalided home or whose terms of enlistment should expire. He replied, on March 4: "All troops here needed to protect inhabitants, and in some sections country too few to meet requests." (*Ibid.*, pp. 1147–48.) He continued to the last to oppose the pressure upon him to consent to officers' wives joining them at their post. (*Ibid.*, p. 1149.) On April 10, in response to a message from Secretary Root repeating an unfavor-

The vital question underlying these conflicting views was, of course, as to the real sentiments of the Filipino people, both of the great majority of those above and of those below. This

able report on the situation by the Associated Press correspondent, especially with reference to the demand by Young for more troops in Ilokan provinces, Otis sent what he called a "rather pessimistic summary" of conditions (*ibid.*, pp. 1158–59), yet one which indicated that he thought the opposition in Ilokos proceeded entirely from Tagalogs who had gone there and that only "about one half of 35,000 rifles" were still out against the Americans or were hidden, concluding: "The military organizations here, if kept full [they then numbered 2211 officers and 61,230 men], are sufficient to meet any anticipated emergencies. . . . We no longer deal with organized insurrection, but brigandage; to render every town secure against latter would require quarter-million men." (Young had repeatedly called for more troops, as he did again in 1900, and he had also complained in December, when General Hall, whom he outranked, was temporarily put in command of Lawton's former division: when Otis was asked before his departure to commend a successor to MacArthur in command of northern Luzon, he named Wheaton, whose resultless expedition to San Fabian had spoiled Lawton's and Young's plans for heading-off Aguinaldo.) In asking permission to return home by May 1, Otis said, on April 3 (*ibid.*, p. 1156): "Believe matters here can be placed in quite satisfactory condition by that date, although large repressive military force must be retained for some time." Just before sailing on May 4, Otis cabled (*ibid.*, p. 1165) that 1209 rifles were secured during April and that "leading Filipinos express confidence in early pacification of islands; say war has terminated; leading insurgents surrendering." Writing his final official word on the Philippines while en route to San Francisco, he said (*Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 364): "I am convinced from observation, investigation, and the expressed opinion of the educated men of the islands that the declared guerrilla warfare will cease within a few months, and that ladrone organizations or robbers in small bands who well know the legal penalties they invite will alone remain to terrorize the people." Here a distinction is made between "declared guerrillas" and "ladrones"; but the press correspondents complained that the censor would recognize the existence only of the latter. A very good statement of the official view as to the Philippine situation in May, 1900, was made in a letter of General Schwan, Otis's chief-of-staff, to Adjutant-General Corbin (*Harper's Hist.*, pp. 372–73). Before his departure, also, Otis gave the New York *Sun* correspondent a very optimistic survey of the workings of the military government (*ibid.*, pp. 375–79, and New York *Sun*, May 3, 1900). His optimism reached its height in contributions to periodicals after his arrival in the United States (*Independent*, June 14, 1900, and *Leslie's Weekly*, June 16, 1900), he saying: "There will be no more real fighting in the Philippines. There is no rebel army, nothing but guerrilla bands. . . . Those bands are not even soldiers, but are ladrones. . . . Those under arms have only 15,000 guns altogether." For some of the estimates of the situation made by well-informed correspondents, see letters of John T. McCutcheon (Chicago *Record's Stories of Filipino Warfare*, pp. 103–04, 107, 109, 111, 113, and *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 373–75); of Harold Martin (*Harper's Hist.*, p. 380); of H. Phelps Whitmarsh (*Outlook*, December 15, 1900); also Albert G. Robinson, *op. cit.*, 376–80, and the Philippine Information Society's *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 9.

abstract question we may here leave for the concrete facts to settle as they are brought to light. But, by way of summing up the facts already presented, we may note again that, from the very first, only contact and a little pressure had been necessary to shatter the Filipino army and its civil organization so far as the latter asserted control over the archipelago as a whole, and that observant commanders in the field, foremost among them Lawton, had soon reached the conclusion that the having accomplished this did not end the resistance, but that other factors lay underneath. They had seen that driving back the many "generals" and their pretentiously organized, but really disordered, bands of followers was the simplest part of the problem; that territory so "cleared" had to be occupied and energetically patroled to preserve the order which American authority presumed; and that, even with adequate garrisons and activity, the American troops must still regard themselves as in hostile territory. It was General Otis's belief that contact of the American troops with the inhabitants would speedily remove this hostility. The men in command in the field had not, however, unless in isolated cases here and there, noted that this was the result of garrisoning the towns. Even if their views were not to be taken into account, there was precedent in recent Philippine history bearing directly upon the situation in 1900, and warning any American who should study it (as no one in fact seemed to do) what were the conditions most likely now to be met. Aguinaldo's part in the insurrection of 1896–97 had from the first suggested to him the best course to follow in order to make Filipino opposition effective. He had, as already seen, been disposed to return to guerrilla methods before the death of Luna, and he had, after taking direct military command, shaped things to that end, and thenceforward simply awaited a vigorous forward movement on the part of the Americans to scatter his commands and begin a new phase of the war.

On the night (November 12, 1899) when Aguinaldo and

his party started on their flight from Bayambang on the railroad, whither they had retired from Tarlak, a council of commanders was held wherein it was formally decided to resort to warfare by means of "flying columns and guerrilla bands." So far as he might, Aguinaldo would direct these operations from a retreat which he hoped to reach in Nueva Vizcaya, but from which Lawton's troops had in fact already cut him off; but he appointed at the time "politico-military commanders" of the districts of "central Luzon" and of the Tagalog provinces south of Manila, similar to the commands already existing in the Kagayan Valley, the Ilokan provinces, the Camarines and Albai, Sámar, Leite, and Panai, and these commanders were authorized to "issue orders by proclamation, impose contributions of war, and adopt all such measures as may seem for the good service of the country," having also the "judicial powers" which had, in June or July, been assumed by Aguinaldo as "Captain-General," in direct imitation of the discretionary powers (involving deportation or punishment in other ways) vested in the Spanish governor-general as chief of the army in the Philippines.[1]

[1] See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. 1, part 5 (the first part of which will hereafter be cited as *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, which report was issued in two volumes, with appendices in a Manila edition, differently paged), pp. 59-60, for a copy of the order appointing Pantaleón García politico-military commander of central Luzon. He was captured on May 6, 1900, but the guerrilla warfare in those provinces was never waged after any organized plan, the separate commanders, Alejandrino Makabulos, Mascardo, Hizon, Tekson, Gerónimo, *et al.*, conducting it individually with their distinct bands. Somewhat similar "civil authority" had, in 1898, been conferred on Tirona in Kagayan and Tinio in Ilokos, though soon withdrawn from the latter for policy's sake, the Ilokans not liking it. Trias in Cavite, who had in 1899 virtually been made vice-commander of Aguinaldo, was in theory politico-military commander of all southern Luzon; but Malvar in Batangas, Cailles in Laguna, Belarmino in Albai–Sorsogon, and various minor commanders, like Guevara in South Camarines and Noriel in Cavite, conducted their commands separately, and there was hardly more than a nominal recognition of superior authority in regard to "civil affairs" (primarily, the levy and collection of contributions), with much jealousy aroused over it. Except with Lukban in Sámar, who himself operated with the greatest independence, there was henceforth very little communication between the Bisayan leaders and Luzon. The similarity in methods followed everywhere was mainly due to the methods being best adapted to the climate and geographical conditions, to habits of warfare existing before the

The documentary evidence of the formal adoption of a virtually outlawed method of warfare was not obtained by the Americans for some months afterward; but verbal information as to the nature of the plans adopted was obtained in less than two weeks, and the actions of the scattered Filipino bands speedily confirmed it. General MacArthur had, at the time, proposed that a formal proclamation be issued from American headquarters in Manila, extending the offer of complete amnesty, with pay for rifles surrendered, and declaring that all who did not accept this offer, but who conducted guerrilla operations, would be treated when caught as outlaws and murderers. General Otis had rejected the suggestion very curtly, though having a number of weighty reasons, among them the fear of retaliation upon the American and Spanish prisoners of the Filipinos and the inability of the Americans in late 1899 to publish any such document throughout southern Luzon and the larger part of the Bisayas.[1]

After MacArthur succeeded Otis,[2] on May 5, 1900, he at

Spanish conquest, to scant military training, and, more directly, to the experience of 1896–98. Such a document as that cited as an appendix by MacArthur (*ibid.*, pp. 72–76, extracted from *Filipinas ante Europa*, the "junta" organ published by Isabelo de los Reyes in Madrid), giving instructions as to the methods of conducting guerrilla warfare, is important mainly as revealing the mental equipment of the editor; such essays on warfare, extracted mainly from Spanish military treatises, were regularly published by this organ, but had comparatively little circulation in the Philippines. Among the captured documents at the War Department are many orders, decrees, etc., prescribing guerrilla warfare methods. Captain J. R. M. Taylor, editor of these documents, says the tactics prescribed in such orders were taken from the Spanish drill regulations for what is called "extended order in battle."

[1] See *Otis's Rept. 1900*, pp. 79, 80, 82, 90, and *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. 1; part 8, pp. 59–60, for the telegrams on this subject between Otis and MacArthur, and the former's reasons for rejecting the policy proposed. He finally told MacArthur that legal difficulties of an "international character" forbade it and that "no further advice on this subject was desired." This was on December 9, 1899, after MacArthur had protested against the permission given to the local authorities of a town in his territory to have firearms, saying: "The whole country is in a disorganized condition and full of robbers everywhere, and the discord will be increased by allowing communities to arm themselves. The problem can only be solved by the United States by systematic operations and an inflexible policy," and indicating as such a policy the proclamation he had proposed on November 23.

[2] In requesting his relief, on April 3, Otis had said: "Private interests require

once commenced efforts, through Filipinos in Manila who had been captured or had come in from the revolutionary camp, to bring about the surrender of Aguinaldo and other leaders in hiding, and thus to secure a laying-down of arms by the people in general. To this end he offered the amnesty he had before proposed, and even more in the way of assurances as to the future government; but he did not revive as yet the "outlawry" feature of his December programme. As steps looking toward the suppression of genuine banditry, which was now aggravated because conducted under cover of revolutionary pretensions, toward the prosecution of a vigorous campaign after the rainy season should end, and toward the reduction of the American forces to 45,000 men in 1901, MacArthur urged upon Washington, and in part secured authority for, the organization of local constabulary forces recruited among the natives and the expenditure of $1,000,000 gold in building better roads across the provinces. But the conciliatory part of this programme failed quite completely during the summer of 1900, and, when he presented his formal report on affairs in the archipelago on October 1 following, he was ready to say that " the skulking bands of guerrillas " of which Otis had

my return to the States ; absent from family and business, attention to which important, since November 1, 1897, except few days." This request came very soon after the news of the appointment of the second Philippine Commission, which was to take from the military governor part of his powers at once, and the rest of them by degrees. The members of this Commission were to sail from San Francisco on April 17, and a direct passage would bring them to Manila by the middle of May. General Otis expressed his desire to be relieved by May 1, and actually sailed on May 5. But the Commission made a slow trip, via Honolulu, Japan, and Hongkong, and did not reach Manila until June 3. By instructions from Washington, General MacArthur had made a tour of the military posts of the archipelago in April. See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1156–57, 1164–67. As a sidelight on the new military governor, we may quote the closing sentence of his final report as commander of the Second Division (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, p. 70) : "Recruited from a hardy and valiant race, the memories these men [the soldiers of his division] will carry to their homes of common triumphs and hardships incurred in behalf of republican institutions will undoubtedly engender a bond of mutual esteem which, proclaimed through organizations of memorial bodies, may serve to keep alive a warlike spirit among the people of the Republic which alone can create, civilize, and defend a state."

written were not properly classified as ladrones, but were "a mere expression of the loyalty [to the revolutionary cause] of the towns"; that the work of the American army was something more than mere police duty; that there was "almost complete unity of action" on the part of the Filipinos; that fear and intimidation could not fully explain such unity, for one traitor in a town would destroy it, but it was more probable "that the adhesive principle comes from ethnological homogeneity, which induces men to respond for a time to the appeals of consanguineous leadership, even when such action is opposed to their own interests and convictions of expediency," a rather roundabout way of saying that the Filipinos were strong in race-feeling, though apparently denying them a real sentiment of nationality.[1]

As was stated at the beginning of this chapter, the American commanders in the field throughout northern Luzon had been first to comprehend that the new conditions which they faced were more puzzling than the former conditions of open and organized resistance. This was because they occupied the territory first fully "conquered" in its extent, and, where stationed outside of Tagalog territory, had expected to find little

[1] General MacArthur was very prominent as a phrasemaker for the next two years. For the above quotations, see his *Rept., 1900*, pp. 60–62, 64. For his plan of arming native police forces in the towns and eventually relieving the American army of part of its work, see *ibid.*, pp. 64–65 (*General Orders, 1900, Mil. Gov. Phil.*, no. 87) and for this and the road-building project, *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1172–73, 1176, 1177, 1179, 1206. The building of roads is treated farther along, as also the question of a native constabulary, on which MacArthur later seemed once more to alter his opinions. (He had, in December, 1899, as noted in connection with the proposed proclamation of outlawry, vigorously protested against the arming of natives in the towns.) Already, on August 7, 1900 (*ibid.*, p. 1197), he said he could not recommend any increase of native scouts (numbering then about 450 Makabebes in Luzon and 1200 Bisayans in the various islands of their group, to which number of rifles 3000 shotguns and revolvers in the hands of municipal police would soon be added), because "conditions not propitious, nor, generally speaking, can natives be trusted"; and he would not risk so many arms in their hands "were it not for necessary reduction of American troops at early date." Immediately after taking command, he had cabled (*ibid.*, p. 1167) an objection to losing any regular-army officers from his commands, saying: "Every military resource strained to limit, and all possible efforts are necessary to maintain force in highest state of efficiency."

opposition on the part of the Kagayans, Ilokans, Pangasinans, and Sambals; yet had speedily discovered that this "official view" of the situation was, if not entirely foundationless, at any rate of no value as a working hypothesis in dealing with the people.

The best conditions of all undoubtedly prevailed in the Kagayan Valley, where only a portion of the ruling class of natives had hastily espoused the cause of the Malolos leaders, where there had been dissensions among the Malolos appointees, and where the masses had, owing to remoteness from the scene of action and to the backwardness resultant from past ecclesiastical and economic domination, been only partially aroused to what was going on. Nevertheless, Colonel Hood, who had the entire Sixteenth Infantry in the provinces of Kagayan and Isabela, with an isolated detachment at Bayambang, Nueva Vizcaya, called for reinforcements in March, owing to disturbances in one or two sections off the Rio Grande, and received two more battalions of infantry. In general, however, the great tobacco valley remained, as before, little disturbed by actual warfare, though the effect upon the masses in seeing their religious masters overthrown by the revolution was playing its part in arousing in them a greater spirit of independence toward their economic masters, the tobacco corporations.[1]

In northwestern Luzon, where it had been expected that the native residents (Ilokans) would mostly welcome any other rule but that of Tagalogs, and tranquillity would be complete as soon as the Tagalog commanders and the soldiers from the

[1] That the revolution helped bring about a great awakening in the Kagayan Valley is indisputable. For the military situation and the operations therein during 1900, see, besides military reports on northern Luzon cited below, *Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 140, and *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 772–82, 789–93. The activities in March were ascribed by Otis to the Tagalogs of Tirona's command who had remained in the valley, and by Hood also to Aguinaldo's reported presence in the foothills of Isabela. Villa's diary, hitherto cited, shows that Aguinaldo was present in Nueva Vizcaya and on the borders of Isabela in early February, issued orders for guerrilla warfare in that section, and decided to march back across the main range to join Tinio in Abra, on account of reports that the Americans knew his whereabouts (see *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 2004–08).

south were ousted, the condition by the middle of the year was less promising than it had been at the beginning. General Young, almost without interruption from January 1, had been calling for more troops. He thought at the start that, with another regiment to add to his regiment of cavalry and fifteen companies of infantry, he could clear up the country in two months; but he could then get only a battalion. In March, he was yet more insistent in his demand for reinforcements, both of men and of equipments (coast-transportation, pack-animals, etc.); and, having learned somewhat of how the people were being organized against the Americans, he only planned on bringing about the desired peace by means of a vigorous campaign before the rainy season should set in. He finally received another full regiment of infantry, partly mounted, and was given authority to recruit scouts among the Ilokan natives. Some very energetic subordinate commanders were in his command, and were kept constantly scouting. During the month of April, nearly 1000 Filipinos were killed by these forces, most of the victims being ignorant peasants of North Ilokos upon whose adaptability to religious fanaticism the priest Aglipai had played to enroll them in the bolo bands, which were supported by a few rifles; generally, the guerrilla commands in the hills evaded contact so far as possible, but these zealots and their leader fairly forced themselves upon the American arms in several particularly sharp encounters, and made attacks on the towns, including even Lauag, the principal American garrison in that region. The forces of occupation gained the upper hand in the course of several months of vigorous campaigning, but only with the result of driving the guerrillas farther into the mountains and somewhat limiting their sphere of action, not sufficiently to prevent a recrudescence of hostilities later in the year; and, at its close, General Young was calling for additional reinforcements even more insistently than in the opening months.[1]

[1] For the campaign in Young's district to the middle of 1900, see (besides further

The fact of importance at the moment confronting the Americans was that here in Ilokan territory, too, they were opposed by practically a united population, hostile either openly or secretly. They were aided, in several cases actively and openly, by some few of the leading residents of certain towns; quite generally, however, these men had been addicted to the Spanish officials in these provinces; hence their authority among the people was weakened in the face of a vigorous propaganda based on race-sentiment. It is impossible to ascribe the friendly greetings which the Americans received from the populace in most Ilokan towns, as they marched into them at the close of 1899, entirely to cautiousness and courtesy; on the other hand, it was probably sincere only in so far as it indicated satisfaction at seeing put to flight the Tagalog military masters who had ruled for nearly a year and a half. Here was a basis for approximation of interests between Americans and Ilokans. But the Americans came there primarily to run the Filipino riflemen to earth, and made that their chief pursuit. These riflemen in Ilokos had not been entirely Tagalog, or led only by Tagalog leaders; and now the new revolutionary organization, which, though loose, was also elastic, shrewdly adapted itself to circumstances, and men of Ilokan birth henceforth played the chief part in organizing and maintaining the opposition in this territory. Tinio, the Tagalog, remained theoretically in superior command of the district; but Tinio was somewhat diplomatic; and, besides, the conditions of guerrilla warfare made each

reference to northern Luzon in general) *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. 1, part 6, pp. 722–33, 741–59, 787–88, 798–802; *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 225–30, 237–40, 241–42, 248–70, 319–20, 323; and *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 129–39. Otis wrote (*ibid.* p. 139), shortly after his departure from the islands on May 5: "The dispatches of Young, just cited, pp. 129–38, show that our men were gladly received by the mass of the people upon entering the provinces; that later a portion of the people under insurgent impressment contributed in men and money to drive the Americans out; and finally, that the great majority, gaining confidence, united with our troops to destroy the Tagalogs and the robber bands which they directed." Young, interpreting these messages of his, would probably have made the first two statements somewhat differently; certainly, he would not have made the last at all, especially after what followed in late 1900.

leader virtually independent. In the southern Ilokan provinces, where the towns were all along the coast, an underground organization for the purpose of obtaining contributions and of keeping up, secretly, hostility toward the Americans, was the chief end in view. In the mountains of Abra, threatening both North and South Ilokos, Juan and Blas Villamor, both Ilokans, who had been in Malolos and Tarlak, were the leaders of guerrilla bands, which could do no great damage in themselves, but which represented a virtual consolidation of the Ilokan *principalía* in a number of towns around Bigán and in Abra. Farther north, Aglipai, the priest, in imitation of a tradition in Spain and Spanish America (not without honor also in France), had turned guerrilla. There is a special interest in Aglipai's part in the campaign by which, in large part after the Americans occupied the Ilokan provinces and under their very noses, the masses were turned actively against them. It was significant that appeals to religious fanaticism, as well as the darker methods of intimidation, sequestration, and even assassination, had to be resorted to in order to bring about an effective alignment of the Ilokans — significant, however, less for the present than for the future, since these methods contained in themselves the germs of disintegration. The bloodier pages of this record, those revealing in places a veritable civil war, were to be written in late 1900 and early 1901. But even during the period with which we are dealing, some dark deeds were wrought on Filipino "traitors" in the name of Filipino "patriotism." Nevertheless, for the majority of natives of the ruling class, it was not necessary to resort to intimidation (for, if it had been, successful intimidation would not long have remained possible); the masses, meanwhile, were held in line by the mysterious influence of the priesthood, a legitimate inheritance from the days of friar rule. In this respect, Aglipai was the center of the whole propaganda. From the time that he moved north with Aguinaldo on his flight and established himself in the mountains bordering Abra and

North Ilokos, his activities and influence, formerly directed to building up a "national priesthood" under his own control, were confined to this district. Allied with him were most of the native priests of North Ilokos and Unión provinces; and they kept up the propaganda among their flocks under the very rifles of the American garrisons. The Katipunan idea was for the first time spread generally throughout Ilokan territory; especially in North Ilokos, the men of the peasantry were branded by the wholesale, the triangle and sun being tattooed on their breasts. Secret oaths were imposed, and a mysterious religious significance given to the cause of maintaining the war against the Americans. Something of the Mohammedan's frenzy to slay the "heretic" was imparted to the ignorant and impressionable wielder of a bolo. It was a practical application of the ideas which Aglipai had preached to the whole country in his proclamation a year before from Malolos, defying and deriding Archbishop Nozaleda and cunningly disseminating the notion that the friars were now allied with the Americans in an effort to re-subjugate the Filipinos.[1]

Religious fanaticism also played a part in central Luzon, though less as a direct means of organizing opposition to the United States than as an incidental cause of local disorders, with which the American forces had to deal, but which were in themselves reminiscences of friar domination and anti-friar agitation. In Bulakán and Pampanga, impostors played on the religious credulity of the people to organize fanatical sects which would swell their pocket-books. In Pangasinan and Sam-

[1] For the quasi-religious propaganda in Ilokos, see especially, among the citations in the preceding note, *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 798–802, and part 7, pp. 237–40. For Aglipai's proclamation of March, 1899, insinuating in the minds of the Filipinos the idea of an alliance between Americans and the Spanish friars, see *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 117–20. For data on the secret organization of the towns, resort to intimidation, etc., see especially *ibid.*, p. 130 (a threat at Kandón in January to execute all Filipinos who surrendered); p. 132 (a rumor that Tinio authorized murder when contributions were refused); p. 134 (the Katipunan tattooing in North Ilokos and the ambushing of American soldiers in Unión); pp. 135–36 (sequestration of municipal officials, etc.); and *Rept. War Dept., 1000*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 257–65.

bales, where, except in some few localities, the masses generally had remained docile to friar management, the absentee Dominican curates (mostly living in the large convent of their order in Manila) were still able to make their influence felt in the regions from which they had fled for safety, their devotees among the upper classes and adepts among the shrewder (quite often unscrupulous) men of the lower classes maintaining an organization known as the "Guards of the Honor of Mary." Theoretically, this was a society formed to foster devotion to the Virgin and to cultivate in general greater religious fervency; practically, it was so conducted as to aggrandize a number of impostors who preyed on the ignorance of the masses, and its avowed object of combating the irreligious tendencies of the revolution turned it into an agency for creating civil war in many of the communities of Sambales and Pangasinan and in some towns of Tarlak and Unión. It has already been noted that it had played a part as a sort of reactionary league during the insurgent propaganda against Spain in these provinces at the beginning of 1898, and that, after the friars had been expelled along with the other elements of Spanish authority, this religious society had kept up a sort of counter-revolution against the Malolos Government, semi-anarchy prevailing in these districts throughout 1899. The religious disturbances in Bulakán and Pampanga during 1900 apparently had no political significance, though complicating the disorders of a troublesome time, but simply showed how easily some crank or charlatan can lead the Filipino masses astray by preying upon their superstitions. This same element was at the basis of the "Guards of Honor" movement, but it had, in its connection with the friar hierarchy of Manila and in the animosities aroused during nearly three years of the whetting of vengeances (the land question being also to some extent involved in it), no little significance in a political way. The "Guards of Honor" represented, however simply a large part of the peasantry had been enrolled through religious faith,

the old régime of religious and political autocracy on one side and of humble submission on the other; the opposition to this now semi-militant organization represented, however crudely and with mixed motives, the rising sentiment of nationality, blindly aiming at the riddance of all domination. Theoretically, the Americans had nothing to do with either of these parties, except to restore and keep order where they had found whole communities rent asunder by internal strife. But the revolutionary party could strengthen the hostility to the Americans by misrepresenting even an act of impartiality in the interest of order, and could proclaim, in the fashion begun by Aglipai, an alliance between the Americans and the friars. In this respect, considerable cloudiness as to American relations with the friars was to be regretted all through 1900, and certain incidents occurring in this district, aided by designing misrepresentation of the facts, helped to keep Filipinos and Americans apart. Down underneath the resistance in the regions of the Ilokans, Pangasinans, and Sambals there lay all the time this religio-political disturbance. But the American commanders in the field did not, with a few exceptions, conceive that they had anything to do with the "Guards of Honor" as such—indeed, most of them, even after two years passed in the very midst of its operations, did not really know what the organization was. And if they had endeavored to align the Filipinos with American authority either for or against this organization, they would probably have been reprimanded for meddling with the "religious question"; the American military government had no policy on this the question underlying all the disturbance going on in Philippine society. Attention was perforce attracted to the "Guards of Honor" movement by a new community called Kabaruan, organized in Pangasinan by impostors who used the name of the society to seize a tract of land for the new town, and who had drawn into it, by March, 1900, over 10,000 ignorant people (inspired by religious fanaticism and promises of a so-

cialistic paradise), whom they could exploit and also set to prey upon the crops and animals of Filipinos marked as enemies of the society. Despite the disorders produced by this community, it was not broken up for a year thereafter, by which time 25,000 people had been attracted from their little homes in other towns, and public morality as well as order had been contravened, while the deluded followers were being plundered by their equally uneducated, but shrewd, exploiters (among them Filipinos posing as "Christ" and the "Virgin Mary").[1]

The central provinces of Luzon had been the chief theater of American operations all during the year of 1899 up to the end of November; and upon the theory that contact of the American soldiers with the populace would establish good feeling, and the dispersion of the organized Filipino army would leave only ladronism as an obstacle to public order, central Luzon should have become peaceful, if not contented, early in 1900. Instead, its eight provinces continued for yet a year to occupy the attention of a larger proportion of American soldiers than any others in the archipelago. The 33 stations of troops in MacArthur's division (covering several provinces, excluding Morong and the territory lying northward of the Laguna de Bay) on December 1, 1899, had increased, under the necessities of the situation, to 117 on April 6, 1900; the bulk of the force of 25,000 distributed in some 150 posts

[1] For military reports on Kabaruan, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, pp. 198, 332–35, and *ibid., 1901*, vol. I, part 5, p. 114. The second citation, a report by General J. F. Bell in March, 1900, is the only published military document of any consequence on the "Guards of Honor," but it does not specifically mention the organization, though indicating the connection of the Dominicans with it. For other reports by Bell, describing, as early as December, 1899, the thoroughly unsettled conditions of the Pangasinan and Sambales towns, though not mentioning the religio-political agitation, see *ibid., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, pp. 322–25, 326, 332. This officer was one of the few who tried to get to the bottom of the situation wherever he was. See also *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 142–43, on the Kabaruan trouble and the fanatical sects in general; General MacArthur's and Colonel Jacob H. Smith's reports give no indication of a knowledge of the popular movement of which Kabaruan was a symptom, and General Otis's comments show him quite at sea about it. The military government's relation to the religious question will be more generally discussed below.

throughout northern Luzon was in these provinces when Wheaton took charge of the new department soon after. The four succeeding months were filled with petty engagements of precisely the same character as those conducted under MacArthur during the four preceding months. Makabebe and American scouts (commonly composed of men picked from the infantry and mounted) did the principal work outside of the towns; for the enemy always remained in hiding when a force of any size went out. The only fights at all approaching the character of set engagements were brought on by expeditions undertaken against the mountain retreats of guerrilla leaders, on the borders of Bulakán, Nueva Écija, and Pampanga, and of Nueva Écija, Tarlak, and Pangasinan; and the actual fighting in these expeditions did not assume a greater dignity than mere skirmishing. The capture of these leaders was, from first to last, virtually an impossibility; they could be driven from one mountain retreat to another, but their system of communication kept them informed of the movements of any American column, and they could so mingle with the people and be protected by them as to come at times into the garrisoned towns. Several subordinate commanders holding guerrilla commissions to cover their depredations, but who were in reality nothing but brutal murderers and thieves, were, it is true, captured in Pangasinan and Nueva Écija; but their operations had put them outside the pale even of Filipino patience under abuse (when accompanied by force), and they were captured as outlaws, not as revolutionary leaders. A number of these men were promptly tried by military commission, convicted, on various counts, of murder and lesser crimes against their own people and were hanged before public assemblies in Pangasinan and Tarlak.[1] Several Filipino leaders surrendered in this

[1] The first of these hangings (the first executions in the Philippines under American rule, beheld with considerable awe by the Filipinos, as the *garrote* had been in recent years the Spanish method of execution for civil crimes and shooting the method used in military executions) took place on March 30, 1900, at San Carlos, Pangasinan (*Harper's Hist.*, p. 340). A number of other chiefs, bandits pure and

region at about the time of the peace agitation and amnesty offer at Manila;[1] but the movement did not become at all general, and those who surrendered brought in comparatively few rifles, and did not for some months thereafter join in an effort to induce other surrenders, either of leaders or of rifles.[2]

simple, were tried in Pangasinan, Tarlak, and several other provinces, during the early months of the year, but only two other executions had taken place under General Otis as reviewing authority before his departure. See *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 1006–25 and 1340–50, for the records of the first trials of this sort, especially pp. 1344–47, the trial of Vicente and Inocencio Prado in Pangasinan in June, 1900, they being convicted of murder and other crimes, both felonies and semi-political, and against Americans as well as Filipinos. They were hanged at Dagupan in December, 1900. Vicente Prado had been a member of the congress at Malolos; this is an indication of the character of the men the revolutionary leaders would sometimes employ, especially in regions of factional feeling like Pangasinan. See also *ibid.*, pp. 1055–57, 1063–65, 1073–74, 1077–80, for cases arising out of the Guards of Honor trouble in Pangasinan.

[1] One of these, Servillano Aquino, was later tried on the charge of ordering the execution of five American soldiers in the mountains on the border of Tarlak in the preceding January. See *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 1205–06, for the record of the trial and sentence to imprisonment for life. See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, pp. 286–90, for report of the American officer who investigated this affair and affidavits of the wounded soldiers (two of whom survived). They were shot and then mutilated with bolos as their captors were being put to flight by an American command. One of them was quite positive in his identification of Aquino as having given the order; but the latter maintained that it was given by a subordinate who resembled him, and whom he afterward punished. Aquino was the only insurgent officer of any note who did not receive the benefit of the full amnesty of 1902, the offense of which he had been convicted being held to fall outside the exemptions of that amnesty. But he was pardoned by President Roosevelt in March, 1904, upon recommendation of Secretary of War Taft, the presiding officer of the court which tried him (General F. D. Grant) having also expressed a doubt as to the identification of Aquino with the order being positive. See the daily press, for Associated Press dispatch of March 23, 1904.

[2] Several of these men were, indeed, thought to have surrendered mainly in order to avoid the discomfort of life in the hills, and were suspected, during the latter part of 1900, of secretly conducting operations by giving orders to subordinates from their homes in the garrisoned towns. Besides Aquino, the more conspicuous of those who surrendered at the time were Francisco Makabulos in Tarlak and Pantaleón García in Nueva Écija (the latter being captured, but probably not against his will). For Makabulos's notice in January, 1900, to the people of Pangasinan that he had been "elected" again as civil and military chief of that province, and his entreaty to them not to accept the Americans' dollars for their rifles or otherwise to play the traitor, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, pp. 473–74. Its fervent warnings as to the brutality and exploitation to be expected if they do not hold out against the new masters are but crudely translated: "Soon we shall be devoured, for they try to grasp us with their paws and teeth and then swallow us against our will."

Most of the 3400 rifles obtained from April 1 to the end of July in all northern Luzon were captured, one to thirty at a time, by the small scouting parties, a considerable number being also found in *caches* on information obtained from natives of the rank and file or surrendered by the latter for the reward of thirty pesos each. During the summer months there was, in attacks on garrisoned towns so widely separated as Banged in Abra and those of eastern Nueva Ecija (where Lakuna, the leader of 1896, was still operating), some evidence of the reheartening of the guerrilla commands which was to display itself in a real recrudescence of warfare during the fall months. The coming of the rainy season, the withdrawal of some American troops for the campaign in China, the interposition of the offer of amnesty, and perhaps some weariness on the part of the American army of efforts not crowned with decisive results, all had their influence in bringing about to some degree a lull in the activity on the American side. So far as this relaxation of energy on the one side and revival of hope on the other was due to psychological causes, it was to be connected with the electoral campaign in the United States, the effect of which will be seen further along.[1]

The course of affairs was in all essential respects the same in the provinces of southern Luzon, with the difference that these provinces were occupied from one to three months later

[1] For data on the guerrilla warfare in northern Luzon (aside from the summaries to be cited below, indicating the nature of the campaign throughout the archipelago) up to the recrudescence of Filipino activity in late 1900, see the following: *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 144–51, 226–36; *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 196–206 (Wheaton's summary, April–July, wherein the enemy are called indiscriminately "ladrones" and "insurgents," and burning of *barrios* and supplies is reported with sufficient frequency to suggest that such burning had become, though informally, a policy); *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 76–78, 78–82, 89–93, 93–96, 115–20 (Grant's operations, mostly in Tagalog territory, partly in coöperation with Funston; also showing the nature of the operations of the Makabebes), and pp. 365–76 (operations in Funston's district, indicating a relaxation in the summer); *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 68–72, 481–510 (also preceding reports of MacArthur's subordinates, December–April). The Ninth Infantry was withdrawn to go to China on June 17.

than those to the northward of Pampanga, hence the methods of guerrilla warfare and the attitude of the people did not quite so speedily manifest themselves. The 55 posts (outside of the barracks in the southern portions of the city of Manila) that were garrisoned south of the Pasig when the Department of Southern Luzon was organized at the beginning of April represented practically the towns occupied in the expedition under Schwan and those occupied at the time of the expeditions to the hemp ports of southern Luzon and to the Camarines; at the end of July, their number had grown to 74, and by September 1, to 87 (including 5 Manila barracks, whence troops could be drawn for operations in neighboring territory, and 5 posts in little islands near Luzon), of which 56 were located in the four Tagalog provinces and 27 in the Camarines, Albai, and Sorsogon. The fugitives show the greater ferment in the Tagalog provinces (indeed, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas had been in a state of rebellion and dissent almost continuously since 1896); but the comparative quiet that prevailed in the less developed territory of the Bikols was due rather to the inactivity of the American forces than to the more submissive disposition of its inhabitants, though this, too, was a factor. Portions of Sorsogon were quite peaceful (as also some parts of the Camarines, into which American troops scarcely entered); but around Donsol and on the borders of Sorsogón and Albai the masses were sullen where not actively hostile, and for a long time remained in the hills rather than return to their homes under the oversight of an American garrison, cultivating new crops on land thitherto wild and resorting to bows and arrows, supported by a faith in the *anting-anting*,[1] to make up for their scant supply of

[1] *Anting-anting*, name commonly applied in the Philippines to charms, of one sort and another, which are worn on the body and are believed by the ignorant (sometimes, too, it would appear, by natives with some degree of education) to ward off all manner of evil. Primitively, they would seem to have been connected with Filipino witchcraft superstitions, and the word itself may be a variation of the old word *antang-antang*, to be stupefied by poison. In recent years, charms of

rifles. It would require a vigorous campaign at the end of 1900, continued well into 1901, to restore anything like real order to the interior communities of the Bikols. In the Tagalog provinces, scouting was incessant, but was conducted in the face of the same obstacles as in the central and northwestern provinces of Luzon, and was rather less productive of results, as indicated by the record of 381 rifles captured or surrendered during the four months April to July.[1] In Batangas and Laguna especially, the guerrilla opposition was not only as elusive as in northern Luzon of all American movements in force, but, under Malvar and several active subordinates, towns were attacked and intrenchments sometimes thrown up. These words of General Bates, describing the situation on August 15, 1900, reveal in part the nature of the problem as it then confronted the American army, not only in his department, but practically throughout the lowland provinces of Luzon, and in Panai, Leite, and Sámar, and to a lesser degree in Sebú and Bohol, as well as in parts of northern Mindanau: —

this sort were worn by bandit chiefs and religious charlatans, who thus made their ignorant followers believe them invulnerable to the Spanish bullets, and they came into more general use in this way during the rebellions against Spain and the United States. The wearing of scapularies, amulets, etc., blessed at Roman Catholic shrines, would seem to have given the idea added sanction during the Spanish régime, and the *anting-anting* of to-day has words of sacred significance and figures of the Virgin or the Crucifix (frequently drawn in rude style in ink on a ragged breastplate of cheap cotton cloth), besides meaningless words and figures of beasts which date back to pre-Catholic days. (See Sawyer's *The Inhabitants of the Philippines*, p. 265.) The subject of Philippine religious superstitions and folklore has hardly yet been investigated at all; the writings of Pedro A. Paterno are virtually worthless, being in fact discreditable to his race, and the pamphlets of Isabelo de los Reyes, while better, do not deserve the name of "researches."

[1] In all southern Luzon and the adjacent islands, reports for those four months (not complete for July) showed: Filipinos killed, 610; wounded, 214; captured or surrendered, 581; rifles captured or surrendered, 581; Americans killed, 22, and wounded, 81. Only 45 rifles were obtained in the Bikol provinces during the three months April to June. See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 221–22. There were at this time nearly 12,000 soldiers in southern Luzon, about half as many as in northern Luzon, or not its full proportion as regards populated area guarded by these troops; but, on the other hand, there were in northern Luzon perhaps four times as many rifles still out in Filipino hands as there were in southern Luzon.

I regret that I cannot recommend the reduction of the forces in this command by so much as a single soldier. . . . A single battalion can to-day march from one end of this department to the other without encountering enough resistance from the enemy to impede seriously its progress, but small parties of troops cannot leave the garrisoned posts without incurring a danger of attack. . . . The *insurrectos*, after making an attack, disperse, assume civilian garb, and conceal themselves among the peaceful inhabitants, often taking up their residence and continuing their conspiracy in towns occupied by our troops, where they terrorize the mass of inhabitants by threatening condign punishment to those who display friendship toward Americans. When captured and again set free, they have shown their lack of appreciation of the policy of magnanimity by again appearing in arms against us at the first opportunity. The necessity of ferreting out, running down, and punishing this hostile minority . . . and our moral obligation to protect our friends render it necessary to have troops stationed at all places where civil government is established; for the absence of troops means the presence of anarchy. It will doubtless be a long time before any diminution can be made in any of the garrisons of this department.[1]

The foregoing statements as to the character of the warfare faithfully summarized the reports from commanders in the field everywhere; the expressions as to the "hostile minority" and the intimidation of the mass of the people reflect rather the views of headquarters at Manila, where Bates stayed. Before investigating the question as to how far coercion played a part in bringing about the puzzling conditions of 1900, a comparison of certain data for that year with those of 1899

[1] The quotation is from Bates's annual report on southern Luzon, *Rept. War Dept.*, *1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 207–29. See, further, for reports on the activity of the Filipinos in Batangas–Laguna and the nature of guerrilla warfare, *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 296–97, 315–18, 393–409, 434–35, and *Otis's Rept.*, *1900*, pp. 236–45; for the trouble on the Albai–Sorsogon border, *Rept. War Dept.*, *1901*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 331–58. Major Hugh D. Wise at Donsol was both energetic and diplomatic, but it was September before the former inhabitants began even to trade in the town and October before they returned in numbers. But still no rifles came in, and a more energetic and generally planned campaign was yet to be necessary, as in all other parts of southern Luzon. Citations covering guerrilla warfare in the Bisayas have already been made. For evidence of the number and character of the engagements, nearly all petty, throughout the entire archipelago during 1900, see the chronological summaries in *Rept. War Dept.*, *1901*, vol. I, part 4; also *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 334–44.

will reveal graphically how a war which had been formally "ended" may be worse than when it was apparently at its height. On November 1, 1899, when the *coup* was about to be administered to Filipino governmental pretentions, the American army occupied 53 posts in the Philippine Islands and comprised not quite 40,000 officers and men; by September 1, 1900, it had been spread out in 413 posts, and numbered approximately 61,000 members, excluding some 3000 drawn away from the islands for the Peking relief expedition.[1] To be sure, during November–December, 1899, the greater part of northern Luzon was for the first time occupied, and during January–April, 1900, practically all southern Luzon, as well as the central islands and Mindanau, were occupied, so that the number of garrisons grew from 122 in January to 375 on July 31 primarily through the natural progress of the extension of American authority throughout the archipelago. They had, however, continued to increase in May, June, and July, after the Christian provinces had all been occupied, and it was significant that they grew from 375 to 413[2] during the single month of August, and should thereafter increase to 502 by March, 1901, practically without the addition of new territory,

[1] By November 30, 1900, after the return of troops from China, the army in the Philippines numbered approximately 69,000. This was the maximum reached, a homeward movement of the two-year volunteers commencing soon after. Secretary Root (*Rept. Sec. War, 1900*, pp. 3–4) gives the figure as 74,094; apparently this figure included also all troops en route to or from the islands. The monthly reports by cable from Manila are more nearly precise. MacArthur (*Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1207, 1233–34, 1246–47) reported a force of 63,838 on August 31 (including 3130 in China), of 68,775 on November 30, and of 67,804 on December 31, 1900, including contract surgeons, but not including, apparently, general officers and staffs. The Adjutant-General's *Report for 1901* credited the Philippines with 69,120 troops in November, 1900, and 69,420 troops in December, 1900, these two months being those with the maximum of force, and shows a total of 112,277 officers and men, regulars and volunteers, serving in those islands from the arrival of the first expedition in 1898 to June 30, 1901. (See *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 2, pp. 11, 66–68, table B, facing p. 64.) The army of the United States, volunteer and regular service, increased from 98,588 on November 29, 1899, to 103,150 on November 30, 1900.

[2] Of these 413 posts on September 1, 1900, 318 (including 27 barracks in the city of Manila) were on Luzon, of which number 147 (including those in Manila) were in Tagalog territory.

but almost entirely through the endeavor to prevent the control by the guerrilla leaders of towns where local government had been set up under American military supervision. It was significant also that, though the movement of the new volunteer organizations to the islands was completed in January, 1900, and the expeditions of occupation ended in April, yet the force in the Philippines increased from about 60,000 to about 70,000 by the following November, through the constant sending of recruits to more than balance men being invalided home, and through the re-transfer of troops sent from the United States to China. Turning to the record of engagements reported, we find that, from the beginning of war until the end of November, 1899, they averaged 44 per month, while for the seven months after the organized Filipino Government was scattered (December 1, 1899, to June 30, 1900) they averaged 106 per month; or, taking the period occupied in extending American authority over the archipelago, we find therein an average of 60 engagements per month, whereas for the months April to June, 1900, after the provinces were occupied, the average per month was 120. The number of "contacts" began, of course, to increase rapidly from the 1st of October, 1899, when the final campaign was inaugurated, and the greater number of them thereafter was due primarily to the much greater extent of territory into which the American army spread between October 1, 1899, and about April 1, 1900. But it is, nevertheless, noteworthy that while, during this period of rapid extension of American authority over territory always at least theoretically in control of an enemy who would resist dispossession, the combats, large and small averaged 92 per month, they increased to 120 per month between April 1 and June 30.[1] Despite the number of engagements during the

[1] These combats were, between May 5, 1900, and June 30, 1901, to continue at the rate of 73 per month, despite the very notable decline in their numbers during April, May, and June, 1901, owing to the surrender of Filipino leaders and the pacification of all but three provinces of Luzon and three Bisayan islands. (See *MacArthur's Rept., 1901*, p. 98.)

first three months of 1900 that were due to the occupation of southern Luzon and the Bisayas, one has to note that over one fourth of these engagements occurred in northern Luzon, in territory occupied before the beginning of that year; moreover, about one third of all the American casualties and a much larger proportion of Filipino casualties for the succeeding four months occurred in northern Luzon.[1] The actual number of casualties had, indeed, declined since the operations resembling organized warfare had come to an end, and the percentage of casualties to the whole force employed (which had increased in number) had, of course, declined still more. Of the total of 2729 casualties (509 killed and 2220 wounded, of whom 170 also died) in the American army from February 4, 1899, to June 30, 1900, there had been a monthly average of 174 killed and wounded between the date of the outbreak and the end of March, 1900 (during which time the force averaged 41,000 men), as compared with an average of 93 casualties during the succeeding three months (with an average force of 63,500 men).[2] But something of the character of the warfare (commonly from ambush) was indicated by the increase in proportion of American killed to those wounded; during the period when a more or less organized force was encountered behind trenches or in the open, about 1 American was killed where 4 or 5 were wounded, but in 1900 the proportion rose

[1] For the four months May–August, 1900, American reports for the entire archipelago showed 1513 Filipinos killed; for the four months April–July, 1900, Wheaton reported 1014 Filipinos killed in northern Luzon alone. (Philippine Information Society's *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 9, pp. 22–23.)

[2] The percentage of casualties was much greater during the fighting around Manila and in the subsequent advances on Malolos and San Isidro than ever thereafter. This is better shown by the average of 200 casualties per month from February to November inclusive (comprehending the fall campaign against San Isidro and Tarlak, when, however, the Filipino resistance was markedly weaker than in the spring), as against the average of 102 per month from December to April, despite the expeditions of occupation. After June 30, 1900, casualties increased somewhat, marking the greater frequency of ambushes and (later in 1900) a more active American campaign, averaging 96 per month during April–August, 1900, and 60 per month during the year July, 1900, to June, 1901, despite the absence of operations in most of the territory during the last three months of that period.

at times to, 1 killed for two wounded. Probably, too, the debilitating influence of the climate was beginning to show in this increase of the proportion of killed to wounded.[1] The percentage of sick in the whole command had, indeed, declined. During the early months of 1899, when the smaller command had been overworked in the hot sun, one fourth of entire regiments had at times been in the hospitals or on sick report in field quarters, and during the whole year the percentage of sick had perhaps averaged 12, ranging from 9 to 13 during the closing months.[2] The establishment of the detachments in quarters of a more permanent character, and the opportunity for more effective work afforded the Medical Corps by the organization into departments and districts, brought about a reduction of the sick to 8 or 9 per cent, and sometimes less, during 1900. But three times as many were dying from disease as were killed by wounds, dysentery alone causing nearly as many deaths as wounds, or one fifth of all. Of the

[1] Said Colonel C. R. Greenleaf, Chief Surgeon, Division of the Philippines, in August, 1900 (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, p. 120): "The number of deaths [including those from disease] in the army has steadily increased, and a diminution of the death list can scarcely be expected. The number of men shot from ambush by small guerrilla bands now exceeds those killed at any previous time [a mistake, owing to errors in the accompanying tables], and as time progresses and the men become more and more debilitated by tropical service, the more marked will be the ratio of deaths. [By greater sanitary precautions, we may cut down] the list of preventable diseases, but the non-preventable diseases will constantly become more severe and more intractable." The following year Colonel Greenleaf also said (*Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 2, p. 669): "The seasoned men who pass a year in the tropics, of strong constitution, observing the ordinary hygienic rules, and old enough to be moderate in their appetites, should show a small sick rate, were it not for two adverse factors. The first is the inevitable undermining of the strength of even the most robust by continued service in the tropics, and the second is the increasing prevalence of venereal diseases. The most energetic and stalwart American, after a year of service here, loses energy, strength, and ambition. He performs what work his duty demands more or less half-heartedly, and with a draft on his vital energy which he can actually feel at the time. Slight ailments, to which a second thought would not be given in the United States, are felt out of all proportion to their severity."

[2] One cannot get satisfactory data on the percentage of sick during 1899. In a letter of May 28, 1900 (*Sen. Doc. 426*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9), Surgeon-General Sternberg said: "During . ... February to July, 1899, . . . the sick list for some time reached as much as 25 per cent of some of the regiments."

2575 in hospital on June 23, 1900, but 10 per cent were there for wounds, while 35 per cent had intestinal diseases and 23 per cent malarial fever. Moreover, the figures on percentage of deaths and of disease were calculated for the size of the army present in the Philippines and did not include the men invalided home, some of them for discharge as disabled, others for treatment in a climate more favorable to their ailments, of whom a fraction died en route or in the hospitals enlarged for their reception at San Francisco. For the first seven months of 1900, the 995 deaths in the Philippines (654 from disease) represented a death rate of 26.7 per 1000 per annum; but the total rate of loss to the command per annum was 67.8 per 1000, for during those seven months 1560 men were sent home, 303 with certificates of disability, 1147 for treatment, and 110 as being insane.[1] Herein lay some reason for encouragement of the Filipino revolutionists, in thinking that they might gain their ends by mere prolongation of the resistance, although in actual combat they regularly lost twenty men for every American soldier killed or mortally wounded. Though the American mortality figures, both of those slain by bullets and those succumbing to disease, had from the first been much lower than the corresponding losses of the Spaniards in 1897,[2] yet the entire campaign had been on a very much larger scale than that caused by the Katipunan revolt, and, moreover, American losses were systematically and grossly exaggerated

[1] Chief Surgeon Greenleaf's report of 1900 (cited above) contains further analyses of these data in detail, it being the first comprehensive report of the sort furnished for the Philippines. His report of 110 insane sent to the United States in seven months would indicate a rapid increase of that cause of disability, if the figures are correct; for the War Department reported (*Sen. Doc. 426*, p. 8) a total of but 95 soldiers sent home for insanity from 1898 to May 24, 1900, of whom the diagnosis was in 24 cases not confirmed. The percentage of insanity revealed by this figure was no greater than it had been in the army in the United States prior to 1898.

[2] Figures on the Spanish losses by disease, etc., in 1897 are not afforded by the works cited in the opening chapters of volume I, though inferences may be drawn from the data afforded; statements made in Primo de Rivera's *Memoria*, for instance, would point to a death rate in Philippine hospitals of 100 or more per 1000 per annum and a loss still greater in men invalided home.

to the Filipino people by their revolutionary leaders. The revolutionary programme had in the three years expanded greatly beyond the Biak-na-bató demand for reforms and eventual capitulation to money; but there was doubtless some recollection of Biak-na-bató in the hope commonly held in 1900 that the United States would be compelled to compromise.[1]

[1] For the figures and comparisons presented above, the following sources (sometimes contradictory, and not always accurate) have been consulted: *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 363–64; *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 3, pp. 43–71, 75 (tables of Philippine casualties in annual report of Adjutant-General of Army); *ibid.*, part 5, (*MacArthur's Rept., 1900*), pp. 5–43 (chronological list of events, 1899–1900); p. 60 (MacArthur's summary); pp. 78–85 (appendix A, report of Adjutant-General of the Philippines); pp. 117–35 (appendix F, report of Chief-Surgeon of the Philippines); p. 206 (Wheaton's summary of northern Luzon); p. 221 (Bates's summary of southern Luzon); *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 2, pp. 11, 65, 66–68 and table B facing p. 64 (figures compiled in Adjutant-General's report of 1901), and pp. 665–66, 668–82, 885–92 (Surgeon-General's reports and tables for 1901); *ibid.*, part 4, pp. 5–72 (chronological list of events, 1900–01), p. 98; *Sen. Docs. 426, 435*, 56 Cong., 1st Sess.; and *Corr. Rel. War*, for cablegrams on casualties, etc., monthly reports on the size of the American force being given from July, 1899, onward, and monthly reports on percentage of sick being cabled in 1900. In response to a Senate resolution, the War Department furnished the figures in *Sen. Doc. 426*, comparing the casualties, sickness, insanity, etc., in the Philippines up to May 24, 1900, with those of European armies and of the Union army in the Civil War. But these figures are not complete for the last two months. The Adjutant-General's figures for casualties and disease from February 4, 1899, to June 30, 1900 (apparently not including deaths en route home or in the United States), show the following totals: Killed or died of wounds, 679; wounded (not mortally), 2050; died of disease, 1080; suicide, accident, drowning, homicide, etc., 212; total deaths, 1971; total casualties, 2729. A year later, these figures (including, however, the entire period of American occupation, beginning June 30, 1898, and extending to June 30, 1901) stood as follows: Killed or died of wounds, 918; wounded (not mortally), 2609; died of disease, 2146; suicide, accident, drowning, homicide, etc., 429; total deaths, 3493; total casualties, 3527. The Filipino casualties (*Sen. Doc. 435*): 10,780 killed, 2104 wounded, and 10,425 captured and surrendered up to the 1st of June, 1900, are only American estimates, the number of those killed in early fights having often been exaggerated, while the number of wounded was never even approximated, for reasons already stated. Roughly speaking, their proportion of losses to those of the Americans under guerrilla warfare would seem to have remained about 15 to 1 or 20 to 1 (judging by the incomplete data in MacArthur's 1900 and 1901 reports), while their total losses appeared to decline (though increasing in late 1900), as did those of the Americans. Later reports on their losses were, however, always more incomplete than in 1899.

CHAPTER XXIV

GUERRILLA METHODS AND ORGANIZATION

GUERRILLA warfare between communities on the same social scale, or between men of the same race, will evoke deeds of the darkest sort, justified on each side as "retaliation" or "reprisal." Introduce the element of race-feeling, and still worse conditions may be expected. As has been seen in connection with the events of 1899, there had been incidents of this sort, partly retaliatory upon the part of the American soldiers for the abuse of the flag of truce by Filipinos and for deeds of brutality toward captured comrades (sometimes real, sometimes exaggerated in reports). Now that guerrilla methods were avowed as the policy of the Filipinos, the bitterness of feeling, on the American side at least, was bound to increase, with a consequent greater likelihood of unauthorized retaliation on the part of subordinate commanders or abuses of any and all natives by unthinking or ill-disposed soldiers. Reprisal is recognized as legitimate in organized warfare, and will naturally be invoked frequently against a foe which employs ambushing and other methods of treachery. But the authority to resort to reprisal is not given to subalterns in the field or to individual soldiers, else each man would be a law unto himself in making war. Burning of houses, and sometimes of entire *barrios*, especially of those lying near the hills and affording facilities for guerrilla bands to recruit men and supplies and raid the more populous portions of a Filipino town (which is, in fact, a "township"), became quite common during 1900, so common, indeed, in some districts as to necessitate the supposition that it was enjoined as a policy by superior officers. No evidence of the promulgation of such a policy during 1900 for the archipelago as a whole or for any of the military

departments or districts, has been put on record.[1] The burning of houses from which shots were fired at American soldiers or near which telegraph wires were cut, and the destruction of *barrios* where ambushes were arranged or insurgent headquarters were maintained, were legitimate methods of reprisal, quite obviously necessary to follow, in most cases at least. In various other ways, not always possible of definition in hard-and-fast rules of campaign, the exigencies of a warfare at best semi-barbarous would at times demand summary methods, inevitably involving some visitation of the penalties upon the innocent. As to burning, moreover, the application of a torch to the thatched cane houses (worth, in the majority of cases, but a very few dollars) of a tropical community does not entail any such loss and suffering as is consequent upon the destruction of towns built with more permanent materials in other climates; while burning of Philippine towns had been begun by the Filipinos themselves (under Luna), and probably in the majority of cases throughout the period 1898 to 1902 was due to their own torches. Still, a home is a home, in the tropics or elsewhere; and, whether destroyed by the Americans or by guerrillas, the humble people, thus caught between two fires, blamed the Americans for the conditions which caused it. Herein lay the desirability of having on the American side, so far as possible, a well-defined policy, in consequence of which punishment should fall on the innocent as lightly as possible and on the guilty as inevitably as possible, while as nearly as might be the distinction should be drawn between the American forces, resorting to harsh measures only with some definite end in view or to protect the peace and order of the majority in the community, and the guerrilla bands, burning,

[1] General Hughes, in his testimony in 1902 about Panai (*Sen. Doc. 331*), indicated that houses, or even towns, were at times burned, in accordance with his plan of campaign; General Wheaton, in a summary of four months' operations in northern Luzon (*Rept. War Dept.*, 1901, vol. I, part 5, pp. 198–205), cites the burning of houses or *barrios* in so many cases that the existence of superior authority for the action is to be presupposed.

torturing, or assassinating, sometimes out of pure wantonness, sometimes to carry out a personal vengeance, again in execution of a threat against a community for its non-support, and always to the detriment of the peace and order which alone would restore prosperity to the Philippine fields. The racial sympathy of the masses, and so far as an ideal of nationality had dimly reached them, their hopes and aims also, were against the Americans and with the guerrilla leaders. The United States, unless it proposed to crush out resistance purely by the exercise of brute force and by the possession of greater resources and powers of endurance, could hope to appeal only to the material interests of these people in a return of peace, and could do so only by making the burden of the blame for disorder rest with the guerrilla chiefs. In a still higher degree was this necessary in order to secure the support of the landed aristocracy, with whom self-interest would weigh more than with the peasant having a tropical standard of life and its necessities (aside from the common blindness of the latter to any but the crudest appeals to his reason). Obviously, the display of petty vengeance, of race-hatred, or of sheer wantonness on the American side would not tend to a clear discrimination between the aims and methods of the two armed parties, especially when there was lack of a concerted plan, plainly promulgated and unflinchingly carried out. It was in connection with the eager pursuit of the arms that were employed in guerrilla warfare, and the consequent zeal for praise by subordinate commanders, particularly those of the native scouts, that the use of torture appeared upon the American as well as upon the guerrilla side — indeed, the Americans borrowed from the guerrillas and from Spanish-Philippine history in resorting to the use of the "water-cure" and similar tortures to gain information or rifles. The conduct of American soldiers and the discipline of the army became later a vital feature of the "Philippine problem" as discussed in the United States; for the "water-cure" and allied methods remained during

1900 *sub rosa*, merely occasional (except in certain districts), and strictly without the sanction of superior authority, so far as the evidence goes. That such things were possible, and did many times occur, was subsequently proved; herein lies a plain comment upon the lack, during a whole year of guerrilla warfare, of a policy, enforced under strict disciplinary measures. If an officer of one rank might burn a cluster of huts without express warrant of superior authority, or wink at the employment by the Makabebes of methods for obtaining information which could not be mentioned in official reports, why not an officer of another rank? If a young lieutenant, fresh from the States and from school, and regarding with swollen pride a whole community subject to his control, could take chances of this sort, why not a sergeant out with a scouting party, or soldiers themselves? Under such conditions, unless every American command was officered by prudent, humane, and vigilant men, the contagion of guerrilla methods would spread from the Filipino to the American camp. And in many, indeed, almost certainly most, places it did infect American officers, both high and low, and their soldiers. Said a cautious and well-informed correspondent, as early as April 20, 1900: —

> Since the insurgents have adopted their guerrilla methods of attacking weak parties of Americans, and boloing men who get outside our lines, a feeling of intense bitterness has sprung up among our soldiers. It is the old cry — "The only good Indian is a dead one" — repeated, with a deep thirst for revenge behind it to strengthen it. . . . Some of the most atrocious butcheries have been committed by the Filipinos, cases where a dozen or more natives have killed a single American, and hacked the body frightfully. The news reached the nearest post, and a scouting party goes out to the scene of the killing. It can be imagined that the comrades of the murdered man do not feel in a merciful mood, and they proceed to burn the village and kill every native who looks as if he had a bolo or a rifle.[1]

[1] Letter of John T McCutcheon, reproduced in the Chicago *Record's Stories of Filipino Warfare*. (The letter is overdrawn as regards the "terrific slaughter" of Filipinos beginning in 1900; later data showed their losses to have very consider-

Some of the soldiers whose comrades thought they had been kidnaped and mutilated subsequently turned out to have been deserters; nor were all those captured put to death, though guerrilla warfare had changed the Filipino camp from one which boasted of its Spanish prisoners and talked of international recognition to scattered commands skulking in the brush and through the hills. But the loose organization of 1900–01 afforded the opportunity for assassination by brutal subordinates, ignorant or reckless of consequences; and the secrecy of methods and common anonymity of the commanders who were really responsible for the operations on the Filipino side were thought by some of these superiors, also of a brutal type,

ably declined from the early part of 1899 onward.) The principal instances pertinent to this question during 1900 have already been briefly cited, especially in connection with Panai. The only cases not already mentioned which figured in contemporary official reports are the shooting of Filipino prisoners in connection with the killing in ambush of Lieutenant Edgar F. Koehler in Tarlak in February, 1900, and the summary execution of two Filipinos by General Funston at San Isidro the following month. In both these cases, Filipino cruelty and treachery had given provocation. Koehler was enticed into the woods by Filipinos who promised to show him where rifles were hidden and deliberately led the way into ambush; yet it appears, from the American accounts themselves (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 783–86, and part 8, pp. 167–69), that the guides had been threatened with "harsh usage," and it does not appear that the investigation into the killing immediately thereafter of 27 prisoners who "tried to escape" was very rigidly conducted. In the other case, Funston himself reported by telegraph (*Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 233) that two Filipinos were "caught in the act [of boloing kidnaped Makabebes], made no defence, and we took them up into the *barrio*, within 200 yards of the scene of their crime, and within ten minutes thereafter publicly hanged them." There was talk of a court-martial for this (*Harper's Hist.*, p. 341), but it was dropped. For special orders *re* conduct of troops during 1900, see *Sen. Doc. 205*, 57th Cong., 1st. Sess., pp. 40–41 (pp. 988–89 in *Sen. Doc. 331*); they show fear (and some knowledge also) of abuses committed against the natives, on the part of the commanders of central and southern Luzon, of Leite, and Sebú. Colonel Murray, in Leite, speaks of having "reliable information" that there has been "indiscriminate shooting" in which women and children have been killed or wounded; and General Grant, in Pampanga, tells of "a large number of complaints . . . of ill-treatment of natives on the part of scouting parties." As to army discipline during 1899–1900, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 86–99 (*MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, appendices B and C), for the reports of the Inspector-General and Judge-Advocate-General of the Philippine army division. The work of inspection, it seems, was not systematically organized until July, 1900. (As seen in chapter XIV, Lawton had been responsible for beginning inspections in 1899.)

to be a mask sufficient to save them from future condemnation in case of capture. Instances of betrayal of pretended friendship for American soldiers, followed by decapitation and hacking to pieces with bolos, were sufficiently frequent, and sufficiently common to all parts of the archipelago from North Ilokos province to Mindanau, to counsel the soldiers to be on their guard in practically every community and against the whole population; a few instances of Americans being buried alive were rumored, and one case of an American being burned to death was fairly well substantiated.[1]

But Filipino inhumanity to Filipino was far worse, and was exhibited on a far greater scale, than in the atrocities committed against American soldiers, the latter being, by comparison, very insignificant in number. Excluding the cases of sheer outlawry in a disordered time, and the instances where private vengeance was executed, the brutal outrages perpetrated upon natives by their fellow-countrymen, sometimes their own neighbors, because of failure to support the guerrilla forces (the vast majority of the victims being humble people of no property beyond that required for their immediate needs), or because of being charged with more overt demonstrations of friendship for the Americans, form a record of which the written evidence, in military trials, etc., is, though very incom-

[1] Besides the instances of brutality to American prisoners already brought out (notably the shooting of five men by Aquino's command), see the chronological summary in *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 339, 340, 344, for the following instances, reported by the press, of private soldiers decaptitated or otherwise mutilated: February 10, 1900, in Panai; March 11, in Leite; March 25, in Batangas; July 26, in Orokieta, Mindanau. See also *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 963–64, for the Orokieta case, and the testimony of officers and men serving in Panai (*ibid.*, parts 2 and 3) for the burning of a soldier and other atrocities. Some of the cases of this sort were brought out in military trials as offenders were caught. The orders summarizing these trials and publishing the sentences are to be found in *General Orders, Headquarters of the Philippines*, series of 1900 and 1901. They are reproduced in *Sen. Doc. 205*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., and also in *Sen. Doc. 331*, part 2. Among the trials for cruelty toward Americans (part 3 of exhibit G), note the following orders for especially atrocious cases: of 1900, nos. 100 and 137, the former reciting the order of a major of guerrillas detailing one company "exclusively to the extermination of the American cavalry and infantry"; of 1901, nos. 94, 106, 112, 174, 272, 292, and 370.

plete, sufficiently horrible. The most casual summing-up of these data will suffice to raise again the query as to how far the opposition to American authority was supported by intimidation. The opinion which had for a long time prevailed at headquarters in Manila had been stated in General Bates's summary of conditions in southern Luzon in mid-1900, quoted above: It was a "hostile minority" which had to be "ferreted" out and punished; this minority, mingled among the people in peaceful garb, "terrorized the mass of inhabitants"; and the duty of protecting "our friends" required many garrisons. After the failure of his peace negotiations in June and July, 1900, General MacArthur had, as has been seen, accepted the practical unity of the people as a fact, and declared that "fear as the only motive" would not account for it, while, two months previously, General Hughes had remarked of Panai: "As the people of the island are a unit against us, no betrayal has yet occurred. On the question at issue, no Judas has been found among the million of people." Treating as a substantial fact the practical unity of the Filipinos in opposition to the American army during a period of time which varied somewhat in different districts, there is yet the question as to whether this opposition was more positive than negative, or the converse. In so far as this question regarding the attitude of the people is psychological, it may be left open to a considerable degree of difference in opinions, within the limits, that is, which the facts as they develop permit difference of opinion as to the aims and motives of the Filipino people, both rank and file. To this end it falls in order here to note how generally and in what manner intimidation was resorted to by the guerrilla leaders.

After the revolutionary leaders were driven from the Ilokan towns at the end of 1899, they had, as has been made plain, proceeded more effectually to organize the Ilokan people than had ever been felt necessary in the days of Tagalog military rule in those provinces. Religious fanaticism was a potent ally

in this work of organization, particularly in North Ilokos; but it was not, even there, felt to be sufficient to solidify the people, and resort was had to intimidation. The secret society formed at the beginning of 1900 proclaimed as one of its objects, over a long list of signatures: "To put to death all persons who resist the objects of this society or give any information concerning it."[1] A few months later, Tinio, the superior military commander in this district, sent out an order whereby there should be tried in "summary judgment" and "punished by death" the following persons: (1) all municipal officials who should not give information of the movements of the American forces; (2) all those, regardless of age or sex, who should give information to the Americans about the revolutionary forces; (3) guides, unless acting as such under compulsion, or unless they should mislead the Americans; (4) all who should bring about surrenders to the Americans.[2] The results of this order, when carried out by the secret organization which was recruited among the most ignorant people, led by men of a somewhat shrewder but quite depraved type, were revealed later in particularly revolting evidence brought out in the trials of some of the culprits (though the story was by no means all told): murder was perpetrated on a wholesale plan in various towns from the northwest corner of Luzon down through Unión province, a band which operated at night burying alive in the sandy beach near one generally peaceful town some thirty people, these people, moreover, not having given even such provocation as three Ilokans who were buried alive in a town farther north had given by enrolling as policemen under American government.[3] Even in the comparatively quiet

[1] A captured document of the War Department, cited in the Philippine Information Society's *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 10, p. 10. Numbers of such documents will be brought to light when the War Department's collection is published.

[2] *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, pp. 62–63.

[3] For the more typical and flagrant cases developed in the military trials in the Ilokan territory, see General Orders 151, series of 1900, and 83 and 238, series of 1901. The documents collecting these trial records have been cited in the third preceding note.

Kagayan Valley, the guerrilla leaders gained sufficient assurance to make guarded threats against the natives who accepted judicial and municipal offices under American authority.[1]

Coercion and brutality were, from first to last, more in evidence in central Luzon, the chief theater of warfare, than in all other regions of the archipelago combined, with the possible exclusion of the Ilokan provinces. As a matter of fact, there was more likelihood of defections from the revolution and differences of judgment as to continuing the warfare, in the Tagalog provinces, for the very reasons through which they had been foremost in organizing revolt against Spain and in rejecting American sovereignty. In the non-Tagalog provinces of Luzon and in the Bisayas, speaking generally, the soil is less fully cultivated, the population considerably less dense, the ratio of literacy is lower, and the proportion of small landholders or tenants is much lower, the great mass of the people being, in fact, *peons* on large estates. When the great mass of the population can be moved—if moved at all—at the will of a few *caciques* in each community, coercion of an active, much less a brutal, type is not brought into play. This was true in 1900, whether, as in the Kagayan Valley, the majority of the *caciques* threw their influence for peace, or, as in the extreme south of Luzon, Filipino priests turned their flocks with a mere word into unreasoning opposition to the Americans. The Bisayan peasant is the same: praised during years past by travelers for his docility, simplicity, and relatively greater honesty and reliability than the workmen of the more sophisticated regions, he was now displaying the same sheeplike docility in ways less attractive. Murder, robbery, fanatical religious movements, and disorder generally, all found, under unscrupulous leaders, an unthinking, unquestioning agent in the Bisayan peasant. So far as intimidation and coercion were employed in the central islands to bolster up the revolution, they were directed not against the humbler natives (except in

[1] See General Order 130, series of 1900.

some few rather isolated instances), but against men of prominence whose opposition or lukewarmness might weaken the hold of the guerrilla chieftains on the masses. Furthermore, in Bohol, Sebú, Sámar, and the non-Tagalog part of southern Luzon, the comparative inactivity of the American army during the major portion of 1900 very likely operated to reduce the evidence of difference of opinion among the Filipinos, the guerrilla leaders not being so hard pressed and the shoe not pinching so hard upon those whose interests cried for peace.[1]

But in the Tagalog provinces, and in those neighboring provinces wherein guerrilla bands operated under direct control of Tagalog chiefs, the common people were every day the victims of crimes which, while evincing pure wantonness of brutality, yet had also a political object. Many of these cases suggest that the name "Revolution" was used as a pretense to cover pure outlawry, and factional strifes also were, as in Pangasinan, the real cause of some murders committed ostensibly in behalf of a "cause."[2] But the assassination of a Makabebe passing unarmed along the street of a Pangasinan town by a band of ignorant natives under the orders of a municipal official; the tearing up of railroad tracks and cutting of telegraph wires in Tarlak by a group of peaceful laborers who declared they were compelled to perform such depredations at night under threats of death; and the hacking to pieces of a man in Sambales whose offense as an "Americanista" consisted simply

[1] The effort to coerce advocates of peace by assassination had, as seen, begun early in 1889 in Sebú. Panai leaders were still pretty well aligned for war, and most of the crimes revealed before military trials in that island were, if having political significance, crimes against American soldiers or United States authority, not against Filipinos. See, however, General Orders 148, series of 1900, and 59 and 197, series of 1901. A particularly atrocious case in the Camarines, wherein women and children, as well as men, were assassinated and barbarously mutilated at the mere nod of a self-styled Filipino leader, because they were related to a river-pilot employed by the Americans, is recited in General Order 103, series of 1901.

[2] There are hints of the "Guards of Honor" and of the Prados' band in the atrocities rehearsed in General Orders 87 and 110, series of 1900, the latter having to do with the decapitation of the president of San Carlos, Pangasinan, as far back as November, 1899.

in acting as cook for American officers, are typical instances of the sort of coercion that was employed against the humbler people of these central provinces for political reasons.[1] Coercion appeared in its most hideous aspects in the organization of bands of assassins. In the Tagalog provinces bordering on the Laguna de Bay, regular executioners seem to have worked in places as the agents of men who bore roving commissions to take vengeance upon their fellows accused of disloyalty to the cause.[2] For over a year, one village near the lake was terrorized, under the nose of the American garrison, by a band operating under the instigation of the local priest. Its more active members were all illiterate countrymen, but, under the priest's instructions, they simulated friendship to the force of occupation when it took possession, and secured the municipal offices when the town was reorganized under military government. They maintained secretly a guerrilla militia, in which the new municipal officials were subordinates, and held regular midnight sessions wherein the victims chosen, fellow-citizens declared guilty of disloyalty by some power which never appeared to pronounce sentence even in summary form, were first confessed by the priest, then knocked on the head or

[1] These typical cases are rehearsed in General Orders 32, 147, and 153, series of 1900. The laborers tried for cutting the telegraph wire and tearing up railroad track pleaded that, had they refused to coöperate with a small guerrilla band in this work, they would "all have been killed and their *barrio* burned." They were convicted on the ground that they "lived in territory fully occupied and protected by the American army, and, had they been so disposed, could have asked and would have received protection from the murderous threats of any and all the irresponsible chiefs of banditti." The sentence of death against them was, however, commuted to fifteen years of imprisonment, and they were, of course, released under the amnesty proclamation of 1902.

[2] See General Order 259 of 1901. In this case, one arising at Binang, Laguna, the prisoner, one of the "official executioners," is said to have acknowledged before the military commission the truth of these statements contained in a signed confession previously obtained from him (if by torture, less stress is, of course, to be placed upon it): "I carried a letter of authorization . . . to act as special agent, which means authority to commit murder. Each time a murder was committed, a letter was sent to one of four men, by one of the chiefs. . . . Afterward the letter was taken up and burned. If a man did not pay his contribution to the insurgent collector, he was ordered to be killed."

otherwise maltreated, and, in some cases, hurried into their graves while still alive.[1]

There were many cases wherein deeds of brutality were more plainly and directly related to the programme of warfare laid down by the chiefs of the revolution. For instance, in an order issued by José Alejandrino, at the time signing himself "General Commander of the Center of Luzon" (a title employed also by other leaders), there appears this clause:—

> All who perform official duties or who have materially contributed to the establishment of the pretended American civil government in the territory within my commands [having been in the preamble denounced as war traitors] will, if caught, be punished by penalties ranging from a fine of not less than one hundred dollars up to the death penalty, by the most summary trial, in accordance with the circumstances, and if the offense is committed by educated persons, the guilt will be regarded as greater.

Further clauses authorized the confiscation of the property of such traitors, with a significant proviso for the waiving of such arbitrary confiscation upon payment of "a proper fine." This order and its results are noteworthy for two reasons: First, its author aimed in a general way at keeping within the international laws of war, though apparently not aware that a government which has no fixed habitat nor public existence, and has no army maintained as the laws of war require, cannot properly fulminate charges against "traitors" to it, and though, had these conditions been realized, there was still the fatal oversight of failing to provide any proper tribunal whereby

[1] This was the famous "Taitai case," dealt with at considerable length in General Order 339, series of 1901 (*Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 1295–1302). The three natives most active in the band were hanged, and the three chief accomplices were sentenced to imprisonment for life. The priest, who asked for a separate trial, was also sentenced to death, but, though indicating his belief that this man was the real instigator of the barbarities, General Chaffee commuted the sentence to imprisonment for twenty years "out of respect for the great religious organization of which he is a most unworthy member." He was released in 1903, the amnesty proclamation being held to cover his offense, as political in character. The accused in the case pleaded that they executed these crimes under the orders of Pio del Pilar.

the accused Filipinos could be given even "the most summary trial," leaving the power of life and death in the hands of any guerrilla leader who had arms behind him and dared assume the responsibility; second, José Alejandrino was one of the best-educated of the guerrilla commanders, being one of the few Filipinos who have ever taken an engineering course abroad, and he had grown up in a household addicted to the reform propaganda and wherein, as in comparatively few Filipino houses, the atmosphere had been favorable to progressive ideas. We are taking, therefore, an exceptionally favorable case among the guerrilla leaders; were we to choose to follow the record of such a criminal as Pio del Pilar, tracing out in the performance of his subordinates the nature of the campaign he waged against both lukewarm Filipinos as well as Americans, we should not give a fair picture of even this side of the revolution as a whole. The results of instituting guerrilla warfare are sufficiently horrifying if we simply note the outcome of Alejandrino's orders (the one cited being merely a more complete statement of orders of campaign previously issued) in one or two cases. In Pampanga, his own province, two guerrilla officers appointed by him captain and lieutenant respectively, bearing his orders in their pockets, were hanged in 1901, having been convicted of murder, robbery, and rape, and of adding greater horror to their assassinations by burying some victims alive, at various intervals during the year 1900. Whatever may have been the opinion of Alejandrino and other leaders of his type about such wanton abuse of power as that by which subordinates of this sort terrorized whole communities,—some at least of the better class of leaders winked at these abuses, though privately they would condemn barbarity,—they invited upon themselves the moral responsibility for it all by the resort to guerrilla warfare and by their loosely drawn orders.[1]

[1] For the trials of these two subordinates of Alejandrino, see General Orders 26 and 57, series of 1901. In the latter, the full text of the order cited above is

The abuses committed upon the humbler natives who evinced a desire for peace, or even became suspicious in the eyes of some irresponsible bandit, show not only how the people of the average Philippine town were caught between two fires. but they also indicate, in so far as they were the outcome of the general orders of campaign, the fear of the revolutionary leaders of a loss of control over the masses. Such a fear had perhaps appeared as far back as 1899, in Luna's order that no Filipinos but those enrolled in the army should possess or carry firearms, and letters exchanged between revolutionary chiefs in 1899 had spoken of "a drifting toward favoring the American Government."[2] They would inevitably, however, plan on controlling the masses mainly through keeping the *caciques*, whose residences and property were now under protection of the American garrisons, loyal to the cause. Evading again the attempt to make a psychological analysis of the attitude of these men, we may, even if we assume them to be practically unanimous in their sympathy with the attempts of their own race to assert itself, find reasons for lukewarmness, and even for open partisanship with the Americans, among them. Many of them had not been at all enthusiastic over the leaders who forced themselves into control at Malolos, and had wavered in their choice; caution and self-interest were influences at work now with men of property as they had been in 1898; and, we may hope and believe, there was, among men of saner judgment and better feeling, already a revulsion at the barbarities of guerrilla warfare. At any rate, the most notable cases of proscription for being "Americanistas" were those of municipal officials and members of the *principalía* who coöp-

given. Alejandrino was assistant city engineer of Manila for two years after it was given civil government in August, 1901. He directed guerrilla operations from his hiding-place on Mount Arayat, Pampanga, until the time of the general surrenders in early 1901. He is the Filipino who came to Manila Bay with Dewey's fleet, to look over the ground for the revolutionary party in Hongkong, and returned to the latter port before Aguinaldo came.

[1] These letters and the order of Luna in question are unpublished insurgent documents in the possession of the War Department.

erated with the Americans, if not in more active and open ways, by trying unobtrusively to reduce the masses under them to orderly habits once more; and the conditions thus revealed at least help toward explaining why municipal officials under American protection quite generally "carried water on both shoulders." Such orders as that of Alejandrino and the one of Tinio previously mentioned go to show that there was not, as high officials of the American army have asserted, a concerted plan among the Filipinos to have as "politico-military" officers of their own secret organization of government the same men who were elected in each town to fill the municipal offices under American military government. Where duplicity was most consciously and cunningly practiced, this was often the case; but the orders of the guerrilla commanders indicate that it was primarily their desire to prevent the Americans from having municipal governments officered by Filipinos; that they did not by any means feel sure of invariably receiving the secret help of such officials; and that, furthermore, there was justice in the plea of many of these men that, if they told all they knew about guerrilla movements, became active American partisans in fact, they ran serious risks. Pantaleón García, on April 15, 1900, in an order covering central Luzon, declared that all Filipinos who "discharge duties for the government of occupation" must give up their positions by April 30, else they would be declared traitors and would receive "the penalty provided by existing law."[1] This threat of a general nature becomes most startlingly specific in a captured letter of April 24, 1900, purporting to bear the signature of the Filipino chief in Laguna province, wherein a subordinate is instructed to "capture [two Filipino municipal officials] and Captain Enrique, the American who causes us so much harm. When this order is carried out, end their lives along with their depraved acts. . . . This is not against the commandments of God, as we but pursue our rights." One of the Filipinos

[1] *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, p. 62.

named in this order was assassinated some time later, and at the same time also the president of a town on the island of Marinduke, just as, earlier in the year, a municipal official had been assassinated in the Laguna district, another in Bulakán, and the chief of police of the capital of Leite.[1] Soon after the second assassination of this sort in Laguna, another president of that province became a sufficiently bold partisan of the Americans to issue a proclamation to the people advising them not to support the guerrillas, and saying he did not believe they would incur danger in refusing contributions; to this proclamation the guerrilla major in command of a so-called "death column" in that vicinity answered with the threat:—

He who reports the passing through, or presence in, his district of the revolutionary soldiers will be shot, without excuse or pretext availing, especially the chiefs of *barrios;* and all the houses will also be

[1] This is not a complete record of such cases. One more flagrant case is cited below, and others did not become of official record. See *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 1000–05, for incomplete reports by military commanders in December, 1900, showing, for Luzon alone, 340 natives assassinated, of whom 63 were municipal officers, and 439 natives assaulted or kidnaped (some for ransom), of whom 52 were municipal officers; the motive for most of the crimes was apparently the fact that the victims were "Americanistas," or were suspected of being so, though in some cases natives were assassinated merely for hiring out to the Americans. During his visit to the United States in early 1901, Brigadier-General F. D. Grant was quoted in the Chicago *Tribune* as saying of his own district: "In the province of Pampanga they killed over a thousand people because they would not swear allegiance to the insurrection. In one narrow district, over three hundred people were buried alive, possibly by ladrones, but much more probably for the same causes. One man killed eight men in one day within reach of my quarters." There is probably some exaggeration here, through reportorial errors. For the special cases mentioned in this text see the reviews of trials in General Orders 21 and 71, series of 1900; *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, p. 63; and Acts of the Philippine Commission, Nos. 11, 51, and 94 (making appropriations for the widows of the Laguna, Marinduke, and Leite officials). In *MacArthur's Report*, the order from which the above quotation is made is cited in full, with the name of Juan Cailles signed to it, and in General Order 21 it is stated that he had sent a signed order for the previous assassination in Laguna. In Act 11, the Philippine Commission declared that Salvador Reyes "was murdered . . . by direct instigation of the insurgent commander Cailles." It is not known that doubt was subsequently cast on the authenticity of the assassination orders as coming from Cailles, but, at any rate, that commander was allowed an honorable surrender under MacArthur in June, 1901, and was soon after appointed by the Philippine Commission governor of Laguna province, a position to which he has been twice reëlected and in which he has been efficient.

burned. . . . If, by reason of notice not having been given us, the American soldiers shall be able to come upon us, the chiefs of the nearest *barrio* will be shot without fail.[1]

Just before the presidential election in the United States, the "Americanista" president of San Miguel, a populous town of Bulakán, came into Manila to report a discouraging situation and ask for more troops; on his way home, he and five of the American soldiers who were escorting him were captured by guerrillas and secretly assassinated.[2] Still another particularly atrocious document of the period just preceding the presidential election of 1900 in the United States deserves

[1] Captured insurgent documents in War Department, reproduced in part in *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 10, pp. 53–55. The "Americanista" president replied: "How will they [the guerrillas] be able to gain what they call 'independence' if they can do nothing but kill, and kill only Filipinos? I believe it is very, very far off. . . . Why must any one be forced or compelled against his will? That is not what is called *natural* right. They do not know the meaning of the word 'liberty.'" (One suspects the hand of the American post-commander in parts of this counter-proclamation.)

[2] See *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 10, pp. 55–57, for extracts from War Department documents on this episode, and General Orders 292 and 371, series of 1901, for the trials of the assassins. José Buencamino, the president in question, was a brother of Felipe Buencamino, ex-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Revolutionary Government, who for six months before this assassination had been working for peace. His brother's petition recited that, while he had influenced the people of the center of San Miguel for peace, there were not enough American troops to protect the many outlying *barrios* near the hills, whose people were accordingly under the control of Teksón's guerrillas; that the latter were emboldened during the preëlection activity to make raids on the main body of the town, and in consequence the Americans were accusing the people living in the latter section of disloyalty and were shooting into them at times and burning their houses. (It is a picture altogether credible, for such confusion not infrequently existed in American headquarters.) In forwarding the document to Washington, General MacArthur complained because Buencamino had, through fear, not given more precise information of the guerrilla movements, assuming that he could then surely have been protected by the American troops; the fate which befell him, even when surrounded by American troops, would seem a reasonable explanation of why he did not tell more. The guerrilla major who ordered these assassinations and the lieutenant who saw them executed were hanged in 1901, and the soldiers principally concerned were sentenced to prison. The major held out promise of reward to officers and men for the deed, promotions to the former and five pesos each and clothing to the latter. His written orders were captured, being plain as to the command to kill the American soldiers and not quite so plain as to Buencamino: "Make as if to take them [the Americans] to the general; but when you reach the tall grass, do with them what we are accustomed to do. . . . No one must know . . . ; only those soldiers who are to do it; do not use bullets but daggers."

notice, because, in speaking of "reorganizing," in behalf of the revolution, several towns in Nueva Écija, it so coldbloodedly describes how "it will be necessary that four or five lives be taken in each town"; this document in particular sheds light upon the methods pursued in 1900 to keep the Filipinos of the *cacique* class in awe of, if not loyal to, the sort of secret organization which was the hobby of certain mentally superficial and morally unscrupulous young Filipino prigs, who nursed the conceit that they were Titans of Machiavellian duplicity, reperpetrating the French Revolution in the tropics, where bread-riots cannot be known.[1]

The various secret organizations threatened to become as

[1] The document in question, made public by Secretary Root in a speech at Canton, Ohio, in October, 1900, and reproduced in *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 9, p. 63, reads as follows (in a War Department translation): —

Sr. Teodoro Sandiko,

Colonel, First Military Chief of the Staff in Santo Domingo: —

My respected Chief and dear Brother: — I have received your respected order regarding the organization of the "Committee" in the towns of Zaragoza, Aliaga, and Likabe. From the movements and actions of these towns, I don't believe it possible to organize immediately. Before we can, it will be necessary that four or five lives be taken in each town. I believe that what ought to be done to these towns is to make a new conquest of them, especially the town of San Juan de Guimba. It is difficult to set straight the Tagalog and Ilokans of importance, as they are badly inclined, and they care to do nothing but pervert our soldiers. This is what I am able to inform you in fulfillment of the respected order of the chief. God guard you many years.

C. Gonzales.

San Cristobla, August 3, 1900.

The Sandiko to whom this letter was addressed is the same to whom the order for the assassination of all whites in Manila in February, 1899, was at first ascribed, and whose connection with the attempted massacre at that time has never been fully made clear. He is now conducting a private school in Bulakán province. In October, 1904, he was the chief organizer of a meeting in Manila to ask of the United States the immediate promise of future independence. He belongs to a class of young Filipinos as rabid during the war as they are visionary in peace — though age and experience have reduced somewhat their prolificness of project, as it has tempered, it is to be hoped, their bloodthirstiness. They are the first and the most vehement in resenting the criticism of whilom sojourners that the Filipinos have only a veneer of civilization which is easily scratched off to reveal the savage underneath, apparently being unconscious that they themselves have furnished the most conspicuous examples in support of this charge against their own people.

numerous, and each as extensive in its ramifications, as there were leaders ambitious to figure at the head of such movements. They are significant chiefly as being the means of keeping the people interested and loyal and of collecting contributions, that is, of supporting, in one way and another, the guerrillas outside the towns; for the chiefs of these guerrilla bands were the real masters of the situation, whether secret organizations of the towns were immediately subject to their direction or not, as quite commonly they were. It is not necessary to enter closely into the character of these organizations, sometimes comprising a group of neighboring towns, sometimes extending throughout a province or several provinces; in general, they were based on the old Katipunan organization, whether they retained that name or not, and they displayed all the characteristic features of the Katipunan as it had been evolved out of "Filipino Masonry," so called, and had reached its culmination in a revolt by the Tagalogs in 1896. It is in this sense that the Katipunan may be said to have spread all over the lowland provinces during 1898–1900, except in those communities (such as some of the communities of Kagayans, Bikols, and Bisayans) where no special organization was necessary, since the people could be herded for any purpose at the word of a native priest or a *cacique*. The assumption frequently made, especially by American military commanders, that there was "a great Katipunan league" extending throughout the archipelago, does not at all accord with the facts, if it assumes that there was ever any single secret organization of the sort, with superior officers for all the provincial and tribal ramifications, its local societies working unitedly under common direction. The revolution, both as a secret propaganda and in its aspects as a guerrilla war, was very much more an affair of free-lances than this view implies. So long as it could retain the pretense of possessing a formal political and military organization, during 1898 and 1899, stress was laid upon this, and the Katipunan methods were not

revived in their full force, the principal evidence that they were still to be reckoned with having been given by the "militia" organizations and secret plots in Manila. But as rapidly as the American army occupied new territory, the methods of 1896–97 were called into play once more, and were employed throughout a much greater extent of territory, with the benefit of previous experience, and with greater energy and resourcefulness, often also vindictiveness, because of the taste of power the revolutionary leaders had in the interval enjoyed.[1]

Considered as a military organization, there is little new to say about the guerrilla system of 1900, as compared with that evolved in the fighting of 1896–97 by the time the Spaniards had retaken the Cavite towns. Indeed, there was no noteworthy change in the plan of military organization from 1899 to 1900, though the character of the military operations themselves changed considerably. The division of the territory of central Luzon into zones and sub-zones, the zones being the territory of a general officer and sub-zones comprising a group of towns generally under a colonel or major, was carried over

[1] The publication of the captured insurgent documents in the War Department will enable those who so desire to trace the broad similarities between the Filipino secret organizations of 1899–1901 and the Katipunan of 1896. The rest must be left to the Filipino historians themselves, who, it is to be hoped in the interest of their race, will clear up the doubtful points bearing on concerted plans for assassination and will help put the responsibility, so far as it is individual, where it belongs. Variants for the name "Katipunan" were "Sandatahan" (meaning "many armed men"), in Manila in 1899, and in Tagalog, Ilokan, and Bisayan communities in 1900–01; "Sandúgong" meaning "friends though drinking each other's blood"), applied to the societies as a common rather than an official name; "Mandodukot," a term common in Panai, etc. "Committees," "Central Committees," etc., were about as common among the upper-class Filipinos, sometimes corresponding somewhat closely to the league of "Compromisarios" among the wealthier natives during the propaganda prior to 1896, sometimes being simply high-sounding titles used in the correspondence between guerrilla chiefs themselves, between these men and Aguinaldo (when they could reach him in his wanderings), and between the Filipinos abroad and those engaged in warfare at home. Such documents as those partly reproduced from the War Department files in *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 9, pp. 47–49, have no particular significance more than this. One contains the "bases" of the "National Committee of the Filipinos," drawn up by Teodoro Sandiko as "Superior Chief of the Republican Guard." A good deal of this was merely self-amusement on paper.

from 1898 in the immediate vicinity of Manila and from early 1899 in the provinces a little farther distant. No such theoretically elaborate subdivision of territory was ever achieved in the Ilokan or Bikol provinces of Luzon or in the Bisayas, where the inauguration of an American campaign, when at last it did begin, led directly into guerrilla warfare. Under decrees of the Revolutionary Government dating some months back of its being snuffed out, there were theoretically no noncombatants, the inhabitants not drafted into the army being considered the "second line of defense," or a sort of militia, which should be ready to support with bolos the men with rifles or to perform the tasks of transportation, fortification, etc., when called out by operations in their vicinity. It was for this reason that the presidents of the towns were given "assimilated rank" in the "guerrillas," as the militia were called, as if in anticipation of the time when, the Americans having pushed out from Manila to occupy the provinces, the methods of 1896–97 would have to be invoked again. So, when this time came, it remained only to enforce the plans for utilizing the town presidents to commandeer their people for any assistance required by the guerrilla chiefs, to furnish information of the movements of the Americans, etc.[1] One

[1] Captain J. R. M. Taylor summarizes the captured documents under his charge in the War Department which bear upon the guerrilla organization from the military point of view as follows: "Towns act as depots of supply of men, money, and food. Local presidents are under the orders of the sub-zone commanders [who have under them territory comprising four or more towns], and furnish them in addition with information of all movements of the American troops garrisoning the towns. They with their police will capture American stragglers and seize adherents of the Americans in their towns, sending them to the sub-zone commander for punishment. Guerrillas will avoid attacking large forces of Americans, but will carry out ambushes and surprises. Their purpose will be to prolong the war, in the hope that the expense, in money and men, will cause the people of the United States to grow weary of it, bringing about a victory for the Democratic party, which is pledged to Philippine independence. Ammunition is to be saved in every way, and used largely in firing into towns where there are American garrisons (probably to let the people of these towns see that the guerrillas were up and about, and were giving the town folks 'a run for their money.') There were no neutrals in the system. The fine old French revolutionary maxim, 'Be my brother, or I will kill you,' was given its fullest application."

reason, perhaps, why the guerrilla warfare in some regions seemed to be directed against the guerrillas' own fellow-countrymen rather than against the Americans was the lack of ammunition. Still, even in those regions where their dodging of the American troops and shrinking from an encounter except when having great odds of superiority were most palpable, the guerrillas managed to display, in petty ambuscades or in "shooting-up" towns at night, the possession of a surprising amount of ammunition.[1] Though their principal arsenals and powder-factories in Cavite and Bulakán had been captured and destroyed during 1899, as also the last valuable portable outfit of this sort which they had was destroyed by Bell's raid into the Sambales Mountains in December of that year, they managed to keep a few small outfits hidden in the hills, and displayed some ingenuity in the methods they employed to manufacture something which would at least explode and make a noise in their guns. Powder made in a crude fashion had to be fired off soon, or it would spoil; certainly in Sámar, during the period of American quiescence, and probably also in other regions, the explanation of frequent useless pyrotechnics on the outskirts of towns was the desire to burn up the powder before it should become useless. In Cavite and other provinces surrounding Manila, the scanty supply of rifle cartridges, which was carefully nourished, was patched out by balls melted out of lead bought from the Chinese, who could smuggle it out of Manila, where they bought bottle-seals and all such odd scraps for the purpose.

Such things indicate considerable tenacity of purpose. They are to be taken into account as well as the facts just noted, namely, the evidence of dissensions among the Filipinos, of differing views as to the proper attitude toward the Americans, of brutality employed by the men in arms to intimidate

[1] MacArthur thought, in December, 1899, that Bell's destruction of the arsenal and powder supply in the Sambales Mountains meant that the armed Filipinos in central Luzon would soon find their weapons useless for lack of ammunition (see, again, *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 8, p. 67).

into acquiescence with their will and their ways the masses and particularly the *caciques*. In dealing with the actual *facts* of the situation, ugly and repulsive as some of them have proved to be, it would be wrong to overlook the part which popular sentiment — call it national, racial, or what you please — played in producing and prolonging the opposition to the United States. On the other hand, the revelations as to intimidation, indeed, the very refusal to make allowance for the existence of neutrals, have a significance to be well weighed before accepting at its face value such a declaration of purpose as this, printed in "La Independencia" in one of the last two or three numbers issued at Tarlak before the revolutionary leaders started forth for a guerrilla campaign: —

> Our enemies will be able — why should they not? — to wheel their heavy wagons of war over our fields. They will leave the imprints of their vandal heels in our villages. But at every turning in their path, behind every bush, at every corner, they will meet resistance — a handful of men, who will check their course, who will disturb their triumphant passage, who will be the little rock to spring the wheel of their vehicle off its axle, the boghole in which their gun-carriage will mire, and who will make them see most clearly that in vain do they juggle with the rights of a people that desires to be united, free, and sovereign.

The sentiment expressed by this pen of an educated Filipino enthusiast is the same which baffled the Roman legions, victorious in all the world besides, at the very height of their empire's power, in the rocky hills of Thessaly; the same which made Great Britain's victory over the Boers one so slow of achievement and so costly; the same that always makes warfare against a united people, in the midst of their own territory, so difficult, so dangerous, and so nerve-wearing for an army which can find no opponent to dispute with it face to face, but whose soldiers may meet an enemy behind every bush, in every house, night or day. Unquestionably, the warfare against the Filipinos partook of this nature. But a declination to tolerate neutrals in warfare — though made, as it was by the

Filipino leaders, in apparent unconsciousness of what would be its consequences when it was pushed to the extreme — bespeaks either a lack of real and complete unity of sentiment among the Filipinos or a lack of any such degree of tenacity in pursuing patriotic ends as some other peoples have shown. The alternative is a necessary consequence of the facts that have been brought out; the psychological issue here raised, we may again refuse to meet.

CHAPTER XXV

FUTILE TALK OF PEACE: FILIPINO ATTITUDE

In following the course of guerrilla warfare during the spring and summer and into the fall of 1900, we have anticipated somewhat events and circumstances which had their part in bringing about a relaxation of vigor, in some districts at least, upon the American side, and a recrudescence of the campaign upon the Filipino side, evinced even more in reprisals upon their own countrymen than in direct attacks upon the Americans. We have now to turn back and investigate more in detail the failure of peace negotiations during the early summer, the influence exerted upon the situation in one way or another by American efforts and promises in the line of governmental measures and policy, and the attitude of the Filipino leaders as expressed in their acts and utterances.

It has already been related that General MacArthur commenced efforts to secure the surrender of the leaders in hiding, immediately upon his accession to command, while General Otis was sailing home and the second Philippine Commission was on its way to the islands. Two days after this body arrived at Manila, on June 5, 1900, MacArthur asked for authority from Washington to issue a proclamation of amnesty, hinting at the possibility of obtaining the surrender of Aguinaldo among others. Permission was granted, and, after the proclamation proposed had been revised by Secretary Root, it was promulgated on June 21. It offered "complete immunity for the past and absolute liberty of action for the future" to all those who had been connected with the insurrection against the United States "in either a military or civil capacity," upon their renouncing "all connection with such insurrection" and their "acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty and

authority of the United States in and over the Philippine Islands"; but there were expressly excluded "persons who have violated the laws of war during the period of active hostilities."[1]

During the month before MacArthur broached the amnesty project to Washington, Felipe Buencamino, who had been released from prison before Otis's departure, was quietly talking peace and the acceptance of United States sovereignty among revolutionary sympathizers in Manila and those guerrilla leaders outside with whom he could get communication.[2] Pedro

[1] See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1175–81. MacArthur, in proposing the proclamation, cabled, "Judge Taft concurs," and the "possible" surrender of Aguinaldo would "greatly expedite pacification"; but if, after ninety days, results were not satisfactory, he would issue the proclamation he had the preceding November urged on Otis (see above, pp. 200–01), "declaring all insurgents outlaws who decline amnesty within sixty days." At the outset, however, he preferred to offer the amnesty "without a threat of any kind," and "hoped second notice unnecessary." On this point, Washington replied that "future action must be determined when occasion arises," but allowed MacArthur to impose a ninety-day limit, because he said: "Otherwise, natives discuss, procrastinate, and never act." In the War Department revision (doubtless by Secretary Root) on June 15, these sentences, at the beginning and end respectively of MacArthur's draft, were stricken out: "The immediate purpose of the United States in this archipelago is to establish stable civil institutions according to the beneficent scheme of republican government, which alone is possible under the American Union. . . ." "Whatever individual views may obtain in regard to the foregoing, it must be obvious to all that general acceptance thereof would contribute to the lasting material benefit of these beautiful islands." The full text of the amnesty may be found in *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, p. 65; it was widely circulated throughout the Philippines in Spanish and the native dialects, both as a "broadside" circulated by the army and in newspapers. It repeated the offer of thirty pesos for each rifle surrendered, which had been informally in force for a year past. For the English text of the oath of allegiance imposed upon those seeking amnesty, see *ibid.*, p. 66; a Spanish version of the oath, a Tagalog version (prepared by Felipe Buencamino), and versions in other dialects were printed in great numbers. Besides the recognition of United States sovereignty, etc., the subscriber swore that he would not "either directly or indirectly, hold correspondence with, or give intelligence to, an enemy of the United States," nor "aid, abet, harbor, or protect such enemy." The protests of the Sebú municipal officials that they took this oath under duress and considered it not binding have been noted. (See above, pp. 112, 184.)

[2] Buencamino, who, as seen in vol. II, p. 90, had been for peace in June, 1899, was released ostensibly to act as Tagalog translator in the military governor's office, in which capacity he worked a few hours per day, but more particularly because he was ready to do missionary work for peace. See his testimony at Washington in 1902 (in *Hearings Com. Ins. Aff.*) and his résumé of all the movements

Paterno was at the time among the group of twoscore or so political prisoners of more or less importance who were confined in Manila.[1] Naturally, this Filipino aristocrat, with a wealthy home awaiting him in Manila, who had in the early nineties spent his money lavishly in order to shine in the society of Liberals in Madrid (making ostentation of his intimacy with certain impecunious Spaniards of that connection); who had been ambitious to pose as the poet and historian of a fictitious Arcadia among the primitive Filipinos (a pre-Spanish civilization, based on a few facts plagiarized from others and embellished by his imaginative brain); who had gratified to the full his love for notoriety in acting as "arbitrator" between Spaniards and revolutionists in 1897, only to meet with the cold and cruel disregard of Primo de Rivera when he asked for the titles and *perquisites* of a "Spanish grandee of the first class"; and who had while Manila was besieged made his final bid for Spanish favor in a scheme for reconciliation of Filipinos and Spaniards so impracticable that even the confiding General Augustín disowned him, he throwing himself then into the revolutionary camp — quite naturally, to repeat, this was a man ready for reconciliation schemes of any sort, or, to speak more accurately, for notoriety of any sort. Apparently, in giving authority for him to move about Manila freely by day, aiding Buencamino in talking peace, but returning to the place of confinement at night, General MacArthur had in mind only Paterno's more recent history as chief promoter with Buencamino of the "peace cabinet" of June, 1899, the

for peace, 1898 to 1901, in exhibit B with *MacArthur's Rept., 1901* (*Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 4, pp. 117–19), wherein he says he began his 1900 propaganda on April 16, and on May 28 was authorized by MacArthur "to make propositions to Aguinaldo for peace upon honorable terms."

[1] Paterno, who had been in hiding in Benget after the collapse at Tarlak, had been captured — surrendered, says Paterno himself, who, at any rate, was probably not unwilling to leave the mountain villages of the Igorrots, cold and lonesome for a lowland native — by a detachment of the Forty-eighth Infantry in April. The political prisoners of note were kept in a separate prison in the walled part of Manila, were allowed to see friends as a rule, and were given a good deal of freedom generally.

plans of which had been upset by Luna's partially executed *coup d'état*. Once given the chance, Paterno "figured" for two months, almost to his heart's content, but with results not quite such as General MacArthur had anticipated. The day before the amnesty proclamation was published, there was a gathering of some scores of Filipinos, of nearly all factions, but mostly ex-revolutionary officials (some of those then in prison being allowed to attend) and men sympathizing with the revolution still. A set of resolutions was adopted, in the preamble of which it was assumed that Philippine independence under American protection would now be granted, making eight demands virtually as conditions "for the termination of the war," namely, general and "absolute" amnesty; restitution of confiscated property; absorption of the revolutionary officers with their present military rank into the future army of the islands; pensions for disabled soldiers and widows and orphans; the personal rights of the Constitution of the United States, especially that of petition, whereby a "Nationalist Party" might at once conduct a propaganda for independence; simultaneous cessation of hostilities on both sides; immediate civil government in Manila and the provinces, with Filipinos in charge, or at least Filipino committees to prepare the ground in the different localities; and the expulsion of the religious orders.[1] Seven former secretaries and under-secretaries of the revolutionary cabinet were ready to sign this paper as a manifesto to the men still in arms if the bases were adopted by the American Government. General MacArthur had no authority

[1] For this document, see *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, pp. 66–67. The preamble, after reciting the evils resultant from the war, rested the demands made as conditions for peace upon expressions of General MacArthur and "the certainty that America will in due time recognize the independence of the Philippines, and that when peace is once established our people will enjoy the right to govern themselves, make their own laws, and constitute and organize their domestic administration as they deem best under the protection and superior direction of the United States with regard to the foreign relations of the islands, [the United States] having the right of intervention in case of absolute necessity, should essential American interests be seriously threatened by acts of the Filipino State, or its domestic peace be disturbed, or its exterior safety endangered."

to accept these resolutions, carrying with them, as they did, the extreme demands of the revolutionary party prior to the war and several new propositions in addition; and he apparently did not consider them as sufficiently within the realm of practicability even to submit them to Washington. But he deemed it expedient, he says, "to animate the public mind as much as possible in behalf of pacification," and, as "the effect of such discussion was in its very nature educational," he encouraged its continuance, and published a statement to the Filipinos at large, promising to them the personal rights guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States, with the exception of the right to trial by jury and the right to bear arms, and promising further, upon his individual responsibility, that, with the cessation of hostilities, all revolutionary funds turned over to him would be duplicated by an equal amount taken from the sums captured by the American army, and the total amount as thus made up would constitute a trust fund for the payment of pensions to revolutionary soldiers or their widows and orphans.[1] It was July 5 when this document was published.

[1] See *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, pp. 67–68, for this document and MacArthur's statement. The proposition to convert the captured property of the revolutionists (which eventually netted the Philippine treasury less than $50,000 in United States currency, in spite of having a total face value of over $800,000 Mexican currency, the major portion being checks on Manila business houses which were never collected, and some of the smaller items being private funds, which were eventually delivered to their owners) into a pension fund was never carried out; it was virtually impossible, because of the lack of muster-records of revolutionary soldiers, if for no other reason. The personal rights guaranteed by MacArthur in this document were repeated from the instructions of the President to the second Philippine Commission. Hearing of MacArthur's negotiations, from outside sources apparently, Secretary Root cabled him not to negotiate terms or conditions or "entertain any proposition from them except unqualified acceptance of amnesty as offered." MacArthur then cabled this proposition as above outlined, resting it upon the instructions to the Commission, the latter body also cabling its approval, saying it was "not a condition of surrender, but as information of our policy in any event, given to strengthen those working for peace and weaken arguments of irreconcilables. Even if mistaken as to the good faith of peacemaker, statement detracts nothing from our position. . . . Insurgent leaders evidently discouraged, but favorable outcome would be hindered by further reducing army [troops then — June 25 — being drawn off to China] and relaxing military grasp." (*Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1083–86.)

During the two weeks preceding, the amnesty offer had not produced more than an initial flurry, evinced mainly in the release of several conspicuous ex-revolutionary commanders who had taken the oath of allegiance. Moreover, at the end of June, Paterno had been put back into prison, having published without authority one of his perfervid but inconsequent and illogical documents, prating of the "Free Philippine State," wherein the people were expected to recognize a new form of the oft-repeated "independence under American protection," secured for them by the diplomacy of "the Maguinóo" (Tagalog "Prince," as Paterno used to dub himself). Adopting the pose of a martyr, Paterno declared he did not wish to leave jail until all political prisoners had been released.[1] At the same time that the opportunity thus afforded for agitation of revolutionary plans under a thin "protectorate" veil was being improved by the more irreconcilable Filipinos in Manila, several hot-headed guerrilla leaders from outside thought the time suitable for another "bomb-plot" and uprising in Manila, but this was squelched by the police before it had gone far.[2] The messenger whom Buencamino proposed

[1] Harold Martin, Associated Press correspondent, in a letter from Manila on July 15, 1900 (published in American newspapers on August 26, 1900), gave the only accurate "inside history" of this "peace movement." He calls Paterno's proclamation "a most remarkable and impertinent document, without reason, without sequence, without head or tail, which began with quotations from a plan of Philippine government [Paterno's of June, 1898] and ended with quotations from European statesmen like Gladstone, Von Moltke, etc. . . . He conceded the changing of the name 'Filipino Republic' to that of 'Free Philippine State,' as a sop to the American national pride. He demanded the admission, on the basis of equality, of Filipinos into the American army, navy, and consular corps. He demanded the recognition of the Filipino flag, but saw no objection to the Stars and Stripes flying by its side." Just how effective a blunderbuss a censorship is under such conditions — at any rate, unless the censor thoroughly knows the situation with which he is dealing — is shown by the fact that Martin had to send this story by mail, accounts of the "peace movement" either by cable or in the Manila press being strictly censored, while Paterno's proclamation was published in all the Spanish papers of Manila, and thus went all over the archipelago, being worded "in such a way that the common people at once concluded that the United States had conceded to the Filipino people all that Paterno had asked for." See also *Manila American*, June 21, 1900, for one of the partially censored stories of the meeting in Paterno's house.

[2] This was a revival of the plot of December, 1899, the prime mover being the

to send to Aguinaldo mysteriously disappeared from sight.[1] The movement which had begun with Buencamino (who was now left to continue it in isolation, if he felt bold enough) had served virtually as a pretext for the reassertion of the full revolutionary programme by a party of irreconcilables in Manila, the sincere and really capable members of which were willing, in order to enjoy this opportunity, to acquiesce in a display of pyrotechnics by an individual whom they did not really respect. But Paterno was given still another chance to pose in front of the footlights before the failure of this "peace movement" was acknowledged in the American headquarters.

Farther along in July, Paterno presented himself to General MacArthur at the head of some fifty Filipinos, desiring to organize a banquet in which the American commander might hear "the aspirations of the Filipino people" and a popular celebration lasting two days in which "the gratitude of the people" for the amnesty might be shown. Permission was granted, with the understanding, says MacArthur, that "every-

same Artemio Ricarte y Vibora ("and Viper," as he dubbed himself, in the Spanish style for family names, calling the secret organization he proposed to raise the "Viper Infantry"). He was captured in Tondo on July 1, 1900, refused to take the oath, and was, six months later, deported to Guam; returning with Mabini in 1902, he refused again to take the oath and was not permitted to land, returning in 1903 from Hongkong and making a ridiculously abortive attempt to lead a revolt in the Filipino constabulary force, for which he is still (December, 1904) in prison under sentence. For this frustrated plot of July, 1900, see, besides the Manila press, the letter of Correspondent Martin above cited, reproduced in *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 9, pp. 32–35, and *ibid.*, pp. 36, 49–51, for the captured documents in the War Department; also the report of the secret police in appendix UU to *MacArthur's Rept., 1900* (in volume on civil affairs, *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10, p. 311). The oath of the "Viper Infantry" is only another form of the Katipunan pledge, and the documents show that the pledge to "faithfully obey all orders whatever of my chiefs" meant also assassinating any traitor. The importance of it is fairly indicated by the fact that, whereas it was intended to enroll 3000 members, and Ricarte was working for some eight months at the plot, but 186 signatures were found among the papers on his person.

[1] It does not appear that any direct proposals for peace were put before Aguinaldo at this time. From Villa's diary of the Aguinaldo party's wanderings, it may be learned that they heard in August of the Paterno meeting and of Buencamino's efforts, and that Aguinaldo regarded them unfavorably.

thing of a political character should be excluded from the celebration." But when the arches and other decorations began to be placed by the Filipino committee which had arranged parades, concerts, games, etc., for the popular celebration during Saturday and Sunday, July 28 and 29, pictures of Aguinaldo, Filipino flags, etc., appeared among them, and the mottoes on the arches were easily capable of political *doubles entendres*. The members of the Philippine Commission were, along with General MacArthur, to be guests of honor at the banquet of Saturday night, wherein Paterno counted upon eclipsing all previous Philippine records for oratory. Manila being under military government, the political mottoes, etc., and the general character of the celebration were the concern primarily of the provost-marshal-general. But, when Judge Taft learned late on the day of the banquet that the speech to be delivered by Paterno that night would contain a virtual request for a protectorate, he immediately dispatched a letter, on behalf of the Commission, declining to attend the banquet, saying: —

. . . As that phrase ["protectorate"] is ordinarily understood, it would mean, as applied to the present situation, that the United States shall guarantee to protect the government of the Philippine Islands from interference or aggression by foreign powers, and should have little or no voice in that government. In other words, that the United States should assume responsibility to the world for a government in which it could exercise no direct influence.

No one having any authority to speak for the United States has ever said one word justifying the belief that such a protectorate will be established. It is impossible. We of the Commission who are sent here with instructions to establish a civil government have no authority whatever to consider or discuss such a proposal.

By destroying the power of Spain in these islands, and accepting the sovereignty thereof, the United States assumed a responsibility to the world to establish here a civilized government of law and order, which should duly respect the rights of all, whether foreigners or natives. It proposes to meet this responsibility by making a government in which citizens of the islands shall exercise as large a measure of self-government as is consistent with the establishment of law and order.

Such a government has been established in Porto Rico. Further than this, the United States will not go.

The discussion of a protectorate as a possibility involves a misrepresentation, which may induce submission to the authority of the United States by deceit. The members of this Commission cannot be party to any such misrepresentation. They could not, therefore, be present at the banquet to-night and hear the subject of a protectorate discussed without rising to state its utter impossibility. . . .[1]

Late in the evening, after the hungry banqueters had waited two hours, Paterno got General MacArthur and the Commissioners to the hall for a banquet without speeches. Naturally, enthusiasm did not overflow either there or in the succeeding day's parades, etc., the objectionable mottoes, flags, and pictures having been removed under the direction of the provost-marshal.[2] And while MacArthur cabled to Washington that, as a popular holiday, the *fiesta* was "a great success," he was ready, a month later, to recommend, considering the "meager result" obtained, and the evidence that the revolutionists were waiting upon the presidential election, that the amnesty be allowed to expire on September 21 "without remark."[3] Only about 5000 people, most of them humble citi-

[1] This document seems to have been published only in the Manila press (see Manila *Times*, July 30, 1900).

[2] Their place was filled, however, by revolutionary proclamations over the names of various guerrilla leaders, which circulated in quantities among the crowds that gathered, and which had evidently been prepared expressly for the occasion.

[3] See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1194, 1203, for the cablegrams of July 31 and August 31; *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, pp. 68–70, and appendices 2 and 3, for the text of Paterno's proposed speech and MacArthur's comments; also *Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 1964–68. The significant passages of Paterno's flowery speech were: "Our gratitude for our delivery from prison through the door of the amnesty has grown to such an extent that we now find ourselves . . . making a public manifestation, asking the protectorate. . . . [Our people respond unanimously that the amnesty is not enough to bring peace] because the prior acknowledgment of the sovereignty of America blots out and extinguishes its pacifying power; because it . . . does not include the political prisoners already sentenced by courts-martial. On the other hand, there is a great explosion of ardent enthusiasm, there is entire frankness in declaring that the protectorate is the only means for making peace. . . . On one side behold the American people, demanding the acknowledgment of their sovereignty to fulfil their international obligations. On the other, the Filipino people, at their head Aguinaldo, demanding their interior independence till the last drop of blood is shed. Are there any honorable means of uniting these

zens glad to escape confinement or to receive pay for a rifle, took advantage of the offer during the ninety days. Prior to its issuance, it had been customary to release all prisoners taken in the provinces except guerrilla chiefs or political leaders of some importance, and there were only about 2000 prisoners when the proclamation was published in June, most of them in Manila. No definite policy as to making or keeping military prisoners had as yet been adopted since the outbreak of the war.[1]

This incident has been described somewhat in detail, not for its spectacular features, which were amusing enough, nor because it affected the situation to any notable extent, or had any clear significance as indicating the attitude of the Filipinos. Principally it will seem of significance to him who has been seeking, in the record of events in the Philippines from the beginning of 1898, evidence of any consistent policy, or any definite methods, or any clear understanding of the conditions that were being met, on the part of the American military authorities. Whether its significance in this sense be negative or positive is a question that may be left to the reader.

To get at the real sentiment of the Filipinos, we must seek further, and in the events as they develop rather than in manifestoes and other documents. Still, there are certain matters of a documentary sort not to be overlooked. In so far as there

two extremes? The Filipino people respond unanimously, the protectorate! Let the American people, then, speak." MacArthur could still speak, in his 1900 report, of Paterno's "apparent sincerity of purpose," and, in his testimony at Washington in 1902, describe him as a "useful" and a "highly educated" man. But he relates (*Sen. Doc. 331*) how Paterno, quite characteristically, told him before the banquet: "We will decorate the hall beautifully — great, big American flags and little Filipino flags!" — and how in their first interview Paterno, even more characteristically, said: "I am permeated with the spirit of European cabinets; I am, therefore, prepared to discuss the Philippine question on the highest basis of statesmanship."

[1] In his cablegram of June 3, 1900 (*Sen. Doc. 435*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess.), MacArthur estimated the total number of Filipinos taken prisoners during the entire campaign as 15,000. Most of the 2000 held at that time were released under the amnesty, the exceptions including several men of prominence, chief of all Mabini.

was anything *bona fide* about the "peace movement" of this period, it should be remarked that the small conservative faction, the men who had been against the extreme measures at Malolos in 1898 and who had sought first a *modus vivendi* and then a truce in 1899, the original "Americanistas," in other words, had scarcely anything to do with it, beyond giving it secret encouragement. Second, the "Americanistas" who had at first been revolutionists and had become more or less open advocates of peace, whether from self-interest, disgust with the revolution, discouragement over the prospects, or from mixed motives, were not yet consolidated into a party capable of united effort or effective influence upon the situation — were, indeed, groping in the dark.[1] Upon the Filipino side, decisive aims, looking to more or less definite results, were still in the possession only of the out-and-out revolutionists, not only those in the field, but also those in the towns, and especially in Manila, who more or less openly sympathized with the warfare and secretly supported it in such ways as they could.

Open and consistent irreconcilables like Mabini were so rare among those living in the towns, either in freedom or in confinement, as to make him virtually unique among his countrymen for frankness, as he was unique among the revolutionists for ability, at least in statement, in theoretical if not in practical statesmanship. Yet Mabini's expressions during this period are not only of interest as the outgivings of a Filipino remarkable in many ways, but also, it is quite safe to assume, as setting forth the opinions of a very considerable element of his fellows more ably, as well as more frankly, than they could or would set them forth. Mabini's documents were never models of clearness, but such lack of candor as they evince was rather the result of the mental roundaboutness and the delight in mere phrasemaking which he had imbibed in the

[1] Buencamino had sent out notices for a meeting on July 22, wherein the discussion was strictly to be limited to measures for securing peace ; but it was not held, the party which was preparing with Paterno for a demonstration in favor of independence and a protectorate having at the time gained the center of the stage.

atmosphere in which he had been educated than of deliberate effort to avoid a full and frank expression of his opinion. The preceding January, a month after he was placed in confinement in Manila, Mabini had written an answer to the statements about the Filipinos in President McKinley's annual message of 1899.[1] Though not quite ingenuous in some of his references to recent revolutionary history, he was very candid in his assertions that the President and the Philippine Commission of 1899 had misrepresented the attitude and aspirations of the Filipinos, and that the plans of government they proposed and the promises they made were too indefinite, while he made the very pointed recommendation "to the village people now under American rule that, whenever an opportunity offers, they ask of American commanders of troops permission to assemble in a peaceful manner in order to

[1] The significant passages regarding Filipino aims and attitude in that document were : —

"I had every reason to believe, and I still believe, that this transfer of sovereignty [by the Treaty of Paris] was in accordance with the wishes and the aspirations of the great mass of the Filipino people.

"If we desert them [the Philippine Islands], we leave them at once to anarchy and finally to barbarism. We fling them, a golden apple of discord, among the rival powers, no one of which could permit another to seize them unquestioned. Their rich plains and valleys would be the scene of endless strife and bloodshed. The advent of Dewey's fleet in Manila Bay, instead of being, as we hope, the dawn of a new day of freedom and of progress, will have been the beginning of an era of misery and violence worse than any which has darkened their unhappy past. . . . [Philippine independence under a protectorate is impossible because it] would involve at the outset a cruel breach of faith. It would place the peaceable and loyal majority, who ask nothing better than to accept our authority, at the mercy of the minority of armed insurgents. It would make us responsible for the acts of the insurgent leaders and give us no power to control them. It would charge us with the task of protecting them against each other and defending them against any foreign power with which they choose to quarrel. In short, it would take from the Congress of the United States the power of declaring war and invest that tremendous prerogative in the Tagal leader of the hour.

"Our flag has never waved over any community but in blessing. I believe the Filipinos will soon recognize the fact that it has not lost its gift of benediction in its world-wide journey to their shores."

In his Thanksgiving Proclamation of October 25, 1899, President McKinley had also said : "While the insurrection still continues in the island of Luzon, business is resuming its activity, and confidence in the good purposes of the United States is being rapidly established throughout the archipelago."

set forth, in the most polite and respectful form, their wishes and aspirations, as well as their abilities."[1] Mabini held himself entirely aloof from the June meeting of ex-revolutionists and the July banquet fiasco, though some of the Filipinos in quite intimate touch with him apparently loaned their names to Paterno. The newly arrived Philippine Commission found him willing to come before them, and sought to elicit his aid in the preparation of the future municipal code (in which other Filipinos were already coöperating); but he seemed so suspicious of American aims and was so far from evincing active interest that they did not urge him further.[2] At the end of August, 1900, General James F. Bell, who had been called from the field to take charge of the provost-marshal govern-

[1] See *Harper's Weekly*, May 26, 1900, for this contribution of Mabini's. In his attempted answers to President McKinley's résumé of the dangers of a protectorate, Mabini was apparently both unwilling to meet some of them squarely and unable to comprehend the full force of others; he appears at precisely the same disadvantage in this respect as in his instructions to the Filipino commissioners for peace in January, 1899. It is noteworthy also that he did not choose to answer that portion of the President's message which denies that the promise of independence was made to Aguinaldo by any American officer (a fiction which Mabini had himself virtually shattered in January, 1899); nor does he mention the passage wherein the President relates the barbarous plan for a massacre in Manila in February, 1899. Mabini's habitual assumption that all Filipinos feel and think like himself, and have the same high aims, speaks in his assertion (made after recounting merely the facts that there was popular indignation at the execution of the three Filipino priests in 1872, and that, some years later, a party of young Filipinos made a campaign for "assimilation" of the Philippines as a province of Spain, a campaign as thoroughly visionary as it was the work of a few) that the revolution was not "the work of a few idealistic or ambitious persons," but of the whole people, and that "the very sorrow and indignation they feel over the abuses and questionable acts of some of the insurgent leaders go to prove our statement." Nor is he ingenuous in his explanation of the failure of the Paterno–Buencamino cabinet's plan for peace in June, 1899, on the ground that "the autonomy proposed was a patent violation of the very constitution they themselves had voted for." He speaks out plainly only on the subject of the indefiniteness of American purpose and the assumption that the majority of Filipinos are opposed to the revolution. They wish tranquillity, he says, and "they show a friendly face to all; but this does not prevent them hiding away in their innermost hearts the precious treasure of their ideals. . . . 'Insurgents and robbers are one and the same thing'; this is what the Americans believe, because they do not know the Filipino people, and because it seems convenient."

[2] Mabini had one interview with the Commission in its session-room, being borne thither from his prison in a chair, the paralysis of his lower limbs, which came upon him at the age of twenty-five, never leaving him till his death at thirty-three.

ment of Manila, made an effort to secure Mabini's influence for peace, mainly in personal interviews, but writing him also a letter, wherein he urged, virtually the recognition of the inevitable: The Filipinos cannot hope to conquer the United States, said General Bell, and as soon as the possibility of success in warfare disappears, "civilization demands in the name of humanity, that the conquered party shall submit"; the Filipinos can obtain nothing from the United States by force, especially while the latter "see no signs that the Filipino people appreciate the efforts and sacrifices made in their own behalf," and "so long as American soldiers are slain under conditions which, according to the laws of war respected by civilized nations, mark their death as assassination"; but, speaking for himself as a private American citizen simply, General Bell felt sure that, if the Filipinos would submit, and if, in fifteen or twenty years at the most, they should have demonstrated their capacity for self-government (under the scheme of government, providing for their own increasing participation in affairs, which the United States was ready at once to set up), and should then come to the American people expressing "their desire for fuller self-government," that people would grant "any reasonable petition made unanimously by the Filipino people." The answer made by Mabini is worth summarizing: —

When the "efforts and sacrifices" of the Americans cease to be merely for their aggrandizement, the Filipinos will show their gratitude. If it were certain that only the possibility of success can justify war, "we should have to seek the solution of all international and domestic questions in [the mere possession of] force. . . . If in actual life the strong nations appeal with great readiness to force to impose their demands on the weak, it is because even to-day the civilization and the humanitarian sentiments so much invoked are for some more apparent than real. . . . I am the first to deplore with all my soul the system of guerrillas and ambuscades which the Filipinos have adopted, because I have always considered more noble and more befitting man the strife that offers equal risks to both combatants. But for this we have [the justification] that the laws of war

which authorize for the great nations the employment of their powerful resources for waging combat with a weak people lacking such resources are the same laws which counsel the weak people to resort to the said system, above all when endeavoring to defend its home and liberties from an invasion." By strife, the Filipinos aim to demonstrate to the Americans that they have "sufficient culture to know their rights." Moreover, they hope to recall to the Americans their own struggle for independence, and, as France came to the aid of the American colonies, so "the Filipinos expect to have on their side the Americans themselves." They understand that the art of self-government comes only by experience, but they wish to learn this "by themselves alone, as the American people learned it without the aid of any other." They fear yielding control of their affairs to the Americans, because the latter would keep it and assert that the Filipinos are naturally incapable of self-government; and they "cannot believe in the aid [in this direction] that is promised, because the conditions prescribed as precedent to its being extended render impossible the fulfillment of the promise." If the present warfare does not stand in the way of organizing municipal government, it need not hinder the formation of a comprehensive constitutional project that shall lay the foundations of the political future of the Philippines, reconciling the aims and interests of the two parties. The Americans can certainly conquer, but they will build upon no lasting peace "so long as they refuse every sort of rights" to the Filipinos. The time for such a domination as that of the Spaniards during three hundred years, when the people were plunged in ignorance and lacked consciousness of national unity, has gone by; the little taste the Filipinos have had of national existence has educated them for more. "I understand fully that it is impossible, and would have pernicious results, for the Americans to leave these islands to the mercy of other powers and their ambitions; moreover, the Filipinos know that union between the two people is the only means of confronting and removing the dangers of the future." The Americans, too, should be keenly interested in obtaining peace before the hatred engendered by war makes this a possibility still more remote. The revolution of 1896 was only in demand of certain concessions by Spain; had she yielded in time, Filipinos and Spaniards would undoubtedly have made common cause against the United States. Finally, in proof of not being so utterly intransigent, "for I understand that who lives in the world must submit to its inconveniences, I shall not advocate absolute independence, knowing it is not to be obtained now. Nor shall I concern myself with independence under

a protectorate, nor with 'autonomy,' because they involve purely theories. The protectorate is a limitation the nature and importance of which depend upon the mutual agreement, tacit or expressed, of protector and protected; autonomy involves in itself the idea of independence: to discuss these formulas, then, is to lose time in abstract questions. I shall go straight to the kernel, imitating the very practical Americans, and shall limit myself to indicating the basis upon which, in my judgment, the political edifice of the Philippines must be reared, to wit: first, the enjoyment by the Filipinos of the personal rights, natural as well as political, which the citizens of cultured and free nations enjoy; second, complete equality between Americans and Filipinos within the territory of the Philippine Islands; third, a government so organized as to afford the best guaranties for the realization of the first two conditions. I should like to see a constitutional project" directed to these ends, and, if it appears suitable, "I will advise its acceptance by my countrymen. . . . It may be that many cannot or will not set forth their real opinions on these questions, but no matter: What I have said lies in the depths of all Filipino hearts."[1]

Aside from the somewhat definite programme of Philippine government which the first Philippine Commission was authorized to offer in May, 1899, the instructions to the second Philippine Commission to extend to the Philippines all the personal rights guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States, excepting only trial by jury and the right to bear arms, had been made known when Mabini wrote the above letter, and at that very time the second Commission was entering upon its duties as a Philippine legislature, with plans, known to Mabini in a general way, for the reconstruction of civil government, beginning with the municipalities. Unless one resorts to the harsh conclusion that Mabini did not mean what he said in his apparently sincere offer to work for peace, one must conclude, in so far as he accepts Mabini as a legitimate spokesman of Filipino opinion, that the revolutionists had at this period no confidence in American promises and demanded the actual inauguration in all its details of a complete civil gov-

[1] The Bell–Mabini correspondence was first published in *La Luz*, of Manila and reproduced in *El Diario de Manila*, September 15, 17, and 18, 1900.

ernment acceptable to them, before they would lay down their arms. Obviously, this was impossible, under the conditions of warfare then prevailing. But, without adhering quite so literally to the text of Mabini's pronunciamento, which scorns to mention directly the hope based upon a change of administration in the United States, it had at that time become plain in other ways that his personal attitude, in tacitly rejecting as insufficient the promises and advances made by the Administration which had been in power in 1898 and when the break between Americans and Filipinos occurred, was one of expectancy.[1]

Others were more outspoken in this respect. The revolutionary leaders in the field, stimulated by reports from the "junta" abroad, now based their propaganda for a continuance of the resistance mainly upon the expected success in the American election of a party whose Philippine programme had not really been worked out in definite form, though on its surface favorable to the aspirations of Filipino nationality. These Filipinos, however, were apparently as certain that a Democratic victory in the United States would mean an immediate recognition of themselves and their now shattered organization as they were confident that Candidate Bryan

[1] That he was at heart unreconciled to American government at all, became plainer still after the November election, as will appear herein. In his posthumous memorials (introductory chapter published in *El Comercio*, Manila, July 29, 1903), Mabini, speaking of his conferences with MacArthur and Bell, says: "They told me they would have confidence in me and would accept my services [toward peace] only after I should have recognized unconditionally American sovereignty in the Philippines, especially if I would then aid them in the establishment of a government which they thought the most efficacious for the happiness of the Filipino people. I replied that so far as I should do what they required of me, in the state of mind in which my fellow-countrymen then were, the latter would at once withdraw the confidence they had in me, and, my influence among the Filipinos being lost, I should be of no service for the purposes of pacification nor for any other useful purpose." In other words, if we accept this statement entirely at its face value, Mabini thought his countrymen not ready for peace in the fall of 1900. His succeeding sentences indicate that MacArthur and Bell told him they considered this reply merely a pretext, and that, if he and Aguinaldo would yield, their countrymen would speedily acquiesce, while they also hinted at the time at the deportation policy adopted later.

would be elected. Optimism of this sort had, as shown in a preceding chapter, served in appeals to bolster up those prone to discouragement before the abandonment of Tarlak, when some at least of the revolutionary leaders apparently expected an immediate political overturn in the United States, a year in advance of the election. In 1900, with the news obtained from the United States, this argument assumed a more definite importance, though Filipino ignorance of the workings of American politics — an ignorance natural enough in the beginning — was still almost as great as ever.[1]

The Filipinos who were active from a distance in keeping up resistance had almost ceased to talk of European intervention, and based their hopes mainly upon the American electorate. To be sure, Aguinaldo, whom we may practically include among the Filipinos abroad, so far as direct influence upon the guerrilla operations is concerned, in his irregular correspondence with the leaders who were really waging the war in which he no longer played an active part maintained a consistent demand that the struggle for independence be kept up, not modifying his position after he had learned of President McKinley's reëlection. But Aguinaldo ceased to play a conspicuous part in Philippine affairs from the time when he plunged into the mountains in December, 1899, though his orders produced some petty guerrilla warfare in the Kagayan Valley and he kept in fairly close touch with the Ilokan guerrilla leaders during the first half of 1900. Forces under Major Peyton C. March nearly captured him in the mountains bordering Abra in May, 1900, making him abandon his Ilokan connections; and when, after another short stay in the Kagayan Valley, not far from American garrisons, he removed, at the end of August, to the isolated little settlement on the Pacific coast where he was eventually captured, he vir-

[1] Various of the earlier appeals to the people to continue the warfare in the expectation of a change in the policy of the United States have been noted in documents already cited. The War Department archives contain many unpublished documents bearing on this point.

tually cut himself off from all intimate connection with events, and such influence as he still exercised upon the course of these became more and more of a purely sensational sort.[1] The

[1] For the American reports of a second attempt of Young's forces to capture Aguinaldo, see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 6, pp. 706–21; also part 5, p. 2011. Colonel Hare led a column of 400 men of the Thirty-third Infantry from Banged eastward across the mountains and Major March struck in from the coast over the same trail on which he had followed Aguinaldo in the preceding December, with 40 men mounted and 80 on foot. Hare's column divided, hoping to surround Aguinaldo's party, but had to give up the pursuit on May 22. March's band came close enough to Aguinaldo on May 16 to capture a horse and dispatches thought to be his. March followed over into the Kagayan Valley, but the confusion of trails, all very difficult, again aided Aguinaldo in shaking him off. Compare these accounts with those of Villa's diary (*Sen. Doc. 331*), which is confirmatory of Aguinaldo's narrow escape. In this document, it appears that Aguinaldo began receiving communications from Manila and Hongkong in January, 1900, but his communication was principally with Tinio in Abra, whom he planned to meet several times. (A sample of the reports of Filipino military successes that were sent to him was one to the effect that Juan Villamor's command had surrounded and killed or captured over 200 Americans with their rifles.) Returning across the mountains from the Kagayan Valley in February and March, and remaining on the borders of Abra for several months, he and Tinio finally had a meeting in Abra on April 12; information of his movements at this time was obtained by Young's command, and led to the attempt to capture him in May. Driven by March's pursuit, he again settled down for several months in the Kagayan Valley, even attending a dance in the town of Enrile on the night of May 28. Though the Americans never seemed to get definite news of his whereabouts, yet they came close to his hiding-places on various occasions, and he appears to have had some uneasiness over the possibility of being betrayed at any time. While in the Cordillera his party had executed several Igorrot and Ilokan headmen in Igorrot villages for alleged "treason" (it being noteworthy that the little party of 100 to 200 men had various encounters with hostile Igorrots), and in July one of the officers of Aguinaldo's escort, Major Gatmaitan, was shot after summary trial, on the charge of desertion (a purpose he could surely have put into execution at any time, had he tried). While near the Kagayan River, Aguinaldo received correspondence within a few weeks from Manila, either overland or from the river towns. On August 11, he sent a messenger to Manila to bear to Mabini "full powers to arrange for peace on the basis of independence." One of Aguinaldo's "decrees," sent out after hearing of MacArthur's amnesty proclamation, should be of interest to those passing observers who have said that the Filipino lacks a sense of humor. It "ordered and commanded" that all the "imperialist soldiers" who surrendered a rifle should be paid 80 pesos (the Americans paid 30) and should be set at liberty without requiring of them "any pledge whatsoever" (whereas the Americans imposed an oath of allegiance), and, if they did not desire to stay in the revolutionary camp, should be "afforded facilities for return and sufficient money for the journey to the most convenient point." (This document was published in *El Diario de Manila*, September 20, 1900; see also *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 9, p. 28, for extracts from this and other Aguinaldo documents at the time.) After reaching lonesome Palanan in September, 1900, he was lost sight

propagandists abroad kept him in the forefront, as the actual leader of guerrilla warfare, in their statements designed to influence opinion in the United States,[1] quite in the same manner as they assured their fellows at home who were in the fight that they, the propagandists who were being supported abroad, were exerting a tremendous influence upon the cam-

of even by some of the most prominent guerrilla leaders. It was January 6, 1901, before he had news of McKinley's reëlection and "arranged to issue a manifesto to the Filipinos in arms inciting them to patriotism in order that they may not be discouraged." It was March 7, 1901, before he received Mabini's letter of November 22, 1900, "transmitting messages from MacArthur and Bell to the effect that our independence cannot be conceded," and asking, on Mabini's part, "whether he is to advocate independence or autonomy," in view of the result of the election, Aguinaldo replying "nothing less than independence," on behalf of "the Filipinos in arms."

[1] Sixto Lopez, who came back to the United States from Europe in September, 1900, in the hope of playing a part in the campaign, made these assertions of fact in an open letter at that time (cited by A. G. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 383): "[Aguinaldo] was recently for a considerable time within seven miles of Manila. I have the very latest news of him both by letter and by Filipinos who have just arrived in London. His losses and arms and munitions are made good and added to by frequent captures of small convoys from the American forces. . . . In one province alone there are fifty-four of Aguinaldo's officers mounted on American horses!" Needless to say, this last was a pure invention, on the part of some one; the source of the story of Aguinaldo being near Manila may have been a newspaper man's dream, printed in one of the American dailies of Manila, about Aguinaldo having spent some time in Cavite — a sample of the rumors afloat at the time regarding his whereabouts. It will afford a good check on Señor Lopez's veracity to compare the above assertions with the record of Aguinaldo's movements as rehearsed in the preceding note from the diary of one of his companions. Soon after his capture in 1901, Aguinaldo stated to the writer and to others that he did not know who Sixto Lopez was, though afterward, apparently, denying this. (See *Independent*, July 10, 1902, and Springfield *Republican*, May 16, 1902). It was Lopez who, earlier in 1900, had assailed the statistics on Philippine schools and education prior to 1898 published in the report of the first Philippine Commission, categorically refuting them as to Batangas with figures which he said showed the conditions as to schools in that province. The data in the Commission's report were furnished by Felipe G. Calderón, another native of Batangas who pronounced Lopez's figures incorrect. The latter did not give the authority for his figures; but many Americans accustomed to the dictum that "figures do not lie," accepted them as a clear impeachment of the Commission's accuracy. From the same or a similar source came the statement to the American public in April, 1900 (*Harper's Hist.*, pp. 379–80), charging the American Government in the islands with raising the poll-tax 300 per cent (whereas it had been reduced from 2 pesos or more on each individual to 20 cents), making sweeping and unqualified accusations as to the brutality of the American soldiers, and saying, as to the first Commission's recommendations for a government: "It is incredible that Mr. McKinley is going to so much trouble and expense solely to benefit the Filipinos."

paign in the United States and that the vote was sure to be favorable to immediate Philippine independence.[1] The junta members in Europe, with Agoncillo at their head, had seemed disposed to modify somewhat their talk of absolute independence at the time when the cabled reports came from Manila about the peace movement, Paterno being quoted therein as declaring that he was acting upon authority from Aguinaldo; but they returned to their original programme with the arrival of news from Manila of the July fiasco and from the United States of campaign activity on the Philippine question.[2] In general, however, throughout the entire Filipino campaign against the United States, the junta members earned a pretty good reputation for consistency as advocates of absolute independence, maintaining a recalcitrant position, in fact, long after the majority of their countrymen at home.[3] Of the repu-

[1] Captured documents of this sort are quite numerous. See *Cong. Record*, vol. 35, part 7, pp. 7125–26, for the Hongkong junta's circular of July 17, 1900, which had some circulation in the Philippines. The junta members take credit for the formation of anti-imperialist leagues in New York and Cincinnati, "born of their suggestions" and "encouraged, when young and resourceless, by their advices and communications." They also cabled, on June 30, 1900, to Hongkong: "Peace negotiations in Manila hurt our cause. They favor McKinley's reëlection." In May, 1900, Secretary Root had directed MacArthur to detail an officer for service at Hongkong watching the Filipino junta, and Major John S. Mallory was sent. In December, 1900, MacArthur reported little benefit from this measure, Consul-General Wildman not coöperating, and instructions were again given the latter officer to lend his assistance. (See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1169–71, 1232, 1235.)

[2] Letters from the Orient, denying that Aguinaldo had indorsed the peace movement, had also reached them, and apparently had some influence. The Paris and London press of the time will disclose the twistings and turnings of these men to those who care to follow them. John Foreman, in the *National Review* for September, 1900, gives in substance the scheme for modified Philippine independence under American supervision which Agoncillo was quoted in June and July as having indorsed. Mr. Foreman puts forth this crazily impossible plan in all seriousness as his own kindly recommendation to the United States of a means of extricating itself from a dilemma! In *Filipinas ante Europa*, September 25, 1900, Agoncillo partly disowns the interviews with him: the acceptance of American sovereignty or anything but independence is "an absurdity," he says; but he acknowledges having expressed himself for an "American Resident without veto"!

[3] To enter into this record in detail demands more time and patience than its importance would justify, since these men exercised comparatively little influence upon the situation. Some indications of the character of their campaign have been given in the preceding notes. It may be worth while to summarize the contents

tation they earned for veracity, one cannot speak so well; unfortunately, these men who had in part assumed, and in part received by delegation, a position as representatives of their people, were ready to exaggerate information received

of the number for September 25, 1900, of the junta periodical just cited, published at Madrid, during 1899–1901, as *Filipinas ante Europa*, and for four months further, in 1901, as *El Defensor de Filipinas*. Isabelo de los Reyes, the editor, has already been mentioned as the author of various pamphlets on the Philippines, mostly worthless; arrested in 1897 as a propagandist of secret societies, he had addressed a *memoria* to Primo de Rivera, protesting loyalty to Spain and throwing the blame for the insurrection entirely upon the friars; later, when deported to a prison in Spain, he had written piteously abject appeals to Spaniards who might be supposed to be friendly with the religious orders, imploring their assistance toward his release, not merely on account of his family, but also on the ground that he had not opposed the friars. (See *La Política de España en Filipinas*, September 30, 1897.) The Spanish authorities never interfered with the anti-American propaganda he began after the transfer of the Philippines to the United States, and, so far as appears, the latter Government never broached the matter to that of Spain, though in 1901 instructing the United States minister in Madrid to keep an eye upon the "junta's" movements, which, he declared, were of no importance. (*Foreign Relations of United States, 1901*, pp. 471–73.) De los Reyes's periodical was maintained by the support of the Filipino colony in Madrid and elsewhere in Europe, and probably also by junta funds; such circulation as it had in the Philippines was limited. In the number above cited, the editor tells of his recent visit to London and the exposition in Paris and his interview with Agoncillo, who had recently made a trip "into central Europe, the result of which we can now publish." Agoncillo is a tremendous worker; he sends "long documentary reviews of his negotiations" to "our Government" every week, and gives lengthy interviews to the leading newspapers of the world, which are occupied all the time with Philippine affairs, for instance publishing pictures of "the dumdum bullets which the Filipinos have just invented, to the great wonder of the English and other foreigners." Señor de los Reyes made to Señor Agoncillo, on behalf of the Filipino colony at Madrid, another "insistent offer to go and fight the Yankees" even as "common ordinary soldiers," or, to aid the cause, they volunteer to go as propagandists "even to the United States, daring to run the risk of being imprisoned and deported to Honolulu"; moreover, they have offers as volunteers from many Spanish officers, even generals of brigades and divisions. The editor recommends that other Filipinos imitate him and visit Paris and London; "much may be learned, and only by this voyage the foreigners would be led to regard us with more consideration, because they would think they ought not and cannot with such impunity tread under foot any one who has breathed the airs of liberty in the two first cities of the world." He has come back loaded with pamphlets on education, catalogues of schools, etc., and so full of ideas that two good-sized volumes will not suffice to develop all his points for his readers, "for whose Europeanization he had imposed upon himself the sacrifice of going to Paris and London." The principal political articles of the number are devoted to the failure of the Paterno banquet and of Buencamino's separate efforts. One of the Hongkong junta writes, on August 27, of the fiasco, saying: "It was made evident that the Taft Commis-

by them from the Orient (from sources frequently questionable), to misrepresent upon their own initiative the conditions of their people and the acts of the Americans, and even to manufacture out of whole cloth stories more or less plausible

sion and Mr. MacArthur are mere decorative figures, authorized to do nothing but exterminate Filipinos. So it is that our fellow-countrymen are now unanimous for armed resistance and for demanding independence." He also communicates these startling pieces of news: "The American general Funston, with 25 cavalrymen, were captured, they say, by Sandiko's troops. In Dumangas [Panai] the forces of the Filipino general Paras [?] have just captured a detachment of 80 Yankees." The editor proceeds to review the promises made in MacArthur's proclamation of July 2, assuming a playfully ironic tone, and demonstrating as he proceeds that he is utterly ignorant of the nature of the so-called "bill of rights" or the part it has played in history. Of the guaranty of a speedy trial, confrontation with witnesses, no cruel and unusual punishments, etc., he says, for example: "Another commonplace for you! Why, were the Yankees already planning on lynching us, without formulation of charges, whenever it suited them?" The proposition to create a pension-fund out of the revolutionary treasury receives his most particular attention. "We 'll deliver this money all to you," he says, "but you may be sure it will be in hissing balls." Moreover, he adds, it would be impossible for the American authorities in the Philippines to duplicate the amount of revolutionary funds surrendered with an equal amount of those they have captured in the provinces, for "the American press itself has already given detailed accounts of the division of these funds, telling how many thousands went to Generals Funston, Bell, MacArthur, etc. Has it not been told how the latter bought the office of governor of the Philippines with what he had amassed in Pangasinan and other provinces? Has it not been told how General Funston was able to get himself clear of responsibility for having summarily shot a number of Filipinos by means of his *savings* in Bulakán and neighboring provinces? How about the fat sums Abella turned over to the Americans in the Camarines? . . . Make us a list of these captured funds [such lists had already been published, of course, in the United States military reports], with their respective sources, and we will proceed to show how much has *evaporated*." The issue also contains a treatise on making trenches, extracted from a military textbook, a biography of the young General Tinio (named "brigadier-general" in 1897 during the revolt against Spain, when only twenty years of age), an account of the opening by Filipinos of a new school, the Manila Lyceum, etc. But the article of greatest interest, as of greatest length, is one wherein the editor, who had recently been deprived of a house in Tondo by decree of a Filipino judge appointed by General Otis, inveighs against corrupt Filipino judges and lawyers and calls on the Taft Commission to clean up the courts. He who has just been proclaiming uncompromisingly for absolute independence and rejecting American intervention *in toto*, now that his own ox is gored, resorts to frantic capitals and exclamations in his exhortations to the Commission, saying: "We already have said we shall accept with pleasure from the Yankee all that may contribute to our social education . . . that we should not object to accepting their legal and educational systems, if they regard them as indispensable for our moral advancement." A marked copy of this attack on the Spanish legal methods, the Filipino judges then on the bench, and the existing judicial system was sent to each member of the Commission.

to Europeans unacquainted with the Philippines. On the whole, the record of the so-called foreign representatives of the Filipino Revolutionary Government, for the impartial friend of the Filipino people is not a pleasant thing to contemplate.

CHAPTER XXVI

AMERICAN PROMISES AND PERFORMANCES

The steps by which the policy to be pursued by the United States in the Philippine Islands became an issue in the Presidential campaign of 1900 need not here be recited in detail, nor is there any necessity at this point for weighing the pros and cons of the question as argued during that campaign. Regarding the election merely from the standpoint of its effect upon the situation in the islands themselves, there are, nevertheless, certain facts connected with the development of this issue in the United States which require brief mention here.

First, the so-called anti-imperialist movement, dating back to 1898, and primarily non-partisan in character, had, so far as it was an organized movement, virtually proclaimed its entrance into partisan politics when, at the first meeting of its promoters which laid claim to being national in scope, namely, the conference in Chicago on October 17 and 18, 1899, the intention was declared of endeavoring to make its aims an issue of the 1900 campaign, implying, of course, active support of the party which would espouse those ideas. No really national anti-imperialist organization was, however, ever effected, and the New England league of that name and the local leagues in Chicago, Cincinnati, and elsewhere remained ostensibly non-partisan, though openly opposed to the McKinley Administration on its Philippine record. Their principal activities were in the holding of meetings, distribution of documents, etc. Greater influence in this direction was exerted, however, by some of the independent and a few of the more able Democratic newspapers of the country, while the most notable anti-imperialist in Congress was Senator George F. Hoar, the venerable representative of Massachusetts sentiment on moral questions, who himself continued to support the Republican party, though attacking the Admin-

istration for annexing the Philippines and for waging a war there. He spoke from the typical anti-imperialist point of view, which regarded the annexation of the Philippines as violating American principles of government, and as threatening the future of the Republic through the demoralization of its ideals, and which, beyond issuing a flat demand for beating a retreat, concerned itself very little with practical measures for meeting the events and conditions resultant upon the war with Spain.[1]

In the second place, it is to be noted that the issue regarding the treatment of the Philippines and the Filipinos did not present itself in such a manner, when the campaign had begun in earnest, as to divide plainly the American electorate upon it. The Republican platform simply indorsed in general terms the record of the preceding two years in regard to the Philippines, and the Republican candidate for reëlection rehearsed that record and offered himself upon it; as for the future, no more definite declaration of policy was made than this of the plat-

[1] For an account of the anti-imperialist conference of October, 1899, see *Public Opinion*, October 26, 1899. The resolutions adopted, besides condemning the McKinley Administration for its course in the Philippines and demanding the immediate cessation of the war, declared: "We shall oppose for reëlection all who in the White House or in Congress betray American liberty in the pursuit of un-American ends. We shall hope that both of our great political parties will support and defend the Declaration of Independence in the closing campaign of the century." For speeches on the Philippine question during the first session of the Fifty-sixth Congress, see the *Congressional Record*, especially for the months of January, February, and April, 1900. See also *Collier's Weekly*, February 3 and 10, 1900, for opposing arguments by Senators Hoar and Lodge. The discussions in Congress began around resolutions of a general character introduced by Senator Hoar on January 4, and were stimulated by Senator Beveridge's first speech on January 9. As no definite policy was yet on trial or officially proposed either on behalf of the Administration or of the opposition, these discussions of 1900 were of a generalizing (and even a diffuse) character; there could be no real debate, as there had been about the treaty in 1899 and as occurred about the Philippine government in 1902. However, as the nature of the administration plan for the government of Porto Rico outlined itself, and the constitutional questions involved in the maintenance of customs tariffs between the new insular possessions of the United States and its body of States began to come to the front, the speeches on the Philippines connected themselves with the Porto Rican debate and became correspondingly less diffusive. The non-precise status of the "Philippine question" was remarked by one of the speakers at the anti-imperialist conference at Chicago, when he said: "We are not opposing any policy, but protesting against the absence of a policy."

form: "The largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties should be secured to them [inferentially, the Filipinos and Porto Ricans, who were not once expressly mentioned] by law." To be sure, the Democratic party put itself, in general terms, squarely in the anti-imperialistic position; but, though its candidate, Mr. Bryan, declared he would, if elected, immediately summon Congress to carry out the platform promise for Philippine independence under American protection in an international sense, it was notable that quite generally Democratic stress was laid during the campaign upon the proposal to institute in the Philippines, "first, a stable form of government." Moreover, in spite of the Democratic declaration that this question formed "the paramount issue of the campaign," and of Mr. Bryan devoting almost the whole of his long speech of acceptance to it, yet the real issue of the campaign was that of 1896 over again, with the additional question as to whether the business conditions that had been builded upon the decision of that year for a currency internationally stable should be endangered by a reversal of that policy. The Republican managers were not unwilling, after the election was over, to claim that their "Philippine policy" had been indorsed; but they had during the campaign pressed to the fore the advantage they held in standing for a continuance of business prosperity. Mr. Bryan himself recognized what was the trend of the campaign when, in his formal letter of acceptance of September 17, he devoted two thirds of his space to economic questions and only the final paragraph to "Imperialism."[1]

[1] As to the presidential campaign of 1900, reference may be had to the press of the United States for the Republican platform adopted on June 20, 1900, at Chicago; the Democratic platform adopted on July 5, at Kansas City; Mr. McKinley's speech accepting the nomination, July 12; Mr. Bryan's speech, August 8; Mr. McKinley's letter of acceptance, September 8; Mr. Roosevelt's letter, September 16; Mr. Bryan's letter, September 17. See also the campaign textbooks of the two parties for 1900 and 1904, and *Harper's Hist.*, pp. 381–88, for some of the campaign documents presenting the Philippine question. In July, 1901, the New York *World* published some dispatches regarding a meeting between Mr. Bryan

The Philippines were too distant, however, to enable the Filipinos — even had they been sufficiently familiar with American politics — to follow with real discernment the trend of the campaign. To them, including those few of them near the center of affairs who desired the reëlection of McKinley and a continuance of his partially outlined programme of government as well as the great majority who counted on the election of Bryan, the contest appeared to be waged purely on the Philippine question. Before going into the more significant of the many circumstances which show how this feeling steadily grew, from the middle of August to its climax in the first week of November, it is essential to recapitulate the facts of every sort which, in addition to those already brought out for the years 1898 and 1899, contributed during 1900 to make up the "partially outlined programme of government" just referred to as being in the minds of certain Filipinos. For, although no definite comprehensive policy as to the Philippines had been proposed by the McKinley Administration to the American electorate, or even to Congress, the actual performances of the military government in the islands had in various specific ways, when coupled with the programme announced in general terms by the two civil commissions, shown the general purposes of that Administration, and had sketched out in rough the plan of government which it would complete if continued in power; and, though Mabini's attitude in demanding a comprehensive and detailed "constitutional programme" may be taken as representative of a large element of his countrymen, there

and two members of the "Filipino junta" in New York during the campaign, wherein the Filipinos offered $100,000 for the Democratic campaign fund and promised also that, if desired, Aguinaldo (who could then, as a matter of fact, be reached by them only after a delay of two to six months) would issue a proclamation to the American people promising that, in the event of Democratic success, the Filipinos would lay down their arms and trust to the Bryan Administration. Both the offer of money and of such a proclamation were refused, so the story goes, the Filipinos being told that the Democrats could not negotiate with men in arms against the authority of the United States. Mr. Bryan was quoted as pronouncing the story "substantially correct." See *Literary Digest*, July 20, 1901.

were, nevertheless, Filipinos, most respectable for their position and attainments, who accepted the promises extended upon the authority of Washington as made in good faith, and who regarded the governmental measure already undertaken as sufficient for the time being. While not losing sight of the fact that such views were not popular in the Philippines, least of all, perhaps, during the months August–November, 1900, let us, passing briefly over the Washington plans of government so far as they yet remained in the *promise* stage, note the main accomplishments of military government, together with their merits and defects, the latter principally as bearing on the political situation.

The second Philippine Commission had thought best not to make any elaborate announcement of plans upon its arrival at the beginning of June, 1900, relying upon time and the development of events to reveal both the character of its purposes and the fact that it had real power to influence the situation. The previous Commission, which in the final analysis had no authority, but was simply resolved into an investigating body, had disappointed the hopes of Filipinos who looked to it for definite accomplishments; and certain of the revolutionary leaders had, in advance of the sailing of the second body of civilians from San Francisco, announced to the people that the new Commission was only another trick to beguile them into acquiescence in arbitrary government. Hence, Judge Taft and his associates, who were, moreover, to spend the first three months in preliminary study of the situation, went to work very quietly, making only a general statement of their aims.[1] Manila

[1] The announcement in full was given to the Manila press on June 5. It was reproduced, with the exception of some information as to the personnel of the Commission's party, as exhibit A in *Rept. Taft Phil. Comm., 1900.* Besides announcing the Commission's intention first to study the situation deliberately, consulting all Filipinos who would lend their help, and eventually to secure to the Filipinos "such a measure of popular control as will be consistent with stability and the security of law, order, and property," it indicated that this body would participate in the military government and itself make the recommendation for the removal of military control when the time should come for full civil government, saying: "We have

Filipinos, however, very speedily began to see that the investigations of the new body not only were comprehensive in scope, but also involved careful study of details with a view to practical, constructive legislation. In spite of the general tendency of the Filipino and Spanish press to regard the newcomers as merely a display for "show purposes," or as a "campaign dodge," occasional accounts of their labors were published which indicated that what they were doing might, after all, have far-reaching significance. In the preliminary announcement, as proof of the sincerity of their intention of inaugurating a comprehensive school system, the Commission announced the engagement of a civilian superintendent of education for the archipelago; and their first public appearance was at the opening of the Manila Lyceum, a school for boys, organized and taught entirely by Filipinos, which has flourished since.[1] Felipe Buen-

full instructions, and extensive powers are given us." But, said the Commission: "We are civil officers. We are men of peace. The field of our work must, of course, be confined to regions in which the armed enemy has ceased operations. We cannot deal with men in arms. They are to be dealt with by the United States Army and the general commanding."

[1] As has been remarked in an earlier chapter of this work, a few privately conducted schools were opened in the Philippines after the extension of the Spanish Civil Code to those islands in 1888, most of them in the larger provincial towns; but they led a precarious existence, threatened by the hostility of the friars and the possibility of a repeal of the law permitting such associations, or an interpretation of it that would be unfavorable to their continuance, and, in general, secular education may scarcely be said to have existed under the Spanish régime. Certainly, no band of radical Filipinos, such as were, for the most part, the active promoters of this enterprise, could formerly have expected success, or direct countenance of the Government (except temporarily under especially liberal administrations) for their efforts to establish in the capital itself, not a modest private school wherein a Filipino should gather a few students in his house, but a school avowedly organized to take from the hands of the friars and Jesuits the training of the Filipino youth who were expected to learn more than their A B C's. Judge Taft delivered an address at the opening of the Lyceum, on June 19, warmly commending its plans and purposes. (See Manila press of June 20, 1900.) The speech of Leon M. Guerrero, its director, was a vigorous expression of "Nationalist" sentiment, and was directed, it would seem, not only against Spanish ecclesiastical control of Filipino education in the past, but also against such a possible exercise of American authority as would in the future hamper Filipino development along racial and national lines. He spoke of "those souls thirsty for knowledge, whose instruction and development we cannot, must not, abandon to foreign pedagogues, who, though fit and able, cannot know thoroughly the ethno-

camino was allowed to publish a stenographic report of an interview he had with the Commission in July, just before the Paterno fiasco, wherein the plans for future Philippine government were authoritatively outlined, expressly for the purpose of this document being used as a more definite presentation of American aims to the revolutionists in the field.[1] From time to time, rumors which aroused great interest were heard of the investigation of the friar question to which Judge Taft himself devoted most of the summer, and, when there found its way into print a list of the questions which he was sending to prominent Filipinos in all parts of the archipelago (in addition to interviews with those whom he could personally reach, as well as with the prelates of the Church and some of the friars themselves), it was noted that these queries suggested

logical necessities and characteristics peculiar to our people, especially since always and inevitably there are interposed between them and us the misleading mist of prejudices of race and school and the perverting prism of political ideas and sentiments. . . . And if, through the errors and superficiality of the already discredited and disappearing science of phrenology [*sic*], perchance also through the vanities and *hauteur* of the races that call themselves superior, doubt has been cast upon our capacities and every lofty project of our spirit has been received with the smiles of incredulity, possibly, or rather certainly, for the sole reason that under our epidermis there is a layer of pigment of darker color, *it is a duty of our national dignity* to remove at once from the countenance of Europe that mortifying ironic smile, by the manifestations of our *new psychic energies.*"

[1] See *El Diario de Manila,* August 3, 1900, for a copy of this lengthy exposition in full. It indicates that the Commission had not yet decided whether or not to retain the old Spanish provinces as administrative units, but expected to follow up the civil organization of the municipalities with new administrative divisions called "departments." This was an idea partially developed in the report of the first Philippine Commission and was more definitely broached in the President's instructions to the second Commission ; it looked toward a more simple, hence possibly more economic, division of the archipelago, which would also adjust itself more readily to tribal (and sometimes geographic) lines, thus perhaps also opening the way to a system of "American Residents." In so far as the latter idea was involved in the plan, it was to be found incompatible with the governmental scheme eventually adopted, as will appear. The Commission stated in this interview that they had not yet decided whether or not there should be popular assemblies in these "departments." It, however, virtually held out to the Filipinos the promise of a popular assembly as one house of the future legislature of the archipelago, when it held up the government granted by Congress to Porto Rico as an evidence of the degree of participation the Filipinos might expect to have in their own central government.

the possibility of the appointment of an American archbishop, of purchasing the friars' lands and selling them in parcels to their tenants, and of the compromise "Fairbault plan" for meeting the law as to separation of Church and State while avoiding possible objections to public schools without the catechism.[1] In entering upon its duties as a Philippine legislature on September 1, 1900, the Commission simply quoted those clauses of the President's instructions of April 7, 1900, which bore directly upon its immediate assumption of authority in this respect as a part of the military government, besides making the further announcement that public discussion would be granted before measures were put on their final passage.[2] By the practical exercise of the powers granted to it, the Commission's presence as a real force in the situation came to be felt, though gradually, rather than with an early full comprehension of its importance by either Filipinos or American military men, as will hereafter appear. In the actual administration of military government so far as the period covered by this chapter goes, the Commission's presence was in only a small degree directly felt, though the suggestions of its in-

[1] The list of questions, twenty-six in all, drawn up by Judge Taft, covering the friar question in its moral, political, economic, and educational phases, was published in *El Diario de Manila*, September 3, 1900, and *El Progreso*, Manila, September 4, *1900*. They are contained, with some few of the responses received, in *Sen. Doc. 1900*, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., which also contains the interviews in 1900 with the Philippine prelates, provincials of the orders, and others. In the division of subjects for investigation by the members of the Commission (*Rept. Taft Phil. Comm., 1900*, p. 15), Judge Taft took the civil service, the friar and land questions for himself. For comment on some of the results of the investigations of the various members, see *ibid.*, especially pp. 15, 19–34, 37–38, 46–48, 71–101, 105–12.

[2] For this announcement, see *Rept. Taft Phil. Comm., 1900*, pp. 120–21 (exhibit B). The President's instructions to the Commission, which some one has called "the Magna Charta of the Philippines," were given out by the Associated Press on September 17, 1900, and a further evidence that the Philippine question had assumed a secondary place as the campaign developed is to be found in the fact that this document was little discussed and its full significance scarcely heeded in the United States, — nor yet is it, for that matter, — one of the results of this fact being a failure to appreciate what was going on in the Philippines in early 1901. The document in full (published also as appendix B to *Rept. Sec. War, 1900*) reached the Philippines first through the American press.

fluence were already significant, especially in regard to the important matters of municipal government, the schools, the judiciary and fiscal legislation.

Quite the transcendent thing of 1900 as affecting matters judicial — indeed, the one accomplishment of American military government in this direction which could be considered permanent in its effects — was the amendment of the old Spanish code of criminal procedure, by a military order of April 23, in such manner as to introduce the essential safeguards of English and American procedure, most notable of all the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*.[1] The real im-

[1] This was General Order 58 of the Military Governor reproduced in full in *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 261–71 (also in *Public Laws enacted by the Philippine Commission*, vol. I, pp. 1082–95; for it still remains in force as the Philippine code of criminal procedure, amended only in minor respects by the Commission's Acts, nos. 194, 440, and 590). The principal changes which it made in the methods of trying crimes in the Philippines, many of them of a most sweeping sort, were summarized by Military Secretary Crowder, who helped draft the new law, in *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, appendix AA (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10, pp. 17–20), and are, most briefly stated: (1) The requirement of a specific complaint or information, charging but one offense; (2) preliminary examination with witnesses, with immediate decision as to holding the prisoner, abolishing the interminable and secret *sumario;* (3) the right of being confronted by the witnesses, of cross-examination, of compulsory attendance of witnesses for defense, of exemption from testimony against one's self — all the methods of the open trial, in place of the secret or semi-secret procedure of the Civil-Law countries, and the right also of appeal in all cases; (4) the privilege of demurring to an insufficient complaint and of pleading a former judgment or jeopardy; (5) the right of joint defendants to be tried separately; (6) the right of new trials in case of errors of law or newly discovered evidence; (7) the extension of such procedure, in a simple form, to justices' courts; (8) the making of all persons, including defendants, competent witnesses, instead of excluding the accused and his relatives and employees; (9) evidence to be relevant and the best of which the case might be susceptible, doing away with the former free admission of hearsay evidence; (10) extending the privilege of bail not only to the lighter offenses, but to all offenses not capital, or where proof or presumption of guilt was strong; (11) introducing the specific remedy of the *habeas corpus* writ, instead of the theoretical assurance in the Spanish law of a "speedy trial"; (12) safeguarding the issuance and execution of search-warrants. Chief Justice Arellano said of this change in criminal procedure (*ibid.*, p. 159, in appendix GG): "This law, based upon the accusatory system, has abolished the inquisitorial period so derogatory of the rights of the accused, and which was the foundation of our former criminal procedure; the time formerly taken up by this inquisitorial system without the right of intervention on the part of the accused, which at times would be prolonged for years, dependent upon the difficulty of investigation, has been saved; the long period of preventive punishment suffered by

portance of this reform could not, however, make itself manifest under the conditions prevailing in 1900. *Habeas corpus*, in particular, is held suspended where martial law is in force; and, without resorting to a specific proclamation of the sort, it was provided that this new privilege should not "operate to permit the civil courts to release prisoners confined under military orders."[1] Moreover, the jurisdiction in criminal cases throughout the archipelago was, under the prevailing state of war, pretty nearly absorbed by the various military courts, as it had been in the city of Manila during 1899.[2] The place of justice-of-the-peace courts was taken for the most part by the petty provost courts, while military commissions commonly assumed charge of punishing crimes of a more serious nature, often including purely felonies, since such crimes might, under one head or another, be deemed offenses against military

many persons during the long summary examination is now avoided, which said examination was carried on only for the purpose of investigating the commission of a crime and whether any person was guilty thereof; the new procedure provides for complete equality between the accuser and the accused, between the prosecution carried on by the Government and the defense of his personal liberty and security interposed by the defendant; a brief proceeding, which becomes and is public from its initiation, fully provides all that is necessary for a complete defense, and is an absolute safeguard of personal security; this, undoubtedly, is the greatest benefit conferred upon the inhabitants of this country."

[1] This was done by General Order 70, of May 21, 1900, the failure to make such specific provision in Order 58 having apparently been an oversight; at any moment, the issuance of the writ by a civil court, in the case of a military prisoner, might have compelled the formal proclamation of martial law in the Philippines (a thing which had been avoided); or, through the necessity of preventing a dangerous precedent, have resulted in a disagreeable demonstration of the fact that these civil courts rested only upon military authority and were subject to that authority. This same question came to the front after civil government was inaugurated in the archipelago. The writ of *habeas corpus* was, in July, 1900, resorted to for the release of some fourscore of prisoners from Bilibid prison in Manila, confined there since the days of Spanish rule without the formulation of charges against them. A Filipino lawyer, one who helped prepare the Constitution of Malolos, was not aware that these prisoners could thus be released until he was so informed by Judge Taft, the matter having come to the latter's notice casually; and Judge Taft then drew up the form of petition to the Supreme Court which the lawyer employed in bringing about this "jail-delivery."

[2] During the fiscal year 1899–1900, there were 218 defendants in criminal actions before the superior provost court of Manila, and 10,511 defendants before the inferior provost courts (corresponding to police courts). (See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10, pp. 281–83.)

authority. The civil machinery of justice had been but partially restored, for one thing, leaving the burden of responsibility for peace and order upon the military officers administering the districts, small and large; under guerrilla warfare, the ferreting-out of criminal bands and the punishment of crimes in the most prompt and efficient manner possible became in many places the chief duty of the moment, as well as the most effective way of bringing about peace; and it was natural, indeed generally necessary, that the district and department commanders should depend upon courts composed of American officers to do this work.[1] After January, 1900, when courts of first instance began to be reëstablished in the provinces, civil jurisdiction, in such cases as were ventilated during these troublous times, was left to the newly appointed judges of these provincial circuits, which, however, comprised only part of the entire archipelago.[2] But the operations of

[1] These military commissions (already referred to in connection with the barbarities of warfare), seem to have been an outgrowth of circumstances, beginning under Otis (see *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 273–74), and becoming more and more common under MacArthur, as it became evident that the civil courts would not meet the needs of the situation. On May 21, 1900 (by General Order 70, *Mil. Gov. Phil.*), General Order 58 had been amended merely so as to leave to provost courts and military commissions jurisdiction over cases "properly referred to them." But on August 10, 1900, they were formally organized as a part of the judicial machinery of military government, by General Order 64, Headquarters Division of the Philippines (a strictly military order, that is). This order brought together in some sort of uniformity the various fragmentary provisions already existing with regard to provost courts and military commissions. The operations of the latter were based definitely upon sections 3 and 4 of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1867 (authorizing special military courts for "Reconstruction" days in Southern States after the Civil War). It was provided that the commanders of the departments could convene military commissions (acting usually upon the advices and recommendations of district commanders, who, by delegation of powers, could themselves refer minor offenses to provost courts for trial), and hence were the reviewing authorities; but in all cases where the sentence passed was death or imprisonment for more than ten years, the division commander at Manila should also review the judgment.

[2] To the courts of first instance reëstablished in Manila in 1899, there were added ten more by similar military orders during the first five months of 1900, in Pangasinan, Kagayan–Isabela, South Ilokos, Cavite, Iloilo, Pampanga, Nueva Écija North Ilokos, Bataán, and Sebú provinces. (See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 259–60, and *General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil., 1900.*) The Commission created, by legislation in October, 1900, similar courts in Bohol and Unión–Benget, making sixteen in all;

these civil courts were limited not merely by the circumstances of war and the presence of military courts; they were limited also by the general distrust felt and expressed, by Filipinos as well as by foreigners and Americans, as to the integrity of a good number of the judges. The old habits of bribery and extortion were not easily to be uprooted, where bench and bar had been trained in the methods of the "squeeze" system for years; and inordinate delays and time-consuming motions and decrees were often as annoying and as adverse to justice as downright corruption. The suspension of the judge of the Binondo district in Manila by the military governor in August, 1900, had been but a tardy recognition in one case that the nomination of judges had not been altogether happy in perhaps a majority, certainly a large number, of instances.[1] Pending a thorough reform of the courts, — a step loudly called for by Filipinos, even those most adverse to American occupation, — the Commission, after full examination in public, made the suspension of this judge final, and, by public resolutions in the case of exorbitant fees assessed by another judge of Manila, expressed opinions calculated to check such extortions and irregularities, or at least to make the unworthy judges more cautious.[2]

also, pending complete reorganization of the judiciary, the Commission provided for the assignment of these sixteen judges to cases arising in provinces not yet equipped with civil courts. (See the Commission's Acts, nos. 14, 24, 28, and 44.)

[1] Nor was the military government happy in its selection of an American lawyer as auxiliary judge to aid the judges of first instance in Manila in the application of the newly introduced American principles of procedure. Military Secretary Crowder, in his review of the judicial department of military government, limited himself to saying on this point (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10, p. 19) that, owing to the lack of preparation of native judges and lawyers in the new system of procedure, "there have been numerous errors and some miscarriages of justice, which, so far as possible, have been corrected on appeal or review by the criminal branch of the Supreme Court." In his final report (*Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 271) General Otis had said: "Most of the courts of first instance have conducted their business in an eminently satisfactory manner." The following year, Secretary Crowder was more reserved in his comments (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 4, pp. 245–47).

[2] These resolutions, given to the Manila press, with the record of the public hearings, were published in the two first quarterly volumes of *Public Laws and Resolutions of the Philippine Commission*. The judge of the Tondo district, having followed an American lawyer's advice in assessing an extortionate fee, was not removed, but warned as to what was deemed honorable practice in the United

Besides the reform of the code of criminal procedure, General Otis had promulgated one other comprehensive military order a short time before leaving for home; this was an important administrative measure, the new municipal code, published as General Order 40 of the military governor, on March 29, 1900.[1] The board which had drafted it, headed by Chief Justice Arellano, had been instructed to provide for a form of local government "as liberal in character as existing conditions permit."[2] The result of their labors was a code based to a considerable degree upon the Maura Law of 1893, but providing for elections of municipal officers by voters qualified by education or the payment of taxes, and making a very considerable extension of local autonomy, notably with regard to the expenditure of municipal revenues; in general, the code was "Americanized," in the direction of freer and fuller self-government in the towns. Indeed, in sweeping away the specific restrictions whereby the Maura Law (regarded in its time as so great a step in advance, and violently condemned by the

States (minutes of September 28 and 29 and October 1, 1900). The suspended judge of Binondo at his own request was given a hearing on December 17, 1900, on the matter of his having ordered an attachment for $36,000 on a bank of Manila without said bank being in action or being heard at all, and was definitely removed by a resolution of January 5, 1901, wherein the moral, as well as legal, aspect of his action was very plainly stated. In *Rept. Taft Phil. Comm., 1900*, it was stated (p. 83): "The salaries paid to judicial officers under the Spanish régime were very small, the highest being paid to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, which was, for salary and allowance, $6500 Mexican, equivalent to $3250 American money. The judges of the courts of first instance received no allowance, and their salaries ranged from $1875 Mexican ($937.50 American) to $2750 Mexican ($1375 American), each. With these meager salaries, it is not strange that charges of acceptance of bribes should have been freely made against the judges. The evidence is very strong that the charges were well founded. The judges appointed under the American administration receive 20 per cent larger salaries, but the salaries are entirely inadequate to secure competent men. Charges of corruption and incompetence against the present Filipino judges are common."

[1] Cited in full in *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 281–91; also published at Manila in 1900, in pamphlet form, in the English and Spanish languages and the Tagalog, Pampangan, Ilokan, Bikol, and Bisayan dialects.

[2] See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 280–81, and *General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil., 1900*, no. 18, of January 29, for the appointment of this board, composed of two Filipinos, the second being Attorney-General Florentino Torres, and of the three American judges of the *Audiencia*.

anti-Liberals of Spain and the Philippines as a measure of destructive leniency) had bound the municipalities to superior control, particularly that of the provincial authorities, so as virtually to nullify, from the American point of view, the right of local autonomy, the new code failed to put, in place of these restrictions, which past experience had sanctioned and future experience was to prove still necessary, any adequate, or at least well-defined, provisions for the superior oversight of municipal administration. It was a halfway measure, not coupled with any logically worked-out scheme of provincial government; and the Philippine Commission soon after its arrival informed Military Governor MacArthur that changes would be deemed necessary in the code in order to fit it into the future structure of civil government.[1] The military government, nevertheless, went ahead with the holding of elections and reorganization of the principal towns under this new order in a number of provinces. So long, however, as conditions like those of 1900 prevailed, it made little matter whether the towns were formally organized under General Order 40 or under the simple scheme introduced the previous year.[2] What had made General Order 40 feasible as a detached plan of municipal government while military rule should prevail, was the fact that the commanders of the districts (composed of one or more provinces) held, through the general powers conferred upon them, which they could delegate to the commanders of garrisons, really absolute authority over the government of the towns; they could, moreover, dispense with the elections and appoint the local officers wherever they thought the conditions prevailing at the time made such action advisable or necessary. Throughout all southern Luzon, this had been done, even the simple form of election prescribed by General Order 43 not being deemed advisable by General Bates, while

[1] In addition to the necessity for working out a more comprehensive scheme of internal government, some of the administrative and structural details of the code were also deemed unsuitable.

[2] General Order 43, of August 8, 1899. (See chapter XIV, p. 68.)

Order 40 was not given trial in that department at all. This order, therefore, remained throughout 1900 chiefly of importance as indicating, in the way of a promise expressed in definite terms, the liberal intentions of the American Government.[1]

As to the actual working of the quasi-military municipal government, it was good, bad, or indifferent, according to the circumstances. Among these circumstances should be counted as of most importance the military officer who took the immediate direction of the local administration in each town; sometimes he was the chief, if not the only, scource of initiative toward improvement within the town, a real force of inspiration to the better-disposed people, and sometimes, all too often, indeed, he was, by his indifference or his ill-will and high-mightiness, an effective means of widening the breach between Americans and Filipinos. The double-dealing of Filipino officers, swearing loyalty to the United States and conducting or conniving at a secret organization of their towns in behalf of the guerrillas, was undoubtedly connected to some extent with the incompetence or race prejudice of many of these American officers; but it existed sometimes in towns where the officer in charge was both diplomat and administrator. That such duplicity did not always exist has already been sufficiently demonstrated;[2] it was, how-

[1] See Military Secretary Crowder's report, section on Municipal Government (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. 1, part 10, pp. 28–30). It shows that elections under Order 40 had, by September 26, 1900, been held or ordered in 101 towns (of the more than 1000 towns of the Christian provinces, as organized under Spanish rule) mostly in northern Luzon, but 27 also in Bohol, 11 in Panai, and 10 in Sebú.

[2] Later, as feeling in the American army became yet more bitter toward the Filipinos, it was common for the assertion to be made, without real knowledge of the facts, that "the whole Filipino people" had played "traitors" to the United States. This was the view expressed by General Chaffee, after he had been only five months in the archipelago, in his review of the famous "Taitai case" (General Order 339, Division of Philippines, 1901; *Sen. Doc. 331*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1297–98), when he said: "Throughout these islands, wherever a *presidente* of a *pueblo* or *cabeza* of a *barrio* was appointed or elected under American authority, he, with few exceptions, either acted in the same capacity for the insurgents, or maintained silence with respect to his neighbor who served in like capacity in the same jurisdiction. This dual form of government existed everywhere, in strongly garrisoned towns like Manila and in the smallest *barrio* alike; and all were doubt-

ever, sufficiently common to be termed the general rule. It was easy to ascribe such conduct, in sweeping terms, to "Oriental traits" and a disposition which "preferred to lie rather than tell the truth"; but it was quite as simple, for the American who really studied the situation, to find explanations of these incidents in the sycophantic social atmosphere hitherto prevailing in the Philippines, in a natural sympathy of Filipinos with the revolution, with their own race against a stranger race, and in no small degree also in the methods of intimidation which have been noted as being employed by the guerrilla chiefs. Under the conditions, quite the logical thing to have expected was that the majority of Filipinos, who could not be called "traitors," in any fair sense, to a sovereignty to which as yet they owed no duties of patriotism, would "carry water on both shoulders." [1]

less oath-bound in the great Katipunan league. . . . Having established themselves in all the places of trust and responsibility in the new civil government and of power as insurgent partisans, these accused [the Taitai defendants] now commenced the difficult task of serving two masters. In all lawful matters they served with due appearance of loyalty the American government, while at the same time they labored secretly and diligently in the interest of the insurrection. In gross violation of the laws of war, they secretly levied and collected taxes and exacted contributions from the people, who, with universal accord, submitted silently thereto. They held communications with the enemy, and in all ways open to them gave the guerrilla bands aid and comfort."

[1] Similar in significance to many documents already cited is an appeal of Licerio Gerónimo, a guerrilla commander in Manila's environs, dated November 1, 1900 (a copy of which is in the possession of the writer), asking for contributions from those "who live under American rule with its mere trifle [for taxes]," saying this is not "a compulsory donation," but the commander "thinks it proper to expect the entire sum set down above." An amount was, apparently, placed opposite the name of each of the well-to-do citizens to whom this secret circular was addressed, and they were to write their names and the amount subscribed on the back. See General Order 24, Division of Philippines, 1901 (*Sen. Doc. 331*, pp. 1109–11), for the sentence of the natives of San Felipe Nery, a town in Gerónimo's district, who worked under his orders while holding office also under the United States. General Bates, after explaining that southern Luzon was not yet in a sufficiently peaceable condition to put General Order 40 in force, said (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, p. 227): "A great obstacle in the way of the establishment of successful civil government is the difficulty of getting good men among the inhabitants to act in official capacity, owing to their fear of bodily harm at the hands of those who are inimical to the United States." See also *ibid.*, part 7, pp. 257–65, for a report on the secret revolutionary organizations maintained for taxation purposes in each town of Unión province.

The prime object in the minds of army officers supervising the local governments was order, that they might thus contribute to the success of military operations and the pacification of the country. To this end, as already seen, MacArthur had, when he became military governor, to some extent reversed his position of the preceding December while commanding in the field, and had secured authority to arm the municipal police.[1] Whatever was accomplished in the way of education, sanitation, betterment of streets, markets, etc., was, as stated, almost always in an exact ratio with the intelligent efforts of the American officer in charge, or with his lack of zeal, as the case might be. Beyond the distribution, from the office of the artillery captain in Manila, — who gave, in addition to other duties, some attention to public instruction, — of school books, mostly in Spanish, to the value of about $100,000 Mexican, practically nothing was done at the headquarters of military government in regard to schools.[2] Outside of Manila, also, no organized

[1] See *General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil., 1900*, no. 87, of June 18, leaving to the discretion of the department commanders the arming of local police, to act outside the towns also as an auxiliary constabulary force. The arms distributed under this order were 45-caliber Colt revolvers, and 2000 shotguns were at the time being dispatched from the United States for native constabulary. (See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1177, 1179, 1180.)

[2] The nautical school had been reëstablished at Manila (General Order 55, December 15, 1899), under the direction of an officer of the United States Navy. In Manila, there were, on June 30, 1900, 39 schools, with an attendance of 5000 and a teaching force of 149, of whom but 24 could teach English. It was left to the district commanders, and still more the commanders of towns, to do what they might to meet the general demand which every one could not fail to note for schools, and especially for instruction in English, by detailing soldiers as teachers. Military Secretary Crowder estimated the number of scholars so enrolled during 1900 at 100,000. See *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10, pp. 26–28, 220–44, for his remarks on the subject and the reports of the officer in charge of public instruction (not detailed to this duty until March 30, 1900), of the district commanders (eight outside of Mindanao and Jolo) who took an interest in the subject, and of the superintendent of the nautical school. The military secretary, disregarding the importance of this work as a pacificatory influence, remarks that, until better conditions of tranquillity and order have been attained "it will not be practicable, it is thought, to take up the subject in the energetic and comprehensive way which the situation would otherwise demand and justify, nor is the diversion of the large portion of the revenues of the Government necessary for the successful conduct of the schools possible so long as war conditions, requir-

sanitary work was undertaken by the military government, such efforts as were made in behalf of the native population being left to the district and garrison commanders; but the medical officers of the various posts were quite frequently doing their best in this direction, from humanitarian motives as well as more directly in the line of their duty to safeguard so far as possible the health of the American commands under their care. They were allowed money from the Philippine civil funds to supply medicines to the native population and to employ Filipinos as assistant vaccinators;[1] to some extent, there was conducted in the provinces the sort of vaccination campaign which had reduced deaths of smallpox in Manila from seventy-five per month to seven in nine months.[2]

Police and sanitary measures also made up for the most part the operations of the provost-marshal government of Manila, continued on the same lines as in 1898–99, but gaining in efficiency, especially during the latter part of 1900. Two new steel markets were built in place of the two most rotten of the old dens of disease and crime that were so much frequented as centers of the traffic and trade of the masses in Manila. Two garbage crematories were also built, and a beginning made in the problem of preventing sewage-disease. Streets and ditches were cleaned in a way to which Manila had never been

ing the expenditures of large sums for the prosecution of military operations, continue." See also *Rept. Taft Phil. Comm., 1900*, pp. 106–07, for a statement of conditions upon the arrival of that body.

[1] See *General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil., 1901*, no. 91, of June 26, authorizing the expenditure from funds collected by taxation in each military district of $150 Mexican each month per 1000 persons for medicines, and the hiring of native vaccinators at $30 Mexican per month.

[2] See the 1900 report of the Manila Board of Health, and remarks of Chief Surgeon Greenleaf on the general sanitary work of the army medical officers, in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 123, 132–35, and part 10, pp. 283–288; and the same for 1901, *ibid.*, 1901, vol. I, part 4, pp. 197–200, 439–49. The appointment of a committee to select an isolated island for a leper colony, and the more effective organization for the Philippines of the United States Marine Hospital service (which labored to keep out bubonic plague and cholera) are other events of 1900 pointing toward a more effective sanitary system, not only for Manila but for the whole archipelago.

used, and macadamizing was begun. Among public works not having reference merely to sanitation, two of the three old bridges across the Pasig were repaired and a new one begun. Besides various brief ordinances of a sort new to Manila, enforced in a roughly efficient way by the soldier-patrolmen of the provost guard when too unique or too full of possibilities of "squeeze" to be left to the native policemen, a special system of licenses for saloons was introduced at the beginning of 1900, for the first time in the city's history; this at once reduced the number of "bars" of the American sort (though run, in the majority of cases, by Spaniards and Filipinos, American camp-followers being the proprietors of only 23) from 224 to 155.[1]

The military government, in fact, still remained in large part merely a government in and for the city of Manila, although, through the concentration of ninety per cent of the foreign trade in the port of Manila, the economic life of almost the entire archipelago was in a considerable degree subjected to the influence of the new administration. The opening of ports for inter-island trade, simultaneously with the military occupation of southern Luzon, the central islands, and Mindanau, had stimulated export trade from Manila rather than from Sebú and Iloilo, the trade of the latter ports going by fits and starts.[2]

[1] There were, as already stated, no "bars" under Spanish rule, wines and liquors being sold at cafés, amusement-places, etc., and native drinks at stalls all over the city. The drinking-saloons on the American pattern which had sprung up after August, 1898, had paid 4 pesos for the ordinary business-license. Under the new license-system, the charge, according to the nature of drinks sold and the location within the city, ranged from 50 to 600 pesos. For detailed reports by the provost-marshal-general and subordinates on the government of Manila in 1900, see appendix UU to *MacArthur's Rept., 1900* (also in *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10, pp. 281–315), and appendix FF to *MacArthur's Rept., 1901*. For miscellaneous reports on the workings of municipal governments under army control in the provinces, in addition to reports already cited by districts (especially in Leite), see *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 7, pp. 405–07, and *ibid.*, part 8, pp. 162, 163–64, 235–37, 262–74, 311, 314, 372–74; also *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 141–43, and the following appendices on Grant's district.

[2] Besides the fifty-one ports equipped for inter-island trade during the first months of 1900, some thirty were added during the remainder of the year. See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 343–48, and, in addition to the administrative measures

Foreign trade generally showed an increase in 1900, owing to the removal of restrictions upon it with the extension of American authority throughout the archipelago; and a tendency toward normalization was evinced by the fact of this increase, despite the renewed disquiet in most of the provinces toward the end of the year. The total of revenues collected at the ports open for foreign trade during the calendar year 1900 was $11,565,913 Mexican (of which collections at Manila were $9,808,085), as compared with $9,168,537 ($7,650,000 at Manila) during 1899. Customs duties had, from August, 1898, continued to increase, the old Spanish tariff continuing in force, in a way which invited comment on the Spanish administration of this department.[1] American military government, as from the very first, derived almost its entire revenue from customs duties; they produced $11,364,530.41 of the total revenue of $13,606,964.85 Mexican for the fiscal year

already cited in connection with the organization of northern Luzon and the opening of the hemp ports and Mindanau, various minor orders on the subject in *General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil., 1900.* For military reasons, one Leite port was closed in June, and Marinduke Island was closed to trade in November (General Order 136).

[1] See *Rept. War Dept.*, vol. I, part 10, pp. 8–10, for a table comparing collections under Spain and the United States and comments by Military Secretary Crowder. The receipts for the fiscal year 1899–1900 were more than twice those of 1897, 127 per cent more than those of 1896, and nearly three times those of 1895. Importations for the army, being free of duty, were not involved in this comparison. Crowder ascribes the increase in part to the fact that imports from Spain no longer came in free, falling off in consequence from 10,509,937 pesos (36.8 per cent of the total) in 1894 to 4,047,294 pesos (11.6 per cent of the total) in 1899–1900; but he states as the "principal cause" the fact, as testified by Manila merchants, that "it was the prevailing custom of importers to declare their goods erroneously, either in class or quantity, or both . . . and that the practice was recognized and connived at by the customs officials." The difference between the old and new administrations in this respect was much commented on by importers in Manila. There were, of course, rumors of dishonesty in the American management of the custom-house, and it would not be strange if minor incidents occurred to support the charge, as the organization had been hastily effected and the personnel was not of the best. Principally, the charges affected its efficiency, and it was probably for this reason that in October, 1900, the military governor summoned General James F. Smith from Negros and made him collector of customs at Manila (with supervision of the other ports), the Philippine Commission having begun an investigation of customs administration.

1899–1900. Though internal revenue collections had been resumed under the Spanish laws, they produced but $1,045,689.58 for this year, of which $824,000 were collected in Manila alone.[1] Even with the half-million pesos obtained by the Manila Government from licenses, market-fees, fines, etc., and with the work of policing largely done by American soldiers paid by the United States Government, it was necessary to resort to the insular treasury for part of the expenditures in behalf of the city. The local revenues in the provincial towns were very much more inadequate, though their needs were, proportionately to population, still less than those of Manila; and, as they got no aid from the central treasury, here lay another very important reason for the lack of progress in regard to schools, sanitation, etc.[2] Aside from meeting the expense of customs administration throughout the archipelago, paying the civilian employees of the military government, and defraying a part of the expenditures of the city government of Manila, a good-sized fraction (at times one fourth or more) of the insular revenues were being expended for purely military and naval purposes. Where the customs receipts went for roads and bridges (even though built primarily to facilitate

[1] Among the portions of MacArthur's report on civil affairs for 1900 (*Rept. War Dept., 1900,* vol. I, part 10) of special importance as bearing on trade, customs collections, and fiscal administration generally, are Secretary Crowder's summaries, pp. 6–17, and appendices BB (treasurer), CC (auditor), DD (collector of customs), and FF (internal revenue collector). For the second half of 1900, see the corresponding summaries and tables in *MacArthur's Rept., 1901.* See also *Rept. Taft Phil. Comm., 1900,* exhibit K, for imports, exports, and collections by ports from August, 1898, to the end of 1900; *Otis's Rept., 1900,* pp. 343–50, 358–59; and *General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil., 1900,* no. 14 of January 27, promulgating Tariff Circular 112 (War Department) lowering the duty on books and printed matter by a reclassification, and nos. 53 and 54 (April 17), abolishing the cumbersome surtaxes on the Spanish industrial tax and simplifying methods of collection.

[2] The arming of the policemen of part of the towns and the allowance of money for medicines and vaccination, matters mentioned above, are partial exceptions to the statement that the municipalities had to shift for themselves; they had no share of even the small amount of internal revenue collected in the provinces. By General Orders 52 and 55 (*Mil. Gov. Phil.*) in April, 1900, the provost-marshals of the towns were instructed to use for local improvements the fines assessed by their provost courts (commuting fines at the rate of 50 cents Mexican for a day's labor on public works).

military operations), for the support of the quarantine service, for arming the constabulary, etc., the Filipino people themselves could be regarded as directly receiving the benefit. But the larger part of the expenditures from the Philippine funds for military purposes went for an unnecessarily huge refrigerating and ice-making plant for the army commissary in Manila, for rental and repair of buildings used by the army, purchase and maintenance of launches and larger vessels for the quartermaster service, and in similar ways to provide supplies or comforts for American officers and troops not regularly appropriated for by Congress. Money thus expended could be held only indirectly to benefit the people of the Philippines, in so far as its use in such ways contributed to bring peace, and could be justified only as a partial contribution from the Philippines toward the heavy burden imposed upon the United States Government by the insurrection.[1] The postal department (which had been separated from the United States Post-Office

[1] See *Rept. Taft Phil. Comm., 1900,* pp. 36–37, showing that $320,000 Mexican per month was being spent from the Philippine revenues for purely military and naval purposes. After the Commission gained control of these revenues, and all appropriations from them had to pass that body, various irregular expenditures (among them the hire of vehicles for officers engaged in civil duties or of quarters better than the army allowances provided for their rank) were gradually cut off; but the question of a proper division of expenditures as between military and civil purposes (i.e., as falling upon the United States Treasury or upon that of the Philippines) remained a vexing one so long as quasi-military government lasted. The military reports on civil affairs for 1898–1901 are in no case sufficiently detailed to show the character of the expenditures from civil funds. Most of them were made through the Quartermaster Department. The chief quartermaster's report for the fiscal year 1899–1900 (appendix D to *MacArthur's Rept., 1900,* exhibits C and E, published only in Manila edition) showed $7,048,836.17 spent from civil funds, of which $1,212,922.13 went for the rent, construction, and repair of buildings, improvement of quarters not specially appropriated for by Congress, etc., and $582,234.64 for the Manila ice-plant (which would cost $1,000,000 by the time it was finished, as will be seen). See also appendices H and RR to *MacArthur's Rept., 1900,* for smaller expenditures from civil funds. Circular 8 of May 24, 1900 (*General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil.*), shows civil funds used for roads, bridges, interpreters, native horses, rent, rifles for scouts, etc. The allowances for medicine and vaccinations for the inhabitants of the provinces were, of course, made from the insular revenues; so also the expenses of the Marine Hospital service in the archipelago (made retroactive as against the insular revenues by President McKinley's executive order of January 3, 1900).

Department and made subordinate to the Philippine military government in May, 1899) continued to be operated principally as an adjunct to the American army and the posts; but it was not a drain upon the revenues, showing a surplus, as the Quartermaster Department transported the mails.[1] One year and a half after American occupation, the mining and forestry bureaus were tentatively reorganized, in March and April of 1900, respectively. The work of the former was confined, for the time being, to bringing some order out of the chaos of records; but rules regulating the cutting of timber on government land were prepared by the forestry bureau on the basis of the former Spanish regulations (but with increased rates per cubic foot), and were promulgated in June, 1900, a trifling monthly revenue being derived from this industry during the latter part of the year.[2]

In so far as the measures of military government could be regarded as pointing toward a definite programme, and a programme directed toward conciliation, its chief defect lay in a lack of comprehensiveness, a failure to provide sufficient means of approximation between Filipino and American aims and interests. Above all was this true in that matter which chiefly had inspired the Filipino reform propaganda of the eighties and nineties, which had made the Katipunan possible, which

[1] See the postal director's report, appendix HH to *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10; also *ibid.*, pp. 23–24, and Circular 11 of September 23, 1900 (*General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil.*), promulgating rules adopted jointly by the War and Post-Office Departments at Washington for better unification of the service in the Philippines.

[2] See *General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil. 1900*, no. 31, organization of mining bureau; no. 50, of forestry bureau; and no. 92, timber-cutting regulations. See also *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10, appendices HH, II, and KK, for the reports of Captain G. P. Ahern (in charge of forestry and of patents and trademarks) and of Lieutenant C. H. Burritt (showing attempts of Spaniards and Americans to establish extensive fraudulent mining claims, in the interim when the mining bureau was disregarded by the military government). See also, regarding forestry operations, *Rept. Taft Phil. Comm., 1900*, pp. 54–57. Regarding currency in 1900, the reader may consult *ibid.*, pp. 85–94; and *Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 10, p. 6; regarding the railroad and claims of the foreign corporations in general, *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 318–23, General Order 23 (*Mil. Gov. Phil., 1900*), *MacArthur's Rept., 1900*, appendix D, and *Magoon's Reports* (Washington, 1902).

had come to the front again immediately after the Tagalog truce with Spain, and which had been the chief rallying cry of the revolution in 1898 — the "religious question," as it is called in the Philippines. The efforts of the American commander to secure the release of the friars, in 1898, had been bruited among the people as evidence that the religious orders would dominate an American administration, as they had most of the Spanish governors. So, in 1899, every evidence of merely courteous relations between the Americans and the friar prelates and regular clergy at Manila had been hailed as good material for the anti-American propagandists in the provinces. And, coming into 1900, the Ilokans had been converted into active enemies of the Americans chiefly by the efforts of native priests working in defiance of the ecclesiastical authorities at Manila, while generally peaceful Pangasinan was in a turmoil of passions, little comprehended by the Americans in its midst, but partially caused by the murmurings that the Americans were in league with the friars. On a question underlying, as did this, all other questions pending in the Philippines, it was not enough that the representatives of American authority should merely be technically correct in their attitude; the theory of separation of Church and State, though much talked about, was not at all comprehended by the Filipinos, and something positive, if not as a complete programme for the future, at least as evidence that American authority was not in sympathy with, and would not support, the friars against the wishes of the people, was necessary to prevent feeling on this matter from continuing to be also a dangerous current of opposition to the United States.

One measure, both in the interest of morality and in negation of the time-honored right of the priesthood to dominate the social life of the people of the Philippines, had been enacted by the military government in December, 1899, when General Otis made marriage lawful by a civil as well as by an ecclesiastical ceremony. One of the accusations of the Fili-

pinos against the friars had been that, by excessive fees for performing marriage, they had contributed to make still more common the very ordinary practice of living out of wedlock in the Philippines. Inasmuch as this practice favors a loose regard for marital ties and their frequent dissolution in the Philippines, the charge, emanating from friar quarters in Manila, that the Americans "introduced divorce in the Philippines" will hardly seem very serious. Civil registration had been one of the special omissions from the civil code of Spain when it was introduced into the Philippines ten years before, primarily because civil marriage was one of its corollaries. The American practice now introduced, leaving the manner of marriage optional was, though necessarily a corollary of American administration, in effect a blow to ecclesiastical pretensions, and was so regarded by both friars and Filipinos.[1]

[1] See *General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil., 1899*, for the order establishing civil marriage, no. 68, of December 18, 1899 (reproduced in *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 256–59, and in *Public Laws and Resolutions of Philippine Commission*, vol. I, appendix). It made marriage legal for males at fourteen and females at twelve, requiring consent of parents for infants before the law; the ceremony might be before a judge of first instance or justice of the peace, as well as before a priest or minister of the gospel. By General Order 70, May 21, 1900, authority to perform the ceremony was also given to the chief executive officers of municipalities where civil judges or justices had not yet been appointed. The ordinary legal impediments to marriage were recognized as grounds for annulment of the ceremony by the civil courts; the institution of divorce, properly speaking, was not introduced by the order. Civil marriage had been proposed months earlier, and marriages had already been performed by some of the Filipino civil officers in Manila; these recent marriages were recognized also as legal. (See *Corr. Rel. War*, p. 1125; the War Department urged action in the matter in December, 1899, probably at the suggestion of the first Philippine Commission, just after Otis had issued the order.) Justice-of-the-peace marriages became very common for a time thereafter in Manila, some of the humbler natives who took advantage of the smaller fees being the parents of families.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION

On the second day of 1900, Archbishop P. L. Chapelle, of New Orleans, arrived in the Philippines as papal delegate. As an American, he was the object of suspicion to the revolutionary element among the Filipinos; as a prelate educated in the revolutionary school of Catholicism of Latin Europe, and possibly chosen for this mission by the element at Rome with which the Spanish friars were allied, he was not less the object of distrust on the part of the Filipinos more friendly to American rule. If his mission was, in part at least, to harmonize the Filipinos once more with Rome, he had a conciliatory task certainly no easier than that of the representatives of American Government. Yet he never gave any evidence of regarding conciliation as part of his mission. He allied himself from the first, and quite openly, with the Spanish religious orders; the Filipinos who opposed the friars and a resumption of friar rule he treated as enemies both of religion and order, and proposed for them the domination of force and authority, both civil and ecclesiastical; and by his nationality and his public efforts to create the impression that he represented equally the Papacy at Rome and the Government at Washington, he transferred to American authority in the islands part of the odium attaching to the friars and to himself as their champion.

The papal delegate had been in Manila only a week when a Spanish newspaper man published an interview with him wherein he said, virtually, that the friars would be sent back to their parishes and would be sustained in them by American military authority. He repudiated the interview, but, whether or no he had said what he was quoted as saying, subsequent events proved that the Spanish reporter was substantially cor-

rect as to his attitude. In any event, the damage was done from the moment its publication was allowed to go without categorical denial, substantiated by practical proofs that the delegate had not come to the islands to constitute himself a friar defender.[1] It was not intended to clarify the understanding by Filipinos of the principal of separation of Church and

[1] The Spanish editor in question, Senor Juan de Juan, who had a great talent for figuring in affairs and was fond of making mischief for the Americans by insinuations, though later active in indorsing the Taft "policy of attraction," had the proverbial American reporter's "nose for news" and had acquired American newspaper ideas about the use of the "interview." His paper was *El Progreso*, and a portion of this alleged declaration of Chapelle's is thus translated by A. G. Robinson (*op. cit.*, p. 332): "The four public lectures given by Father McKinnon caused President McKinley to realize the necessity for the monastic orders remaining in the Philippines. I come to Manila with ample authority for everything. The friars of the Philippines have alarmed themselves without any reason. I know their importance, and am openly predisposed in their favor. If the friars occupy the parishes, they will be considered as elements of order, and therefore as American agents." The outbreak in Filipino newspapers against the friars (*ibid.*, p. 329) and the petition of Manila Catholics to Chapelle (*ibid.*, p. 330–31) were caused by this interview in *El Progreso*. Before going to the Philippines, Archbishop Chapelle had given to the American press of October 23, 1899, a statement on the Catholic Church in the islands, indicating to some extent the opinions held at Rome regarding the situation. In a letter dated at Manila, June 12, 1900, Harold Martin, the Associated Press correspondent said (*Harper's Hist.*, p. 381): "The Church has become a troublesome factor in General Young's territory. . . . The priests of the region have been sending contributions to Aglipai. Two prominent priests are in jail charged with aiding the insurrection. . . . Guam is advocated as a possible and advantageous residence for captured officers and civil officials. Archbishop Chapelle is a supporter of the idea. . . . He believes the policy of leniency is wasted upon Asiatics, who fail to comprehend the motives for it. To the American officers with whom he has talked, the Archbishop has said the heads of the leaders should be cut off. . . . Archbishop Chapelle has taken no uncertain stand on the question of the friars, which the Filipinos regarded as the keynote of all their troubles. The Archbishop has expressed his opinion freely to many officers and civilians, although he declines to give any formal interviews for publication. His conclusions, summarized, are these: 'That the Filipinos owe to the monastic brotherhoods all the education and civilization they possess; that it would be a great injustice to the friars to expel them from the field in which they have worked for centuries, or to deprive them of the estates which they have acquired honestly, and have administered to the public good; that it would be impossible to replace them with other priests, because there is no other clerical force acquainted with the country and the language of the people, and the Filipino priests are not competent to hold any but the subordinate positions in the Church; that the opposition to the friars is an artificial propaganda fostered by the insurgents and by the Filipino priests, who are themselves leaders in the insurrection and are using it to obtain control of the Church in the islands.'"

State that, among the questions stated by Spanish newspapers as being discussed between Archbishop Chapelle and Nozaleda were these: "Shall the catechism be taught in the primary schools?" and "Shall taxes be imposed for the maintenance of the Church?" — while other queries hinted at schools and hospitals supported by the State but controlled, as under the Spanish régime, by the Church.[1] In his correspondence with the papal delegate, General Otis had been perfectly correct in his attitude as representing a government which could not officially recognize any form of religion or any ecclesiastical organization except as an ordinary person or corporation before the law; and, more than that, he had, in this private correspondence, taken ground strongly against the advisability of returning the friars to their parishes and their estates. Delegate Chapelle had urged such action upon Otis very soon after arriving in Manila, in plain disregard of the constitutional inhibitions against the United States Government or its agents having to do with ecclesiastical preferments; also urging it as a wise political measure designed "to secure the pacification of the people."[2] The Otis–Chapelle correspondence was not

[1] See A. G. Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 325–26, for some of these topics for discussion, as alleged by *El Comercio* and denied by *Libertas*, the Dominican organ.

[2] See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 298–301, for references to this request of Chapelle's and a lengthy extract from Otis's reply, going extensively into the question of church property in the Philippines. In reply to the claim that it was a "legal right due" the friars to put them in the possession of estates claimed by them, Otis put forth the right, indeed, the obligation, of the United States Government first to investigate and settle the conflicting claims to such properties, further complicated by alleged transfers of some of these estates to foreign corporations. As to the necessity of the friars going to their parishes again for "controlling political reasons," Otis said: "That it would satisfy or pacify the inhabitants, I am firmly of the opinion that it would not. . . . I am positive that no act on the part of the United States Government would so excite, irritate, and cement them in rebellion as to place among them the members of four of the eight religious orders domiciled here. [This is true, says Otis, not only of the Tagalogs, but also of the people of other parts of Luzon and the Bisayas.] We cannot force the friars upon the people against their consent, and you, as a distinguished American citizen, would not advocate such action. If I am mistaken in my impressions, the circulation of these religious men among the people dwelling beyond the confines of Manila would show my errors; but, having an interest for their personal safety, I could not encourage such a test." The essential features of this letter of February 15, 1900, were cabled by Otis to

known to the Filipinos, though they were assured in general terms that they should enjoy "religious liberty" and that friars should not be forced upon them. On the other hand, the religious orders themselves, through their newspapers and in other ways, were quick to make use of even the smallest incidents that might imply an identification of their own interests with those of the American Government, and the Filipinos in general were only too ready to accept these things as significant. That the commanding general had virtually forbidden the Archbishop to send the friars into the garrisoned towns, by declining to guarantee their safety, was a thing known to but very few Filipinos. But it was cried from the housetops that the new American prelate, come to reinstate the friars, was brought ashore in the government launch, given a reception in the old governor's palace with the friar archbishop and the other friars by his side, and otherwise shown official courtesies, which to Americans were merely ordinary social amenities, but to Filipinos were magnified into matters of great importance.[1]

Washington (*Corr. Rel. War*, p. 1145), in response to a query from Secretary Root, inspired possibly by press reports of the renewed excitement created in the islands by the plans of Chapelle.

[1] In March, Chapelle asked for the friar bishop of Sebú, about to make a visit from Manila to his diocese, "the courtesies due to his position," and Otis promised to communicate with the colonel in command in Sebú and "bespeak for him the courteous welcome he desires." (*Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 306.) The colonel fully performed his part, and the echoes of the affair were long in dying out among the opponents of the United States in Sebú. The general attitude of the friars, both then and for some time afterward, was that of saying to the people, through their publications of various sorts, through occasional emissaries to work up petitions for their return to their parishes, and through the Filipino priests who remained actually, not just outwardly, obedient to the friar archbishop and friar bishops: "The insurrection must soon end, for the Filipinos cannot hold out much longer; we shall be recognized and protected by the United States as we were by Spain; if you want to be on the safe side in the future, you must be for us now." How effective such a propaganda might be among the *principalia* of the Filipino towns, so long trained in sycophancy and time-serving, may be readily conceived. Yet General Otis told Washington merely: "Friar question will give great annoyance." A hint as to why he was misunderstood by the Filipinos may be obtained from his own statement in the February 15 letter to Chapelle: "Since your arrival I have labored with Filipinos of education and prominence, who profess Catholic doctrine and lead consis-

MacArthur's succession to the chief command did not alter the apparent attitude of the military government that the religious question in front "craved wary walking" — rather more, however, with an eye to possible misunderstandings on the part of Roman Catholics in the United States than with a view to a clearing-up of the doubts of the Filipinos, a Roman Catholic people. In making his announcement of American purposes, succeeding the offer of amnesty, MacArthur published also a specific pledge of religious liberty, based upon the President's instructions to the second Philippine Commission.[1] In response to petitions coming from points in southern Luzon against the return of the friars, and the reiterated assertions of the commander in the Kagayan Valley that it was detrimental to the interests of peace to have Dominican friars again coming there, even if they went over to the isolated Batanes Islands, MacArthur had this authoritative statement of fundamental American principles of religious freedom conveyed to the garrison commanders for publication, accompanying it also with the explanation that under this policy there could be no govern-

tent lives, to ascertain their views, informing them of my opinion that the reception by the people of those friars against whose reputation no moral taint is known appeared to be the best solution of the church difficulty which now confronts us and which I think to be serious, and they have invariably asserted that the Filipinos will not receive them. I would that I could entertain your views in the matter, that we might consistently act as you advise, but I am powerless to do so." (*Otis's Rept., 1900*, p. 301.)

[1] This section of his proclamation, an expansion of the President's instructions, read: "As under the Constitution of the United States complete religious freedom is guaranteed. and no minister of religion can be interfered with or molested in following his calling in a peaceful and lawful manner, and there must be complete separation of Church and State, so here the civil government of these islands hereafter to be established will give the same security to the citizens thereof, and guarantee that no form of religion shall be forced by the Government upon any community or upon any citizen of the islands; that no minister of religion, in following his calling in a peaceful and lawful manner, shall be interfered with or molested by the Government or any person; that no public funds shall be used for the support of religious organizations or any member thereof; that no official process shall be used to collect contributions from the people for the support of any church, priest, or religious order; that no minister of religion, by virtue of his being a minister, shall exercise any public or governmental office or authority, and that the separation of Church and State must be complete and entire."

mental interference with the peaceful measures taken by a congregation to express its disapproval and rejection of a minister.[1] What the Filipinos required, however, in the existing state of the public mind, was some concrete evidence that there was not and could not be any compact between the friars and the American Government; they would not be satisfied with abstract declarations of principle, which, in the minds of many of them, might cover secret designs. The friars went back to the Batanes Islands and to several other out-of-the-way and undeveloped districts whither modern political sentiments had not penetrated; and they went, as many Filipinos thought, with the express sanction of the American authorities, though really because these authorities had no lawful right to interfere, if the friars' superiors wished to take the

[1] See *Sen. Doc. 190*, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 219–27, 283; and *MacArthur's Rept., 1901*, appendix M (*Rept. War Dept., 1900*, vol. I, part 4, pp. 235–37). When, however, a district commander recommended that this document be translated into Tagalog and given the widest possible circulation, he was informed that it was not "deemed expedient to publish the Tagalog translation" (through fear that the clause added by MacArthur might be an excuse for disorder on the part of the masses?), while there was "no objection to it receiving suitable circulation among the people." The second party of Dominican fathers to arrive at Aparri on their way to the Batanes Islands brought a letter to Colonel Hood from Delegate Chapelle, saying they were sent by the latter "with the full knowledge and approbation of Major-General Otis . . . and will call on you . . . to learn whether, according to your judgment, it would be well for me to send soon other fathers to administer to the spiritual needs of the people within your district. . . . As a matter of duty, they [the members of the religious orders] all feel bound to oppose insurrection, to keep the people from entering into any blood-covenant against us, and in the interest of law, order, and of religion to support American authority. The accusations adduced against them are the merest pretexts of shrewd and anti-American Filipino politicians. . . . As you know, it is sufficient for three or four men to mislead a whole town in these islands. I am glad, however, that the mass of the people begin to see that they have been misled, and that American officers are not now ready to give credence to the representations made to them by the wily educated Filipinos who, whilst professing to be *amigos*, would put us Americans out of the country, or cut our throats if they could." At the time of writing this letter, the papal delegate had been but three months in the Philippines, had not been outside of Manila and its suburbs, had seen comparatively few people outside of the friar archbishop, the friars, and the circle surrounding them, and knew of Philippine history and current politics only what they told him.

responsibility for their safety. A little later occurred the one concrete case under the MacArthur régime testing the friars' power still to control the disposition of affairs in those populous parishes which had been in the midst of the revolutionary upheaval of 1896–1900; and the practical outcome was such as apparently to place American military authority on the side of the friars. Archbishop Nozaleda sought to transfer from the important parish of Dagupan a Filipino priest named Adriano Garcés, an unusually capable man of his class, an open opponent of the friars and sympathizer with the revolutionary movement, and to put in his place a native priest willingly subordinate to the Dominicans and addicted to the "Guards of Honor" society. With the support of a large part of his congregation, Garcés refused to surrender the church at Dagupan and to go to Kabaruan, the ill-starred town of religious fanatics and vulgar thieves, formed in consequence of the "Guards of Honor" movement, he claiming that the latter town was "prejudicial to his health." He was placed under formal censure by Bishop Hévia, the Dominican friar at the head of the see of Nueva Segovia, who had been imprisoned in 1899 and 1900 in the Kagayan Valley. It was with the more or less direct knowledge of this bishop that a number of Filipino priests and theological students, among them Father Garcés, had been tortured in the seminary at Bigán at the time of the revolutionary outbreak in 1896. The outcome of the matter was that, in connection with a visit of Delegate Chapelle to Dagupan in September, 1900, Father Garcés was imprisoned by General Jacob H. Smith as a revolutionist working against the United States. Regardless of the merits of the questions as to ecclesiastical authority that were involved, and conceding, without stopping to examine the facts, the complicity of the priest in the secret attempts to maintain opposition to the United States, this arrest was certainly most inopportune. The Spanish and Filipino press spread the knowledge of it all over the archipelago, and it was generally re-

garded as proving a community of ideas and interests between the Americans and the friars.[1]

Delegate Chapelle had also very promptly after his arrival sought to commit the United States, through its military agents, to a recognition of the exclusive right of the Church to control property and charitable or educational works which had, under the mixed civil-ecclesiastical régime of Spain, been jointly controlled by both Church and State, though sometimes supported entirely by the latter. Obviously, under its

[1] In December, 1900, the War Department cabled to MacArthur: "Reported Jacob H. Smith, at the instance of Archbishop Chapelle, required priest named Garcés leave the parish, where another priest was substituted. Is it a fact?" MacArthur replied: "Jacob H. Smith explains that native priest Garcés removed because not loyal. Removal requested by majority communicants parish. Action necessary preserve peace. Garcés not confined, as has been necessary many cases native priests." (*Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1238–40.) The statement as to the attitude of the majority of the Dagupan parishioners is open to serious doubt. General Smith afterward became conspicuous in connection with the campaign in Sámar. A study of the Garcés episode in the Manila press of the time and in the documents to be cited, sheds light not only upon the anti-friar campaign of the closing years of Spanish rule and upon its connection with the revolutionary organization of 1898–99, but also upon the schismatic movement organized in 1902. Garcés is one of its leaders, and was one of the first bishops of the "Independent Philippine Church" to be ordained. He had been a friend and associate of Aglipai, the "Bishop Maximus," in 1896 and in 1898–99, and, whether actively in opposition to the United States in 1900 or not, he was undoubtedly a sympathizer with the cause, at least as represented by Aglipai and the other Ilokan priests engaged. During the period of organized revolution against the United States, Garcés had published in *La Independencia* a *relato* of the events of 1896 in South Ilokos, his account of the torture administered to him and his companions having been quoted in the large pamphlet, *Defensa del clero filipino* (Manila, 1900), by Father Salvador Pons, the Augustinian friar who had separated from the order and made common cause with the Filipino priesthood. In his *Impugnación de la censura impuesta por el Obispo de Nueva Segovia* (Manila, 1900), published just before his removal from his parish, Father Garcés declared that one cause of Bishop Hévia's resentment toward him was his failure to obey the bishop's order that the pamphlet of Father Pons should not be bought or read, being in the "index of forbidden books," but that in reality it had not been forbidden by Archbishop Nozaleda, "in view of the favorable report upon it by the Jesuit fathers." He also says (*ibid.*, p. 2): "I was one of those tortured with fury, the victims of plots contrived by certain friars and professors, also friars of the then Seminary of Bigán, the protagonists in those scenes being the Reverend Fathers and Friars Rafael Redondo, vicar—*foráneo* of Unión at the time, and Casimiro Gonzalez, provisor, the inseparable companion of Bishop Hévia. I say *certain friars*, for, out of respect for the truth, there is among them here and there one who is very good, as an individual, not as a friar."

Constitution, the United States Government could not succeed to the position of the King of Spain as "royal patron of religion" within the domains subject to him, and could not exercise in the Philippines the right of appointment to benefices or the control of church property, any more than it could pay for the support of the institutions of the Church. But there were many nice questions involved in the decision as to where the title to some of this property had been vested, and should be vested in future. All this was apart from the practically more urgent question whether the legal principle of "prescription" would apply in any and all the cases of landed estates claimed by the religious orders. Furthermore, there might prove to be merit in the contention of many Filipinos that valid titles could not be shown for a part at least of the land included within these estates. There was the distinct and new legal question as to whether, even if the friars had good titles, by prescription or otherwise, their alleged transfers of the lands to foreign corporations in 1898, 1899, and 1900 were valid. Finally, there was a practical issue of fact as to whether or no these transfers were fictitious and designed to facilitate the collection of rents and enjoyment of other profits from these lands, of which the former landlords had virtually been deprived since 1896. Ultimately, if not, indeed, primarily, under the American methods of procedure, the questions of law and fact involved must go to the proper courts for decision; and, so far as these conflicting claims admitted of diplomatic adjustment and compromise, such action upon the American side must be taken upon direct authority of the chief executive, subject to the approval of Congress. General Otis necessarily had to say to Delegate Chapelle that it was not within his province to pass upon these questions. He did not, however, rest there, but, while disclaiming any knowledge of canon or civil law, outlined at length a possible legal theory adverse in nearly all particulars to the claims of the representatives of Rome in the islands. Some rather tart cor-

respondence ensued between the military commander and the emissary of the Papacy, covering nearly all phases of a complex subject on which one at least of the two was powerless to act, and culminating in a very arrogant letter from the churchman. The correspondence served no useful purpose in any other way; it seems almost a pity that it might not have been made public for the beneficial effect it would have had politically, by indicating how far the American commander really was from being "under the thumb of the friars."[1]

Yet the one overt act of General Otis bearing upon the claims of the religious orders to property and educational management was, so far as it went, adverse to the regulars. Toward the close of 1899, acting upon the representation of certain Filipinos that the College of St. Joseph, which had virtually been incorporated since 1875 into the University of St. Thomas as a medical and pharmaceutical department of the latter,[2] had really belonged, with its estate worth perhaps half a million dollars gold, to the Crown of Spain, he had ordered the provost-marshal-general of Manila to close the doors of the institution and take formal possession of it pending investigation. Since this action could only be taken upon Otis's authority as the military commander in an era of warfare, it is to be assumed that he closed the college in the belief

[1] See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 296–313, for portions of this correspondence, Otis's comments on the religious question, etc. Chapelle's letter of April 6, wherein he advised Otis "for his own sake" to modify some of his views, indicates that the friars probably intended to claim title by prescription to part at least of their landed estates. The questions raised (*ibid.*, pp. 304–05) regarding the *Obras Pias* (certain "pious works" consolidated under one management, performing the functions of a loan bank among other things) antedated Chapelle's arrival; in fact, Archbishop Nozaleda had, as he thought quite shrewdly (so the appendices to his *Defensa obligada* would imply), laid the foundation, by representations before the military government in the fall of 1898, for the assumption by the church authorities of full charge of these funds, the origin and management of which had under Spain been partly secular. (Nozaleda returned to Rome in September, 1900, by permission of the Pope, but did not cease to be Archbishop of Manila, by resignation, until February, 1902, when plans for the "Americanization" of the Church in the Philippines were at last being considered, three years after the establishment of American sovereignty.)

[2] See vol. I, p. 40.

that its continuance under friar management was a factor making against the public peace. He contemplated its reorganization under "strictly civil management"; but the conflicting questions thus raised proved to be too complicated to be passed upon offhand, besides running far beyond his jurisdiction.[1] In the interim, in order to meet the protests of students who had practically concluded their medical course and could not now receive their degrees, a board of medical examiners was constituted.[2] The question was left for General MacArthur; but, as the newly arrived Commissioners were expressly instructed by the President to examine into the questions concerning church property, the matter speedily became theirs to deal with, and the first public hearings before them were with regard to it. At intervals from July to October, 1900, the matter was argued before them quite as before a court. They did not announce their conclusions until January, 1901, and then refused to pass judicially upon the merits of the case, but relegated it to the Philippine Supreme Court for decision, conferring the jurisdiction and providing the special procedure required. Pending such adjudication of the matter, they provided that the college should be reopened and continued under the former management, i.e., of the rector of the University of St. Thomas. The chief thing to note about their procedure, as bearing upon the situation in 1900, was that the hearings before them were public, and the representative of the Filipinos who contended that the college and its property belonged to the Government to administer in behalf of the

[1] See *Otis's Rept., 1900*, pp. 296–97, 304. In his letter of April 6, Chapelle takes up this matter (*ibid.*, p. 302). He speaks of the "venerable and ancient vested rights" of the faculty of this college to confer medical degrees; they dated from 1875, and were not conferred upon the University of St. Thomas as such at all. He also declares: "It could be easily proven that the medical and pharmaceutical standards of examination are at least as high in the College of San José as those approved by many of our American medical faculties." His real point, however, is against the supposition that the continuance of these courses could be "dangerous to public safety," and he asks: "Why should we buffet our friends and wink at the wicked machinations of our enemy?"

[2] See *General Orders, Mil. Gov. Phil., 1900*, Circular no. 5 of April 1, 1900.

people measured his talents in a contest as full legal equal of the prelates of the Church who presented the arguments upon that side of the case. Even had he not come off very creditably, as he did, it had been made plain that the day of special ecclesiastical courts, and special privileges in general, had forever passed. The outcome legally might be adverse to them; but the Filipinos had had the satisfaction of presenting their case against the friars, and had seen this particular phase of it pass for adjudication to a tribunal in which their own people were well represented.[1]

[1] The briefs before the Commission are cited in Pardo de Tavera's *Biblioteca filipina*, pp. 76–79, 287, under the names of Felipe G. Calderón and Bernardino Nozaleda, the chief protagonists. See also *San José College: Statement of His Excellency, Most Reverend P. L. Chapelle, Apostolic Delegate.* The case for the Filipinos was best presented in Calderón's final argument, *Refutación de las pretensiones alegadas.* Nozaleda took a position quite openly depreciative of the Filipinos, and was evidently nettled that he should be measuring swords with the young Filipino lawyer, Calderón, who had been in the Malolos Congress, and, having a sharp tongue and quite keen wit, was very ready to use his opportunity to express Filipino feeling toward the friars; Nozaleda had a representative to read his arguments in his place. The issue was concisely stated in *Rept. Taft Phil. Comm., 1900*, p. 16, and the arguments and questions involved were very fully and clearly stated in Judge Taft's summing-up at the time the Commission announced its reference of the matter to the Supreme Court and passed Act 69 on January 5, 1901. These documents were reproduced in *Sen. Doc. 190*, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 26–46, as well as in the second quarterly volume of the Commission's Acts. The Commission said: "We are not a court. We are only a legislative body. It is our expressly delegated function in just such cases as this to provide a means for the peaceful and just decision of the issues arising. Had we been able to decide clearly and emphatically that the petitioners had no rights here and that their claims were so flimsy as not to merit the assistance of the legislature in bringing them to adjudication in a court of justice, we might properly have dismissed the petition and taken no action thereon, but we are of opinion, all of us, that the contentions of the petitioners present serious and difficult questions of law, sufficiently doubtful to require that they should be decided by a learned and impartial court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is our duty to make legislative provision for testing the question." It was also thought proper to appropriate $5000 from the public funds to support the costs of the prosecution of the claim to the college and its estates in the name of the people of the islands, the trustees named to conduct the litigation being three Filipinos and two Americans. Provision was also made against the judgment of the Manila court becoming final, in case Congress should provide for appeal to the United States Supreme Court; this Congress did on July 1, 1902, under the general terms of section 10 of the so-called "Philippine Government Act." Finally, the Commission said: "There has been much popular and political interest in the controversy in which we have now stated our conclusions. The questions considered, however, have not had any political color at all.

When the Commission assumed its legislative duties on September 1, all laws were put upon their third reading in public sessions at which any one, whether Filipino, or Spaniard, or other, might express his views on the issues that were pending. Despite the tendency of the press printed in Spanish and of the radical element of Filipinos to criticize the quasi-civil, quasi-military government now inaugurated, partly from pure misunderstanding of American methods of procedure, partly from disappointment at the necessarily provisional and incomplete nature of this governmental innovation, and partly from a desire to disseminate discontent,[1] the presence of civilians in the government was regarded with satisfaction by all Filipinos, and the first acts of the Commission were closely observed. So, too, despite the general attitude of the American military officers to regard the sending of the second Commission as an "interference" (as they regarded the mission of the first Commission), those at least who were in touch with the mili-

They have been purely questions of law and proper legal procedure, and so will they be in the court to which they are now sent. The decision of the right to control San José College cannot legitimately be affected by the political feeling which one may have for or against the friars. It is unfortunate that the public should clothe the settlement of an issue purely legal with political significance, when it ought not to have and does not have one. But, however this may be, those charged with settling it can pursue only one path, and that is the path of legal right as they see it." An agreement in the case was reached by the United States and the Church in 1907.

[1] In *El Diario de Manila*, September 1, 1900, a Spanish writer of some ability, but an inveterate mischief-maker (a rôle he had played under Spanish rule as well as under American military government), pointed out that the Commission, though not having executive powers, was to make the nominations to positions in the civil service, while the military governor, possessing no veto power, would be in an anomalous position, and concluded that, considering the state of war and the military commander's absolute authority over all such operations, "he is the arbiter of the execution of the suspension, partial or total, temporary or definitive, of the reforms of legislative or governmental character that the Commission may institute. Wherefore it is concluded that its labor is like that of a secret laboratory, which makes experiments and conducts investigations of an empirical character, without practical adaptation to real life." The writer was, of course, correct as to the anomaly in the governmental system here adopted— to serve, however, only temporarily, and under anomalous conditions ; the effectual working of this plan, while it should last, depended upon coöperation between the military governor and the Commission.

tary government soon began to note that this new body could not be considered quite so powerless, even if they still thought it superfluous, when its control tightened over the purse-strings, through the necessity of referring to it all appropriations from Philippine revenues for expenses of the military government. Most of the forty-three acts passed up to November 6, 1900, had to do with appropriations or other routine requirements of the military government.[1] But several of the acts, put upon their final passage before the public, attracted good-sized audiences, and received general expressions of approval. Among them was the very first measure adopted, appropriating $2,000,000 Mexican for the construction and repair of highways and bridges; this was, however, merely a formal ratification of authorization already given by the War Department to General MacArthur.[2] Similar in character was the act providing $1,000,000 in United States currency toward completing the extensive harbor works in front of Manila, beginning with the breakwater as it lay partially completed at the close of Spanish rule.[3] The one measure passed before the presidential election which might be said to have a direct political bearing, and to come home to the Filipinos generally as having such import, was that enacted on September 19, creating a civil service board for the islands. It very comprehensively put all appointments to civil posts in the insular government under the so-called "merit system," to be made from lists prepared as the result of competitive tests (written examinations,

[1] Among these, however, the temporary reorganization of several civil bureaus, and especially that of the auditor's office, with partial reform of the system of accounting, of requisitions against the civil funds, etc., hinted at the coming revision of the entire administrative system.

[2] See above, p. 289. The primary object was the facilitation of military operations, but of course the incidental benefit of the regions which received appropriations of importance from this fund was considerable. The act provided for its expenditure under the direction of the military governor "as in his judgment may be most conducive to public welfare."

[3] This work was begun in 1891, and had been prosecuted in a very leisurely way, even before the internal troubles of 1896–97 came to interrupt it; and the events of 1898 stopped it entirely.

of course, being waived in the case of ordinary day-laborers); only, with a view to placing no obstacles in the way of the free exercise of the appointive powers conferred on the Commission during the months while this system was being organized and a new civil government was being built almost from the ground up, such positions as those of the auditor, treasurer, and the heads of the more important bureaus were exempted from the provisions of the act for eighteen months. Applicants for examination were required to take an oath of allegiance. The instructions of the President were followed in the provision that "the appointing officer, in his selection from the list of eligibles to be furnished him by the board, shall, where other qualifications are equal, prefer: first, natives of the Philippine Islands; second, all honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines of the United States." The Filipino who had been selected as one of the three members of the civil service board having died suddenly just before the appointments were announced, Chief Justice Arellano consented to serve temporarily, without salary, as the representative of the native population on this board, and as its president; the other two members were ex-employees of the United States Civil Service Commission.[1]

WAITING UPON THE ELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

Curiosity alone had been sufficient to account for the attendance at the first public sessions of the Commission. A desire to figure in everything of a public nature had also had something to do with the appearance in these sessions of cer-

[1] The Filipino to have been appointed was Joaquín Gonzalez, a very capable *mestizo* (the son of a friar), who had been a prominent member of the Malolos Congress in 1898, but had not been in favor of warfare, and had particularly deprecated the later methods of the revolutionary leaders. He had aided Commissioner Worcester in the revision of the municipal code. See the first quarterly volume of the Commission's laws for a resolution regarding his death; also for the Civil Service Act (no. 5), and *Rept. Taft Phil. Com., 1900*, pp. 20–23, for comments. It provided a more comprehensive application of the merit system than has yet been made in the United States.

tain of the Filipinos who were not friendly to American government. It was significant that, as the time for the election in the United States drew near, this class of men remained away, as if not wishing to compromise their future position with the more out-and-out revolutionists. The generally routine character of the laws presented during October was partly the cause of the dwindling of attendance; but it was precisely on account of the critical conditions that the revised municipal code, ready in October, was laid over to await the decision as to whether the work begun by the Commission should be suspended by a change in administration.

On August 21, in response to specific instructions from President McKinley, the Commission had cabled a detailed report upon the situation, declaring the recrudescence of guerrilla warfare to be due to the "defining of political issues in the United States," which gave "hope to insurgent officers still in arms of changed policy, and stayed surrenders to await the result of election." This statement, somewhat in the nature of a prophecy, was also made: "It is conceded by all but men in arms, and is implied in their proclamations, that if election confirms present policy, remnant of insurrection will disappear within sixty days by surrender of leaders and fading out of rank and file."[1] In making its first annual report late in Novem-

[1] For this message in full, see the American press of the time, also appendix D to *Rept. Sec. War, 1900*. The Commission said also: "Change of policy by turning islands over to a coterie of Tagalog politicians will blight their fair prospects of enormous improvement, drive out capital, make life and property — secular and religious — most insecure, banish by fear of cruel proscription considerable body of conservative Filipinos who have aided Americans in a well-founded belief that their people are not now fit for self-government, and reintroduce the same oppression and corruption which existed in all provinces under Malolos Government during the eight months of its control. The result will be factional strife between jealous leaders, chaos, and anarchy, and will require and justify active intervention of our Government or some other." One of the most prominent and most capable of Filipinos, a man whose influence had been sought by the organizers of the revolution, but who had coöperated with American authority, had, as is personally known to the writer, made all arrangements for a friendly transfer of his property and for removing with his family to Hongkong, in case the election resulted in a Democratic victory, he assuming, as did the revolutionary leaders, that this would mean the more or less immediate recognition of the revolutionary organization.

ber, 1900, the Commission modified in some particulars the data upon which its August statement of conditions had been based, and said that the success of guerrilla leaders during September and October in stirring up the country might operate "to postpone the collapse of the insurrection, predicted in our dispatch as likely to occur within sixty days after the election, for a somewhat longer period." In substance, however, they maintained their position as to the influence of the election upon the situation, saying: "The most intense interest was felt by the insurgents before the election in the issue, and the most intense disappointment since, which will certainly effect the collapse of the insurrection in the near future. Capital and all business interests hung upon the predictions of success of the one party or the other. No one breathed more freely and took more enjoyment in the result as announced than the conservative Filipino people who had anything to lose from the anarchy which it was sure would follow in the abandonment of these islands under the policy of the defeated party in the late election, as that policy was understood here by the *insurrectos* and other Filipinos."[1]

General MacArthur, who had himself been for over a year in the field against the Filipinos, and who had never, after assuming superior command, viewed the situation through glasses so bright-colored as those of his predecessor, sounded a note of caution when he reported a failure of the amnesty offer at the end of August — a note that was later to deepen into something approaching pessimism on his part.[2] Coupled

Shortly before the Commission made its report, a half-caste captain of Filipino police in Manila, who had been active in secret-service work and in the captures of Ricarte and others, was killed one night. *Filipinas ante Europa*, September 25, 1900, said: "The execution [*sic*] of the unfortunate Lara in the center of Manila gives testimony of the vigor and power of the Revolution even in the very capital of the archipelago, under the cannons of the Americans."

[1] See *Rept. Taft Phil. Comm., 1900*, pp. 16–20. The Commission also reaffirmed its opinions of August as to terrorism and intimidation being the preëminent influences upon the attitude of the majority of Filipinos.

[2] See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1203–04. It was significant, as bearing upon subsequent events, that his warning as to the possibility of a large armed force being

with election rumors, the story had been busily circulated in the provinces, since the first withdrawal of troops for the Peking expedition, that a large part of the American army would have to be sent to China.[1] Increased activity on the part of guerrillas, especially in northern Luzon, has been noted as beginning in July,[2] and their aggressiveness became steadily more accentuated during the succeeding three months. Early in September, General Young put in another insistent call for more troops to cope with a very pronounced accession of vigor and boldness on the part of the Ilokan guerrillas. He said he no longer felt it safe, considering the new character of the opposition, to send out less than 100 rifles in a party; and, on October 24, even that number of American riflemen were ambushed and compelled to retreat by a large force under Juan Villamor, located in a well-chosen position in the hills of South Ilokos, losing 8 men captured, 7 killed, and 14 wounded.[3] In

required for a long time in the future was submitted as "touching army reorganization" by the Congress to assemble in December, 1900. He said: "Week by week, situation shows little improvement; month by month, progress slow, but quite apparent. Unless rapid improvement sets in after election, which fortunately now seems very probable, it will not be possible to materially reduce present force for a long time, unless territory now occupied is abandoned; constrained to modify accordingly estimate of troops necessary to hold archipelago, set forth in cable May 27 [45,000 troops after March 1, 1901]."

[1] In actual fact, the time was not far off when it would be necessary to begin moving homeward for discharge the twenty-six regiments of two-year volunteers, whose term of service would expire on June 30, 1901; but little or no comment had been made on this fact in the Philippines.

[2] See the Associated Press dispatch to the American press, dated Manila, August 5, 1900.

[3] One of the two American lieutenants in charge of the 100 men was killed in this ambuscade, and 9 rifles and 24 horses fell into the hands of the Filipinos. According to American reports, probably exaggerated, Villamor had 400 riflemen and 1000 bolomen. See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1211, 1221, and *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 5, pp. 32–33. See also *ibid.*, for general data on northern Luzon in late 1900, especially pp. 5–14, Wheaton's summary of operations in the entire department; pp. 30–33, the Ilokan district; pp. 109–112, Smith's comments on Pangasinan and Tarlak; pp. 169–173, 186–191, scouting in the Manila–Morong district, perhaps the most active of all, though devoid of spectacular features. Young's call for more men on September 7 is also reproduced in the Philippine Information Society's *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 10, in which see pp. 8–28 for data received by the War Department on the situation throughout the archipelago just prior to November, 1900.

the Department of southern Luzon, where a great deal of the scouting kept up in the Tagalog provinces was purposeless (in part, because the American officers themselves had become somewhat hopeless over the situation), and where much of the Bikol territory was allowed to drift,[1] two reverses to American arms of a more serious character, though really meaningless, heartened the guerrilla cause everywhere. On September 13, some fifty men were surrounded by a large Filipino force while trying to press their way across the mountainous little island of Marinduke; the men, for the first time under fire, were stampeded in the face of the odds against them, after their captain had been wounded and four of their number killed, and the whole party then surrendered.[2] Four days later, a band of 130 Americans was mistakenly led into attacking a much larger force under Cailles in Laguna province (near Mabitak), advancing frontally against an intrenched position across a causeway where the men were exposed, and, being in single file, but a few rifles could be brought to bear; among the 21 men killed was the captain who had made this tactical blunder.[3]

In the Bisayas, never fully in the current of revolutionary thought, there was less evidence of special activity at this time.

[1] See *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. 1, part 5, for preëlection activities in southern Luzon, especially the summary, pp. 235–38; appendices A and B, chronicling the scouting expeditions in Tagalog territory; and pp. 348–400, on the Bikol territory, the absence of reports indicating the lack of activity in the Camarines from July to December, 1900.

[2] See *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. 1, part 5, pp. 236, 455–61, and *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1214, 1216, 1218, 1219. General Hare was sent to Marinduke, with a regiment, and forced the surrender of the captured men on October 14 following.

[3] See *Corr. Rel. War*, p. 1211, and *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. 1, part 5, pp. 236, 287–92. There were also 23 men wounded before the subordinate officers of the command could get it out of its exposed position. The men were in water to the waist, and some of those who died were probably not mortally wounded, but died from drowning after being hit by bullets. Perhaps out of respect for the commander who had retrieved his blunder with his life, MacArthur, in reporting by cable, merely said "the attack was pushed from the front with great pertinacity," and that "33 per cent is profoundly impressive loss, and indicates stubbornness of fight, fearless leadership of officers, and splendid response of men."

Still, even in Negros, the influence of the election in the United States was felt, in some tendency to unrest, though no open disorder resulted there.[1] Even in distant Mindanau, the revolutionary leaders in Misamis province, who had talked of surrendering, decided in September to await the result of the election, and a virtual truce ensued between them and the Americans for this purpose.[2]

As this period of doubt and confusion hurried on to its close, one more protest was registered against the censorship of press dispatches designed to inform the American public on the situation.[3] Yet in the Philippines themselves, the local press,

[1] See *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 6, p. 260. Military conditions in the Bisayas throughout 1900 have already been pretty fully covered. See also, as bearing particularly upon this period, *ibid.*, part 4, pp. 217–21, for the report of the chief signal officer of the Bisayas, covering Panai, Sebú, Leite, Negros, and Bohol.

[2] See *Rept. War Dept., 1901*, vol. I, part 6, p. 264, for Kobbé's statement to this effect, and p. 267 for the little fights in the Orokieta district in September, after which peace ensued until the Americans commenced an active campaign in late November. See also *Facts about the Filipinos*, vol. I, no. 10, pp. 26–27, for the letter of the insurgent chief Doloso in October, saying he had in his possession "many copies of letters of eminent gentlemen of different parts of the North American Republic, announcing the surety of triumph for Mr. Bryan's candidacy, and adding that if his overthrow should result, and the said Bryan should not be able to ascend to the Presidency of the United States, then each party would desire to be governed by its own self. This class of opinion makes it easy, and surely civil war will happen in that great republic." (This, of course, was the writer's invention, as a Filipino idea of what would happen, he not understanding how a defeated candidate and party would accept the result without attempting a revolution.)

[3] See *Corr. Rel. War*, pp. 1220–21. Nearly all special correspondents had left the Philippines and gone to China in June, leaving only two men who sent reports by cable, P. G. McDonell, of the New York *Sun*, a newspaper friendly to the Administration, and Harold Martin, of the Associated Press. Besides representing a news-bureau which served in common American newspapers of all shades of opinion, and which aims to have its dispatches colorless, Martin was both well-informed and impartial. He protested against the delaying and mutilation of his report of the Marinduke disaster and other dispatches, and, on October 19, the War Department cabled MacArthur to be guided by its message of September 9, 1899, practically removing the censorship (if it had ever been obeyed). MacArthur replied that Martin had tried to send "garbled information." A new Associated Press correspondent, J. J. Emery, was then on his way out to relieve Martin, and the War Department, informing MacArthur of this, said: "All censorship will be removed; this of your own motion." (*Ibid.*, p. 1225.) On November 16, the cable company operating the line from Hongkong to Manila announced that the previous censorship on messages had been taken off, but a copy of all dispatches sent from Manila must be filed afterward with the military governor. (*Ibid.*, p. 1229.) Ref-

both in Spanish and Tagalog, continued to distort news matters, and found frequent opportunity to make sly, insinuating comments calculated to exercise, very directly, an unfavorable influence upon the state of the popular mind.[1] Finally on the day of election in the United States, there appeared in a Ta-

erence is again made to Mr. Martin's description of the Manila censorship in the *Forum* for June, 1901.

[1] See, for example, *El Diario de Manila* (edited by Romero Salas, a Spaniard who had been willing to complicate the situation for a Spanish Government by his unauthorized declarations in February, 1900, and who had ever since 1898 continued to sow dissension between Americans and Filipinos) of August 17 and September 12, 1900. The former number reproduced an article on political parties in the United States from the friar organ *Libertas*, signed by a "Dr. Robinson" (a favorite method of *Libertas* being to pretend having English or American correspondents). This writer makes the Republican party descend from the "Know-Nothings," i.e., from Anti-Catholicism in the United States; it "aspires to imperialism and colonial expansion, favors the trusts, the banks, the [gold-] standard, and the increase of the army and navy." The old Democratic party, he says, was succeeded by the Populist, or Workingmen's party, called also "Equal Rights and Locofocos," and the present Democratic party comes from one called Free Silver, born in 1873. Let not the Filipinos be deceived by its talk of anti-imperialism, however; for, "whether or no Bryan ascends to the presidency, this man, as ambitious and astute as McKinley, has a thousand ways of promising without compromising himself, another thousand of emerging untouched from his compromise, a thousand more of leaving his formal promises without effect, and a hundred thousand of laughing at the fools who confide in them. . . . In a country like America, where the utilitarian spirit predominates, it is not strange that electoral corruption has taken root deeply and is a veritable gangrene upon the Government. Of each four years one is spent in political strifes, the candidates devoting themselves to buying the votes of the country at high prices and by illegitimate means. True, these votes are paid for out of the private purse of the candidate, since there are not posts in the Government enough for so many electors; but it is very certain that the Presidents find in their office plenty of means to indemnify themselves for their preliminary expenditures and to render ineffectual the promises made during the campaign."

In the issue of September 12, commenting on McKinley's formal acceptance speech, the editor of *El Diario* writes of it as "McKinley's Sacrifice," with amazing ignorance even for him, but with sarcasm no less effectual for his Filipino readers. The result of McKinley's reëlection will be extermination for the Filipinos: "The extermination to which we refer is not the act of separating heads from their trunks, nor of eating children raw, but of another sort, more practical, less scandalous, and of greater profit. It is moral extermination; it consists in imposing upon the Filipino country another country that will overwhelm it, systematically reducing its native inhabitants to powerlessness and their life to mercenary terms, with all the rest that the discreet reader understands without it being specified. Lovely future! From it result two sacrifices: McKinley and the Philippines."

galog paper of Manila a screed humorous under one aspect, pitiful under another, but above all significant of the undercurrent of thought among the middle, and to some extent lower, classes for which this little publication was added; it was a "prayer" for the election of Bryan, in which, however, Tagalog curses and imprecations for Americans and Filipinos not in sympathy with the cause were freely mingled.[1]

That the American people were to a great extent occupied with other political questions, was not comprehensible to the Filipinos. Still less did they understand that the success of the Democratic party might not mean just what they expected it

[1] This curious document appeared in *Ang Kaliwanagan* ("The Light"), a small daily paper, printed half in Spanish and half in Tagalog, on November 6, 1900. The prayer was printed only in the Tagalog half. It was written by a Tagalog schoolteacher-editor, later a collaborator of *El Renacimiento* and ostensibly accepting American government. A poor translation of it was published in *Manila Freedom* of November 12, 1900. More accurately rendered, the passages of the prayer proper are: —

"On this day there is a struggle indeed in America: on this day is decided our life.

"It is necessary then that we all kneel down and recite the Rosary of the Fostering Fatherland.

"Kneel ye and let me offer:

"Open, Lord, our lips, to curse and criticize such chosen President as be not to our taste.

"So be it, then, my God.

"Glory to Bryan, glory to America, glory to the Fostering Fatherland, glory to the sons of the Nation.

"Grief to imperialism, grief to McKinley, grief to the hated.

"Pardon, my God, the soul that loves our liberties.

"Curse also, Lord, him who compels us to take oath.

"Holy Liberty — With us be thou.

"Holy right — Triumphant be thou.

"Holy victory — With us be thou.

"Mother Philippines — Blessed be thou.

"Mr. Bryan — Triumphant be thou.

"Renowned democracy — Regnant be thou.

"Renowned America — Honorable be thou.

"Our independence — May we win thee.

"The life of Aguinaldo — May it be for a thousand years.

"My title — Be it that of general.

"Battalion of anti-Judas spies — Be thou strong.

"Godfather Kamalai (sharer of the secret) — Live thou.

"Our army — Be thou great.

"By this mercy, Lord, curse those who watch over us — Do so, then, Lord. — All this, Lord, so be it."

would mean. The achievements of military government, faulty as well as meritorious, had to some extent outlined the policy of the Administration at Washington as to the Philippines, and the civil commissioners of the President had given broader hints of the scope of this policy. But the programme had not yet rallied openly to its support more than a small though conspicuous element of Filipinos. The country hung upon the verdict of a distant and unknown electorate as upon an oracle. When the cables brought from under the seas, traveling not westward, but eastward past the shores of the old "metropolis," Spain, and skirting the borders of Europe's whilom outposts in the Orient, the news of the American *vox populi*, it was a surprise to most Filipinos and a shock to very many. Reconciliation and reconstruction were now the questions of the immediate future. Progress in this direction depended upon how wisely the American administrators proceeded, and how generally the Filipinos would coöperate with them. The war was not over; but it might be waged on the American side so as to conduce promptly to reconciliation, or so as to leave open the sores of an everlasting hatred. The future administration of the Philippines had been but sketched out; it might, so far as the mandate of the American electorate had directed, be evolved into a scheme for permanent colonial rule, designed to fit into a genuinely "imperialistic" project of world-power, or it might aim at developing self-government among the Filipinos and at realizing sometime the inchoate aspirations for nationality lying under the halfway revolution against Spain and the pretentious, but still crude, campaign against the United States. The Philippine situation had craved a statesman's touch, a master at the helm, through a quarter-century of devious Spanish steering and two succeeding years of drifting with the currents. The time was now ripe for a positive, but a sympathetic, leader.

THE END

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Merritt in his testimony before Peace Commission says he kept aloof from Aguinaldo before capture of Manila (p. 362), but (p. 363) told Greene he might use force if necessary to get men in trenches in front of insurgents (p. 367). That he, Merritt, suppressed all such correspondence owing to wishes of Government (p. 367). He had no word from Washington instructing him for his negotiations with Aguinaldo *re* occupation of Manila.
Sen. Doc. 331, p. 2976, Dewey's testimony.
Sen. Doc. 208. President's instructions to Merritt of May 19.
See Anderson's letter to Washington when he read these (p. 85).
See also Merritt's Report, 1899. His proclamation of Aug. 15 is in Sen. Doc. 86.
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Capture of Manila

Negotiations re Surrender

Sen. Doc. 331, p. 2927.
Dewey says Manila would have surrendered to him on May 1 and several times afterward.
Dewey says surrender was prearranged with him, pp. 2929–43–47–61.
Report of Bureau of Navigation, 1898, pp. 118–22–25. Dewey's cables *re do.*
Correspondence Relating to War, etc., vol. II, pp. 750–66.

Insurgent Activity

Sen. Doc. 331, p. 1405. Merritt ordered Aguinaldo not to participate. Aguinaldo acknowledged the order. (See his Reseña verídica.)
Cong. Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6609.
Sastrón, p. 484, for note of Pio del Pilar *re* Spaniards and Filipinos opposing Americans.
Sen. Doc. 62, p. 413; also p. 364.
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Cong. Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6930, letter of Aguinaldo to Pilar, García, Noriel, Cailles, *re* saving ammunition for Americans.
Correspondence Relating to War with Spain.
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Orders of Merritt *re* same.
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American Relations with Filipinos, August to February, 1899

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Sen. Doc. 331, p. 507.

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